The Nigerian Military Contribution to Counter-Insurgency (COIN) A Study of Organizational Culture, Institution, Doctrine and Operations

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THE NIGERIAN MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO COUNTER-INSURGENCY (COIN):

A STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, INSTITUTION, DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONS

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Abstract

Why has the Nigerian military struggled within its contribution to counter insurgency, and what are the underpinnings of that contribution?

This is the central question addressed by this research PhD, as an original contribution to academic knowledge. The thesis begins by examining the broader discourses, with one overarching set of findings: the military contribution to counter-insurgency is, *ab initio*, fraught with problems and is a difficult contribution to make effectively and with readily demonstrable results. This for the most part is the case for militaries everywhere, moreover. Part of this difficulty is down to the nature of insurgency as irregular warfare.

That the Nigerian military has struggled within its contribution to counter-insurgency therefore is not, in itself, unique. What is unique, and where this project makes an original contribution to academic knowledge, are the processes that underpin the Nigerian military's own contribution to counter-insurgency, from its formative years as a professional fighting force, to date.

Consequently, four premises, supported by evidential data, and with field and theory-driven analysis, underpin the thesis' research-based argumentative response to the central question.

The first premise of the central argument holds that the Nigerian military's identity crisis, emergent from a hasty institutional transfer process from the British, contributed to institutional isomorphism. This is a process whereby an organization B, modelled after another, A, in order to reduce uncertainty, limits and selectively adapts change. The Nigerian military's failure to re-interpret its internal function left it as a "coercive institution" of the state and, furthermore, left it even more internally involved than was the case during the colonial administration. With indiscipline already an issue within the institution, this political meddling, a coup culture, and a neglect of professionalization, will further undermine the military's legitimacy and will damage the civil-military interface.

The second premise is that strategic culture of the post-civil war era meant the military saw a regional peace support role for itself between the late 1980s and the turn of the century; and before that, in the 1970s, perceived the main threat to security as external and largely Francophone. Neither posture encouraged the need to diversify the military function to accommodate a counter insurgency culture. Consequently whereas there already was recognition within the Army's school of infantry, as at 1978, that counter-insurgency required development, this development will be stifled over the decades.

Third, doctrinally — both in codified and in uncodified form — the Nigerian military persistently failed to develop theory and practice suitable for counter-insurgency. The military's doctrine drew too heavily from Western interpretations to accommodate its own experiential learning and the local operational environment. The Nigerian military's doctrine moreover, has been demonstrably difficult to change, *in situ*, during a campaign. This is in stark contrast to Boko Haram's military doctrine, and its adaptability, examined in the thesis.

The three previous premises therefore, connive to give the lie to the notion that the Nigerian military, in its operational contribution to COIN, should have been more effective. If anything they lend explanatory power to why it seems too much, in too little time, is now expected of operations by a military that culturally, institutionally, and doctrinally, has failed to purposively prepare for this *forme de guerre*. Still, at the operational level of war, there has been some progress. JTF ORO had its challenges, and at times struggled; but certain lessons can be taken, in the area of joint and multi-agency operations, from that phase of the Nigerian military's counter-insurgency.

By evaluating these four underpinning premises, by supporting them with evidential data, and by structuring all four areas of thought into a coherent narrative on Nigerian military counter-insurgency, this study therefore constitutes an original contribution to military and academic knowledge.

Index of Abbreviations

2iC second-in-command

2 R ANGLIAN 2nd battalion, the royal Anglian regiment; also, "the Poachers"

AA anti-air

ACC air component commander

ACoS G3 assistant chief of staff G3 (operations); see also: **OO**

ADJUTANT adjt

AFCSC armed forces command and staff college

AFN armed forces of Nigeria

AHQ army headquarters

AoR Area of Responsibility

APC armoured personnel carrier

AQ Al-Qaeda

AQIM AQ in the Islamic Maghreb

AQAP AQ in the Arabian peninsula

ATM air troop movement

BDE brigade

BHTs boko haram terrorists, also boko haram, ISWAP

BMATT British military assistance training team

BN battalion

BRIG brigadier

BSG base services group

CAS chief of air staff

CASE chief of standards and evaluation

CDR commander

CDRE commodore

CDS chief of defence staff

CGSS continental general staff system

CIMIC civil-military co-operation

CMO civil-military operations

CMR civil-military relations

CO commander officer

CoA Course of Action

COAS chief of army staff

CoG center of gravity

COIN counter-insurgency

JFC joint force commander; also, **JTFC**

COL colonel

COMDT commandant

CONOPS concept of operations

CSP chief superintendent of police

CT counterterrorism

CT-COIN counterterrorism-counterinsurgency

CTD counter-terrorism division

CTOP chief of training and operations

DA defence attaché

DDRR disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration

DHQ defence headquarters

DIA defence intelligence agency

DIV division

DS directing staff

DSS department of state services; also, SSS

ECOMOG ECOWAS monitoring group

ECOWAS economic community of West African states

EX exercise

FGN federal government of Nigeria

FM field Manual

FOB forward operating base

GEN general

GPMG general purpose machine gun

HUMINT human intelligence

HQ headquarters

IED improvised explosive device

IG inspector general of police

IHL international humanitarian law

IISS international institute for strategic studies

IS internal security

ISIL Islamic state in the Levant; also: Daesh

ISIS Islamic State in Iraq & Syria; also: Daesh, ISIL

ISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

ISWAP Islamic State's West Africa Province

JAD joint action dimension

JCET joint combined exchange training

JCP joint campaign plan(ing)

JE joint effort

JIC joint intelligence committee / joint interrogation centre

JIPOE joint Intelligence preparation of the OE

JOC joint operational competencies

JOW joint operational warfare

JP Joint Publication

JTF joint task force

JTFC joint task force commander; also, **JFC**

JTF ORO JTF operation restore order

JTF (O)PS JTF (operation) pulo shield

LCC land component commander

LIC low intensity conflict

LOO line of operation

LT Lieutenant

MACA military aid to the civil authority

MACP military aid to the civil power

MAJ major

MANPAD man-portable air-defence system

MN-JTF multi-national joint task force

MAW manoeuvrist approach to war

MOD ministry of defence

MOOTW military operations other than war

MOPOL mobile police

MOUT military operations in urban terrain

NA Nigerian army

NAAS Nigerian army Armour School

NADC national air defence corps

NAF Nigerian air force

NAPKC Nigerian army peacekeeping centre

NASA Nigerian army school of artillery

NASI Nigerian army school of infantry

NATRAC Nigerian army training centre

NATO North Atlantic treaty organization

NCS Nigeria customs service

NCDSC Nigeria security and civil defence corps

NCO non commissioned officer

NDA Nigeria defence academy

NDC national defence college

NIA national intelligence agency

NIPSS national institute for policy & strategic studies

NMD Nigerian Military Doctrine

NPF Nigeria police force

NPS Nigeria prisons service

NSA non-state actor

NSCDC Nigeria security and civil defence corps

OC organizational culture

OE operational environment

OO operations officer; see also: **ACoS G3**

OOTW operations other than war

ONAT office of Nigerian army transformation

ONSA office of the national security advisor

OP operation

OPTAG the operational training advisory group

ORBAT order of battle

OTW other than war

PCC police component commander

PMSC private military security contractor

PSO peace support operation

QIP quick impact project

RETD retired

ROD Responsive Offensive Doctrine

RPG/RPGL rocket-propelled grenade launcher

RUF revolutionary united front

SA surface-to-air

SALW small arms and light weapon

SLA Sierra Leonean army

SO stability/stabilisation operations

SOF special operations forces

SSA sub-Saharan Africa

SSS state security service; see also, DSS

SWW special warfare wing

TOO theatre of operations

TRADOC training and doctrine command

TTP tactics, techniques and procedures

UoE unity of effort

VBIED vehicle borne improvised explosive device

VNSA violent non-state actor

WG wing

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INTRODUCTION

"The trouble with the Nigerian government is that they want a big red button, which you can press and it will fix everything"

- Col James Hall (Former British Defence Attaché to Abuja)[1].

"If you wish for peace, understand war, particularly the guerrilla and subversive forms of war"

- B H Liddell Hart[2]

0-1. Overview of Boko Haram

Boko Haram's insurgency, perhaps more than any other feature that defines, or that threatens, Nigeria's identity, has become arguably the most visible representation of the country within the media and mainstream academic commentary today.

Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, translated in Arabic as "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad" (Chothia, 2015), and widely known as "Boko Haram", are a Salafi-Jihadist movement in Nigeria. The group, proscribed by the Nigerian government as a terrorist organization (The BBC, 2013a), has been waging an insurgency in northeastern Nigeria since 2010.

After a bloody confrontation between Boko Haram adherents and Nigerian security forces in July 2009, the movement went dormant; with Ustaz Yusuf, its leader, dead and hundreds of suspected

[1] Walker (2014).

[2] Basil H. Liddell Hart, 1961 cited in MOD (2001a, p. i.).

members killed or in police custody. In September 2010 however the group re-emerged under a new leader, Abubakar Shekau. Proving himself a military tactician in the years that followed, Shekau led Boko Haram through a number of phases and has successfully taken the group from a small guerrilla outfit to a force numbering thousands, with a range of military capabilities, and able to contest and hold territory in swathes of northeastern Nigeria.

Ipso facto, the insurgency in northeastern Nigeria, by Boko Haram, has become the country's main military threat; supplanting (Recorded Future, 2013) the Niger Delta insurgency that proved to be the military's main domestic concern between 2000 and 2010 (Omeni, 2013). By 2015, over 1.5 million people have been reported displaced (The BBC, 2015a) and several towns, within contested areas of northeastern Nigeria, now lie in the hands of the insurgents (Blair, 2015). Boko Haram fighters now number possibly over 10,000—larger in size than an entire Nigerian Army (NA) division (Freeman, Henderson, & Oliver, 2014). Indeed, besides Daesh (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), Boko Haram now has, by far, the most fighters amongst al Qaeda linked militant groups in the world (Freeman, Henderson, & Oliver, 2014).

Two years ago, with Boko Haram fighting a guerrilla campaign, such conventional military gains — and with them the holding and contestation of strategic towns — may have been difficult for some to imagine. As one report puts it,

> Boko Haram's fighters have now achieved mastery over 11 local government areas with a total population exceeding 1.7 million people […] Once, the movement's fighters would launch hit-and-run attacks on defenceless villages. Now, Boko Haram's realm stretches from the Mandara Mountains on the eastern border with Cameroon to Lake Chad in the north and the Yedseram river in the west (Blair, 2015).

Boko Haram today operates on two main fronts, the overt and the covert. The overt front includes the insurgent fighters drawn from a mix of sect adherents, conscripts from largely ethnic Kanuri-dominated areas, and mujahideen from Niger and Chad. This is Boko Haram's backbone military and

its formations have capabilities bolstered by small arms and light weapons (SALWs) obtained from Libya in 2011 after the fall of the dictator, Qaddafi. This standing force also benefits from external training — likely from al-Qaeda affiliates in the West and Horn regions of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Confiscated and looted SALWs and ammunition from Nigerian security forces, as well as tactical assets — including armoured personnel carriers (APCs), Toyota 4x4 Hilux vehicles and other forms of ground transport — also now form part of the group's capabilities. Consequently, Boko Haram is no longer an "unsophisticated" military outfit. Sophistication is relative and relative to the Nigerian military, the capabilities asymmetry has arguably been reduced over the years. As will be discussed in chapter five, Boko Haram today also possesses protected mobility and anti-aircraft capabilities; limiting airpower contribution by the Nigerian Air force (NAF).

Boko Haram's covert front, on the other hand, constitutes a loose network of 'sleeper' terrorist cells in several towns in northern — and specifically in, but not limited to northeastern — Nigeria. These covert cells infiltrate normal neighbourhoods and remain passive until a covert operation is imminent. Within this context, vehicle borne Improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), improvised explosive devices (IEDs), use of local and remote detonable suicide vests, and other forms of *Istishhad* (martyrdom operations) have been integrated into the group's tactical portfolio since 2011. *Istishhad* in particular is an area where Boko Haram has exploited its covert front, most recently having the technical proficiency to effectively deploy teenage girls as suicide bombers within multiple and simultaneous covert attacks.

0-2. Framing the Project's Problem: Military Counter-Insurgency in Nigeria

Responding to the insurgency, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) mandated two major military campaigns against Boko Haram: in 2011, under Defence Headquarters (DHQ), and prosecuted by a joint task force (JTF) and 2013, under Army Headquarters (AHQ), and prosecuted by a newly created Nigerian Army "counter-insurgency division", 7 Infantry Division[3]. 7 Infantry constitutes a sixth manoeuvre division, adding to the Army's existing five. Notwithstanding the

[3] For brevity, I may refer to it as 7 Div, or 7, from here.

Army's creation of a sixth division, primarily to check the insurgency in the northeastern axis however, the counter-insurgency against Boko Haram has struggled. This has been the case since late 2013 in particular; when the multi-agency activity by Joint Task Force Operation Restore Order (JTF ORO) was replaced by 7 Division's army operations.

Indeed, increased intensity of Boko Haram attacks, has led some to criticize the government's military strategy. The operational function of the JTF in particular, as the fulcrum of that strategy between 2011 and 2013, has likewise been criticized. JTF ORO, this line of criticism goes, was ineffective at containing the threat of what some at the time assumed was a group of poorly organized, trained, and equipped, Islamist radicals. The Nigerian military's struggling COIN campaign has led some to question why a military force instrumental to bringing about regional security since the 1990s, and successful in its own civil war two decades earlier, has struggled since 2011 against Boko Haram. Evaluating this question, and presenting research-driven analysis in response to it, constitutes the thrust of the thesis.

0-3. Original Contribution

This project evaluates military counter-insurgency in Nigeria. It uses an interrogation of COIN theory, as well as field data, to evaluate the doctrine, operations and non-formal influences within the Nigerian military context. The findings of this evaluation are critical to understanding the underpinning and nuanced factors influencing counter-insurgency warfare by the Nigerian military. Furthermore the study makes an original contribution to research-based studies on African military counter-insurgency warfare. This is insofar as it is the first embedded study of its kind, on Nigerian military counter-insurgency operations again Boko Haram.

Within discourses on COIN warfare in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), both the theory and academic study has largely focused on European or Western militaries fighting African or Asian insurgent groups, typically in a colonial or postcolonial setting. Whereas Reno (2012; 2011), Abdullah and Muana (1998), Young (1996) and Herbst (2004) are amongst noteworthy contributors to contemporary studies

on conflict within African states, too much emphasis has been placed on insurgency-side dynamics *per se*. Less research has been conducted on military operations and thinking around countering insurgency. Studies such as those by Pham (2013) and by Evoe (2008) are important as contributions to counter-insurgency studies. Nonetheless even these fail to address the holistic military function and sociology, necessary for a robust understanding of COIN within sub-Saharan African militaries. This study, by contrast, examines Nigerian military thinking, doctrine, training and operationalization around counter-insurgency, both more broadly and specific ally as a counter to the Boko Haram insurgency. Sociology and culture of the Nigerian military is also a study area.

Furthermore, whereas studies by Luckham (1971a) and Miners (1971) evaluate the sociology of the Nigerian military between the post-independence years and the 1980s, few studies have evaluated the Nigerian military institution in the decades that followed. Whether by building on Luckham's seminal study for instance, or in presenting an entirely original field-driven narrative, practically no embedded research is conducted, as a base for commentary on the military as a primary actor in counter-insurgency in Nigeria.

Moreover even Luckham's study focuses more on the Nigerian military's sociology within a given period, rather than conducting an analysis on why the military's internal function developed the way it did, *per se*. This again constitutes an area of original contribution within this thesis, insofar as it evaluates both why, and how — using historical and sociological analyses — the Nigerian military institution has developed the way it has since the postcolonial period. The case for why the military's organizational culture (OC) in the postcolonial decades influenced thinking and action within its internal function also is made.

Finally, there are no existing research-driven studies on the doctrine of Nigerian military counter-insurgency. Nor are there research-driven, case-based studies, that bring a field-informed evaluation of contemporary COIN operations by the Nigerian military; whether more broadly or specific to the Boko Haram insurgency. This final area — a research-driven technical analysis of the doctrine and operationalization of counter-insurgency in Nigeria — is another area where this thesis makes original

contribution to the broader COIN literature, as well as to counter-insurgency studies within SSA (and in Nigeria in particular).

In summary of the project's contribution therefore, the research PhD thesis aims to fill an academic gap in military studies on counter-insurgency theory and practice in SSA. Focusing on the Nigerian military experience, the project aims to evaluate (1) the main discourses within the insurgency-COIN literature in SSA. (2) Organizational culture in the Nigerian Army and its impact on the Army's internal function since the postcolonial period, circa 1960. (3) Development of irregular warfare in the Nigerian military learning environment, since the post civil-war era, circa 1978. (4) Ideology and doctrine of counter-insurgency within the Nigerian Army (1970s to 2011) and (5) Counter-insurgency within a TOO, using JTF ORO (2011-2013) for instrumentality.

Whereas the dissertation will include a literature review chapter that expands the lens on insurgency to include the phenomenon as it occurs in SSA, the project's emphasis will remain on counter-insurgency within the Nigerian military experience.

To achieve the second objective highlighted above, the project's fieldwork component, discussed next, will be used to supplement a sociological analysis of the historical literature on Nigerian military organization and culture. To achieve the third objective, a field study-based institutional review of counter-insurgency formal development in Nigeria will be conducted. The fourth broad objective, an evaluation of Nigerian military COIN doctrine, will be realized via an interrogation of select publications (Army manuals, largely) on Nigerian military counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism theory. This section's analysis will not be isolated to the NMOE *per se*. Rather there will be demonstrable intercourse with the broader literature discourses on COIN doctrine. The aim here is to understand how Western military doctrine has influenced, and continues to influence, Nigerian COIN thinking. The final objective, (5), earlier highlighted as an evaluation of COIN activity within the operational level of war in Nigeria, will be attained using analysis of field data from JTF ORO and JTF OPS. This primary account of military COIN operations against Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria, aims to contribute to academic understanding of Nigerian military operations to counter

insurgency. Operational features and challenges of military counter-insurgency in Nigeria, from the perspective of personnel between ranks of Lt. Colonel and Major General (SO3 (OF-4) to SO6 (OF-7)) and equivalent within the TOO, will constitute an important part of the final section's analysis.

0-4. Methodology

The methodology section of this chapter, outlined below, is divided into a number of areas. (1) Qualitative research design, effectively an overview of the literature that guided field methodologies adopted. (2) The qualitative interview, why this particular method was adopted and how it ended up being employed). (3) Respondent selection, the processes that guided the interviewee selection approach. (4) Avoidance of symmetrical bias, why such avoidance is importance and how this project tried to achieve it. (5) Some fieldwork challenges, and (6) the main set of primary sources that contributed to the field study process.

In addition, as a project that employs a qualitative data based approach within the social sciences, a number of decisions were made in conduct of the study. The theoretical and practical reasons that helped shape these decisions constitute sub-sections 0-1-1 through 0-4-6 of this methodology section.

For instrumentality, the specific case of JTF ORO is selected, within the context of the Nigerian CT-COIN operations. Data from JTF ORO was obtained as follows. (1) As observed during periods in which the researcher was embedded within Nigerian military units[4] in JTF ORO; watching them train, communicate, interact with colleagues, superiors and subordinates and otherwise perform daily functions. I also went on patrol with the JTF, including one nighttime patrol, in Maiduguri. However operational-level features of the COIN, rather tactical level activity *per se*, was the fieldwork focus. (2) From over twenty interviews with senior military officers — both commanding officers (COs), and staff officers (SOs) in the field. The ranks of Nigerian (and non-Nigerian) military field commanders

[4] I recognize, within this study, that "performance" by respondents may diminish objectiveness and overall use of field data collected. "Performance", and possible ways by which it may be addressed during and post-fieldwork, is discussed later in this chapter.

and staff officers interviewed range specifically from the ranks of OF-4[5], to OF-7[6]. As I had the required clearance from DHQ and had personally been introduced to the Chief of Training and Operations (DHQ), practically every senior commander in JTF ORO could be interviewed formally and several more informal conversations were had, besides. Formal access to the TOO was granted, in addition.

0-4.1. Primary Documentary Data

Documentary research material was issued from the commands visited, from the Office of the NSA (ONSA), and from the CT-COIN Directorate. Furthermore, as clearance was granted for assistance from TRADOC, the relevant set of military doctrinal manuals also provided important primary material for analysis (Nigerian Army, 2011a, 2011b, 2009a). Additional primary documentary material has also trickled in over the course of period following field study.

0-4.2. The Qualitative Interview Process

The qualitative unstructured interview was the research tool of choice. Interviews were conducted over a six-month period in the field, between July 2012 and January 2013. Interview locations and personnel are included in Table 0-1. Most interviews occurred starting from August, as the first few weeks were spent trying to assess viability of access to military personnel who eventually would contribute to the project. Informal interviews with rank up to Brig Gen were also conducted within this period; but were not included as clearance was yet to be obtained by then. Nigerian (and foreign) military commanders and staff officers formally interviewed range from the ranks of SO3 (OF-4). This is Army Lt Col and equivalent in the Nigerian service branches, in the armed forces of other military respondents interviewed, or in the Nigerian police and paramilitary forces. The upper end of interview respondents was SO6 (OF-7), Nigerian Army Maj Gen and equivalent. Informal interviews ranged from private all the way up to Brig Gen. These interviews informed thinking in small areas of the project but were not transcribed, quoted or paraphrased like the core data set.

[5] Nigerian Army Lt. Col and equivalent

[6] Nigerian Army Maj. Gen and equivalent

Except in few instances where interview notes were hand-written without any accompanying recording, majority of the interviews were audio-recorded then later transcribed to text and codified for analysis. A course at the King's Learning Institute (KLI) was taken to understand use of NVIVO Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) computer software. The course details are recorded in one of my progress reports for this project. The decision was however later made, post-fieldwork, that NVIVO would not be required.

During codification of data post-fieldwork, interviews flagged as "off the record" refer to (1) interviews where respondents signed the interview and data consent forms, but did so under condition of anonymity or (2) interviews where the respondents were happy to be interviewed but not to sign forms, or to be recorded. Due to the nature of the investigative study, on an on-going military operation, this was to be expected however. Respondents who declined to sign the consent form but still wanted to be interviewed were accommodated. However in such cases data obtained would typically be inferred to, but not directly referenced, during post-fieldwork analysis.

A question format was designed by the researcher, approved by the primary supervisor (at the time) and by the ethics process at King's College London. Interview questions were open-ended to encourage robust responses and thus did not require preapproval due to the nature of the unstructured open-ended interview format. An example of a typical question asked could be, "*In what ways did you come about the battalion's JIPOE (Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment) framework?"* A follow-up question could then be, "*Okay, and what have been the battalion-level challenges in facilitating the JIPOE?"* Another possible question could be, "*I understand from ABC military manual that XYZ requirements should be in place, though this does not appear to be the case on the ground"* or "*I observed this the other day on patrol with XYZ unit, whereas ABC training/doctrinal manual stipulates this, what is you view on this difference [between theory and practice]*?"

This question format for the unstructured interview therefore was aimed at stimulating robust conversation that was more organic, non-leading, and with flow. This is as opposed to, for instance, a

more structured interview format that may have been developed to elicit a Yes/No response. Whereas questions that elicit Yes/No responses are useful in certain studies, they were decided against within this study. One arguable disadvantage to the Yes/No question format is there may be a related difficulty in attempting to probe further—"to solicit a more complete answer to a question", as Babbie writes (2005, p. 276). Furthermore, and notwithstanding the ease of coding and analysis of structured data (using QDA for instance), vis-à-vis the same process involved unstructured open-ended data; the descriptive and explanatory primary source code from unstructured interviews lends rich responses to the research process. Moreover, as Babbie observes, there are a number of effective methods to help the student-researcher analyse and codify unstructured qualitative data sets (2005, p. 276).

As indicated above, possible disadvantages exist to this (qualitative interview) technique. Nonetheless there are multiple benefits too. As Bradburn, Sudman and Wansink observe,

> In many instances an open-ended format can also produce vignettes of considerable richness and quotable material that will enliven research reports […] it is an absolutely essential tool when you are beginning work in an area and need to explore all aspects of an opinion area (2004, p. 154).

Bradburn, Sudman and Wasink's defence of the qualitative unstructured research approach is pertinent to capturing details of the insurgency-COIN project here, as a "rich" narrative was more likely where respondents had increased latitude for self expression. Nuances within the military phenomena being investigated otherwise may have been difficult to capture (and lost further still in codification), had the "yes/no" format been strictly adopted.

Prior to initial interviews, the researcher also met with one Army colonel with the National Defence College (NDC) who had conducted qualitative research with the Army in the past. Advice proffered within that meeting suggested the qualitative unstructured interview was the right choice, given the study parameters.

A noteworthy concern within the unstructured interview format is that such interviews could provoke respondent “performance”. Such deliberate or unintentional “performance” could be due to a number of pertinent factors. These include the environment; the circumstances of the meeting; whether the respondent felt “pressured” to interview (due to the interviewer’s clearance level); sensitivity of the subject matter, with the insurgency-COIN still on-going; respondent background, and respondent perception of researcher-interviewer.

Rothbauer refers to the process, of using more than one source to check collected results and enhance data validity, as “triangulation” (2008). The method was adopted within this project to lower actual impact, within analysis, of performance. Cohen and Manion define the triangulation method as being an "attempt to map out, or explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human behaviour by studying it from more than one standpoint” (2000, p. 254). As Bogdan & Biklen note, the process is valid in qualitative studies (for inquiry); though it can also be employed in quantitative (for validation) (2006).

Cross-referential data (for instance data gathered from an interview but also double-checked from written documents) and multiple interviews on the same broad theme were ways by which overall effects of “performance” were addressed within this study. Data archives, military library resources and local media sources, where feasibly employable to the subject being interrogated were used on occasion in this data triangulation and verification process.

With regards to other reasons for which the unstructured interview is a viable method in qualitative social research, Babbie makes the case that, “unlike a survey, a qualitative interview is an interaction between an interviewer and a respondent in which the interviewer has a general plan of inquiry but not a specific set of questions that must be asked with particular words and in a particular order” (2005, p. 314) Babbie also notes that a particular strength of this qualitative unstructured interview approach is its flexibility (2005, p. 314). A question is asked, the response to carefully listened to and then interpreted within the general frame of the interview topic. If the response solicits further interrogation because it sheds new or additional light on a critical area, then a further probe is carried out. Otherwise

respondents' attention is redirected back to the main topic, using a question more relevant to the central theme.

0-4.3. Avoiding Symmetrical Bias

With much of this project's field study phase dependent on primary sources, the possibility exists that symmetrical bias may compromise empirical data sets analysed within the thesis. This is more so the case because as Russell, who himself conducted similar embedded studies with military units, points out that, "all military units for obvious reasons seek to portray their actions in the best possible light" (2011, p. 18). A measure taken here to address such potential bias is use of secondary sources to cross-examine accounts within primary sources. This is consistent with the overarching project objective of presenting nuanced analyses that trade emphatic but questionable findings with findings that are robustly defensible, due to triangulation.

0-4.4. Fieldwork Challenges

A number of challenges in the field are worth mentioning. Before discussing these challenges however, it is worth highlighting the impact of being a Nigerian citizen on conducting research on sensitive and still on-going military operations at the time. I was advised on more than one occasion (by personnel at or around Brigadier rank) that the kind of direct access I was afforded to Nigerian military units in the TOO was possible only because I was Nigerian. Future PhD research conducted by non-Nigerians, on the Nigerian military, therefore may face challenges peculiar to their circumstance, which I was spared.

With regards to fieldwork challenges, perhaps the most prominent challenge, and one worth discussing in detail, was that of access to military respondents. The researcher, as part of the field study phase, was tasked with identifying respondents with clearance level, rank and understanding of the themes being researched. That is, military respondents were meant to be from around rank of SO3 (OF-3) and above, and had to be involved in some capacity with CT-COIN. There was also the issue of access. Having to approach and interview these respondents within their Area of Responsibility (AoR) was

problematic when operations were still ongoing. However, a serendipitous meeting with the Nigerian Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) at a King's College London talk, led to a second meeting with the CDS at Nigerian Defence HQ (DHQ), Abuja. This is turn led to an introduction to the Chief of Training and Operations (CTOP). The CTOP and his adjutant were instrumental to the researcher's access to, and reception within, the TOO; as well as the various command and non-command military structures visited. A cross-section of key respondents is outlined in Appendix II at the end of the thesis

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Besides the military sources outlined in Appendix II, other data sources include documentary data issued by most commands and security agencies visited, were obtained. These included documentary data from the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA); from JTF ORO; from Department of Land Warfare (three years' worth of related Land Power Symposium papers) at the Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC); from the CT-COIN Directorate; and material on Special Task Force Operation Safe Haven (Jos). Other primary sources include data from the intranet of the National Defence College (NDC) and documentation from the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS). The set of the NA's doctrinal manuals for its military operations other than war (MOOTW) were also used in chapter four's analysis of COIN doctrine.

0-5. THESIS CHAPTER STRUCTURE

The thesis is split into five chapters, each with a contribution that interacts with the remainder of the analysis. The chapter that follows precedes the four core chapters and provides a pithy theory background to the main COIN discourses..Crisscrossing decades-spanning contributions, from classic counter-insurgency theory to contemporary thinking around the subject, the chapter's findings point to counter-insurgency as being difficult for militaries everywhere; challenges faced within the Nigerian military contribution are not, *per se*, unique to the Nigerian military's particular incompetence and performance in this form of war relative to performances by militaries elsewhere. The chapter identifies and interrogates three features that make counter-insurgency a universally difficult *forme de guerre*.

Chapter two is on organizational culture (OC) and historical experience, and their influence on the Nigerian military's internal function. Today, that function is largely now counter-insurgency, although the military in Nigeria had always played a prominent internal role. Broadly speaking therefore, chapter two sets out first to evaluate why counter-insurgency in Nigeria has progressed along its current course. Coercive force remains the emphasis of the Nigerian military's COIN war model. The chapter evaluates how this force model has been reinforced and what role, if any, institutional transfer from the British had in facilitating this coercive-leaning model against civil disobedience. The chapter then uses, for case study instrumentality, the Niger Delta experience and the military's counter-insurgency in that theatre of operations (TOO), as an argument for why this force model has not served the Nigerian military as well recently as in the past.

Finally the chapter uses a sociological analysis of organizational theory to explain why the military has perpetuated this model over the decades; mixed results notwithstanding. The chapter uses DiMaggio and Powell's concept of "institutional isomorphism" (1983) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) as a framework for its analysis on Nigerian military OC. The framework is central to the project's evaluation of the underpinnings of the Nigerian military's interpretation of its role in countering insurgency. Other aspects of the postcolonial Nigerian military and its identity in the decades that followed — the military's "coup culture" (Siollun, 2009) for instance— which were alien to the British, but that the Nigerian military chose to adopt, will be explained within this framework.

Chapter three is largely an institutional review of counter-insurgency development in Nigeria. Whereas chapter two looked at OC as a non-formalized vehicle of influence on the military's ideology, thinking and alignment with strategic culture; chapter three focuses on formalized attempts to institutionalize COIN; mostly within the Nigerian military learning environment.

A historical approach is for the most part adopted within the chapter's analysis. This approach begins by charting the Army's early attempts at irregular warfare in the school of infantry in 1978 and ends with field-based findings within contemporary CT-COIN structures as they function today within the Nigerian military institution. The role of external strategic partnerships with the US and Britain is

highlighted within the chapter's analysis. Implications of these partnerships for the institution of CT-COIN in the Nigerian military are further evaluated in the final summary and implications chapter.

Chapter four evaluates doctrine, within the broader context of its implications for both the insurgent and the counter-insurgent. To this end, the chapter discusses, in this order: doctrine for the insurgent and some practical implications for the counter-insurgent; doctrine and its implications for the transformation of Boko Haram; meta-theories of military doctrine; Nigerian military doctrine, and Nigerian military COIN doctrine. The chapter's thrust, and indeed its emphasis, remains on doctrine within the context of the Nigerian military contribution to counter-insurgency. However, the additional background provided, validates the relevance of doctrine and its implications within this study.

Insofar as doctrine is one of four critical influencers of the course of a military campaign, argued within this thesis; being able to use one's own doctrine as a lever to improve operations, and at the same time being able to make out the practical "common sense" of the enemy's, notwithstanding whether that doctrine makes little sense to outside observers, affords better knowledge of the nature of decisions being taken by the enemy. This holds true as much for the insurgent as for the counter-insurgent, moreover.

Consequently, the argument is put forward that VNSAs' ability to fairly rapidly adapt their doctrine, and to align it with new and markedly different typologies of operations over the conflict cycle, makes them a particularly potent threat against state militaries, which are typically much larger, more bureaucratic, more likely to suffer from institutional inertia, and thus less adaptable over the course of a counter-insurgency campaign. A case in point of such considerable shifts in doctrine and operations by a VNSA, is that of Boko Haram between its formative years and 2015.

Boko Haram's doctrine on the one hand is ideological; with 13th (and 14th) Century religious scholar Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya's thinking on lesser jihad constituting an influence in the group's formative years. As the insurgency matured however, Boko Haram's doctrine would shift: from the formative years of merely inflammatory and anti-establishment rhetoric in its mosque, Ibn Taymiyyah Masjid, to

a military posture that increasingly employed proficiencies in *Istishhad* (martyrdom operations), guerrilla warfare tactics and, over time, a more conventional campaign. Such a shift would not happen over night, but nonetheless happened quickly enough for the military to be caught flat-footed. Moreover there was not, *per se*, just the single shift in doctrine by Boko Haram; there arguably were a number, as the chapter would set out to show.

With this evolved doctrine will come a demonstrable ability to defeat the Nigerian military within the engagement, and even to hold considerable swathes of territory in the contested northeast.

Such adaptation by VNSAs, over the conflict cycle, is not without precedent in the insurgency theory discourses moreover. On the contrary, the chapter argues, insurgency theories around Maoism and focoism theories hold explanatory, and indeed predictive, power around how and why the insurgent often makes certain adjustments to doctrine, over the course of his campaign.

To the observer, such shifts in doctrine may indeed be confusing: it is not uncommon for VNSAs to be called insurgents one day, terrorists the next, rebels the day after, and proscribed action groups (PAGs) on yet another. Yet, an evaluation of such groups' doctrine, such as in the case of Boko Haram, and if the insurgency theories are to be analysed closely in concert, reveals such groups, rather than suffering an identity crisis, are making adjustments to their thinking — and thus to their decision-making — that such not only be expected but that are explainable, over the course of the insurgency.

Only the first two sections of the chapter evaluate doctrine as it relates to the insurgent however. With virtually a non-existent research base on doctrine's function within the Nigerian military's contribution to counter-insurgency, the chapter also makes an original contribution in its critical evaluation of counter-insurgency ideology and doctrine within the Nigerian military operational environment (NMOE). Military doctrine, military COIN doctrine, and specifically CT-COIN doctrine for the Nigerian military, constitutes the chapter focus beyond the first two sections. Furthermore, the Nigerian military's transitioning from offensive doctrine (ROD) to the manoeuvrist approach to warfare (MAW) underpins much of the chapter's subsequent analysis.

Field interviews within the TOO and elsewhere in (mostly northern and north-eastern) Nigeria, as well as key doctrinal manuals related to counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, as part of what the Nigerian military still refers to as operations other than war (OOTW), form of the core of documentary data from the Nigerian Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

Also within chapter four, the questions of how Nigerian military COIN doctrine has developed (between the 1960s and 2011), of where Nigerian COIN doctrine draws influence from and of why the extent of this influence is now arguably problematic, are all addressed. An original and alternative framework to the processes that underpin development, functionality and operationalization of Nigerian military counter-insurgency doctrine, is introduced. Finally, and sequel to an evaluation of doctrine as a function of the military as a learning organization, a flowchart that recommends processes to link experiential learning, doctrine, training and operationalization, is introduced.

Chapter five is the last main chapter and focuses on operationalization of counter-insurgency in Nigeria. The chapter's originality comes from the primary findings of the project's fieldwork, detailed earlier in this chapter. Central to the fieldwork was field research with JTF ORO. This military COIN operation, against Boko Haram between 2011 and 2013, is analysed in inside-out embedded technical detail, with emergent implications that can be linked to findings of previous chapters.

The Nigerian military contribution to counter-insurgency constitutes a much discussed, yet poorly researched, area of the on-going discourses on the Boko Haram insurgency and on the FGN's response. For this reason, the fieldwork, analysis, findings from and implications of, chapter five, are of particular heuristic value to current thinking and practice around the military contribution to counter-insurgency in Nigeria. The chapter also broadens the conversation of the military contribution, to extend beyond that of the tri-services. This is a reflection of actual contribution in JTF ORO.

The outcomes from the previous chapters, in the areas of organizational culture, institutionalization and doctrine, indicate that the military contribution against Boko Haram, whereas flagged as counter-insurgency initially had all the makings of standard military operation; more so with the Army

spearheading the land component and adopting a combined arms approach with the Air force. The Nigerian military, unlike in the area of PSOs, did not, hitherto, have a counter-insurgency culture. Operations in the Niger Delta will indicate a shift towards manoeuvrist doctrine, but it was in JTF ORO that joint and inter-agency operations would gradually mark a departure from the Army's more traditional role in operations of this nature.

The chapter's analysis indicates that counter-insurgency adaptations in JTF ORO, took place largely as a result of joint service and inter-agency operations. Neither the force to population ratio, nor capabilities, nor the nature of the insurgency itself, favoured a military decision or a long-term ability to protect all contested area. To begin with, a defensive action set was not sustainable long-term; especially with the insurgent increasing his numbers. At the other end, offensive operations, given the nature of the insurgency, and of the OE, were problematic as a preponderant action set within joint campaign planning (JCP). First because the military lacked the capabilities (force structure, combat readiness and sustainable capabilities) to be effective, using a purely kinetic doctrine. Second because the enemy was not just contesting sparse and arid terrain: Boko Haram was actively contesting what the military referred to as "built-up" populated areas of Borno state, such as Bama and Maiduguri.

As a consequence of the above realities in the TOO, and contrary to what many might assume, the military contribution to the COIN, so far as JTF ORO was concerned, had offensive operations as only one of five typologies. A range of other operations was critical to the JFC's campaign plan. Such adaptation at the operational level was necessitated by the OE and by the nature of the insurgency; it is not codified in the Army's doctrine. This adaption required both inter-service and inter-agency coordination, and influence operations, as the nucleus of campaign planning, circa 2012.

Whereas the Army was the most visible force within the land component of JTF ORO, the police, the Directorate of State Services (DSS), the Air Force and other primary components played key roles that steered the Army away from its more traditionalized and institutionalized function of military fighting, and towards counter-insurgency.

Specific additional emphasis therefore is placed on policing, police doctrine (in counter-insurgency) and the police operational contribution to Nigerian military COIN. Such additional examination is necessary insofar as the police component is an area neglected within the "boots on the ground" paradigm, more broadly within the COIN discourses, as well as local to Nigerian military contribution.

The role of airpower in COIN, the critical institutional and operational challenges of the NAF that *ab initio* detract from its contribution, and the adaptation and coordination required of the air component within JTF ORO, are also examined. The intelligence component and the contribution of intelligence — which goes beyond just the DSS and also includes Army G2, police and paramilitary contributions from customs and immigrations services — are also interrogated from a field-driven perspective.

In summary of the chapter's contribution, it is noteworthy that task force level adaptations, and the interactions between components are difficult to access except from *ab intra*, from within. This is the perspective provided by the chapter's analysis, and is an important part of its originality. So as not to exaggerate aggregate impact of the military contribution at the task force level however, it is perhaps worth a further mention that adaptations at the task force level may not, *per se*, reflect at the command level. This is insofar as strategic level progress may require more than the military contribution — even where effective at the tactical and operational levels — to bring about long-term stable peace.

The final chapter presents an overview of the project's findings, with implications for both military and non-military stakeholders in and out of Nigeria. Put another way, the chapter presents a coherent summary of the four core chapters, on a chapter-by-chapter basis. Rather than constituting a rehash of the preceding chapters however, the summary and implications chapter extracts the technical findings from each chapter and, evaluating them at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war as necessary, presents information in a more digestible form for military personnel, for academics, for practitioners and even, albeit to a lesser extent, for policy makers.

0-6. SUMMARY OF INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

This introductory chapter to the project has (1) provided a frame, and some background to the "problem" being researched. (2) Introduced the central research questions and highlighted why, in addressing these questions, the thesis makes an original academic contribution. (3) Discussed how the project's main objectives key into that question, through the use of chapter-specific scope items. (4) Outlined the main research project methodologies, and (5) highlighted how field study outcomes, and a theory base, were structured into the five-chapter narrative that constitutes the dissertation. What remains now, with the main body of the dissertation, is the task of first evaluating the central questions being asked and then using primary and secondary research finding to address these questions.

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CHAPTER ONE

OVERVIEW OF COIN THEORY

Counter-insurgency entails a legitimate government-mandated military contribution to counterbalance the armed threat posed by VNSAs. This threat typically manifests within state borders and is perpetuated with the assistance, coerced, willing, or due to circumstance, of a section of the local populace. External actors could, and indeed often do, play a role in sustaining an armed insurgency; however such support tends to play a more important function, if any, later in the conflict cycle.

Strategically, the threat of insurgency often exists in contestation of state legitimacy and rule. Common aims of perpetrator groups include establishment of territory either within the state or via secession. Even where the insurgent is yet to pursue a territory seeking armed strategy, he can, through guerrilla warfare and terrorism, delegitimize state power by making contested areas effectively ungovernable. Insurgency however is not, *per se*, a purely military confrontation; even where the armed threat remains a clear and present one. Whereas the engagement may indeed be preponderant to the contest for state power, underpinnings of the contest may necessitate non-military and unconventional military roles, within the theatre of operations. Moreover the religious, political and socio-economic underpinnings that drive "popular" support in insurgency mean that even a military decision is not, *per se*, conclusive in this form of war.

For the military contribution however, and insofar as the insurgent, *ab initio*, poses an armed threat to internal security, the spectrum of ways by which the insurgent exploits his military capabilities become important to calculations around an adequate military counterbalance.

At the tactical level, subversion and armed conflict are vehicles by which the insurgent aims to either delegitimize the state, gain or hold territory, or both (US Army and Marine Corps, 2007). Guerrilla

warfare, as well as terrorism, within this war form, is to be expected as a tactic adopted by the insurgent (Nigerian Army, 2011a). For the latter however, that is, the use of terrorism against a vulnerable populace segment, this may not, *per*, *se* be a tactic of choice for the insurgent. This is insofar as other tools — subversion, sabotage, psychological warfare and propaganda, and even territory-seeking open military engagement where the capabilities are available — potentially could be employed instead of, or alongside, terrorism (Nigerian Army, 2011b).

Put another way, the terrorist may or may not be an insurgent, just as the insurgent may or may not adopt terrorism *per se*, as his modus operandi. Terrorism, in this context, is a tactic, albeit one that could be of key strategic significance to the insurgent (Merari, 2007).

In the past, Maoist insurgencies, fought "people's war", and could, eventually, muster significant field armies fuelled by popular support and contribution (Tse-Tung, 2007). Today however, that threat has increasingly shifted to that of radical Islamist groups that cite jihad as their reason for contestation and that, in some way, may have been influenced by al-Qaeda's emergence after 9/11 (Mackinlay, 2012). This new threat typology can be categorized more into radical Islamist groups that, increasing since 9/11, fall within what John Mackinlay (2012) describes as a post-Maoist era of insurgency. Both typologies of insurgent threat nonetheless have a number of commonalities that make them particularly problematic to dislodge, by conventional military means. As Sperotto writes,

> Counter-insurgency operations differ from conventional operations because of three main factors. First, operations are often conducted among civilians and troops are mostly lodged in urban areas while military outposts are close to agricultural activities in rural areas. Second, [insurgent forces] forces [opposing counter-insurgent forces] generally avoid direct military confrontation, instead using unconventional methods like terrorist attacks. Finally, opponents are sometimes difficult to distinguish from peaceable civilians until combat erupts.
>
> These circumstances require a degree of caution in the conduct of counter-insurgency operations higher than that provided for by international humanitarian law (IHL), the law of

> armed conflict. Despite the considerable number of issues covered by that body of law, its rules — when compared to the complexity of modern warfare — are insufficient (2009, p. 19).

With much of this research project investigating, in various contexts, the military contribution to counter-insurgency, a preliminary task before all else is to provide, for the readership, a broad overview of counter-insurgency within the main discourses. Such a task is this chapter's objective.

Whereas the introduction so far indicates some features of insurgency and why counter-insurgency, as a result, differs from conventional operations, there remain the additional questions regarding what the main themes are, within the counter-insurgency discourses. A cursory analysis of these discourses reveals three broad defining themes.

The first of these themes is the historically violent and intractable nature of counter-insurgency (Callwell, 1996). As the evaluation later in this section will highlight, counter-insurgency is a military function that armed forces everywhere have struggled, and continue to struggle, with. Indeed, it is an intractability that transcends military culture, operational environment and society. The operational challenges faced by militaries as culturally and doctrinally different as the Sri Lankan Army and the US Army (Smith N. , 2009), and the intractability of COIN in societies as vastly different as Belfast and Helmand (Chin, 2012), only serve to highlight the macabre commonality of this war form.

In the case of Nigeria, whether on *terra firma* — solid earth — in the arid northeast against Boko Haram, or in the riverine creeks of the Niger Delta fighting militias prior to the amnesty agreement of 2010 (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012), the misery of the military's counter-insurgency campaigns has been largely consistent with that of militaries elsewhere. The political and historical underpinnings that contribute to the broader operation environments of both campaigns highlighted above could not be more different, moreover.

The Niger Delta militias' agitations historically have been along the broad themes of polity inclusiveness, ecological and economic reparations from the federal government (FGN) and crude oil

multinationals (MNOCs), and self-determination and increased control over crude oil proceeds from the region (Samuel, 2013; Obi & Rustad, 2011; Omotosho, 2009).

Boko Haram's fundamentalist ideology, religious and politically millenarian, was to do away with *karatun boko* — western education — and its discontents and social influence. *Boko*, Westernization, embodied by the secular Nigerian state and its institutions, particularly a police force viewed as corrupt and that embodied the state, therefore constitute an impediment to Boko Haram's establishment of a caliphate in northern Nigeria; one underpinned by universal Sharia law and puritanical interpretations of Islam free of Bid'ah (innovation, heresy) (Mohammed, 2010).

By some measure, therefore, Boko Haram's insurgency, its underpinnings, its history, and even the physical terrain being contested is considerably different to that of militias in the riverine Niger Delta. Yet, such marked dissimilarities aside, the intractability, and elusiveness of a military decision in counter-insurgency, as much in the Niger Delta as in northeastern Nigeria, prove a constant feature.

The second theme increasingly popularized within the COIN discourses is that more often than not, military power, and force measures commensurate to that power, may well become a liability for the counter-insurgent. This is insofar as overwhelming use of force, unlike in pitched engagements where an enemy's most powerful armoured corps can be destroyed by such an approach, could, in counter-insurgency, in effect constitute an over-reactive target response against an enemy embedded within the local populace. Yet, such a target response may be just what the VNSA hopes for, in order to discredit the state's commitment to protecting its people (Neumann & Smith, 2008). This, however, is but one view of the utility of force in counter-insurgency. There is another.

Some writers such as Weichong (2009) for instance argue for the utility of extreme force measures by the counter-insurgent. Others such as Professor Edward Luttwak take this thesis even further outfield with the view that a more effective approach to defeat an insurgency and indeed to defeat "all insurgencies everywhere" is to "out-terrorize the insurgents, so that the fear of reprisals outweighs the [citizens'] desire to help the insurgents" (2007). Luttwak (2007) points to Nazi exterminative counter-

insurgency practices in the Sudetenland, particularly after the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich in 1942, as evidence. Granted, the force measures were so extreme in that case, the Nazis never really had to worry about further unrest in the Sudetenland (Luttwak, 2007). Yet, it is questionable whether referring to what effectively were mass-executions of Czechs and Jews (MacDonald, 1989), as counter-insurgency, is not simply stretching the concept too far.

Such revisionist thinking, around the utility of force within the military contribution to counter-insurgency, should not be too easily dismissed. Certainly the case has been made that the current "neo-classical" counter-insurgency era marks a departure from the "Roman model" that "overemphasized kinetic solutions" aimed at the enemy, over influence operations aimed at the population (Hoffman, 2007). Indeed, rather than themes of kinetic military force — now the domain of "a rabid minority", in the words of Frank Hoffman (2007) — a different military attitude to an old problem is, today within the counter-insurgency discourses, frequently propositioned.

However, this should not be assumed as a universally accepted way to counter insurgency. Nor should it, for that matter, be seen as universally effective. Too often today, the practically questionable notion that hearts and minds need to be won and that it is problematic when hearts and minds are *not* being won, dominates the conversation[7]. It is for this reason that revisionist thought, which highlights the difficulties and challenges related to this business of population-friendly COIN, or that out rightly questions its effectiveness, is important to the debate.

Some writers for instance acknowledge that use of force, in and of itself in counter-insurgency, is problematic; but question whether it is in fact possible to conduct COIN operations, without a civilian body count (McFate, 2010). Montgomery Mcfate, cautiously examining the thesis around "less force" in counter-insurgency, provides "a caveat […] to argue that lethal force by *itself* is ineffective in a

[7] See for instance: Carruthers (1995); Eland (2013); Iqbal (2011); Mortenson & Relin, (2008); Nagl (2005); US Army (2014); Dixon (2009); Gurman (2013); Kilcullen, (2010); US Army and Marine Corps (2007). Perhaps also of note is that Mortensen's *Three Cups of Tea* thesis has been called into serious question; see: John Krakauer's *Three Cups of Deceit* (Krakauer, 2011).

counterinsurgency is not to argue that lethal force is unnecessary or should never be used" (2010, p. 193).

Notwithstanding the kinetics-as-counterinsurgency thesis, the aggregate benefits of this focused kinetic approach as a means to holding territory that is stable and peaceful *over the long term*, has been questioned (Sepp, 2005; Rid, 2010; Kilcullen, 2010). Indeed, "utility of force", as a viable pathway for the counter-insurgent, have been challenged (Smith R. , 2006; Nagl, 2005; Kolenda, 2012; Kolenda, 2013). Kilcullen for instance rebukes Luttwak (2007),

> The methods Dr. Luttwak mentions are thus not a prescription for success, but a recipe for disaster. As he quickly admits, U.S. and Coalition forces would never consider such methods for a moment. And this is just as well, since this approach does not work. The best method we know of, despite its imperfections, has worked in numerous campaigns over several decades, and is the one we are now using: counterinsurgency. I admit (and have argued elsewhere) that classical counterinsurgency needs updating for current conditions. But the Nazis, Syrians, Taliban, Iranians, Saddam Hussein and others all tried brutalizing the population, and the evidence is that this simply does not work in the long term. (2007, p. 3).

Rather, the alternate thesis goes, restraint, deliberate planning around "minimum use of force" and a "population-centric" approach to counter-insurgency, constitutes a more viable pathway to stable peace (Kilcullen, 2010; Rid, 2010). Moreover, as the US learned in Vietnam, the bringing to bear of force superiority in COIN carries with it the potential to further damage long-term campaign objectives (Fitzgerald, 2014).

The final theme within the counter-insurgency discourses, considered within this theory overview of the subject, is that no single solution exists for the counter-insurgent: no panacea. Counter-insurgency requires many lines of operations (LOOs), and indeed *very* many lines of operations, if some theorists' recommendations are to be adopted (Kilcullen, 2010). Such LOOs, moreover, are often said to be necessary even within the military contribution (MOD, 2009), which is this thesis' focus area. That

COIN activity, even within the military contribution, is so broad, perhaps leads to David Ucko's criticism that counter-insurgency's definition has become,

> Too broad as it fails to exclude from its remit any action ostensibly taken to counter an insurgency […] Even the effectiveness of such action is irrelevant to the use of the term, as the definition centres on the intent to defeat the enemy rather than the success in doing so (2012, p. 68).

For theorists like Ucko, counter-insurgency therefore is "a divisive concept" (2012). For others, such as Sean Liedman, Western counter-insurgency thinking "must properly account for the fact that the scope and scale of any counterinsurgency campaign are determined by the means made available for that campaign" (2011, p. 1).

This all leads to why counter-insurgency has come today to be defined the way it is within the broader discourses. Central to these discourses is the codified thinking within Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 (Department of Defense, 2012).

JP 3-24 is an updated codification of the so-called "Petraeus Doctrine" (Saunders, 2008, p. 1), which some argue, "changed the U.S. military" (Bergen, 2012). US doctrine is of particular import here as, along with its predecessor, FM 3-24 (US Army and Marine Corps, 2007), JP 3-24 is quite possibly the most influential COIN military manual in general circulation today (Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2012). It therefore holds a widely popularized, if not as widely feasible (Chin, 2012; Liedman, 2011), definition of what counter-insurgency operations are.

As the writers of JP 3-24 observe, counter-insurgency is "comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes" (Department of Defense, 2012, p. iii). This theory of multiple LOOs, and the recommended centricity of military operations aimed at winning populace "hearts and minds", today constitutes the popular dominant narrative on how militaries can defeat insurgency (Kilcullen, 2010; Kolenda, 2013; Rid, 2010).

On paper it sounds like a sensible approach, but is not without criticism. Warren Chin writes for instance that US doctrine (FM 3-24) "contains within it a paradox", with recommendations of the importance of change of counter-insurgency tactics juxtaposed with declarations that "most insurgencies follow a similar course of development…" (2012, p. 283). Liedman (2011), in cautioning the counter-insurgent not to "break the bank with COIN", is more concerned that existing thinking within US COIN doctrine, which wields much influence in militaries elsewhere, is simply too expensive without blurring the lines around what is operationally feasible, and what is not.

Liedman therefore arrives at the sobering conclusion that "FM 3-24 prescribes anything but a 'small war' with its force planning requirements" (2011). It is a concern that Chin also appears to share: the sheer sum of expenses (in terms of human capital, monetary costs, matériel and others) put forward as necessary for a full-spectrum military contribution, makes counter-insurgency an unwieldy affair: one that is difficult to coordinate and, more importantly, difficult to fund (2012, pp. 283-284).

Saunders likewise appears unconvinced of COIN. Heavy and prolonged military presence within contested areas, with military personnel overseeing projects and adopting non-military roles, he argues, makes counter-insurgency look like "a lot more like old-fashioned colonialism" (2008, p. 2). Moreover, doctrinal differences, in military thinking around countering insurgency, mean not all Western military personnel necessarily buy into the US COIN model. As one report notes,

> There are good reasons to be suspicious of this approach.
>
> "We do not believe in counterinsurgency", a senior French commander [says]… "If you find yourself needing to use counterinsurgency, it means the entire population has become the subject of your war, and you either will have to stay there forever or you have lost" (Saunders, 2008, p. 4).

All this being said, even COIN critics may be hard-pressed to contend that is as costly in terms of human costs to the population, as it is in monetary costs. Indeed, COIN is all about minimizing the military's force and supplementing the heavy stick with a carrot, so to speak (US Army and Marine Corps, 2007). After all, unlike a conventional war where defeating an enemy's most powerful

formation — an armoured corps perhaps — might bring about a battlefield decision, the same cannot be said of counter-insurgency, in which the battle is not focused on the pitched engagement. In counter-insurgency rather, as Thomas Rid (2010) notes, the population *is* the battleground. Indeed, the counterinsurgent, Rid contends, in a view now popular within the COIN discourses, "competes against the insurgent for the trust and the support of the uncommitted, civilian population. These assumptions have become a core conceptual foundation of today's counterinsurgency debate and doctrine" (Rid, 2010, p. 727). The writers of FM 3-24 present a similar argument where, quoting classicist COIN theorist David Galula (2006) at length, they note,

> To confine soldiers to purely military functions while urgent and vital tasks have to be done, and nobody else is available to undertake them, would be senseless. The soldier must then be prepared to become […] a social worker, a civil engineer, a school-teacher, a nurse, a boy scout. But only for as long as he cannot be replaced, for it is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians (US Army and Marine Corps, 2007, pp. 2-9).

With such advice in mind however, two questions become preponderant to the war calculus of today's military counter-insurgent in SSA, who historically has had limited temperament and even less resources. The first question is related to the area of state capacity and the financial and resource burden that comes with prosecuting counter-insurgency, once this path is followed. For the US military, which by virtue of its defence spending is in a category of its own (IISS, 2005; IISS, 2007; IISS, 2009; IISS, 2012; IISS, 2013; IISS, 2014; IISS, 2015), counter-insurgency as recommended by Kilcullen *et al.* may indeed be operationally feasible. For other militaries, indeed, even the British military as Chin cautions, this way of war may well be "uncertain" going forward (Chin, 2012).

The African military planner as a counter-insurgent therefore appears to be faced with an impasse. On the one hand, the historically generous use of the heavy-stick may fail to bring about the same effect on the invisible enemy that is the insurgent. Such an approach, moreover, is now roundly criticized (Margon, 2014). Put another way, real questions now exist, for the African military counter-insurgent, around the utility of force.

Yet, on the other, there simply does not exist the capacity, within many African states, Nigeria included, for the extensity of military resource allocation that will approximate "counter-insurgency". Nor is this the only issue militaries within fragile, collapsing and failed states need to contend with.

The second question, with which such militaries must wrestle in their counter-insurgency task, is related to the issue of military capabilities: force structure, combat readiness and sustainable capabilities. Despite what is a de facto capabilities challenge within these military institutions, with the Nigerian military being a case in point, the counter-insurgent in SSA, who looks to Western COIN doctrine for guidance in his campaign is effectively being encouraged to turn his main asset in this *forme de guerre* — his light infantry — into boy scouts, policemen, teachers and even "trash-pickers" (Anderson G. , 2010). Which then begs the question: *has the practice of such theoretical assertions, popularized within the discourses, had a stellar record historically and today?*

It is an important question to understanding the decision-making calculus of militaries, such as the Nigerian military, which historically have done modest amounts, if any, of counter-insurgency. It may be tempting to pull out copies of FM 3-24 or of *Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice* by Galula (2006), as a cautionary reminder, to errant militaries that deviate from counter-insurgency "best practices" (Sepp, 2005), why these cardinal rules of COIN are so important even today. Yet, one must weigh such advice carefully, insofar as these works are both fallible in practice and have been criticized even within the discourses.

That the theory sometimes is derivative thinking, with contemporary ideas often drawing heavily from classical theory, may do little to dispel the possibility that militaries anywhere are doing anything but making up their COIN responses as they go along and hoping that codified best practices that worked for others may work for them too.

Douglas Porch (2013; Few, 2011), like Gregor Matthias (2011), for instance, is critical not only of the notion of population-centric COIN but of Galula's supposed use of it in particular. Porch, urging a revision of the romanticized view of the French COIN experience in Algeria, arrives at the damning

conclusion that, “however heuristically fruitful Galula’s theory might prove for U.S. COIN doctrine, it must be interpreted and implemented under the caveat that it was not successfully field-tested by its author” (Few, 2011). Such views are largely reflected across this school of thought, questioning why Galula and the French experience in Algeria have been so influential on US COIN doctrine, despite the unsuccessful nature of French efforts in that theatre (Few, 2011; Manea, 2010).

Geoff Demarest, as an example within this school, appears baffled at the fact that “the words Algeria, France, French, and Galula […] are used at least 42 times [in FM 3-24]” (2010, p. 19). “Why do the manual [FM 3-24] writers put so much emphasis on the French experience”, Demarest asks,

> Given that the French failed strategically, engaged in immoral conduct during the war, provoked a civil-military crisis in France, and tolerated genocide and mass population displacement in northern Africa after the withdrawal of French forces? It seems that the French government could not have achieved a worse set of results, nor could U.S. doctrine have chosen a worse model to admire, if admiration it is (2010, p. 19).

Stern words indeed from Demarest (2010), who goes on to urge that the French experience in Algeria be altogether expunged from US military COIN theory.

Such questioning of the dominant theories around COIN is also relevant insofar as both the US and its NATO allies that drew heavily from US COIN doctrine’s dominant influence in Afghanistan (Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 14) hardly have a record to suggest counter-insurgency works. Nor for that matter is that the case that those militaries — the Sri Lankan Armed Forces for instance — that prosecuted “disconcerting” COINs, which stood “in almost complete opposition to the conceptualization of counterinsurgency articulated in FM 3-24” (Smith N. , 2009), have fared better.

Put another way, regardless of doctrine, the practice of counter-insurgency remains, as Colonel Charles Callwell once famously said, a “thankless” form of war (1996). Indeed, arguably *despite* doctrine, if the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, since circa 2006 when the US introduced its influential COIN doctrine, FM 3-24, are any sort of yardstick, counter-insurgency remains a miserable

experience for even the best militaries. Nor is the enemy's relative weakness necessarily a barometer of how quickly the war will be over. Since late 2000 and virtually relentlessly since, al Qaeda and the Taliban have been persistently degraded in capabilities. Yet both Iraq and Afghanistan are still fighting both enemies respectively, with some new actors, such as Daesh, besides (Schechter, 2015).

It is this quagmire for the counter-insurgent that has led increased revisionist thinking around whether counter-insurgency, the way it has increasingly become to be defined as a concept, should be adopted as a viable strategy (Gentile, 2008; Manea, 2010).

Colonel Gian Gentile for instance, contending that the dominant narrative on counter-insurgency has a number of practical "defects" (2008), argues that today's emphasis on "population-centric COIN" is "restrictive in and of itself" (Civins, 2011, p. 3). Gentile challenges the practicality of an approach he sees as unconventional to the military function as COIN (Civins, 2011; Gentile, 2008; Gentile, 2009; Manea, 2010). Gentile, who Civins refers to as "a strong critic of population-centric COIN" (Civins, 2011) (Civins, 2011, p. 1), argues for continued relevance of "hard power" in COIN (Civins, 2011, p. 1). Indeed, "Population-centric counterinsurgency", Gentile contends, "has perverted" conventional warfighting functions (2009, p. 5). One of Gentile's criticisms is that this approach insinuates the lengthy, indistinct, task of "nation-building", which demands long-term military presence and runs contrary to Sun Tzu's[8] own advice that "… speed is the essence of war" (2008, p. 16).

Put simply therefore, COIN is not merely capital, time and resource intensive, it is, in the view of Colonel Gentile (2008), extremely so. Furthermore, and at least within the context of militaries in Africa, it pressures the military in areas where it may not be particularly good at, to begin with (Herbst, 2004; Thom, 1999).

Indeed, the sum of this opening section's analysis gives the lie to the notion that, comparative to insurgencies elsewhere, the Boko Haram insurgency is necessarily lengthier or more intractable; or that the Nigerian military is particular poor in this area of warfare, comparative to militaries elsewhere

[8] Sun Tzu (2009)

and their COIN campaigns. Theories of counter-insurgency have been written for about a half-century now (Kitson, 1971; Thompson, 1966; Galula, 2006; Trinquier, 1961) and the practice continues to confound militaries; even those, such as the US military, which, in developing COIN have drawn heavily, and perhaps even a little too heavily, from classical COIN theory (Demarest, 2010).

Sandwiched between contemporary contributions such as those by Kilcullen (2010), Farrell (2009), Chin (2012), Nagl (2005) and Ucko (2009), the classic theory of counter-insurgency, popularized by the trio of Kitson (1971), Thompson (1966) and Galula (2006) in the 1960s and early 1970s, itself preceded by Colonel Callwell's contribution, *Small Wars* (1996) from the late 19th century, is a storied narrative on what militaries (the counter-insurgent) must do to defeat their adversaries (the insurgent) in a form of war where pitched battles and heavy mechanized engagements are not necessarily the pathway to victory.

Rather this form of war, the theorists argue, is one where guerrilla warfare tactics and subversion across an entire spectrum, by the insurgent, should force the counter-insurgent to rethink his calculus of war. This, however, is much easier said than done, and is fundamentally what is set out to be proved, within this project's thesis on counter-insurgency within the Nigerian military context.

A cursory evaluation of much of the theory since Galula first wrote his influential text, *Counter-insurgency: Theory and Practice* (2006), however gives the lie to the notion that militaries have been very good, most of the time, in this area of warfare. Indeed, Galula's own thesis has been criticized for being an exaggeration did failed to match the experience of the Galula and the French in Algeria (Mathias, 2011). Nor were the French to only ones to struggle here moreover. The Nazis would struggle against this unconventional threat in The Sudetenland (Luttwak, 2007), after the assassination of Reynard Heydrich in particular (MacDonald, 1989). Likewise the British Army, in Mandatory Palestine (Charters, 1989), in the Aden (Naumkin, 2004), in Malaya (Barber, 1971), in Kenya (Bennett, 2013), and back at its doorstep in Northern Ireland (Chin, 2012), would face a enemy typology where the military's "full might" so to speak could not be brought to bear, as in past engagements, without the risk of destroying the population, the "hearts and minds", or at the very least

the passive support, of which was being fought for. Likewise the Portuguese would struggle in Angola (Cann, 2015); and the Americans, in perhaps the most spectacular failure of all, would invest heavily in the Vietnam counter-insurgency, and yet lose that campaign (Fitzgerald, 2014; Nagl, 2005).

Not all insurgencies have been about Western armies fighting in "small wars in distant lands" as Callwell (1996) famously defines the concept, however. Indeed, arguably most of the insurgencies since the Second War, and certainly since the postcolonial period, have involved local militaries either as part of the effort to counter insurgency, or entirely in charge of operations. The Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) and its many allies against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF); Operation Banner by the British in Northern Ireland; The Sri-Lankan military against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the myriad of insurgencies across sub-Saharan Africa—from Nigeria in the West, to Somalia in the Horn—all constitute examples of first-party counter-insurgencies, being waged in various ways, and precipitating a range of outcomes.

Nor is this by any means a *forme de guerre* from a bygone era. Counter-insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Somalia and Nigeria are just a few of several military campaigns that serve a potent reminder of how difficult this form of war is; even today; even for the most advanced militaries.

Sadly moreover, insurgency is a threat form that has now spread like wildfire. From Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan in the Middle East and South Asia, to Nigeria, Chad and Mali in West Africa, militaries across the globe — either through treaty alliances or because the threat form is domestic — continue to struggle against insurgents. In the past, the threat form may have taken the shape of groups fighting against colonial oppression (such as in Kenya), against perceived unfairness from a government (such as in Sri Lanka) or aligned with communist and anti-communist ideologies (such as in Vietnam). Today however, the preponderant form taken by this threat is that of radical Islamist jihadism, and specifically the form of radical Salafi Jihadism, to which groups like al-Qaeda, Daesh (the Islamic State) and its provinces, al-Shabaab and dozens of other movements now appear to be aligned. It is within this final threat area that Boko Haram, recently now Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) (Oladipo, 2015) falls into.

The theory base provided within this chapter, and the contradictions within the counter-insurgency discourses, are important to putting the Nigerian military's performance into context. Counter-insurgency in Nigerian, so far as the military contribution is concerned, has brought about a poor return for the military's investment it seems. Comparative to military campaigns elsewhere however, the Nigerian military's performance in its counter-insurgency can hardly be considered an outlier. Counter-insurgency is today ostensibly supposed to entail so much (Kilcullen, 2010; US Army and Marine Corps, 2007), that questions must now be asked (Ucko, 2012); not least of all in the area of what counter-insurgency's resource and financial intensiveness in practice (Liedman, 2011), means for the military contribution, within weaker armed forces, as they try to counter insurgencies locally.

That the Nigerian military performance is not an outlier does not make what has been a poor performance indeed, against Boko Haram, an issue to be ignored. Questions should be asked around why this military contribution has taken its current course, how operations are conducted today, and what the bottlenecks to improvements in doctrine, institutions and operations are.

With the Boko Haram insurgency a seemingly unsolvable security puzzle for the Nigerian military, considerable academic interest has gone into the conflict: its history and origins; features; the range of factors that have contributed to escalating the conflict cycle over the years, and its impact on an already fragile region of Nigeria, in the northeast (Comolli, 2015; Higazi, 2013a; Hill, 2012; Forest, 2012; Mohammed, 2010; Lunn, 2014; Agbiboa, 2014). Comparatively less interest however, underpinned by research facts and primary data, appears invested into how the military has conducted its counter-insurgency. Both historically and today, majority of the contributions rather seem a little too vested in pointed out the heavy-handedness, corruption, indiscipline and unprofessionalism of the Nigerian military (Margon, 2014; Higazi, 2013a; Hill, 2012; Aghedo & Osumah, 2012). This broad-beaten path of "Nigerian military counter-insurgency" may hold explanatory power for human rights activists and social scientists, and it may well be a tempting school of thought considering how much commentary presents the topic of military counter-insurgency in Nigeria and then focuses on how heavy-handed, corrupt or unprofessional the military forces are (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Higazi, 2013a; Margon, 2014). However such discussion affords little forum for the military scholar, military

planner, or practitioner, hoping to understand actual military contribution — tactics, operations, features, planning, coordination, joint effort (JE), doctrine, institutions and so on — within the Nigerian context, to what much of this chapter has shown to be a universally violent and intractable *forme de guerre*.

As an example, even narratives that point out the heavy-handedness of British counter-insurgency in Malaya and Kenya for instance, go into considerable detail clarifying the finer details of what the military contribution to counter-insurgency meant in those theatres (Markel, 2006; Bennett, 2013). The same can be said for the French in Algeria (Mathias, 2011), and for the US in Vietnam (Fitzgerald, 2014). Yet, within the Nigerian context, questions must be asked around whether such focused narratives exist at all; or whether indeed the same extent of care and detail has been taken to understanding the military contribution to counter-insurgency.

Furthermore, with virtually all attempts at investigating Nigerian military COIN being outside-in (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Higazi, 2013a; Solomon, 2012), rather than in-side-out embedded due to lack of clearance and access to on-going military operations, there is a limited amount of substantive, actual primary data, and inevitably a lot more hypothesizing, around the Nigerian military contribution to counter-insurgency.

The thinking, doctrine and operationalization of COIN within a military may be influenced by organizational culture and historical experience; at least the former of which (OC) may require a close-up understanding of the organization. Certainly however both historical experience and OC, the former by necessity, may not require studies *in situ*, where robust secondary research material exists the organization in question. This appears to be the case, to some extent at least, for the Nigerian military, particularly in its critical formative years (Luckham, 1971a; Miners, 1971; Peters, 1997). However, unless such studies are in and of themselves standalone projects, they cannot — without parallel grounded primary operations data — provide a full-spectrum narrative on what the Nigerian *military* contribution to COIN is, how that contribution is made, where the bottlenecks to performance exist, and what underpinning factors influenced it historically and today.

With this thesis' focus on the *military* contribution to COIN within the Nigerian context, it is this range of questions that the remainder of the project will address; beginning with the first factor argued as an influence on the Nigerian military's interpretation of its contribution to counter-insurgency: the military's modelling, which in turn requires a closer look at its historical experience and organizational culture.

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CHAPTER TWO.

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE (OC) AND HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF THE NIGERIAN MILITARY

2-1. Introduction

Chapter one's pithy evaluation of COIN theory highlighted three broad features of this area of the military function. First, that counter-insurgency has been a historically difficult area for militaries to adapt to. Outcomes may depend as much on the disposition and decision-making calculus of the insurgent, as on the ability of the counter-insurgent to execute a well-planned campaign. In the case of the Nigerian military experience for instance, that the counter-insurgency in the Niger Delta ended in a negotiated settlement, whereas the military campaign in the north remains a hard-fought conflict, does not mean operations in the former were necessarily better, or worse, than the latter as an aggregate.

The second feature identified within the discourses is that, especially where militaries have firepower at their disposal, the temptation exists to employ overwhelming use of use, even though this is precisely the over-reactive target response the insurgent may be hoping for. As study findings from this chapter, and from chapter four, will indicate, the disposition of a military to be offensive-minded, even in COIN, may to an extent depend on its doctrine and modeling.

Third, the theory chapter's analysis also highlights that whereas on the one hand the popular dominant narrative within the COIN discourses indicates multiple lines of operations are required within the military contribution, on the other hand this approach is so resource and capacity intensive in practice that militaries may question the mainstream view that discourages excessive use of force, even where an option for the counter-insurgent.

Within the context of the Nigerian military all three features may be extricated from its decision-making within its counter-insurgency campaigns; that decision-making however, which hitherto has

resulted in poor or altogether modest outcomes, is influenced by a range of factors as this thesis argues. Indeed, especially with the military's apparent lackluster performance against Boko Haram, it becomes increasingly important to evaluate the range of factors that have contributed, historically and today, to the Nigerian military's decision-making around, and its interpretation of, its contribution to counter-insurgency. These factors include (1) the military's historical experience and organizational culture, (2) the institutionalization of COIN within its learning environment over the decades, (3) its doctrine and (4) its approach to operations. The remainder of the thesis will address each of these factors. This chapter focuses on the first of them, historical experience and organizational culture of the Nigerian military as an influence on its interpretation of its contribution to counter-insurgency.

To achieve its objective, the chapter is laid out as follows. First, it demonstrates the coercive leaning ideology of the Nigerian military's internal function, since the postcolonial period. Second, it evaluates, using a historical and sociological analysis, how the preferred kinetic force model has been reinforced and where within the military's transitioning this model originates. Third, the chapter uses, for case study instrumentality, the Niger Delta experience as an argument for why this force model has not served the Nigerian military as well recently as in the past. Finally the chapter uses employs OC theory to evaluate why the military has perpetuated its adopted model in its internal function, so doggedly over the decades, mixed or altogether poor results notwithstanding.

Central to the chapter's analysis is the notion that institutional isomorphism, as a vehicle of change and institutional transfer between the British colonialist military and the Nigerian military that emerged post-independence, holds explanatory power within an analysis of why the Nigerian military, in being so closely modeled after its colonialist principal, failed to make a number of adjustments that should have underpinned its role as an instrument of democratic power answerable to the Nigerian government, rather than to the crown.

"Isomorphism", as defined by Amos Hawley, is "a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions" (1968, p. 328). Applying this concept to organizational theory, DiMaggio and Powell, contend that their theory

extends “from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions” and argue that “once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar [even] as they try to change them” (1983, p. 147). Sequel to an evaluation of the Nigerian military within its internal function in the aftermath of the country’s independence, the thesis will use a framewoek of DiMaggio and Powell’s theory of institutional isomorphism to explain much of the emergent findings within the paper’s discussion of transfer processes between the British and the Nigerian military, and implications for the latter’s perception of its role within the state and of its response method toward the threat of civil disobedience that fell within its remit.

Indeed, with much of the chapter’s focus on the function of organizational culture as an influence on the practice and behavior of the military organization, a central argument made in the chapter is that outcomes of institutional isomorphism — wherein “rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar [even] as they try to change them” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 147) — and of historical experience of the organization, have determinate influence on development of the Nigerian military’s internal function. These three themes of organizational culture, historical experience and institutional isomorphism will underpin the entirety of the chapter’s evaluation of the thinking and behavior, within the Nigerian military, in its attempts to counter insurgency.

2-2. Offensive Ideology, Infantry-Centricity and Military Culture in Nigeria

Nigeria’s first major conflict — the Nigeria Civil War of 1967 — was a war between two sides employing traditional ORBATs and deploying conventional military formations (Atofarati, 1992). The federal forces of Nigeria, in being able to attrit the rebels over a three year period, fought, and won that war decisively; with limited need to develop COIN capabilities. The victory however would come with implications for the military’s internal function.

Brig. Gen Alabi-Isama writes of the “tragedy of victory” and of the ironic consequences of the Army’s victory in the civil war, on institutional reform (2013). Rather than reform, the military became over the decades as politically entrenched within the polity as to practically guarantee a lowering of its

legitimacy. Nowa Omoigui likewise writes of the reticence of the military around the area of actual organizational and inter-service reform (2006). The Army's organization and divisional structure, despite a shift in threat terrain, would remain virtually unchanged, save for the designation of the Lagos garrison as an additional maneuver division in 2002 (Global Security). The promise of irregular warfare development at the Nigerian Army School of Infantry (NASI) would stall (Villo, 2012) and with it hopes that counter-insurgency would take any other direction than the existing model.

To some therefore therefore, the civil war victory, due to the way in which it was achieved, and to the self-assurance it gave the Nigerian military in its offensive ideology, (1) contributed to an increase political influence of the military; (2) contributed to institutional inertia against reform to the military's offensive thinking, doctrine and action set; and (3) ironically would retard development of counter-insurgency; with conventional capabilities acquisition, and offensive doctrine, being reinforced in the post-civil war decades.

Emphasis of this section's evaluation would be on points (2) and (3): offensive ideology within Nigerian military culture, its implications within the NMOE, and what the broader military theory contributes to the debate on infantry-centric warfare and offensive ideology.

As evidenced in its involvement in internal security (IS) operations[9] since the Civil War of Nigeria, the Nigerian military's postwar action set insinuated that an offensive ideology, and the infantry function, insofar as they proved instrumental to winning the war, should constitute the Army's underpinning approach — its doctrine — going forward. Whereas chapter four will discuss Nigerian military offensive doctrine in detail, two features of this ideology are worth highlighting here. The first is that force, when employed in the engagement, should be done so overwhelmingly. Put another way, fighting power, for the Nigerian military, was not just important to unhinging the enemy's CoG, it was critical. The second feature came attendant to the first: the combat arms and combat support arms, rather than the non-combat function, were seen as instrumental to successful military operations.

[9] Predominantly in the Niger Delta, against the Maitatsine insurgents, and against Boko Haram in 2009.

The infantry function would constitute the dominant combat arm, in this regard. Indeed, even when maneouvrist doctrine was later adopted, this second feature in particular, would endure.

Insofar as offensive ideology may be justifiable in the conventional engagement of major war, how effective, Kilcullen asks, is this approach, in counter-insurgency? (2010) It should of course be considered that, unlike major war, insurgencies on paper at least are orders of magnitude smaller, are lower in intensity, are as embedded within the civilian populace as to make the "theatre" ambiguous, and do not have an enemy's most powerful corps or armoured formation, for instance, as the CoG (Martin, 2010). Moreover, as General Sir Rupert Smith suggests, the dilemma of successful use of kinetic force is such that it may engender parochialist pathologies that stifle the learning and non-combat oriented flexibility required for more diffuse threat forms, such as insurgency (2006). Such "parochialism", sometimes identifiable in the aftermath of an ideologically offensive approach that worked in past engagements, is not unique to the Nigerian military however. Rather, such parochialism can be identified with historical experience and organizational culture more broadly, as Snyder argues (1984).

Commenting on Germany's offensive doctrine during the Great War, Synder observes, "the extraordinary prestige of the German army rested on its historical ability to deliver rapid offensive victories […]" (1984, pp. 15-40). The Germany army, Snyder observes, "could not accept […] an inglorious, unproductive stalemate" (1984, p. 17). Snyder's theory casts a shadow on the Nigerian experience. This is insofar as the decisive outcome of the Civil War of Nigeria, in favour of federal forces, may have reinforced the military's belief, in the decades following the civil war, in utility of military superiority and an offensive action set. Indeed, that the civil war stretched into four calendar years may have been underpinned by the Army's tendency to underestimate the enemy's capabilities (Omoigui N.; Atofarati, 1992). AHQ for instance, in a gross overestimate of the utility of force, initially was of the view that the civil war will be over, in four phases, within a month (Obasanjo, 1980). The concept of a stalemate, as highlighted by Snyder above, therefore would have been inconceivable to NA war planners who had an exaggerated reliance on offensive doctrine and its

utility[10]. Yet, such a stalemate should be expected in insurgency — what Callwell calls a "thankless" war (Callwell, 1996). Indeed, writers of the US COIN doctrine suggest this scenario, which they refer to as a "strategic stalemate", to be a "phase" of insurgency (2007, pp. 1-7).

Nor was it only in the doctrine where the Nigerian Army demonstrated offensive ideology. Counter-insurgency, as the NA came to see it, became effectively an infantry affair. This in itself is not problematic *per se*. Counter-insurgency warfare, particularly prior to the stabilization phase, if one is factored into campaign planning (MOD, 2009; US Army, 2014), often entails a combined arms approach that emphasizes infantry elements especially in heavily contested areas. Fieldwork with 21 Bde in Maiduguri, and the Brigade Commander's firsthand account of the land component's CONOPS (Bamigboye, 2012), indicates this infantry-centric approach may be as true within Nigerian military COIN, as it is within Western doctrine and practice. Alice Hills for instance refers to the British approach to COIN in urban areas, as "infantry-centric" (2004, p. 32). Moreover, whereas some elements within the US Marine Corps (USMC) might dispute it, Hills likewise is of the view that the USMC "fulfills an essentially light infantry role" (2004, p. 32). Furthermore with many armies having significant infantry formations — the NA is no exception — the tendency is for operations to be centric around the infantry function.

Apologist commentary on the infantry role is therefore not new. Widening this catechism to war as a broader military concept, Carl von Clausewitz, in his classic text, *On War*, is categorical regarding the relative superiority of the infantry function[11]. "…Distribution of elementary military strengths among the three main arms demonstrates the superiority and versatility of infantry in comparison with the

[10] So it should come as no surprise that offensive doctrine, in Responsive Offensive Doctrine (ROD), was the Nigerian military's operational doctrine for decades after the civil war, until the maneouvrist approach was adopted. This will be discussed in detail in chapter four.

[11] Clausewitzian thinking around offense, and regarding infantry within the engagement specifically, is popular among officers of the Nigerian military. Fieldwork and interaction with a range of personnel from the AFCSC, CT-COIN Directorate, the former War College (NDC) and even other structures far removed from the TOO (such as within 81 Div and at NAF 235 BSG) indicate a practically universal awareness of Clausewitz' apologist take on the infantry function and, to a lesser extent, the view that the Army's counter-insurgency against Boko Haram concerns first and foremost, infantry personnel.

other two", Clausewitz notes; "it [infantry] alone combines all three qualities" (1976, pp. 667-668)[12]. The subtext of Clausewitz's position however is identifiable: insofar as infantry may be the most indispensable function for a military force, a combined arms approach, all other things being equal, should be viewed by the warplanner as more effective than a full-blooded infantry thrust. Clausewitz himself makes this clear, "A combination of all three [combat arms] confers the greatest strength" (1976, p. 669).

Clausewitz' writings apply to the engagement more broadly, and especially to the engagement, as a pitched affair, as it was in his time; he is not, *per se*, speaking about the infantry function in irregular warfare. Interpretation within COIN parameters therefore should be cautiously undertaken; not least also because an ongoing debate exists, regarding Clausewitz' 21st Century relevance (Strachan & Herberg-Rothe, 2008; Strachan, 2013; Kaldor, 2005; Beyerchen, 1993; Echevarria, 2008; Gray C. , 1999; Paret, 1984; van Creveld, 1991; Waldman, 2010). Galula also makes a case for the infantry function, but does so within a context specific to counter-insurgency,

> As long as the insurgent has failed to build a powerful regular army, the counter-insurgent has little use for heavy, sophisticated forces designed for conventional warfare. For his ground forces, he needs infantry and more infantry, highly mobile and lightly armed […] The counter-insurgent, therefore, has to proceed to a first transformation of his existing forces along these lines, notably to convert into infantry units as many unneeded specialised units as possible (2006, p. 93).

Yet Galula also clarifies why infantry should play so fundamental a role, in COIN campaigning,

> The adaptation, however, must go deeper than that. At some point in the counter-insurgency process, the static units that took part initially in large-scale military operations in their area will find themselves confronted with a huge variety of non-military tasks which have to be performed in order to get the support of the population, and which can be performed only by

[12] Pages are taken from the indexed digital version and may differ slightly from actual location of quotes in the print version.

> military personnel, because of the shortage of reliable civilian political and administrative personnel […] They have to be organised, equipped and supported accordingly (2006, p. 93)

The sort of switch Galula intimates however — from a kinetic action set to a more population-centric one by infantry, *in situ* — may be simplifying the training, the skill, the time and the temperament required to transition the warfighter to simultaneously become a policeman, a mentor, a community liaison, a well-digger and possibly even a trash-picker (Anderson G. , 2010); assuming, to begin with, infantry forces were so disposed.

Within the Nigerian military COIN context for instance, such a switch may be too much to ask from infantry forces hitherto deployed for kinetic activity in the theatre of war. Nigerian infantry historically has been poor at going from an offensive action set, to activity that approximates stability operations (SO). Indeed, herein lies part of the problem for military COIN in Nigeria: operations, from the perspective of the Nigerian Army, have not just emphasized the infantry function; they have been dominated by its most kinetic aspects, and with only modest latitude for non-offensive LOOs and support functions.

As an example, if the concept of "clear, hold, build" is considered a CONOPS that requires multiple LOOs, that is more stabilizing (US Army and Marine Corps, 2007; Sepp, 2005; Russell, 2011; Farrell, 2012), and that underpins a lot of the contemporary Western COIN doctrine itself copied by the Nigerian military[13], the Nigerian military's dominant posture has typically left little room for holding, and even less for building, in operational AoRs. This has been the case in the military campaign against insurgents in the Niger Delta[14] and across swathes of northeastern Nigeria, in the current counter-insurgency against Boko Haram. There have been exceptions.

As chapter five's analysis will demonstrate, JTF ORO, within its AoR, did a lot of effective holding and policing and even a modest amount of building in addition. JTF ORO's CONOPS, and the five

[13] This will be discussed in chapter five

[14] Discussed shortly in this chapter.

LOOs that underpinned it, however is consistent with the argument here, that an infantry-centric campaign may preclude the multiple LOOs today's military theorists recommend for the counter-insurgent (Sepp, 2005; Kilcullen, 2010; Nagl, 2005). At the task force level, Operation Restore Order depended less on infantry. The Army, in 21 Bde, certainly constituted the task force nucleus; however warfighting was not the objective. Rather an inter-service and multi-agency approach took up much of the activity in the AoR; and of the task force's five lines of operations, offensive activity constituted just one.

Put another way therefore, whereas the military would, decades later in JTF ORO, demonstrate increased awareness of a need for operations other than offensive when in civilian-populated areas; the 1970s to mid-2000s would see the Army's action set remain underpinned by its offensive responsiveness doctrine (ROD) against threats.

As Gen (retd) Ihekire notes, this action set was initially adopted with the intention that "shock effect" of troop deployment, and, failing that, use of overwhelming firepower as codified in doctrine (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. 5), would bring about a swift end to operations. This effect however, as Ihekhire observes, has become less effective over the decades (Ihekhire, 2005). Within the Nigerian military counter-insurgency adventure, there are a number of reasons for the diminishing returns experienced from use (and abuse) of the military's internal function. Nonetheless, before engaging this debate, as it is specific to the Nigeria case, it is worth briefly considering the theory around the widespread use of military forces internally; a phenomenon common in some African states.

As Howe observes, persistent deployment of the military within intra-state conflict may have hurt the local characters of these forces (2001, p. 30). Michael Desch contributes to this thinking — that military force directed internally often comes with negative implications for civil-military relations — where he notes that whereas "external military missions are the most conducive to healthy patterns of civil-military relations […] internal missions often engender various pathologies" (1996, p. 13). As put by Howe, abuse of the military's internal function,

> Hurt[s] a force's future professionalism by setting undesirable precedents — [by] lowering the division between civilian and military autonomy, [by] weakening the force's unity, [by] diminishing its acceptance by society as an unbiased national defender, and [by] reducing its external capabilities (2001, p. 30).

Situating this theory within the Nigeria case, it can be observed that consecutive government regimes have preferred the military force option, where perhaps other alternatives could initially, and *in situ*, have been explored. Constitutionally, the purpose for these military interventions would be in aid of the civil power (MACP). The military function however has been misused in this process, as will be discussed in the Niger Delta COIN case later in this chapter. Effectively therefore, with abuse of the military's internal function perpetuated, the Nigerian military may have become too exposed outside of its traditional role. This further has served to erode the already ambiguous context of internal applicability of its offensive doctrine.

Moreover not only has it been too frequently deployed internally, the Army also has been used to perform duties outside its regular function. Policing duties constitute a major example, as former British Defence Attaché to Abuja, Col James Hall, notes in-interview (2012). Yet, not only is the Army poorly suited for such tasks, its personnel have come to resent being "policemen", as Col Hall observes.

Whether the Nigerian Police (NPF) is itself suited to function effectively in a persistently hostile environment however, or even in an environment frequently punctuated with organized violent attacks (as becomes the case during insurgency), is questionable. This creates a dilemma for the government. In deploying the military, the FGN risks an over-reactive target response; yet, in choosing to keep faith with an even less equipped and less prepared police force, the government risks further ingresses by the insurgent into strategic territory.

Frequency of deployment and underpinning offensive ideology, are not the only factors that helped influence the military's perceived role in aid to the civil power. Duration also is a consideration,

within this analysis. The Nigerian military has typically deployed for lengthy periods and often had a poor exit strategy, post-deployment, if the Niger Delta counter-insurgency is used as a yardstick. Doctrinally, furthermore, the Army has no stabilization manual; and this lack of a long-term plan involving multiple LOOs and multi-agency campaign planning is evident in the rapid dominance and de-emphasis of post-conflict management the army has looked to, in its historical posture toward internal unrest. Such rapid dominance however has been increasingly hard to achieve.

In the absence of the type of rapid dominance that underpins ROD thinking and military activity, and without a clear doctrine and action set to underpin the range of stabilization operations often required in restive areas, the Army has become increasingly bogged down in its offensive-leaning counter-insurgency operations.

In the case of the Niger Delta for instance, military operations have been ongoing since 1999 and the military has had a permanent footprint in the theatre, circa 2003 (Okonta & Douglas, 2003). Today the military remains in that theatre, as part of JTF Pulo Shield. However, the police and non-military institutions that should long have taken over policing and COIN duties have, consistent with the evaluation conducted throughout the rest of this chapter, been deemphasized. As one IISS report on the military's COIN in the Niger Delta points out,

> Popular mistrust of the army and police makes it difficult for military commanders to gather intelligence from locals. Security operations could be better supported by the paramilitary Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps [NSCDC], but this ill-equipped and structurally weak force is often derided by the army and police, therefore undermining its popular credibility (Omeni, 2013).

Such extended deployment of the military in aid to the civil power, at the expense of operational inclusion of the police and local paramilitaries may have brought about a number of consequences. First it may have bred local contempt due to "over-familiarity", as former TRADOC professor, Jonathan Agwunobi notes in-interview (2012). Second the Army's CONOPS may have had the effect

of spreading its flanks thin within its AoR. The Army's extended, and often awkward, interactions with the local populace may have increased likelihood of abuse within the civilian population. Studies by Okonta and Douglas allude to such occurrences within the Niger Delta (2003), which fall within Neumann and Smith's caution against an over-reactive target response by the military during its campaign (2008).

As a final point, such extended interactions with locals may have increased likelihood of corruption and overt indiscipline within the ranks. The Nigerian military had already demonstrated, during PSOs in Sierra Leone, that there was a discipline issue in its ranks (Rashid, 2014). As another example, allegations of corruption, including cases involving some senior Nigerian Navy (NN) officials, have been of particular concern in military operations within the Niger Delta (Hill, 2012). Ostensibly such operations are to counter insurgency. However it would appear some military personnel — and even very senior ones — as the court-martialing of some senior officers in the Niger Delta indicates, are interested in other unrelated activities to the campaign objective, such as "oil bunkering" (oil theft) (Hill, 2012).

Put another way therefore, the nature, scale, and scope, of military involvement within the internal security environment in Nigeria has contributed to, and likely has warped, the way the military has come to interpret its internal function.

During the Cold War decades, such concerns may not have been much of an issue. This is insofar as strategic culture looked to the interstate paradigm, which in turn meant that internal military deployments were less common; for reasons discussed next. By the turn of the century however, this would change: abuse of the military function internally, coupled with a non-revisionist approach to countering insurgency, would reveal a deeply flawed Nigerian military.

2-3. Nigerian Strategic Culture in the Cold War Period

Contrary to Wendt and Barnett's thesis that "third World state formation has occurred in a largely dependent context in which relative external security contrasts with domestic insecurity" (1993, p. 1),

Nigerian strategic culture post-independence was very much in the interstate paradigm; directed toward perceived external state threats — "relatively equal states possessing domestic legitimacy", as Wendt and Barnett refer to them (1993, p. 1). Whereas "relative equality", in terms of militarization and military capabilities of Nigeria's neighbors vis-à-vis its own, could perhaps be questioned, the nation states neighboring Nigeria possessed legitimacy, were a perceived threat by Nigeria, and would influence its strategic culture between the 1970s through the turn of the century. Consequently there were two broad phases to Nigeria's postwar strategic culture.

Within the first phase in the 1970s, neighboring states were seen as possible threats to Nigerian security. Conversely however, some of these neighboring states also were said to view Nigeria "as a threat to them" (Peters, 1997). Nigeria is surrounded by much smaller nation states, many of which are Francophone countries. In the post-civil war period there was thus the perceived threat of regional influence of France, via its proxies (Nwokedi, 1985). This influence had manifested through France's direct support of Biafra during the civil war (Omoigui N.); as well as indirectly, via Nigeria's Francophone neighbors assistance to Biafra (Omoigui N.). Consequently, and in part due to the wartime posture of France and its West African surrogates, there emerged after the civil war a measure of "bipolarity" between Nigeria and its mostly French-speaking neighbors (Nwokedi, 1985).

Nigeria viewed France and her surrogates as against her interests, based on how these states were aligned during the civil war. Furthermore, Nigeria felt Britain could have played a stronger supportive role, but did not. Regardless, the internal threat was now defeated. The Eastern rebellion had been out down. Federal government writ now spanned the entire territory. The threat, or at least as perceived, was now external and regional. Both warfighting capabilities and military planning thus had to reflect this change in strategic posture.

Consequential to strategic culture of the period thus came an organization of the military consistent to perceived threats from the outside. As an example, 3 Division, situated in Jos and with an Area of Responsibility (AoR) that covered the northeast of the country including the border regions, was an armored division. Likewise 1 Division, situated in Kaduna and with an AoR that covered the

northwest axis of Nigeria, including the border regions, was a mechanized division made up of artillery and motorized formations. With its neighbors perceived as threats and with no real expertise in desert warfare — the Desert Warfare Division at the Nigerian Army School of Infantry was neglected long after inception in 1978 — Nigeria's use of armored and mechanized divisions, rather than an emphasis on infantry as a first line of defence against perceived external threats from the arid northern axis, seemed a sound strategic choice at the time.

The divisional and organizational structure of the military would remain largely unchanged until August 2013 (when 7 Infantry Division was created). Yet, that there had been a sharp change in strategic culture — consequential to a remapping of the threat terrain since the post-civil war period — made the military's strategic and institutional inertia problematic in the intervening years. The Order of Battle (ORBAT) required for more mobile, more maneuverable military COIN operations in that period and even up till today call into question strategic rational for an enduring force structure more suited for a different era of strategic culture.

Within the second phase of strategic culture, signings of a number of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Defence Protocols — the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters (1981) — began to ease post-civil war interstate tensions between Nigeria and its neighbors (Anning & Atuobi, 2012). Strategic culture was indeed changing. However it was not going from an outward-looking posture to an inward-looking one. Strategic culture remained outward looking but was now leaning towards a role-playing and collaborative posture within the region. Nigeria would now view, and would now assert, itself as a major West African force. Thus, beyond this period of the 1980s, in the 1990s and past the turn of the century, Nigeria would intervene strategically in regional matters and the military posture had to be better suited for this purpose.

Consequential to this shift in posture therefore, came a number PSOs and a period of conventional militarization and capabilities building; all of which were all outward looking and consistent with strategic culture at the time. As an example the Nigerian military posture at the time, "…allowed the

three individual services to begin the process of […] codification of their own strategies and tactical doctrine" (Peters, 1997, p. 177) in line with national defence doctrine. Yet, no such attention was paid to doctrine or the methodical development of capabilities for possible insurgency and re-emergence of intrastate conflict. Both special (irregular) warfare and desert warfare, within the Army's institutional environment, would remain neglected for instance and despite first being introduced in 1978 would be under-developed areas of the Army's function in the decades that followed (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012), relative to more conventional forms of war.

Strategic culture's influence on Nigerian military posturing in the 1980s was particularly evident in two areas. First, in the area of national defence doctrine, which had four main objectives,

> One that Nigeria was in a position to deal with French manipulations in Africa, but particularly in West Africa. Two, [that it had] the capability to protect the West African sub-region, its politico-military environment, from destabilizing influences […] Three, the means to ensure South Africa's military and economic strengths were weakened and defeated anywhere in Africa. Four, [that it had] the capability to defend itself in the event of a conflict with South Africa (Peters, 1997, p. 176).

The second area that indicated the lack of development of counter-insurgency capabilities came by way of the nature of military assets, geared toward conventional warfare against belligerent external armies, acquired during the 1980s. To begin with, the ORBAT structure remained the same; no adjustments were made that recognized counter-insurgency warfare would require a markedly different action set — in terms of doctrine and operations — to that possessed at the time. Furthermore, Jimi Peters writes of the Army's revitalization in 1987 that saw planning for an air wing, with some 50 helicopters, and an overall "strong combat-ready" force that could react with "… effective firepower to any military threat […] such as low level attacks, incursions and anticipated major attacks" (1997, p. 177). Both the Nigerian Navy and Air Force followed similar reviews in the same period, with the former adopting a strategy review in 1988 to enable it, amongst other tasks, to be prepared for "defence and protection of Nigeria's maritime interests […] effective coastal defence

[…]", defence of "coastal approaches, territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone" and "…especially in operations in distant waters…" (Koshoni, 1988, p. 6). This naval defence strategy was in line with what some naval officers argued to be a shifting strategic focus "towards the South Atlantic in view of potential threats to the country…" (Oladimeji, 1990, pp. 16-18).

Nigerian foreign policy within the cold war era of the 1970s (Falola & Heaton, 2008; Nwokedi, 1985) through the 1990s (Francis, 2004; Sondhaus, 2006; IISS, 2005; IISS, 2005) reflected its perception of colonialist Portuguese territories[15], Rhodesia, South Africa and even (to a lesser extent) neighboring Cameroon, as greater threats to military security than insurrection. This was consistent with Nigeria's foreign policy of the period, the scholarship of which a number of writers robustly contribute (Falola & Heaton, 2008; Nwokedi, 1985). Lawrence Sondhaus also makes a scholarly contribution in the area, but situates the cold war period within his analysis of Nigerian strategic culture in the interstate, rather than intrastate, paradigm (Sondhaus, 2006). This is in contrast to Wendt and Barnett's assumptions on Nigeria's positioning within "third world militarization" (Wendt & Barnett, 1993).

Peters also discusses Nigerian foreign policy in the period. First he notes that General Yakubu Gowon, who led the Nigerian forces to victory in the civil war against Biafran separatists, effectively ostracized some sub-regional African countries that had recognized Biafra and that had adopted a passive-aggressive posture toward federal forces during the civil war. Some of these countries included Tanzania, Cote D'Ivoire, Gabon and Zambia (Peters, 1997). This aggressive outward posture, fuelled by its military's ability to achieve decisive victory in the civil war despite ambivalence by its Francophone neighbors, led Nigerian strategic culture to bulge outwards, rather than inwards. Peters points out that the domestic front was, as a result, neglected; with Nigeria now looking outward to the perceived Francophone threat (1997). Rather than reverse this aggressive foreign policy direction moreover, subsequent regimes reinforced it (Peters, 1997, pp. 152-160).

As an example, the Muhammad/Obasanjo regime from 1975 adopted a more "forceful" foreign policy posture and "restructured the military" from its inward-leaning orientation, to a more outward-looking

[15] Particularly Portuguese West Africa but also, to a lesser extent, Portuguese East Africa.

one, “so that it [the military] could serve […] as an instrument of foreign policy…”. The arming of the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA) in Angola for instance, where the previous (Gowon) regime had hoped for a government of national unity, was a marker of a further shift of strategic culture within the interstate paradigm (Peters, 1997, p. 153). Indeed, as Dr Akinyemi, one of the policy planners at the time notes, Nigeria’s focus and militarization was practically determined by foreign, rather than domestic policy (1979); with the “open grant of military and financial aid to MPLA” said to mark a “radical departure […] an escalation of the confrontational involvement of Nigeria in Southern Africa” (1979, p. 157). By the 1980s when Muhammad/Obasanjo had handed over to civilian rule, Nigeria already had well-established foreign policy, with subsequent governments doing little to reverse the radical reorganization since the mid-1970s. As put by Peters, “a foundation had been laid” (Peters, 1997, p. 160) and what followed — and it will take a few years — was a more active involvement in PSOs and a further outward-leaning posture.

By the 1990s with South Africa still emerging from the shadow of Apartheid, Nigeria was by far the largest African military contributor to PSOs, with significant regional military influence. Indeed, so active was Nigeria within the region at the time, it “was regarded by the major Western power as the most important African country. Nothing was ever done with regard to Africa without first consulting Nigeria for its views, since the consensus was that anything that had the backing of Nigeria stood a good chance of succeeding” (Peters, 1997, p. 155).

This strategic culture of the period had an impact on the Nigerian military however. This is insofar as there was little incentive for the military, particularly with a limited budget, to reorganize itself for the possibility of internal security threats that could test its ability to defeat an unconventional military adversary.

Additionally, due to the government’s interventionist policies within West African states in the 1990s and well beyond the turn of the century, the Nigerian military would look at OOTW as being fundamentally peacekeeping in nature (Francis, 2004; Sani, 2014). Francis for instance talks about Nigeria’s more assertive regional policy in the postwar period as well as the government’s “big

brother" mentality toward regional states, at the time (Francis, 2004). Lawrence Sondhaus also alludes to this where, discussing cold war era strategic culture of Nigeria, he writes,

> Nigeria remained less pro-Western than before and developed some domestic arms industries. Within the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the UN, Nigeria promoted respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of all existing states, but eventually violated these principles by intervening repeatedly in smaller West African states, on the pretext that regional instability posed a threat to its own security (2006, p. 120).

Thus in the decades post-independence, with foreign policy indicating a heightened mistrust of the West and with Nigerian strategic culture directed at the interstate, rather than intrastate, paradigm (Sondhaus, 2006); the military's action set would fall in line in the intervening decades (IISS, 2005, p. 447; IISS, 2014, p. 451). Consequent to this outward looking posture (IISS, 2005, p. 447; IISS, 2014, p. 451), efforts to actively develop CT-COIN warfighting capabilities were arguably neglected — or, at the very least, retarded — for an extended period, despite being introduced since the late 1970s.

Furthermore, even where involved in PSOs, the NA's mandate in these missions did not indicate a need to develop its COIN warfighting *per se*. This is worth mentioning since, as T.B. Zaalberg observes, whereas COIN and PSOs fall within OOTW, both are operationally distinct and will necessarily require a different action set, form of doctrine, force structure and so on (Zaalberg, 2012). Yet, in the same vein it appears somewhat odd that the Army, in its regional PSO adventure, did so little note taking. During at least half of the period of its engagement in PSOs in Liberia (and in part in Sierra Leone), Nigeria lost a good number of soldiers to the irregular approach adopted by National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) outside of the capital, Monrovia. Many fatalities for instance were suffered through ambush and other guerrilla tactics. Therefore, even if the Army did not have doctrine for this form of war at the time, it *was*, at least on occasion, facing guerrilla-style VNSAs.

Yet, by increasingly focusing on a peacekeeping rather than COIN action set, even when engaging external military assistance partners (USARAF, 2014), the Nigerian military failed to develop the

latter area, leaving it reactionary in its approach to insurgency as it emerged. This is consistent with Otu-Nyiam's observation in 1988 that,

> Planning in the Nigerian Armed Forces, and indeed, in the Ministry of Defence (MOD), has been no more than mechanical programme of reactions to problems as they arise. Even in a few cases where planning went beyond reactions to crisis, they [plans] usually turned out to be routine exercises of repeating reactions taken in the previous year (Otu-Nyiam, 1988, p. 178).

Neglect of counter-insurgency warfare, within defence policy and planning, exacerbated what was already a largely reactionary posture of the Nigerian military to crises. The crisis in the Niger Delta consequently would provide arguably the sternest test of this posture, with troubling implications for the Army's COIN warfighting neglect.

2-4. From PSOs to COIN: Nigerian Military Operations in the Niger Delta

Subsequent to civil war, and consequential to PSO commitments in the 1990s, the Nigerian military greatly increased capabilities in the decades since independence in 1960. By 1995, Nigeria had "257 tanks, ninety-five combat aircraft, an 80,000-man army, artillery, and a navy with several frigates, corvettes, and missile [boat] craft" (Howe, 2001, pp. 153-154). Yet this fairly impressive Order of Battle (ORBAT) should not be taken to mean a force that was equipped for COIN *per se* (Howe, 2001, pp. 153-154). Rather, the indication is that despite its considerable ORBAT, relative to practically any other country in SSA, the Nigerian military remained poorly equipped for COIN (Howe, 2001, pp. 153-154).

This in part is because Nigerian military operations to counter insurgency over the decades have approximated a fit for interstate, rather than intrastate, conflict (IISS, 2014; Howe, 2001, pp. 153-154). As the IISS notes of the Nigerian military's action set since the postcolonial period, decision-making has "arguably not focused on the primary threats to Nigeria, favouring instead […] state-to-state warfare rather than counter-insurgency roles" (IISS, 2014, p. 451). Howe makes a similar observation that Nigeria, as the nucleus of ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), "lacked much of

the suitable equipment, maintenance, manpower, administration, and intelligence required for counterinsurgency effort in Liberia" (2001, p. 153). Howe concludes that the Nigerian military, within ECOMOG, and out of it as a standalone outfit, had an "Order of Battle (OB) [that] was not suited for counterinsurgency operations, even though it was impressive at first glance" (2001, p. 153). This misfit for COIN warfare would be particularly problematic as the military launched operations in the Niger Delta.

Between 1993 and 2003, and again between 2003 and 2008 with the formation of a military joint task force in the Niger Delta (Bello, 2012; Omeni, 2013), the Nigerian military's approach to counter-insurgency would largely stagnate. This contributed to a stalemate within the campaign in the Niger Delta where gains from military tactical offensives would be offset by guerrilla thrusts by the enemy to disrupt communities and the output of crude oil by multinational oil companies (MNOCs) in the Delta. Combined with a criminal element within the insurgency, which used the conflict for "oil bunkering" — theft, illegal refining, re-sale and transport of crude oil — there was little chance that counter-insurgency, in the way the Nigerian Army had historically interpreted that area of its function to be, would bring about lasting peace in the Niger Delta (Omeni, 2013).

Some writers argue the Nigerian military's counter-insurgency serves to exacerbate conflict (Hill, 2012). Within the nature of military operations in the Niger Delta, this may well have been the case.

Kayode Samuel, speaking in-interview (2013), presents as an example, a quartet of operations within the Niger Delta. These operations are the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force (RSISTF) between 1993 and 1998; Operation Savage (1997); the infamous military operation in Odi community (December 1999) (Okonta & Douglas, 2003) and the Joint Task Force in the Niger Delta (circa 2003 - date). All four operations, Samuel observes, reflected convention, rather than change in strategic thinking and operational planning by the Nigerian military in its internal function (2013). Indeed, these operations highlight perpetuity of an approach, "the paradigm of pacification", (Ukeje, 2011) which emphasized coercive force within Nigerian military thinking. Such force posturing moreover came at the expense of more robust and inclusively non-kinetic activity by the military, within the

restive Niger Delta. It also was an approach that backfired on the government. The crisis in the Delta continued to escalate despite an expanded military thrust (Bello, 2012), to the point where an amnesty package had to be arranged for the armed militias, to de-escalate the insurgency in 2010 (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012).

Not everyone may agree the military adopted a stick-without-carrot approach in its COIN, however. Some writers like Obasi (2005) suggest the Army recognized the non-military nucleus of the insurgency required "more of a psychological approach" (2005, pp. 120-121) and attempted to address it through community meetings in addition to tactical offensives at times of the day when civilian casualties were more likely to be minimized (2005, pp. 120-121). Maj. Gen (retd) Sarkin-Yaki Bello, at the time the Commanding Officer (CO) of the unified Operation Restore Hope (JTF OP RH, circa 2008) also observed in an interview contribution to this study that he conducted town hall meetings, completed civil projects including medical programmes, portable water projects and other similar civil-military initiatives to win communities over to the side of the military (Bello, 2012). The former JTF CO also noted he welcomed, and on occasion invited, human rights researchers and media journalists to theatre, as a means to promote transparency of the civil-military iteractions (Bello, 2012). This final point is perhaps worth noting insofar as much has been made of the heavy-handedness and opaque nature of military operations historically in the Niger Delta (Ukeje, 2011; Okonta & Douglas, 2003).

Maj. Gen Bello also makes the point that the approach adopted under his unified command working — with insurgent camps being destroyed, militant leaders being neutralized, more insurgents captured, people more willing to come forward with intelligence, and communities becoming safer. Taking this view further, Gen Bello is of the opinion that the subsequent amnesty, given to the militants, was only accepted in short order because JTF ORH had pushed the insurgents to capitulation point (2012). The former JTF ORH CO is categorical that this final point is often glossed over by those who say the COIN failed, where(as) the subsequent amnesty was successful. Gen Bello disagrees. The amnesty offer was unlikely to have been accepted, or the terms would have been significantly different, as he points out, had the FGN not negotiated from a position of military strength (2012).

Colonel D. Nengite, who had also served in the Niger Delta and who later was the Principal General Staff Officer (PGSO) to the Nigerian Minister of Defence during this project, was likewise of the view that militants were inclined to negotiate only because the Army-led COIN had put the government in a position of military strength (Nengite, 2012). Col Nengite gave, as an analogy, the situation in the Congo-Zaire insurgency where Laurent-Désiré Kabila, in a position of strength as his troops marched on Kinshasa, dictated terms to President Mobuto Sese Seko during talks on 4 May 1997, in South Africa (Nengite, 2012; Reuters, 1997). The Niger Delta militias by 2010, Col Nengite noted, were — like Mobuto's forces — in a position of relative weakness and so were more disposed to a negotiated settlement.

Maj. Gen Bello's successor, Maj. Gen Ochoga[16], also reaffirmed some of Gen Bello's views, during my subsequent fieldwork with the JTF, by which time it had been rebranded JTF Pulo Shield (JTF PS) and was mostly mandated to fight criminality and the criminal element within the de-escalated insurgency (Omeni, 2013). Specifically the new JTF CO presented evidence of community projects the task force had successfully embarked on. The CO noted that whereas the targeting and destruction of insurgent camps constituted a key operational objective, civil-military relations (CMR) are facilitated through projects aimed at winning the meta-war for local hearts and mind (Ochoga, 2012).

Others disagree with this textbook view of Nigerian COIN however, in a different interpretation that appears irreconcilable with the military's self-assessment of its internal function. The established popular narrative within the literature for instance contends that, more often than not, the military's action set has led it to view coercion as counter-insurgency. Yet this approach has yielded modest short-term gains, as an aggregate. Ukeje (2011, p. 91), Hazen (2009), Hazen & Horner (2007), Okonta & Douglas (2003), Hill (2012) and Samuel suggest the military COIN not only failed in the Delta, the intervention may have exacerbated tensions. Accounts to support this position are substantial. Okonta and Douglas, similar to Omotosho (2009), argue the government misjudged the effect of the COIN, noting that if its military response, "was to cow the local communities by making an example of

[16] In between Maj. Gen. S-Y Bello and Maj. Gen. Ochoga, Maj. Gen. Omoregie was, briefly, JTFC.

Kaiama and the other Ijo villages […] they badly miscalculated" (2003, p. 155). "The massacres", Okonta and Douglas note, only hardened local resolve (2003, p. 155).

These are similar to the sentiments of former Bayelsa State Secretary to State Government (SSG), in-interview (Ekeowei, 2012). Honorable Ekeowei, who as SSG was also the former head of the Bayelsa state Security Council, called it "disappointing that the military response in the region [Niger Delta] was so one-dimensional" (2012). First the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), the militant wing of the Ijaw National Congress, and then the plethora of militant groups that sprang up over the years, came to resent, violently at some point, the Army's COIN doctrine. Moreover there are indications from documentary (Okonta & Douglas, 2003; Omotosho, 2009; Obasi, 2005; Ukeje, 2011; Akiri, 2003) and interview data besides (Ekeowei, 2012; Samuel, 2013), that some within affected communities viewed the military deployment(s) as cynical and with a partial agenda. Consequently the militancy, Honorable Ekeowei observes, may well have escalated in response to the extreme force nature of the military COIN. As he notes,

> …See how many people were killed? When you [the military] kill and come back to build; you're not solving the problem. If you kill, you come back to build, and say: "Oh, sorry!" You send relief materials and all that, it doesn't solve the problem. So I think this is how the militancy was built up: as an alternative, or as a radical response [to military operations] (Ekeowei, 2012).

Similarly, Watts contends the Nigerian military's operation in Odi Village may have done little to stem the tide of militancy. Rather, he observes, it may have incited the already restive Egbesu Boys — the militant arm of the IYC — to take up arms in "the so-called 'first Egbesu war' in which Bayelsa youth took on security forces…" (Watts M. , 2007). Supporting Watts' claim, Omotosho's special report, for The Presidency, on the Niger Delta, refers to the Odi incident as "the last straw". Omotosho observes, whereas "it was the thinking of the government that a superior force would clean up the restive region […] that line of thought turned out to be a miscalculation" (2009).

Even Obasi, one of the few writers to argue that the Army's COIN was not as one-dimensional as some make it out to be (2005), observes that the actions of the military in the Niger Delta caused "grave damage not only to the image of the military but also to the unity of the Nigerian nation" (2005, p. 125). As an example, Akiri notes that some deployed Army units had a "strange attitude" that undermined local trust in Army intent. Specifically, Akiri observes an incident from January-February 2003,

> When men of the 7th Battalion at Effurun near Warri, were deployed to enforce a ceasefire fighting between the Urhobos and the Itsekiri, the destruction of over 50 houses and killing of about 20 Urhobos […] led to accusations that the military was siding with the Itsekiri. There were even claims that […] the Itsekiris 'bribed the battalion with a sum of money to look the other way' while they dealt with the Urhobo (2003).

Along with such allegations are locals viewing the military as "an impartial instrument of the state" (Obasi, 2005, p. 125). This was more so because the military appeared, through its extreme use of force and the related graffiti writings on the walls of destroyed community buildings, to have coercion as its agenda — a state of affairs that Obasi notes was "…reinforced in the minds of youths in the region" (2005, p. 125). These same youth would later go on to militarize, as Omotosho (2009) writes. Youth leader, Lawrence Akpeti, gives a pithy summary of the military dilemma in the Niger Delta, "force alone cannot solve the […] problems in the Niger Delta […] the more military men are drafted, the more the youths will become sophisticated […] solutions to the crises, each time violence breaks out, is not to draft soldiers or armed policemen" (Ojo, 2003, p. 17).

That kinetics are often viewed as a temporary approach in COIN, one fraught with local resentment and unlike to translate to national strategic objectives, should not come as a surprise to scholars of this *forme de guerre*. Given that COIN requires multiple LOOs, the force option should be seen as a "Band-Aid" solution at best, as Vlahos (2013) observes. At worst, this approach, especially if enduring, may exacerbate insurgency. Part of the problem then is that force, even (or especially) extreme amounts of it, runs the risk of alienating the local populace who could prove decisive to the

outcome, and potentially, the protraction, of insurgency. As was discussed in theory chapter however, the utility of force in COIN nonetheless remains a divisive area within the discourses..

2-5. Strategic Culture, Historical Experience and (Nature of) Change in the Nigerian Military

One possible verdict, from the analysis so far in the chapter, is that the Nigerian military's efforts to counter insurgency in the postwar decades perpetuated a highly coercive force model. Two emergent questions, which the remainder of this chapter will look to address from a historical and sociological evaluation, are (1) why the Nigerian military has adopted this force model to begin with and (2) where the model itself originated, within the Army's existence.

Relevant to the deconstruction of these questions are factors often neglected in narratives on military COIN in Nigeria. These include: (1) the colonial model of police, policing and the military internal function; (2) the Nigerian military at independence; (3) emergent Nigerian strategic culture in the cold war period and (4) contemporary OC and the institutional isomorphism consequential to the Nigerian historical experience.

The remainder of the chapter considers these issues and to this end, the section of the chapter is split in two. The first part discusses OC and strategic culture within a broader analysis of the effect of culture on military posture and development. Culture, and its interaction with formalized learning forms, is relevant to the military as an organization that learns and develops. This analysis thus is aimed to enrich, rather than to replace, subsequent viewpoints within this thesis on the role of formalized learning. The second part of the chapter discusses the Nigerian historical experience and, drawing from an area of organizational theory, aims to explain why the development of the postcolonial military was institutionally isomorphic.

OC as a concept has associated theories and schools of thought; thus, discussing it from any one viewpoint alone, may be limiting. Much of the analysis that follows thus leans toward a range of theories on military culture, strategic culture, and change within the military as a learning organization. Earlier thinking on strategic culture and its implications, those by Snyder (1977) and by

Booth (1979) will be used here. Later contributions by Booth and Trood (1999), by Koskinas (2006), by Sondhaus (2006), and by Farrell and Terriff (2002) on strategic culture and military change also will be employed within this section's discussion. In addition, theories on OC more generally will also be carefully grafted into the analysis.

In addition, contributions specific to Nigeria will be discussed. To begin with, themes from the set of Nigerian military essays from the Department of Land Warfare at Land Power Symposium 2010 (Senior Course 32) from the AFCSC (2010), discussing military transformation in Nigeria, are implicit to this analysis. Also, writings by Sondhaus, who notes that "Nigeria accounts for the majority of the sparse literature on strategic culture in the sub-Saharan region" (2006), by Francis (2004) and, to a much lesser degree (in terms of specificity to Nigeria) by Wendt and Barnett (1993), will be considered. Nigerian scholars in the area, such as Adefuye (1992), also will be considered.

Whereas the literature considered here appears to conflate strategic and organizational culture, this is not to say both are the same, however. Hopefully the analysis that follows will clarify what the differences are and why both concepts are together useful within the conversation on Nigerian military attitudes toward the VNSA threat.

2-6. Concepts and Theories of Military Development, Change, Organization and Culture

Arguing that the tendency of states to think and act forcefully, or not, are inextricable from "deep roots within a particular stream of historical experience", Colin Gray observes that national postures are distinct and that they determine, as much as other factors, "strategic policy patterns" noticeable over time (1981). This constitutes the frame in which Gray defines strategic culture, as "modes of thought and action with respect to force, which derives from perception of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behavior in national terms" (1981, p. 22). The question which Gray, along with other security policy analysts like Snyder (1977) and Booth (1979), try to address, is how strategic culture is situated in discourses on foreign and security policy, as well as (interstate) military strategy; with the US and Soviet Union often presented within cold war studies (Lantis, 2009).

Yet perhaps a question also worth asking is how strategic culture, determinate from national historical experience, applies to military strategy within the intrastate paradigm. Booth and Trood (1999) already touch upon this area. As Kerr notes of their contribution, it,

> …Differs from other work on strategic culture in that it extends the concept of strategic culture from the interstate to the intrastate level of analysis […] Such research might benefit from building on the work of those new wavers whose level of analysis includes organizational cultures, particularly those in military establishments (2000, pp. 382-383).

In shifting away from the cold war paradigm of strategic culture, others have tried to develop further, OC within the intrastate, rather than interstate, context. Francis for instance "defines as the three sources of Nigerian strategic culture 'its civil war history and experience; the significance of oil resources and geography and the nature of the political establishment'" (2004, p. 109). This chapter's analysis largely supports this view. That Francis' catechism of Nigerian "strategic culture" is outward looking, even where the only interstate deployment of military assets has been in PSOs, is unproblematic. This is due to the period analyzed by Francis (2004), the 1970s to the 1990s, the cold war period[17]. What is perhaps problematic is that Sondhaus (2006), like Francis (2004), fails to interrogate the transference of culture to Nigeria from its British colonialists — national historical experience as Gray (1981) calls it — and how this may have affected subsequent strategic culture and military posturing within Nigeria.

By and large then, where "outsiders" (Sondhaus, 2006, p. 119) have attempted to situate Nigeria within the same frame as countries with arguably a different form of strategic culture more suitable for "realist approaches" within "the cold war paradigm […] the domestic variable" was hence ignored (Francis, 2004, p. 107). This to some degree is visible in the attempt by Wendt and Barnett (1993) to shoehorn Nigeria into a broad category of "third world" that fails to reflect national historical experience and its impact on the Nigerian military as an isomorphic institution on the one hand, and its emergent strategic culture in the cold war period, on the other. Yet perhaps the context within which

[17] This period was earlier discussed in the chapter.

such writers as Sondhaus (2006) choose to frame strategic culture may be limited to the contentious nature of the concept itself.

Booth and Trood for instance are of the view that "strategic culture is a contested but essential concept" (1999, p. vii). The concept, they argue, is contested insofar as it has yet to be measurably demonstrated. Yet strategic culture also is essential, they say, because "to deny its existence is to claim that the diversity of attitudes and behavior with regard to the threat and use of force is entirely the result of material and structural factors unrelated to societal or cultural variables" (Booth & Trood, 1999, p. vii). Cautious as to defining the concept too narrowly, yet critical of what inherently is its broad nature, Booth and Trood settle therefore on a pithy summary of the concept: that, strategic culture sets out elements of a country's "politico-military common sense" (1999, p. vii). In some ways such a definition is similar to Ken Booth's own thesis on the subject, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (1979), published shortly after that by Jack Snyder (1977), on how "the 'fog of culture' interfered in the making and study of strategy", particularly within the Soviet context, making them all the more reticent to "change", as it was perceived within the Western context, as a result (1977). The thesis by Booth (1979) in particular, which appeared evergreen within its re-emergence in writings by Booth and Trood (1999, p. 5) two decades later, is particularly relevant to the theory base being built in this chapter. This is insofar as Booth effectively points out that strategists often fail to see the importance of culture in intrastate organizational development, "and that the failure could have deadly consequences" (1999, p. 5).

If strategic culture, first discussed by Snyder (1977) in the 1970s, has at its core, state "politico-military" posture as Booth and Trood contend (1999), then wrapped around this core is the government as a complex organization. Within this organization, composed of various institutions, culture remains largely consistent. Yet outside of it, culture is different — sometimes markedly so — vis-à-vis what exists in other countries (Kartchner, Johnson, & Larson, 2009). Within the state, strategic culture further embeds the military as an actor that is also a cultural, learning organization as Buley observes (2008). In this regard, strategic culture, scaled down, shares features with organizational culture (OC) (Koskinas, 2006).

Particularly within large and complex organizations, of which category militaries arguably fall into, Alvesson (2002) is of the view that culture is inextricable from organization itself: from its "strategic thinking" all the way down to even its "everyday" function (2002, p. 2). Within the learning organization, culture is said to be "highly significant […] to how knowledge is created, shared, maintained and utilized" (2002, p. 2). Moreover newer members of the organization more often than not inherit such culture, itself present only as the collective historical experiences and learning processes of those who came before, from the "founding period", according to Edgar Schein's classic schema on OC (1992). In this regard OC is inherited, is shared, is persistent, and may be seen in the organizational function. As put by Alvesson, culture is,

> …central in all aspects of organizational life. Even in those organizations where cultural issues receive little explicit attention, how people […] think, feel, value and act are guided by ideas, meanings and beliefs of a cultural (socially shared) nature (2002, pp. 1-2).

This position by Alvesson contributes to a line of thinking behind the definition of OC itself, which Frost *et al.* hold to be "the importance for people of symbolism – of rituals, myths, stories and legends – and about the interpretation of events, ideas, and experiences that are influenced and shaped by the groups within which they live" (Frost, Moore, Louis, Lundberg, & Martin, 1985).

OC therefeore, much like culture itself, is an umbrella concept by which — within the military as an organization (for instance) — we better understand "behavior, social events, institutions and processes". (Alvesson, 2002, p. 4). Indeed, such understanding is relevant because, as Carl Builder notes in his classic text, *Masks of War*, "like all individuals and durable groups, the military services have acquired personalities of their own that are shaped by their experiences and that, in turn, shape their behavior" (1989, pp. ix, 7-14). If this indeed is the case — though a caveat here is that Builder's thesis has itself been questioned (Koskinas, 2006) — formalized approaches to development alone may not capture the extent to which militaries develop. As Farrell and Terriff observe regarding the processes by which military organizations develop (effect change),

> Most scholars concentrate on explaining the major forms of change, those that military organizations are least likely to undertake […] Some analysts focus on change in doctrine. To focus on doctrine, though, is problematic. First, not all militaries have a doctrinal tradition. Second, in different national contexts, doctrine "has a different meaning, function, and relative importance." Third, as Stephen Rosen points out, "Changes in the formal doctrine of a military organization [may] leave the essential workings of the organization unaltered." [(1994, pp. 7-8)] Finally, doctrine may be informed by and developed as much for political as for strategic or operational reasons. These caveats indicate not that doctrine should not be considered when examining military organizations for military change, only that caution should be taken in doing so (2002, p. 5).

Karen Guttieri also contributes to this viewpoint, that formalized education alone may not necessarily make the military "smarter" (2006, pp. 254-255). This situation, she argues, is particularly relevant to developing countries (Guttieri, 2006, pp. 254-255). Making the case for a better understanding of organizational culture if the military is to become more effective and "smarter" within its internal function and interactions with civilians, Guttieri writes, "[military] officers who disdain disorder or are unable to resist the blandishments of civilians seeking to politicize the armed forces […]" may bring about "disastrous results for the entire country" (2006, p. 255).

Yet formalized education will not suffice for the organization to overcome this particular challenge, Guttieri cautions. Within the changing face of war and increased interactions within civilians in what Guttieri indicates is "the nature of war today", the organization must not remain so focused on formalized education, within its operational function, that it becomes detached from the environment around it which, informally, may drive its learning potential. As put by Guttieri,

> Much of professional military education is focused on doctrinal development and the conduct of analysis relevant to operations, because these kinds of studies make the military smarter as it prepares for and wages war. Doctrine and operations will not be effective in the end, however, if they are ill-suited to policy directives coming from the civilian government […]

> To remain relevant, professional military education not only must prepare officers for the challenges of new environments but also must address the complex changes in civil-military relations that accompany new modes of war fighting (2006, pp. 254-255).

Thus, whereas formalized learning is important to a broader understanding of military development, there is also a case to be made for understanding the less formal and less visible ways by which the military develops its operational function. Military culture, as an invisible and non-formalized way by which the organization changes, is therefore presented here as important to understanding organizational change as an aggregate.

This is not to say doctrine and other formalized areas of development no longer constitute agency for change. On the contrary, an enduring argument within this project is on the function of doctrine. Farrell and Terriff themselves acknowledge the importance of doctrine to development of the military organization, "change of doctrine cannot be entirely ignored, for adopting a new doctrine", they note, "can result in substantial changes in the practices and structure of a military organization" (2002, pp. 5-6). Moreover formalized military doctrine cannot always be said to be divorced from OC. As an example, Elizabeth Kier, using the French military experience, describes "the significance of organizational culture" for military doctrine's development (1995).

The position here is therefore that understanding organizational behavior, as an aggregate, involves both non-formalized processes such as OC and formalized processes of learning, discussed in the next chapter (four). Indeed as Kartchner *et al*., observe, an understanding of OC may help the military scholar make better sense of thought processes that underpin formalized processes (doctrine and operations, for instance), that underpin strategic decision making unique, in degrees, within each military (2009, pp. 6-7). This aligns, to some extent, with Jack Snyder's later thesis on the "ideology of the offensive" (Snyder, 1984) and the culture (and history) that underpinned the German army's "belief" in operations aimed at "rapid offensive victories" during the Great War (Snyder, 1984, pp. 15-40).

Moreover such understanding of historical and cultural influences on a military may be, as Lt. Col Kostinas argues, a necessary step — "a prerequisite" as he calls it — "to gaining an appreciation of the institutional assumptions" that may have perpetuated certain aversions (such as to development) or proclivities (such as for offensive thinking) within the military organization (2006, p. 9).

2-7. Historical National Experience and Military Culture in Nigeria

C. R. Niven opens his classic colonial-era text, *How Nigeria is Governed* (1950), by noting the relative absence of change brought about by historical antecedents of cultural transference in the state,

> We talk of new forms of government or of new constitutions, but these are in fact only partially new. The greater part of them is rooted firmly in the past. The changes are like new branches on a tree: the tree remains the same. No matter how revolutionary the change appears to be, if you go into it carefully you will see that it has come logically from past conditions […] sometimes so many steps are left out that it looks like a complete break-away. It is not. The past and the facts of geography will still have their influence (1950, p. 1).

Much of Niven's views above, written in 1948, 12 years before independence, stayed consistent with the postcolonial narrative. Nigeria, a product of empire, remained a polyglot and multiethnic entity — as difficult, and perhaps even more so, to keep together after colonial rule, as during. Government, and what David Killingray calls "the coercive institutions" of the state (1986, p. 422) of the state were appendages of what came before. These institutions, moreover, did not emerge overnight in the postcolonial era. Rather they followed a much-discussed colonialist precedent of force and coercion against the Nigerian citizen (Peters, 1997; Ukeje, 2004; Jauhari, 2011; Onyeozili, 2005), which both Killingray and Niven justify in degrees (Killingray, 1986; Niven, 1950), and which ironically constituted a cultural and organizational impediment to development of the internal security function of the state (Onyeozili, 2005)..

Incidentally Niven, who was not a military historian, does not discuss the military function within the colonial period much; other writers, such as Robin Luckham (1971a), Jimi Peters (1997), Herbert M.

Howe (2001) and David Killingray (1986), do however. Niven's comments are nonetheless consistent with the Nigerian military's institutionally isomorphic change, post independence: whereas much changed, much in fact remained the same. This was due as much to cultural transference between the old guard and the new; as to historical antecedents inextricable to discourses on the condition, on the conditioning, and on the function of the Nigerian Army[18] shortly after independence.

This section's analysis will not focus on the Nigerian military's rapid modernization in the postcolonial years. Peters already does a fine job in deconstructing the important role the British, who were still the majority (over 70 per cent) of the officer corps in the Nigerian Army by 1961 (1997), played in that process (1997). Robin Luckham also discusses in considerable detail the institutional make-up of the 1960s Nigerian military in his classic text, *The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960-67* (1971a).

However it is noteworthy within this conversation on the Nigerian military of the period, that the institution's function was for the most part internally focused, around the post-independence years. Peters alludes to this where he notes that, even years after independence, "the military that Nigeria maintained during the First republic [1963 to 1966] can, at best, be described as a constabulary force" (1997, p. 76). Thus, the analysis conducted here, and the broader conversation on development of the Nigerian military around independence, is barely inextricable from discourses on how the Nigerian military's internal function was developed within the same period.

Central to this conversation, as Robin Luckham observes, is the influence and culture of the British who dominated the Nigerian Army by, and beyond, independence (1971a). In this period, there was a first wave of modernization attempts. Both Miners (1971) and Peters (1997, pp. 81-82) point out that new formations were created in the Army, which in a few years was professionalized and rapidly became a powerful institution in its own right, within the state. There remained the pervading problem of indiscipline within the Army's ranks (Luckham, 1971a) however. Though this, admittedly, was less

[18] At independence, Nigeria had practically no air force and only a modest navy. See: Peters (1997, p.p. 76-83): Obiakor (2014); Nigerian Air Force (n.d)

of a concern amongst the officer cadre, which both Luckham (1971b) and Siollun (2009) appear to hold in particularly high regard.

What the Army's officer cadre lacked in organizational indiscipline however, it appeared to make up for, in ambition that was driven by a flagrant disregard of its constitutional obligations; breaking from its British colonialist roots in this regard (Luckham, 1971a). This politicization of the Army, and impunity as a vehicle of disregard for authority and ultimately attainment of political power, would be exacerbated by tensions inherent to what the politicians saw the Army's role as being in peacetime, relative to what the Army perceived its role as being *potentially*; particularly where an increasingly corrupt political class was viewed as requiring a "purge" — one that only the military could bring about (Siollun, 2009). This interpretation of "order" however, for which the military saw itself as being an arbiter, was "ambiguous" (Howe, 2001); there was no outcome to this politicization in which the Army could simultaneously hold political power, retain legitimacy as the neutral military institution it was originally designed to be, and focus on developing its increasingly neglected internal function. This was, moreover, not a problem limited to the Nigerian military *per se*; but rather was ubiquitous across emerging militaries on the sub-continent (Howe, 2001).

Within the Nigerian Army context, these issues of impunity and increasing politicization, and of tensions arising from the Army's perception of first republic politicians as being incompetent, corrupt and tribalistic, would combine with a distorted self-awareness of the Army's internal function in peacetime, to give rise to the "coup culture" that became part of the Army's identity, in the postcolonial decades (Siollun, 2009).

Politicization of the Army moreover, as historians like Luckham (1971a), Peters (1997) and Siollun (2009) note, would take away its neutrality, making it a political instrument; first *of* the state, as members of the military began taking political sides and making alliances (Siollun, 2009); and then *within* the state as military junta rule, emergent from a series of coups, dominated the political scene in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, with failed or successful coups in 1966, 1975, 1976, 1985 and 1990, in the thirty-three years between 1966 and 1999 the military would hold on to political power virtually

uninterrupted except for the Second Republic — a brief period between 1979 and 1983 when there was a return to democracy (Siollun, 2009; The BBC, 1999).

Such politicization and the Army's non-neutrality to internal politics was, to be sure, not an area of its doctrine, thinking or behavior that could be attributed to the British institutional model it inherited. Rather, the military's politicization, it could be said, was a feature of identity, of a power-seeking organization with a sense of entitlement and superiority over "bloody civilians", and of an interpretation by the military as an institution, of the power it wielded by virtue of the gun barrel.

Such bullishness within the Army's interpretation of the limits of its power moreover, would reflect in the Army's conduct internally. Where the Army was called upon to counter insurgency, or the threat of insurgency — such as against the Maitatsine in the 1980s (Falola, 2009), or in the Niger Delta in the late 1990s (Okonta & Douglas, 2003) — the same impunity left an unmistakable footprint (Samuel, 2013). This posture invariably contributed to the Army's internal perception as a heavy-handed coercive institution of the state (Falola, 2009; Okonta & Douglas, 2003). It is an identity still associated with the institution moreover, even today (Hill, 2012; Sutch & Lark, 2014).

Insofar as the Army was by far the dominant military service arm, and of increasing influence within the polity after the colonialists' departure; the formative years of the military were not entirely about the Army.

Establishment of the Nigerian Air Force, "first mooted in 1961 following the nation's participation in peace-keeping operations in Congo and Tanganyika (now Tanzania)" (Nigerian Air Force), was agreed "in principle", in 1962 (Nigerian Air Force). Along with the establishment of the Air Force as a sister service branch, significant investments were also made to develop the Navy (Peters, 1997). This was all in line with terms of the Anglo-Nigerian defence pact (Peters, 1997, pp. 71-75). As Peters notes of these "formative" (post-independence) years, the Nigerian military benefitted from the British postcolonial role, insofar as the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact accommodated for it (1997, pp. 71-75).

The pact, though unpopular within the nationalist wave being ridden at the time, allowed for a number of benefits for Nigerian military developments. These include, in Article 1 of the pact, "consultation and assistance on matters of mutual defence between both governments". In Article 2 of the pact there was specific accommodation for "training of members of the Nigerian Armed Forces, the supply of weapons, the provision of technical assistance in the development of the army and navy, and the establishment of an air force" (Peters, 1997, pp. 72-73). However, as some statesmen protested sequel to the signing of the pact, did that kind of assistance require the formality of a defence pact? (Peters, 1997, p. 73).

Moreover there were allegations by senior Nigerian officials that the pact was signed under duress. Chief Obafemi Awolowo for instance, Premier of the Western Region and so a delegate signatory, for instance pointed out that the Nigerian Prime Minister, along with Awolowo and the other two regional Premiers, were, "bundled to No. 10 Downing Street and were asked to initial this document, on the understanding that unless we did so, it could not be possible for Her Majesty's government to make a declaration fixing the date for independence" (House of Representatives, 1960).

Notwithstanding political misgivings against the pact, and claims of "bare-faced, unabashed and undue influence" (Peters, 1997, p. 73) by the British in its signing, certain areas of it — Articles 1 and 2 for instance — brought undeniable military gains, and a stability, modernization and professionalization within the Nigerian military organization, it may otherwise have struggled to implement so swiftly without the British.

By 1958, when the Lagos government gained control of the Nigerian Military Forces (NMF) from the Army Council in London, British culture, development and influence was already significant within the Nigerian military institution (Peters, 1997, p. 73). Indeed, such was the British enduring influence the Nigerian military was accused of being one of the slowest institutions to key into the "Nigerianization" process discussed by Peters (1997, p. 63), by Ajayi (2007) and alluded to by other military historians, such as Luckam (1971a).

Notwithstanding this alleged slow pace of the military's Nigerianization (comparative to the police for instance), the former was either still identified as integrating local personnel too quickly (Peters, 1997, p. 78) or was viewed as an institution whose British principal had left in a "hasty" fashion, at independence (Luckham, 1971a). This may have had negative consequences on "professional efficiency, discipline and morale" of the nascent Nigerian military (Peters, 1997, p. 78). Within the Army for instance, "promotions and transfers were so rapid that officers were assigned responsibilities for which they were ill-equipped by their training and experience" (Peters, 1997, p. 8).

Nigerianization, however detrimental its quickening may have been for the Nigerian military's development, nonetheless was both necessary and inevitable. The latter was so because empire, by the mid-1950s, had shrunk and was shrinking as the British left their colonial interests; first to mandated, then to appointed, and then, upon their departure, to locally elected (or militarily forced) rule.

Some positive early institutional outcomes of Army's Nigerianization were the establishment of the Nigerian Military Training College (now the Nigerian Army School of Infantry, NASI) in 1960 and the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) in 1964 "to provide training up to commissioning level" (Peters, 1997, p. 78).

However, being dominated by British personnel by and shortly after independence arguably made the Nigerian military better, rather than worse, going by the study conducted by Luckham (1971a), of the institution at the time. Professionalization — discipline, command and staff expertise, structure and aggregate combat readiness of units — for instance, is an area where it is difficult to see how the military could have developed as quickly as it did, without British direction. This is notwithstanding a crop of younger, newly commissioned Nigerian officers; talented enough to obtain commissions in any army, as Lindsay Barret (1979) observes.

Within this analysis of Nigerian military development around independence, it is noteworthy that the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact, once signed, was short-lived, being abrogated in January 1962 (Peters, 1997, p. 75). It thus will be shortsighted to assume British contribution, to development of the

Nigerian military, existed solely within the pact's parameters. Rather much of the contribution and influence also came in the colonial years; specifically the period between 1953 when the first officers (Maimalari and Umar Lawan) were given regular commissions from Sandhurst (Peters, 1997, p. 63), through independence in 1960 by which time 61 Nigerian military personnel had been commissioned (of which 57 were combat commissions) (Peters, 1997, p. 63) and up to 1962, when the abrogation of the fact put military relations between Britain and the Nigerian government at its lowest since the country was amalgamated.

Still, by 1962, influence in terms of development and culture, extended by the British on the nascent Nigerian military, was significant; bearing in mind the first Nigerian NCOs were given (short service) commissions as far back as 1948 (Peters, 1997; Luckham, 1971a).

This influence certainly had a positive effect on overall quality of the military, as Luckham notes (Luckham, 1971a). This is despite the fact that the Nigerian military institution still had a very Nigerian character, and certainly was "Nigerianized", by the time of British colonialists departure (Luckham, 1971b). Though this was more evident in the officer cadre, and less so amongst soldiers and NCOs who were less stringently recruited. This however is hardly a peculiarity to the Nigerian military experience, as officer recruits tend to be of higher quality in militaries elsewhere. Nonetheless, poor standards of recruitments for soldiers meant such recruits were both more undisciplined and more difficult to discipline, and thus less likely to show restraint in the internal military function. Indeed, the festering problem of indiscipline within the Army's early years manifested in "at least one attempt at munity" (Luckham, 1971a, p. 233), and also in the conduct of the military's internal function. Moreover British influence would prove a double-edged affair insofar as the Nigerian military, by association with its colonial principal, remained unpopular. As put by Luckham,

> The emergence of the army out of tutelage seems to have brought a perceptible improvement in the military's prestige and self-image. The unpopularity of the military as the instrument of

> colonial rule and the low pay of soldiers meant that recruits came mainly from the more remote and less prosperous areas of the country (1971a, p. 233)

A couple of caveat to the accounts underpinning this historical analysis of the Army should be highlighted, For one, first party Nigerian Army officer accounts such as those by James Oluleye (1990) have been criticized for downplaying the "military maladministration" within the institution the time (Okere, 1991). Second, external historian accounts such the interpretation by Robin Luckham (1971a) of post-colonial development within the Nigerian military appear to have been questioned as well. Comparing the views by Luckham (1971a) of the post-civil war Nigerian military to those of Miners (1971) for instance, Berrett (1972) comes to the sobering conclusion that evidential disparity underpinning the narratives of two of the more accomplished writers on the Nigerian military at the time — in Luckham (1971a) and Miners (1971)— was "troubling" (Berrett, 1972). Whereas the assessment by Luckham (1971a) of the Nigerian military at the time for the most part is consistent with that by other writers on the subject[19], precise details of this account by Luckham (1971a) may therefore be worth double-checking; particularly where used in a comparative context.

Nonetheless, the narrative by Luckham (1971a) on the Nigerian military, even if not the specifics of that narrative *per se*, is consistent with accounts of those by first parties in the military at the time; J. J. Oluleye (1990), for instance. Moreover Berrett (1972) does not make it clear whether either narrative by Luckham (1971a)or Miners (1971) is inaccurate *per se*, only that marked disparities exist between both.

Luckham also appears to question overall quality and commitment of British officers seconded to the Army,

> There [has been] …some controversy over whether the British officers seconded to the army were of poor caliber […] their period of service in West Africa was very short, tending to

[19] Howe (2001), Oluleye (1990), Miners (1971) and Peter (1997)s for instance

> reduce their commitment to the country and its army and to make difficult to establish stable lines of authority because of the rapid turnover in command posts (1971a, p. 233) .

This too may have affected the strategic ability to implement the reforms needed to address the problems related to personnel caliber during postwar recruitment. Without a careful assessment of who was allowed to join the Army, how their attitudes were realigned from the colonialist action set, and what type of measures were required to address problems of indiscipline, there thus were serious concerns around what type of Nigerian military was being left to take over from the British, with the entire officer corps being indigenous by 1965 (Luckham, 1971a).

Over the years as the military eased into this new role as an entirely indigenous force, problems emerged related to the unaddressed issues above as well as to the practices instituted within the military, during colonial rule. Also contributing to the military's predicament, as J. J. Oluleye observes, were the range of "wider responsibilities", within the military's internal function, which the transition from colonial rule made it "unwittingly or deliberately" assume (1990). Yet, as Okere suggests, the military in Nigeria, even by the late 1970s, was dogged by "…corruption, indiscipline, economic blunders, ignorance, irrationality, hypocrisy and repression…" (1991, pp. 404-406) all of which may have stifled the military's effectiveness; particularly where its internal function was concerned.

Perhaps the most notable of the emergent issues, within accounts by Nigerian military historians, is politicization and abuse of the military's internal function; as studies by Peters (1997), Gbemisola (2003), Luckham (1971a), Siollun (2009) and Howe (2001) indicate.

Another artifact of the colonialist model was an embedded cynicism and brutality in the manner the military performed its internal function. This existent historical practice is well researched and discussed in the literature (Ajayi, 2007; Alemika, 1993; Ukeje, 2011; George, Shadare, & Owoyemi, 2012; Ejiogu, 2007; Jauhari, 2011; Onyeozili, 2005; Peters, 1997; Howe, 2001), and is hardly disputed within both the historical and contemporary discourses of Nigerian military posture internally. Such

practice by the Nigerian military moreover is consistent with a certain parochialism to the way the Nigerian military would see its function, and a prestige in the way it viewed itself internally, vis-à-vis the civilian within the same environment (Ajayi, 2007).

This culture, moreover, was long existent, being a feature first of the British colonial military personnel themselves (Howe, 2001) and then of the local surrogates (Niven, 1950; Alemika, 1993) to which security duties of the colony were increasingly delegated as empire's direct administrative hold loosened within its colonies.

In a sense therefore, that the indigenous military forces — the "Nigerianized" military in the case of Nigeria — subscribed to heavy-handed methods towards civil disobedience merely made them, expectedly as analysis in this chapter would shortly argue, modeled institutions. The practices were modeled after those by the colonial military and police forces that preceded them (Howe, 2001; Jauhari, 2011; Onyeozili, 2005); which in turn were what Killingray refers to as "the coercive institutions" of the military and police (1986, p. 422)..

For the colonialist state however, military coercion against the citizen was not just important, it arguably was critical, with the British colonialists' administrative calculations, to "keeping the peace" (War Office, 1957). This is taking nothing away from the fact that such peace was, by and large, imposed without a legitimate social contract or democratic dialogue between state and citizen. Furthermore the colonialist military's approach to keeping to peace was markedly different from the same concept of "keeping the peace" back in Britain (Williams, 1967). This indicates a distinction between how the concept of policing and the military function in authorities' handling of civil unrest was institutionalized at home in Britain and elsewhere in Empire.

As an example, Williams conducts a study, *Keeping the Peace: The Police and Public Order* (1967), on the handling of civil unrest back in Britain, in the first half of the 20th century. Williams' study paints a picture of a humane and significantly more civil approach by authorities toward British civil disobedience; whether by individuals or by groups (Williams, 1967). This approach moreover saw the

police, not the military, assigned to policing duties (Williams, 1967). These findings by Williams (1967) are consistent with observations by Killingray (1986) on the marked distinction between policing and law and order in colonialist African territories specifically, and that back in Britain (Killingray, 1986). Killingray concedes that the colonialist concept was significantly more coercive and that overall, "policing in British colonial Africa is in many ways similar to that of England before the Peel reforms of 1829" (1986, p. 413). Part of the idea underpinning such reforms, which were never applied to British administration in colonialist Nigeria, was that law and order could be maintained "without having to call for the aid of the army", and that "[whereas] soldiers were trained to use lethal weapons. A police institution could be trained to restore order without guns and sabres" (Open University).

It is important to understand however, why, almost a century and a half later, by the mid-1950s, the military function remained so prominent within colonialist thinking and action set, around civil unrest in all its manifestations. Two reasons are noteworthy here, both of which had changed so markedly by the post-colonial period, that a revision of the military function was critical. Such a revision however, for reasons demonstrated over the course of this chapter, would arguably never manifest in the Nigerian context.

The first reason this thesis contends, for which the colonialist military played such a prominent role internally, was that the subjugated African, unlike the free British person, was not afforded full citizenship rights even locally within the colony (Niven, 1950). As a result, administrative policies applied by Whitehall to indigenes within British colonies were not just different to policies that applied within the UK; they were markedly different. Policing therefore, within the colonies, took a darker and markedly more violent approach; with the military, rather than just the police, employed for instrumentality (Killingray, 1986). The sort of UK policing reforms to deemphasize the military function for instance, which Prime Minister Peel saw as necessary as far back as 1829, would never manifest throughout the period of British colonialist rule in Nigeria.

Second, there were acute manpower shortages of trainable and deployable police personnel (Killingray, 1986). It therefore was unfeasible that the police alone played a policing role. The armed forces beyond the police *had* to play a prominent role in addition, if the peace was to be kept (Killingray, 1986). To Killingray therefore, "it is clear that law and order meant different things to different people at different times. Colonial officials administering a territory from the capital had a markedly different view of what constituted, and what was involved, in maintaining law and order…" (1986).

Such views are reinforced by the thinking in the influential military manual, *Keeping the Peace (Duties in Support of the Civil Power)*, promulgated for use within Empire: overseas dependencies and colonialist territories (War Office, 1957). The methods described within chapters three and eight of that manual, on "suppression" and "drastic action", and on the use of "military force" against local "terrorists", are particularly disturbing (War Office, 1957, pp. 12-16, 44-49). Additionally, use of interrogation, presented as "extremely valuable" in collection of intelligence (War Office, 1957, p. 48), and afforded its own section in chapter nine of the colonialist manual, is entirely absent from William's study on policing during civil unrest back in Britain. The differences continue. The British citizen had a complement of rights and could sue the police if manhandled, even if accused of civil disobedience (Williams D. , 1967). This was insofar as a legal framework existed that protected citizens fundamental rights, even where guilty (Williams D. , 1967). As a range of studies indicates however, such privileges did not extend to civilly disobedient African citizens under empire (Anderson D. , 2005; Bennett, 2013; Elkins, 2005a; Elkins, 2005b; Newsinger, 2002). This was the case moreover, where the police, rather than the military *per se*, were the aggressors; certainly in the case of Nigeria (Onyeozili, 2005; Jauhari, 2011).

Within the context of British policing in the UK, such force measures as part of keeping the peace, permissible within colonialist territories, should largely be considered unthinkable; not least in part because of the Peel Reforms and the de-emphasis of the role of the military against the civil populace (Williams D. , 1967). In the colonies however, it was different matter altogether. The military role was

an enduringly prominent one, and a doctrinally forceful one omnipresent within "the maintenance of law and order in British Colonial Africa" (Killingray, 1986).

Certainly therefore, within the context of colonial Nigeria, the military's function internally was not only emphasized, the coercive thinking and action set that underpinned that function was systemically was passed on to "indigenous" military personnel (Niven, 1950). These "indigenous" military personnel, effectively trained civilians rather than part of what would later become a professionalized Nigerian Army, were drafted to save administrative costs on British troops (Niven, 1950). Such cost savings were necessary as empire began to wane, even in African territories.

By independence, indoctrination was complete. The new guard had been keenly observant of coercive practices of the old. Indeed, coercive action, in the postcolonial decades, would sometimes be employed with an enthusiasm and vigor that surpassed even the colonialists' (Niven, 1950). The "coercive institutions" of the state, in the military and the police, therefore would perpetuate the colonialist force model against the citizen, even long after colonialists' departure. Indeed, *Keeping the Peace*, although a colonialist manual, would endure within the Nigerian military doctrine, for decades post-independence[20]. Furthermore, long after the military first began its role as a coercive state instrument internally, the stigma would likewise endure. As Sutch and Lark note in a 2014 Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency symposium by the Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC) and US Special Operations Command (US SOCOM).

> The history of the NA as it evolved from the colonial era is fraught with perception that tends to be negative as the service was used as a militia force, by the colonialists. It was essentially used as a repressive organ against the people, who at the time were slaves. The militia was made to carry out acts such as torture, harassment and extortion on behalf of the colonial power. This caused resentment towards militia, from the people who saw the organization as a tool of oppression (Sutch & Lark, 2014, p. 20).

[20] Multiple conversations with a Nigerian Army colonel familiar with the manual.

As Alka Jauhari (2011) argues however, rather than abrogating coercive practices, surrogate military and police personnel were more repressive in turn. “In fact, after independence”, Jauhari notes, “both the national and the regional governments have practiced the policies pursued by their colonial masters with greater impunity” (2011, p. 55). Despite this attitude of the military and police surrogate to his countryman however, he could not be done without and this has little to do with Nigerianization *per se*. As Niven observes, use of the surrogate, whether in direct rule (as in Southern Nigeria) or through indirect rule (as in northern Nigeria) was necessary because,

> Lugard [the British-imposed Governor-General of Nigeria] had a very small European staff, and the money he had to spend could not possibly pay for the large numbers that would be required had it been decided to run the whole country by direct administration—that is, by the personal rule of the white man… (1950, p. 97)

Niven (1950) suggests within his study that, by 1950, security arrangements were gradually opened to local personnel, who would consequently carry out their duty with undiminished brutality. Within this pseudo-local military function, “wrongdoers” — into which vague category those opposed to British occupation fell — were said to be “punished—brutally” (Niven, 1950, p. 97).. Niven rationalizes this behavior, noting such brutality came “under a recognized system of law” (1950, p. 97) and was to be expected, coming as it did under a transformation process (Nigerianization) that incrementally divested security duty from colonialist to indigenous personnel (1950, p. 97). Killingray (1986), writing on the subject, appears to take a somewhat different view.

Rather than seeing colonialist force against the citizen as “inevitable” as Niven (1950, p. 97) does, Killingray observes that, when “violence had to be used some colonial officials saw this as an admission of failure” (1986, p. 414). However like Niven, Killingray for the most part exaggerates the British colonialist as a benevolent ruler interested in the local beyond its convergence with Crown interests (1986). As an example Killingray is defensive of his view that British colonialist administration “rested on a minimum of force” (1986, p. 422).

It is understandable, though no less comfortable, in Killingray's undertone that the British could have used a great deal more force, should it have wished to, in repressing the local citizen (1986). This certainly is true. Furthermore, making the argument that British colonialist administration was, as an aggregate, oppressive in Nigeria in particular may be overplaying the widespread caricaturization of the British as relentlessly evil colonial masters, wherever they administered territory. Indeed, British colonialist brutality in Kenya within SSA (Bennett, 2013; Elkins, 2005b; Alao, 2006), and in Malaya (Barber, 1971; Newsinger, 2002; Newsinger, 2006) outside of it, gives the lie to the notion that British military activity in Nigeria superseded, rather than supported, administrative duty.

Yet that what was in place, in terms of colonial military posture within some of the colonies — Nigeria for instance — was seen in a sense as benevolence on the part of the British, conversely downplays the already repressive nature of colonial military model and ignores the precedent set (Howe, 2001; Peters, 1997) for the postcolonial Nigerian military.

What Killingray does particularly well, which sets his thesis apart from much of the existent literature on the colonial Nigerian military, is his depiction of the interaction between the military and police (Killingray, 1986). To be sure, the police were very much used for policing and maintaining "law and order". Yet the military too, politicized, as Luckham (1971a), Miners (1971) and Siollun (2009) all note, were used for similar purposes. Contributions by Howe (2001), Jauhari (2011), Peters (1997), Ukeje (2011) and, to a lesser extent, by Ajayi (2007) serve to highlight this blurring of police and military use, within a politicized context, internally. As put by Killingray, on the interaction between the police and military functions,

> The forces employed to maintain law and order consisted of the government police in the front line with the military in reserve; both forces were numerically small. Africa was only thinly policed by the colonial government. Colonial government had an interest in protecting European lives and property in towns and commercial centres and providing a measure of control over the key parts of the economic infrastructure (1986, p. 414).

Killingray discusses why the colonial police, by itself, could not keep the peace. In his view the police function was limited by capacity, making it an impractical security instrument, without attendant military aid to the civil power (1986). Killingray presents an interesting analogy,

> The picture of policing in British colonial Africa is in many ways similar to that of England before the Peel reforms of 1829, where, writes Paul Rock [(1983)], "certain areas were unpatrolled and unpatrollable, and they enjoyed an autonomy of state control" (1986, p. 414).

One area Killingray does omit however is the nature of policing and the military function; which others have pointed out tended to be repressive (Howe, 2001). Niven does not so much make the same omission, as he acknowledges the coercive nature of these institutions; "there were, of course, many abuses" (1950, p. 97), he notes. Niven however attempts to rationalize. First where he writes, "the system was sound, and [Governor General] Lugard knew that" it just had to be modernized (1950); then where he contends, "it is inevitable that where so much power is given to individuals, who may not be men of great education and conscience, there will be abuses, cruelties and extortions" (1950).

On the second point, Niven's book was written in 1948 so he could not have tempered his view of British civility with British treatment of "indigenous" elsewhere in Kenya (Elkins, 2005a; Elkins, 2005b; Alao, 2006; Bennett, 2013), in Aden (Naumkin, 2004) and in Malaya (Barber, 1971; Newsinger, 2006; Charters, 1989; Hale, 2013) for instance, as these attempts to counter local insurgencies would come later. However it is odd that he likewise downplayed or even entirely neglected to mention British subjugation of the "native", as Niven referred to the Nigerian citizen on occasion (1950); both in the north and, as the colonialists came inland from the coast, in the south (Niven, 1950).

Where British rule already existed, Niven also neglects to mention the nature of British (or British-mandated) activity to deter or disband occurrences of civil disobedience. Major incidents of military repression within the Nigerian colonialist discourses are admittedly few, particularly relative to the scale of repression elsewhere in Kenya for instance (Elkins, 2005a; Elkins, 2005b). Some examples

however do exist, of heavy-handed responses within colonialist Nigeria. As an example in northern Nigeria, Okene and Ishak (2010) point to the seminal study by Muhammad Umar (2008), on northern Nigerian responses to colonialism. Here, the writers observe,

> […] Fredrick J.D Lugard, then a colonel and commander of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) never hid the fact that the legitimacy of the colonial rule itself was by the British military conquest. The British secured the recognition of its authority by punitive expeditions and ruthless engagements against all those who were considered recalcitrant (Okene & Ishak, 2010, p. 239).

Two specific instances of the WAFF's military adventurisms against revolt were first the "Battle of Burmi in July 1903 when Sultan Muhammad Attahiru I and a score of others were killed" (Okene & Ishak, 2010, p. 240) and then "the exterminative regime against anti colonial Satiru revolts of March 1906" (Okene & Ishak, 2010, p. 240).

Charles Ukeje, this time within Nigeria's Niger Delta, identifies two more examples. These are "the ruthless suppression of dissent; for instance during the anti-tax riots of 1929/30 in Warri province […] and in the suppression of the Egba women's demonstration against the arbitrary indulgences of their king, the Alake, in 1948" (Ukeje, 2004; Ukeje, 2011, p. 88).

These accounts certainly did not approximate repression on the scale of British military suppression elsewhere; but incidents such as these (if not these specific incidents *per se*), within Niven's time, nonetheless constituted repression and were perhaps worth highlighting by Niven (1950) in his account of the role of the colonialist British military in Nigeria.

Furthermore, whereas Niven (1950) acknowledges the surrogate coercive institution was repressive in itself, he fails to make the connection between this mandated institution and the British colonial military it was modeled after. The emerging military culture was, after all, an appendage of what preceded it (Howe, 2001, pp. 29-37). A precedent was set, and one organization simply modeled itself after the most familiar organization it knew, using practices it had seen to be effective (Howe, 2001, p.

29). This precedent however brought with it an enduring stigma to the Nigerian military, linking it to its repressive colonialist military origins. As Sutch and Lark observe, "many people still view the NA as a repressive organization. The stories passed down by people, for over 147 years, have created a negative perception of the NA" (2014, p. 20). Nor is this a narrative unique to the Nigerian military experience; rather it is one that studies indicate applies more broadly to military institutions across SSA (Howe, 2001; Reno, 2011).

Howe (2001, pp. 29-37) discusses the tendency of African militaries to follow the colonialist model of a coercive and politicized army, used for policing purposes. This, in Howe's view, blurred the lines between the police and military functions (2001, p. 37). "African rulers", Howe writes, "continued colonialism's subnational" deployment of the Army for police purposes (2001, p. 37). These leaders, Howe contends, "also followed colonialism's example of using soldiers for domestic partisan purposes. A continuing lack of urgency, aided by the possibility of foreign support […] allowed regimes to stress political loyalty over military competence" (2001, p. 37). The police and policing was not excluded from such behavior, moreover.

Citing the study of colonialism and policing by Etannibi Alemika (1993), Charles Ukeje writes that the police was "prone to brutalizing the colonized [Nigerian] peoples and vandalizing their property" (2011, p. 88) but also adds that the "roots of the crisis of legitimacy […] continues to dog the institution in the post-independence era" (2011, p. 88) leading to a "striking parallel" of the police and military functions in Nigeria, pre and post independence (2011). Alka Jauhari also writes,

> The [Nigeria] police force is a genesis of the colonial times. […] the British used the police force to repress the colonized. After independence, however, it was hoped that the new police force will observe and protect the civil liberties of the Nigerians. During the First and the Second Republic the police power was [nonetheless] used by the national and regional governments to silence any opposition to their authority… (2011, p. 55)

This is similar to Onyeozili's observation that emergent police authorities "adopted" the colonialists' "authoritarian method of suppression and repression" (2005, p. 38). To be sure, advent of independence brought about a requirement — an "urgency", as Howe calls it — that African states abrogate colonial military practices to reflect new postcolonial identity (2001, pp. 29-37). Yet this requirement in practice, at least within the Nigerian military experience, was smothered by institutional isomorphism and retention of the existing war model. Even in areas that the military and police systems were, as Jauhari puts it, "broken" due to the model they adopted; the organizations "made no attempts" to change their approach (2011).

This subconscious or deliberate decision to perpetuate the existing institutional model despite its flaws, and particularly post-independence, may be vexing, or at the least, baffling, to scholars who, Jauhari (2011) included, suggest the adjustment should have been made following the transition from colonialism to independence. Howe refers to this situation as "a lack of urgency" on the part of the postcolonial military (Howe, 2001, pp. 29-37). This is insofar as independence ostensibly provided a vehicle for change.

An interrogation of organizational theory however appears to provide an answer to this apparent organizational irregularity. Testing this theory within the Nigeria case, the emergent argument is that it was not that the military specifically, did not change; it did. However because change was for the most part isomorphically constrained, it served to perpetuate, rather than to re-invent, the existing war model. Similarity between the postcolonial and the colonial Nigerian military should not, therefore, come as a surprise, going by DiMaggio and Powell's thesis on "institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields" (1983). The thesis is not absolute, nor do DiMaggio and Powell (1983) present it to be, even though the writers do a credible job of substantiating it. Indeed, not all not change within organizations that emerge from existing ones, is institutionally isomorphic. However in the case of the Nigerian military, as the section that follows will argue, the theory of institutional isomorphism holds substantive explanatory power for the military's development of its internal function, post independence.

2-8. Theory of Institutional Isomorphism and the Nigerian Military.

Institutional isomorphism constitutes a process whereby institutional transfers between one entity (the modeled organization) and another (the modeling organization) bring about little aggregate change on the latter (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

Within the context of the postcolonial Nigerian military as the modeling organization and the British colonialist military as the modeling organization, institutional isomorphism can be used a framework for evaluating outcomes of the "transfer processes"r(Luckham, 1971a) from which the Nigerian military would emerge between 1956 and 1966 (Miners, 1971). Using this framework, moreover, evaluation of the postcolonial Nigerian military gives the lie to the notion that transfer processes from pre to post-independence military organization brought about substantive institutional change.

The emergent "startling homogeneity of organizational forms and practices" within organizations that seek change, DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 148) contend, hardly a dichotomy. Rather such homogenization between organizational forms and practice constitutes an expected outcome within organizational theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

In attempting to explain the underpinnings of these transfer processes, which drives the isomorphic change of an organization modeled after another, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) introduce two relevant mechanisms within their study. Each of these mechanisms will be briefly introduced and then used within an analysis of how this thesis by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) is of import to an analysis of Nigerian military institutional modeling after the British, in the postcolonial period.

The first of the mechanisms discussed by the writers as two ways by which isomorphism — change that approximates institutionally isomorphic change — is reinforced in practice, is that of "coercive isomorphism" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150). DiMaggio and Powell define coercive isomorphism as resultant from "both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in society within which organizations function" (1983, p. 150).

Within the Nigeria case, exit of colonialists — hitherto the organizers of the Nigerian military and culturally omnipresent in the institution — constituted a form of tacit pressure by which the emergent military would be measured vis-à-vis its principal. This pressure was inevitable and, arguably, unavoidable by the Nigerian military post independence. It was not forced upon or insinuated by the British on their exit, insofar as they had institutionalized this outcome by leaving the Nigerian military dependent, even in independence; a military with only a semblance of professionalism, rather than fully professionalized (Ajayi, 2007).

It also did not help that the transfer process from British to Nigerian military officers was done so quickly and without the smooth transition some might imagine took place. Herbert Howe (2001) devotes time to, and is critical regarding the nature of, this transitioning in his text *Ambiguous Order*. Indeed, this haste in transfer (Luckham, 1971a) may underpin a lot of the Nigerian military's postcolonial institutional and sociological challenges, as the military struggled with identity in its formative years (Luckham, 1971a; Miners, 1971; Peters, 1997; Siollun, 2009). In Luckham's view for instance, "a cogent reason why the transfer of institutions did not have the expected results was that the replacement of the British by Nigerians in the officer corps had to be effected in haste because of the political priorities of Independence" (1971a, p. 3).

Nor were such premature transfer processes limited to the military alone; signs of it could also be seen elsewhere in the Nigerian government, as studies by Adegboyega Ajayi (2007) indicate. Max Siollun also alludes to the disquiet of "premature independence" (2009, pp. 12-13). By independence therefore, and arguably long after, there remained a significant degree of reliance by the Nigerian military on the British institutional model. As Peters writes,

> The fact that before independence, a defence agreement between Nigeria and Britain was negotiated suggests that the British had probably envisaged that some form of military relationship with Nigeria would still be maintained, and therefore refrained from developing the Nigerian Armed Forces… (1997, p. 64)

A caveat should be provided to this argument that the Nigerian military drew much, in principle and in practice, from its British principal. Insofar as organizations may isomorphically adopt features that favour them institutionally, other aspects of the adopted model may be discarded (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Nor is this selection process arbitrary *per se*; identity of the learning organization, as well as the environment in which isomorphism takes place, may both influence what is adopted and what is not.

In the case of Nigeria for instance, "the somewhat rigid traditions", for a military that historically struggled to balance ethnic tensions within its ranks with career expectations, and its status as a professional and politically neutral organization, "made it less easy to cope realistically with tensions between the ranks" (Luckham, 1971a, p. 3). Thus it was to be expected that even though the British institutional model endured, practices and an unwritten doctrine, inconsistent with that model, became part of the Nigerian military identity. As Luckham argues,

> There is little doubt that Nigerian officers at Sandhurst, Mons, Fort Benning, Quetta or the Staff College, Camberley, learned their jobs well and acquired the correct social skills to accompany them. But they returned to play their newly acquired role in an army the social structure of which had been distorted (1971a, p. 3).

Put another way, an organization will not necessarily adopt features that are detrimental to it, nor will it, for that matter, fail to employ methods that are foreign to its principal model but that help it to seize opportunity within the environment it now finds itself.

With regards to the Nigerian military and its British principal, a classic example here is what emerged to be the military's "coup culture", discussed in considerable detail by Max Siollun (2009). As Robin Luckham writes of the beginnings of this culture, which would endure within the Nigerian military institution for decades,

> The colonial government in Nigeria created a military organization in Nigeria which was modelled on the British army in organizational format and professional training. Yet on 15

> January 1966, less than six years after independence, a small group of army officers carried out a military coup against the civilian regime, violating the Sandhurst formula of the political neutrality of the military (1971a, p. 1).

This partial selection of the Nigerian military, in its adaptation of the British colonialist model, appears stark in the above observation by Luckham (1971a). Indeed, Luckham will further appear skeptical as to whether at all institutional transfer takes place, within what he calls "an immeasurably difficult process",

> …There are problems connected with the transfer of institutions from one socio-political context to another tish army in organizational format and professional training. Yet on 15 January 1966, less than six years after independence, a small gronal transfer is notoriously vague; and there are still remarkably few good descriptions of how new organizations and procedures actually become established in the newly independent states (1971a, p. 1).

If indeed academic knowledge on institutional transfer within the Nigerian military in its postcolonial years remains lacking in researched description, the hope therefore, within this section of the thesis chapter in particular, and within the chapter itself more broadly, is that a contribution is made to academic knowledge in this area. Specifically, the knowledge contribution in question refers to the Nigerian military's interpretation of its function, and the model it inherited, sequel to the British army "institutional transfer" process.

With the first mechanism of "coercive isomorphism" now discussed, the second mechanism introduced by Dimaggio and Powell (1983, p. 151), that of "mimetic processes" will be evaluated. The context of the evaluation is how the "mimetic processes" mechanism contributes to an interpretative framework for the institutional transfer processes within the Nigerian military in its formative years as a professional organization.

Mimetic processes, as defined by DiMaggio and Powell, constitute organizational "changes" driven largely by uncertainty (1983, p. 151). Put simply, within this framework, if what is in place "works"

then change, as an aggregate, is minimal. This is similar to what Luckham refers to as a general adherence to "childrearing patterns" within "recently transferred institutions" (1971a, p. 2). In such a case, existing practice, processes, and underlying principles, are retained. Applying this to the Nigerian military case, George *et al*., for instance take incidence with the fact that,

> Despite the country becoming a Republic in 1963, the Nigerian Armed Forces were still structured along the British Military System and to implement British-oriented doctrines, the trainings from the simple to the complex ones both in content and methodology were done […] in the British fashion (2012, p. 195).

However it may not be entirely reasonable to expect that, a few years post-independence, an army reinvents itself and/or develops its own doctrine and practice. At the very least, as Hills (2004) observes, development of codified doctrine takes years, possibly longer if done from scratch, without experience. The postcolonial military did not have expertise or structures to develop doctrine; Nigerian Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was established over two decades after independence, in 1981 (Nigerian Army) and the British did not write, or teach local personnel to develop or use, independent (non-British) doctrine. Therefore, if doctrine were expected to underpin practice, which some argue it should (US Army and Marine Corps, 2007), the process of shifting models that constitute theory and practice may take longer still.

Furthermore, should Luckham's "immeasurably difficult transfer processes" be taken to apply to the postcolonial Nigerian military case, which he suggests it does (1971a, pp. 1-14), then yet more time may need to be accommodated, for these processes to demonstrably show an organization whose adopted model approximates a perfect reflection of that envisaged by its principal.

In reality however, due to uncontrollable features of the local environment — social, political, institutional and so on — with which the emergent organization may have to wrestle for its entire existence, any modeling that occurs will always be imperfect at best, and a hollow caricature of what was initially envisaged by both parties, at worst.

Given such constraints and added to the uncertainty of a newly independent military, it should be expected that whereas the Nigerian military modeled itself after the British this modeling process will take time, will be selective rather than absolute, and will enduringly remain far from perfect. This therefore questions the heuristic validity of George *et al.*'s contention.

DiMaggio and Powell further highlight this inevitability of imperfection and uncertainly in modeling where they write, "modeling, as we use the term, is a response to uncertainty" (1983, p. 151). Yet this should not be taken to mean that attempts at modeling are ill advised or that the associated uncertainty is necessarily problematic for the model's objectives. Indeed, both uncertainty around the modeling process, and imperfection within an adopted model, can be of heuristic and practical value to the modeled organization. As DiMaggio and Powell note,

> The modeled organization may be unaware of the modeling or may have no desire to be copied; it merely serves as a convenient source of practices that the borrowing organization may use. Models may be diffused unintentionally [..] One of the most dramatic instances of modeling was the effort of Japan's modernizers in late nineteenth century to model new governmental initiatives on apparently successful western prototypes. Thus the imperial government sent its officers to study […] Army, and police in France, the Navy […] in Great Britain… (1983, p. 151).

DiMaggio and Powell's framework, within the context of the Nigerian military as an isomorphic organization is outlined in Table 2-1.

HYPOTHESIS	INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM	CONTEXT
A-1	The greater the dependence of an organization on another organization, the more similar it will become to that organization in structure, in climate and in behavioural focus	This is perhaps the most self-evident of all the hypotheses within the Nigerian military context. Even today, the Nigerian military continues to model its culture, practices, structure, doctrine and processes after the British. The next two chapters will demonstrate that the isomorphism in question is not merely a historical artefact.
A-2	The greater the centralization of organization A's resource supply, the greater the extent to which organization A will change isomorphically to resemble the organization on which it depends for resources	Post independence, as argued earlier in this chapter (and as will be demonstrated in later chapters), there was still a significant measure of dependence of Nigeria on Britain. This inevitably extended to military interaction. Thus changing isomorphically to resemble its principle, as DiMaggio and Powell argue, may have been the most logical progression, at least at the period, for the Nigerian military.
A-3	The more uncertain the relationship between means and ends the greater the extent to which an organization will model itself after organizations it perceives to be successful	Judging by the nature of Nigerian military COIN in the Niger Delta for instance, as argued earlier in this chapter, the was a degree of uncertainty between the means by which the Army conducted its COIN operations and the expected operational and strategic outcomes that its conduct was meant to synergize with. The Nigerian Army knew no other way, or perhaps more aptly put, was better schooled in a kinetic action set within its internal function vis-à-vis any other methods it could have adopted in COIN. The British (and British-mandated) approach pre-independence seemed to have worked so far. It thus may have been the easier decision schema to adopt, given the uncertainty within the operational and strategic environment.
A-4	The more ambiguous the goals of an organization, the greater the extent to which the organization will model itself after organizations that it perceives to	With the British ruling Nigeria, the military's internal function was to protect the crown and it did this with such intent that it even failed to participate in the thrust for independence. Post independence however, the playing field for the military had shifted; yet it retained inherited

	be successful […] Organizations with ambiguous or disputed goals are likely to be highly dependent upon appearances for legitimacy	organizational culture, processes, practices and principles. This, at the very least, introduced ambiguity between what its goals should have been post independence and what the Nigerian military perceived them as actually being. This divide has been argued so far in this chapter and may have contributed to a situation whereby it was the more viable option — certainly the "safer" and less institutionally disruptive option — for the Nigerian military to simple model itself after the British thinking and action set towards citizens, which, as Niven argues, "was sound" given the circumstances.
B-3	The fewer the number of visible alternatives organizational models in a field, the faster the rate of isomorphism in that field	Put simply, the less alternatives available to the Nigerian military at independence, the less likely it was to slowly, rather than rapidly, consolidate what existing processes and practices it already inherited. Moreover, in the absence of viable operational and institutional alternatives, there was even less incentive to change any other way but isomorphically.
B-5	The greater the extent of professionalism that an organization, A, requires to effectively fulfil its function, the greater the amount of institutional isomorphic change, dependent on an organization, B, on which A will tend to model practices, principles and processes.	Post-independence the Nigerian military began presenting itself as a professional organization. No longer were the British expected to dictate every decision made. Yet the Nigerian military also had to keep up appearances. Arguably the easiest way it could do that seamlessly, with as little disruption as possible to an existent culture, which for all intents and purposes remained functional, was to change isomorphically.

Table 2-1: Institutional Isomorphism within the Nigerian Military Institution. [21]

[21] Adapted from DiMaggio & Powell (1983, pp. 154-156).

Applying DiMaggio and Powell's framework to the Nigerian military (Table 2-1), the indication is whereas name, uniform, equipment, corps, structures, and recruitment (to a lesser degree, until later (Peters, 1997)) changed post independence, military culture remained an isomorphic appendage; modeled after the British colonialist approach. This isomorphism applied to counter-insurgency as well. Even where colonial-era COIN manuals — *Keeping the Peace*, as an example — were replaced, for instance, it was with British, NATO and US-influenced copies[22]. This is even as practice approximated the colonial model. There is little to indicate an understanding within the Nigerian military that post-independence, the OE had changed sufficiently to warrant a revisionist approach to the existing model. Yet the argument here, using DiMaggio and Powell's framework, is that there is no irregularity in this organizational behavior. Such modeling is consistent with DiMaggio and Powell's theory,

> Organizations may change their goals or develop new practices, and new organizations enter the field. But, in the long run, organizational actors making rational decisions construct around themselves an environment that constrains their ability to change further in later years.

Put simply, measured decisions taken within an organization may, even decades later, still constrain its "ability to change further" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). Within the NMOE this suggests the likelihood, that whatever is ongoing now necessarily constitutes aggregate "transformation" as the Army is now calling it (AFCSC, 2010), may be modest indeed. This is insofar as the proposed changes constitute an isomorphic adaptation of a pre-existing one. Thus, "transformation" may be a misnomer for whatever change the Army today assumes it is going through. Modest institutional adjustments, at best, are what to be expected, going by this chapter's analysis on the isomorphic nature of institutional transfer. Furthermore, these internal constraints to development may be in place without revisionists within the organization even realizing it (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148).

[22] For a detailed discussion of this issue, please see chapter four

The suggestion here is not that need for organizational change has not been recognized within the military. Discourses within the AFCSC Land Power Symposium (Senior Course 32) for instance, on the Nigerian Army Transformation Agenda (NATA) (AFCSC, 2010), highlight a number of salient change areas. These include "attitudinal" change in the Army, changes related to its "force posture and force structure", the adoption of the Continental General Staff System (CGSS) and the creation of the Office of the Nigerian Army Transformation (ONAT) (AFCSC, 2010, pp. 1-10 - 1-11). As will be discussed in chapter four, the Army has also since switched from offensive doctrine (ROD) to the manoeuvrist approach to warfare (MAW).

Nor is the suggestion here that, beyond merely recognizing or talking change, changes that approximate reform have not been implemented in the military. An example here, and an important one, is in the area of the Army's ethnic makeup. It is an area worth probing in some detail.

Pre-independence, and even for a while afterwards, Nigerian military culture was northern-dominated (Peters, 1997). This is not because the northerners were necessarily superior to personnel from the south; it was, rather, down to British colonialist mischief. Peters for instance notes that the Nigerian military during colonial times was "ethnically imbalanced" because "colonial authorities felt more at ease with Hausa/Fulani than with the southerners, and recruited them [the northerners] in large numbers into the military. British officers were encouraged to learn Hausa, the dominant language in the North" (Peters, 1997, p. 64).

Peters however notes the colonialists' decision to recruit northerners over southerners meant the Army culture was northern-leaning and that the overall quality of personnel in the Army was also lowered (Peters, 1997, p. 64). Furthermore this favoritism of northerners would be problematic in the years leading to civil war, as Fredrick Forsyth observes in both his classic texts, *The Biafra Story* (2007) and *Emeka* (1991). Specifically, it became clear to the British that there was "… a need to expand and recruit better educated people to perform tasks that were previously undertaken by European officers

and NCOs" (Peters, 1997, p. 64). Consequently, British colonialists "…were compelled to look to the south for qualified manpower" (Peters, 1997, p. 64).

With injection of southern personnel into the Army however, came realization that people, whose assumed national superiority was questionable, as Siollun (2009) notes, had long dominated the organization. As put by Howe, "in Nigeria, southern Ibos gained many of the initial officer positions during the 1950s, but many of the often long-serving enlistees in the Nigerian arm were of northern origin. This two-tiered policy intensified ethnic rivalries" (2001, p. 30). It also insinuated intra-military tensions and affiliations and influenced a series of coups and counter-coups — what Siollun coined "Nigeria's military coup culture" (2009). This is not the full story however, as whereas the north (Hausa/Fulani) would dominate the NCOs, the Igbos (from the East) dominated the officer corps. Peters for instance notes, "there were 81 Nigerian officers out of about 300 officers of the Nigerian Army by January 1961, with about three-quarters of them Igbos" (1997, pp. 75-81).

Reforms in military recruitment policy and ethnic quota (Peters, 1997, pp. 75-81) over the decades have helped shape a Nigerian military with a stronger, more inclusive, national identity and with an ethnic makeup in stark contrast to that influenced by the British colonialists. Reform was not seamless, certainly not in the first few years (between 1961 and 1966). Rather "the process of redressing the imbalance created considerable fears since it meant Igbo dominance within the [officer] corps [and Hausa dominance amongst NCOs] had to be ended" (Peters, 1997, p. 81). Ironically however the process may have contributed to making the Nigerian military less, rather than more professional, insofar as it "led to increased politicisation of the army…" and with that an identity for meddling with the country's politics (Peters, 1997, p. 81).

Despite the upheaval consequential to the rebalance process, it arguably was necessary however. This is insofar as the British understanding of ethnic suitability, within the officer corps in particular, did not entirely reflect national character (Peters, 1997; Siollun, 2009) and was unsustainable within the

perpetuated model, even short term. Yet herein lies this section's argument. Ethnic makeup within the military, as it approximated a misunderstood attempt by the British to create an indigenous professional force, was unsustainable. Substantive change *had* to be effected; so it was. Likewise, where the "Sandhurst formula of the political neutrality of the military" (1971a, p. 1) did not serve the Nigerian Army's purposes, this doctrine was swiftly done away only a few years after the British left (Luckham, 1971a). However, unlike the ethnic imbalance in the Nigerian military, and the "Sandhurst formula", existing doctrine and practice inherited from the British institutional model were both retained. This indicates selectiveness in the isomorphic change within the institutional transfer.

Retention of codified doctrine and colonialist interpretations of the "coercive institutions of the state" for instance did not necessarily increase uncertainty in the NMOE; arguably, rather, it lowered uncertainty. This is insofar as such selective use of the British institutional model may have saved the Nigerian military the considerable effort of tinkering with existing approaches that proved more than adequate for its British principal. After all, if the heavy stick worked just fine against local civil disobedience, and if codified doctrine, aligned to this coercive expression, likewise worked for the British, why tinker?

In the case of the discarded "Sandhurst formula" however, a break from such moralistic constraints presented a rare avenue of egress from political isolation and ingress into the polity, using the one tool the Nigerian military had a monopoly over: *the barrel of a gun*.

Put another way, and in a pithy summary, the Nigerian military knew what aspects within the colonialist model produced results (force, and sometimes extreme amounts of it); what aspects were unexpendable to the appearance of professionalism and function (the majority of structures, service regulations and organizational building blocks left by the British); what areas could be discarded without penalty (the policy of northern preference in the Army), and what areas could be discarded for opportunistic action (the "Sandhurst formula", as one example).

This sort of organizational behavior should not be seen as unexplainable or inconsistent. Rather it is all largely consistent with the overarching argument so far, regarding the isomorphic nature of change and institutional transfer, within the Nigerian military in its formative years.

2-9. Summary

This chapter discussed why OC and historical experience are both important to the narrative, on why the Nigerian military's internal function has progressed along the current course. Part of the findings from the chapter's analysis is that strategic culture, organizational culture, and historical experience, have all contributed, in varying degrees, to the Nigerian military institution today. An earlier part of the chapter evaluated the concern of the infantry-centric nature of COIN within the Nigerian military. The analysis was not isolated to the local OE but rather was conducted within the context of the military theory and thinking around the infantry function in warfare.

With regards to strategic culture, a conventional action set and an outward looking posture, sequel to the civil war, was the dominant military posture in the 1970s. This in part was due to the aggressive posture of Nigeria's Francophone neighbors during that conflict, insofar as they were aligned with the Biafran separatists. Strategic positioning of 1 and 3 Divisions was consistent with this outward-looking posture. The signing of ECOWAS treaties in the early 1980s would remove the threat perception of Nigeria's neighbors as potential enemies, even though the military would continue to acquire equipment and capabilities consistent with conventional warfighting.

Since the 1990s the Nigerian military's posture remained outward looking but shifted to accommodate a PSO action set. This is evidenced within the amount of regional peacekeeping missions in which the Nigerian military participated, and tended to play lead roles in, since the 1990s. However, within the same period, the military's internal function, and specifically its thinking and action set toward the internal threat of civil disobedience, changed little overall.

Since the emergence of Boko Haram in 2009, and its reemergence in 2010 however, there has been a need, and demonstrable effort around, an increasingly inward-looking posture by the Nigerian military. The military's historic withdrawal from MINUSMA in 2013, to face its internal challenges in the northeast, was an important marker of this shift: the military function of the AFN was now looking solely inward, trying to adapt a counter-insurgency action set. The creation, the same year, of a counter-insurgency division, in 7 Infantry (7 Div), was another such marker. The Army's first infantry division, 7 Div appeared to signal the military's intent to put into large-scale practice, a lot of the institutionalization of COIN that will be discussed within the next chapter of this thesis.

Whereas the Nigerian military's COIN in the Niger Delta until 2010 signaled weaknesses, within this function, in the campaign against the guerrilla-style militias, it is within the military's engagement with Boko Haram (2011 to date) that the extent of this weakness was exposed; in doctrine, in operations and institutionally.

The coercive force approach, inherited from its British principal and hitherto preferred by the Army in the engagement, at best has been less useful than in the past. At worst, the existing model has been effected at such high operational cost, the need for an entire re-thinking of Nigerian military COIN may now be required.

With regards to historical experience and organizational culture, the chapter argued that historical experience influenced the Nigerian military culture insofar as change within the institution was isomorphic in nature and was institutionally modeled after the colonialist approach. That approach was and poorly suited for a now-independent state for two reasons.

First, citizens now had full rights and the same "coercive institutions of the state" could not function within an independent Nigeria, the way they functioned for the colonialists. Nigeria's interests, administered by a Nigerian government, now had to be the interest of its citizens; not necessarily

Whitehall's anymore. Consequently there ought to have been reforms to the thinking around use of force by the police and the military internally.

Also, there was arguably now sufficient local manpower for the police forces to be staffed. Colonialist reasons for dependence on the military internally, within an independent Nigeria with indigenous rule, were now less viable. What now was required was a redrawing of lines around the police function, vis-à-vis those of the military, in counter-insurgency. Put another way, the existing model, perpetuated by the British colonialists, was bound to become unfit for purpose due to changes in the operational environment for the military in its internal function. Yet this model, in the years and decades post independence, was perpetuated; counter-insurgency was neglected: the *forme de guerre*, mistakenly, was enduringly viewed as consistent with warfighting and kinetics. This was evidenced within the chapter's analysis of military operations in the Niger Delta insurgency. Change moreover was institutionally isomorphic, as the chapter argued. The reasons for this institutional isomorphism, within the Nigerian military, are highlighted in Table 2-1.

With the this brief reflection on the chapter's analysis, a final question is where these findings are situated within existing discourses on the Nigerian military's internal function — its counter-insurgency posture — today?

Charles Ukeje talks about "a striking parallel between the behavior of the [Nigerian] police, army and other security agencies during the colonial era and now" (2011, p. 88). "Like the police", he notes, "the inherited army was also an instrument for the enforcement of the will of the state, not the protection of the people" (2011, p. 88). Assertions like this are abundant within the literature on the post-colonial Nigerian military. It is fairly common knowledge the Nigerian military has favored a coercive doctrine, just as it is fairly common knowledge the colonialist military model was likewise coercive, if also functional in addition. Yet what is less common within the discourses is a research-based evaluation of reasons that underpin the military's decision to perpetuate a model, within its

internal function, which increasingly became more problematic over the decades. In evaluating long-standing questions around the Nigerian military in the colonial and postcolonial period, this chapter of the thesis constitutes an original contribution to academic and military thinking around the Nigerian military's posture towards escalated civil disobedience — its counter-insurgency insurgency posture — today.

To summarize, this chapter of the thesis has discussed why the Nigerian military has adopted the institutional model it has, the origins of that model, why the model is problematic for the environment today, and why its perpetuation is supported by theories of institutional isomorphism. Chapter three of the thesis shifts emphasis: from *why*, to *how*, the Nigerian military went about, or failed to go about, formalized processes to institutionalize counter-insurgency warfare since the post-civil war period.

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CHAPTER THREE

FORMALIZED CT-COIN DEVELOPMENT IN THE NIGERIAN MILITARY SINCE THE POST-CIVIL WAR PERIOD

"For most […] the matter of learning is one of personal preference. But for [military] officers, the obligation to learn, to grow in their profession, is clearly a public duty."

- Gen Omar N. Bradley[23].

"Churchill said that World War II was won in the classrooms of U.S. military schools in the 1920s and 1930s […] And I think Desert Storm and the Cold War were won in the military classrooms and training centers during the 1970s and 1980s."

- Gen Edward "Shy" Meyer[24].

The whole thing boils down to training. The [Nigerian Army] soldiers may have the necessary – and expensive – equipment, but they don't have the skills to handle it [sic]

- - Maj. Gen Adamu Ibrahim[25].

3-1. Introduction

Karen Guttieri, Reader at the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), defines the education process as "a central function of military organization" (Guttieri, 2006, p. 251). For military personnel, education can be both formal and informal (Guttieri, 2006, p. 251). Doctrine, defined as "something taught; a teaching" (Posen B. R., 1984, p. 13), is one such formalized construct. Classroom learning, field-based

[23] Cited in Guttieri (2006, p. 235)

[24] Cited in Guttieri (2006, p. 251)

[25] Cited in Ibrahim (2014)

training or a mix of both as often is the case within training for operational warfare (Vego, 2007), are likewise learning forms. However, non-formalized, tacit, processes, as OC and its influence on personnel within the institution, also constitute a key form of development at the organizational as well as at the individual level (2002). Guttieri alludes to this informal regime of education where she writes, "'education' as applied to the armed services may also take on the patina of indoctrination, that is, shaping values and behavior, including those necessary for unit cohesion, morale…" (2006, p. 251).

So important is the aggregate learning function for military development that Guttieri refers to the link between education, and the military as a learning organization, as "fundamental" (2006, p. 251). Differences may or may not exist between military education, which "implies the acquisition of general knowledge and skills required for effectiveness" (Guttieri, 2006, p. 251) and training as "preparation to perform[ing] specific functions, tasks, or missions" (U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000a). Guttieri (2006) for instance makes a distinction between both, and is categorical in doing so. This however contrasts the view by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, that "training and education are not mutually exclusive. Virtually all military schools and professional development programs include elements of both education and training in their academic programs" (U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000b).

In this thesis, and this chapter in particular, no specific distinction is made between training and education *per se*; however the word education is used as sparingly here, as is the case in the Nigerian military environment. Rather the terms "training", "course[s]", "packages" are together combined to refer to individual and collective development, within the Nigerian military as a learning organization. This project's use of the terminology, "military training", as opposed to that of military education", is consistent with references to military development within and outside the classroom environment, in the Nigerian experience. Such military development, as was investigated in the previous chapter (three), is influenced not only by formal learning but also by the cultural and organizational features

alluded to by Guttieri (2006), Farrell and Terriff (2002), Buley (2008), Koskinas (2006) and other writers on the subject of military development.

Still, whereas chapter two discussed organizational culture as a non-formalized process — a vehicle — by which historical experience, isomorphic modeling and institutional identity all contribute to development of the Nigerian military's internal function; this chapter provides a technical assessment of praxis as a formalized learning process that sits at the interface between the theory on the one hand, and the practice on the other, of counter-insurgency. Specifically the chapter looks at the formalization of CT-COIN training and development in the NMOE. The analysis conducted here is aimed at (1) making a case for training and development within the CT-COIN function. (2) Understanding the way formalized development of this area of warfare has occurred, since the postwar period (1970s), in the NMOE. (3) Conducting an institutional review of formalized CT-COIN learning. (4) Highlighting the de-emphasis of experiential learning within the Nigerian military model.

Analysis in this chapter is not aimed to masquerade institutional improvements in the Nigerian military learning environment, since the cold war period, as a marker for aggregate reform within this *forme de guerre*. Nor is an underlying assumption here that learning by experience is the only way to put practice into theory, within the learning environment. Rather the chapter's study, in interrogating how the Nigerian military has gone about formalizing and institutionalizing its development of COIN since the post-civil war period, aims to complement chapter two's analysis of non-formalized influence of OC, on aggregate development of Nigerian military COIN, within its war model.

3-2. Background: Military Learning and Counter-Insurgency

Within contemporary military theory, the functions of training and doctrine are recognized as operational enablers, and possibly even force multipliers (Nigerian Army, 2011a; NATO, 2011; US Army and Marine Corps, 2007; British Army, 2009). Training in particular has been identified as

necessary for joint task forcing and operations that coordinate two or more of the service branches (Vego, 2007). Furthermore, isolated major military activity at the operational level of war by a single service branch is increasingly less popular across militaries today (Vego, 2007); the Nigerian military included (Okoye, 2001). The implication here is that training for joint operations and inter-service coordination is even more relevant, as the writers of US Army Joint Publication 3-24 note (Department of Defense, 2013), as military theorists like Clayton Newell (1991) and Milan Vego (2007) caution, and as Okoye (2001) also pointed out, within his lecture delivered at the National War College, Abuja.

Within the Nigerian military, senior personnel (Lt. Colonel to Major General and equivalent[26]) interviewed, both in command and in staff positions relevant to CT COIN operations (and also strategy) often observed training as a development area[27]. As examples, both Brig. Gen T.K Golau (2012), Director, CT-COIN Centre at Jaji and Maj. Gen J.A.H Ewansiha (2012), the JTF ORO joint task force commander (JTFC), discussed in interview, the function of CT-COIN training in the two areas of combat readiness and force structure. Other military personnel interviewed at the AFCSC, the CT-COIN Directorate , the ONSA and crucially, within military and non-military structures of JTF ORO, all pointed to training requirements as being a key challenge area. As an example, Commander 21 Armored Brigade[28] and JTF ORO Land Component Commander (LCC), Brigadier General R.O. Bamigboye noted in-interview,

> We need to divert our attention from conventional warfare, to counterinsurgency training. If we can do both — if we can improve our equipment capabilities and [if] we can divert our attention - in terms of doctrine, and training, to focus more on counterinsurgency operations

[26] SO3 (OF-4) to SO6 (OF-7) and equivalent

[27] Multiple interviews conducted within senior personnel within the police, DSS, NA, NAF, and intelligence components of JTF ORO, Maiduguri, 2012. Please refer to Appendix II.

[28] Referred to from here as 21 Bde, for brevity. 21 Bde elements were the core constitution of the NA component within JTF ORO

— I think Nigeria [the military] will go a long way in solving counter-insurgency problems (2012).

Brigadier Bamigboye's concerns that his men[29] were too poorly-trained and too poorly-equipped to prosecute COIN should not be dismissed as a mere excuse by a commander looking to rationalize the ground forces inability to reach a decision in the campaign against Boko Haram. A lot of the interview data from the 21 Bde Comd. and fieldwork with the rest of the NA more generally (in and out of Maiduguri and the northeastern axis), suggested the Army component of JTF ORO had been tasked with fighting an insurgent and yet had been equipped and trained for a more conventional engagement prior to the task force's mandate in 2011. Indeed, the LCC's views give the lie to the notion that the Army, in taking the fight to Boko Haram, had been "specially trained" for counter-insurgency *per se*, by 2012. This same capabilities challenge was mostly a concern shared by the police component as well (2012), and it was, furthermore, a sentiment shared by the Head Instructor at the Ct-COIN Centre in Jaji, Colonel Villo (2012). Indeed, as Colonel Villo (2012) pointed out, whereas formalized training and development has long been embedded in the Nigerian military function, this should not be taken to mean it has been directed at the area of counter-insurgency *per se*.

In part as a consequence of the findings from the previous chapter, this broad absence of purposive COIN training and development within the NMOE has proved problematic for the expertise required to understand how COIN poses a fundamentally different military challenge, to conventional warfighting. Nor is it only in practice (training, operations) that the problematic nature of a lack of a COIN culture manifests. As chapter four's analysis of Nigerian military theory — broadly and as it relates to counter-insurgency in particular — indicates, there is an intellectual gap that has institutionally existed within the Nigerian military, for quite some time moreover. Substantive evidential data and analysis to validate this argument will underpin much of this chapter's evaluation.

[29] Brigadier Bamigboye was in charge of the entire land component of the COIN

Without the theory and the doctrine, and the structures, to institutionalize a COIN mindset and culture, it is little wonder therefore that operations — which such draw from the theory, thinking and fundamental principles (doctrine) around a subject area — have historically and till date poorly demonstrated planning proficiency, and even to a lesser extent proficiency in tactics.[30]

Furthermore such apparent intellectual disinterest within military efforts to counter insurgency may preclude the expertise required to make the necessary adjustment to the existing action set. Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely alludes to this in his thesis, Learning About Counter-insurgency, where he writes that "a tendency towards anti-intellectualism" was one of four factors that could, together, "retard the speed of learning in armed forces ". The other three factors, Kiszely notes, are (1) inability to accommodate criticism, (2) lack of a seat for learning and (3) failure to make the necessary adjustment (2006).

A valid point may be that the Nigerian military, bogged down with PSOs for many years, should not be expected to have focused on counter-insurgency institutionalization, doctrine and operational readiness. Moreover, with COIN and PSOs having different thinking, action sets, planning, doctrine, command structures and CONOPS, it makes sense that the Nigerian military may have been good (and gotten better) in its PSO adventure regionally, but yet remained poor at COIN. Both of these are valid points and will be further considered over the course of the chapter.

Much of what has been said so far in the chapter might come across as a critical evaluation of the state of Nigerian military COIN development. There may be a silver lining however. Certainly, the military contribution to counter-insurgency remains improvable, and has been left to deteriorate; but there has been progress too over the years. Indeed, as this chapter's analysis hopefully would demonstrate, there has been a historical and longstanding effort to institutionalize COIN within the Nigerian military. This effort has also had considerable assistance from foreign military partners, historically and till

[30] Chapter five's evaluation of counter-insurgency operations will discuss this in more detail.

date. However, as the Nigerian Army CT-COIN Chief Instructor himself put it, the extent of actual COIN-related assistance, rather than military assistance more broadly, is perhaps more modest than many even within the Army may realize (Villo, 2012).

As an example, the US has been rendering training assistance to the Nigerian military since 2001. However much of the ongoing interactions, a lot of which has been held at the Nigerian Army Peacekeeping Centre (NAPKC), Jaji Cantonment, has been in the areas of basic infantry tactics and more broadly assistance to improve more conventional warfighting for peacekeeping missions across Africa. Military assistance from external partners has not, until fairly recently, been directed at CT-COIN operations *per se* (Villo, 2012). It is worth pointing out nonetheless that, with the Nigerian military struggling in its counter-insurgency against Boko Haram, there is now considerably more emphasis on COIN training and assistance from external military partners.

With its campaign against Boko Haram, the FGN has come to view such PSOs as less of a security commitment vis-à-vis CT-COIN (News Agency of Nigeria, 2014). The recent troop withdrawal from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission (MINUSMA) in Mali for instance was "the first time in the history of United Nations peacekeeping operations in which Nigeria was unilaterally withdrawing its own troops" (Star Africa, 2013). This constitutes a gradual reversal of Nigerian strategic culture's regional emphasis within the cold war period (discussed in chapter two). Internal security threats, hitherto not a concern for the government, have brought about a refocused military posture. As put by President of the Senate, David Mark, via his Chief of Staff, Senator Anthony Manzo,

> The activities of Boko Haram insurgents are beginning to affect Nigeria's foreign policy […] Let me advert [sic] to the domestic exigency that is now dominating and affecting Nigeria's foreign policy. The onslaught of Boko Haram insurgents in Northern Nigeria presently constitutes a serious national security threat. If a foreign policy is a reflection of the domestic

> policy, then, their acts have invariably affected and determined our foreign behavior (News Agency of Nigeria, 2014).

Consequential to this shift in strategic culture, and as the recent troops withdrawal from MINUSMA (Premium Times, 2013) indicates, the NA may now be looking to change its action set from peacekeeping and PSOs, to counter-insurgency (USARAF, 2014). Especially since 2012, this shift in posture has been reflected in the nature of military interactions and collaboration with foreign military partners; the US and the UK in particular. As an example, in mid-2014, the US Army Africa (USARAF) team, along with Special Forces and general-purpose forces from the National Guard trained a 650-strong Nigerian Army ranger battalion for COIN operations (USARAF, 2014).

The battalion in question, the Nigerian Army's 143 Infantry Battalion, was "formed from the ground up" in the months leading to mid-2014 and was trained by a total of California Army National Guard (CNG) personnel from two Los Alamitos-based Special Forces units — Special Operations Detachment–U.S. Northern Command and Company A, 5th Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (California National Guard, 2014). According to the US National Guard, which conducts "full-spectrum operational training" for local forces conducting defensive and offensive operations against insurgents, these units, from the CNG were "deployed for a two-month mission, the first in a three-phase plan to assist in the establishment of the 143rd" (California National Guard, 2014). Training will stay relevant both to operations and to tactics, and will include,

> [rainundamentals of patrolling, small-unit tactics, movement to contact, night operations and ambush tactics. The Nigerian soldiers will also receive instruction on human rights, basic soldiering skills, advanced infantry skills, land navigation, marksmanship and troop-leading procedures. [da In addition to training the 143rd soldiers, the Special Forces troops are continuously developing Nigerian cadre as primary instructors, so they can train other Nigerian forces after the CNG troops depart (California National Guard, 2014).

Col John D. Ruffing, Chief of USARAF's Security Cooperation Division, observed during a briefing relevant to the CNG's training that,

> What we're doing with the Nigerian Army is helping them take a ranger battalion that already exists and provide infantry skills to enable them to go counter a threat within their country, and it is not peacekeeping — it is every bit of what we call decisive action, meaning those soldiers will go in harm's way to conduct counter insurgency operations in their country to defeat a known threat (USARAF, 2014).

Major Liam Connor, West Africa Desk Officer working with the Nigerian Directorate of Training to coordinate training package with the U.S. Army Ranger School at Fort Benning, Georgia, also observed, "this training [by CNG] was specifically requested to take them [the Nigerian Army] out of a peacekeeping mission set putting them more in a decisive action set to defeat and counter terrorist Boko Haram" (USARAF, 2014).

The training initially will roll out with courses on basic and advanced infantry tactics at the Nigerian Army Training Center (NATRAC). Lt. Col Vinnie Garbarino, USARAF's International Military Engagements Officer, observes that tactical training will include packages that provide "fundamentals of patrolling, small unit tactics, ambush/raid attack, movements of contact, night operations as opposed to the more traditional UN focused peace keeping tasks like patrolling, cordon and search, and establish checkpoints" (USARAF, 2014). The US has other concurrent counter-terrorism and counter-piracy training assistance missions in Nigeria, such as amphibious and riverine warfare training at the Training School in Calabar (USARAF, 2014).

The UK is also offering some CT-COIN training and coordination assistance with the Nigerian military (Villo, 2012); coordinating previously with the CT-COIN Directorate, Jaji; with the Directorate's new mandate (Nigerian Army Training Center, NATRAC at Kontagorra) and with the

office of the Chief of Training and Operations (CTOP AHQ, Abuja)[31]. Second Battalion, the Royal Anglian Regiment (2 R Anglian, also "Poachers") for instance have been offering military training to military units fighting Boko Haram insurgents. 2nd Battalion, as part of the larger effort by the British Military Assistance Training Team (BMATT) have had quite positive feedback from units in the field, especially from 72 Special Operations Forces (72 SOF Bn), Makurdi.[32]

Interactions with both 2 R Anglian and Nigerian military personnel in the field indicate there is both positive reception, and demand, for a scaled up counter-insurgency effort from BMATT (possibly up to company-level sized teams, due to the sheer size of training requirements on the ground, and up from the section and platoon–sized deployments currently being used). Reception to US COIN training has been less enthusiastic than that by the Anglians, though this was difficult to triangulate as I had only one source to help evaluate the delivery from US assistance teams.[33]

Despite what appears to be a requirement, and theatre-level demand for COIN training and assistance from foreign partners, not everyone is convinced that increased collaborative training and assistance between Nigeria and Western partners would yield operational results. Professor Gordon Adams, in his critique of US security intervention in Africa, argues that with the US models in Iraq and Afghanistan being "unsuccessful" despite being "carefully crafted", application of those same training methods is problematic in Africa (Adams, 2014). As put by Professor Adams,

[31] Conversations with a Col. with the office of the Chief of Training Operations (CTOP, AHQ). It is unclear, although quite likely the British coordinating also extended to the CTOP Defence HQ. I did meet with the CTOP DHQ, during my fieldwork; however British military assistance was not one of the issues we discussed.

[32] Battalion-level training day I spent with 2 R Anglian. I had prior and subsequent discussions with Nigerian Army personnel in command and staff positions in Northeast Nigeria to gauge the general level of reception towards the Anglians training, and the quality of delivery. There was a strong sense that much of what was being delivered, by 2 R Anglian, met or exceeded requirements.

[33] Conversations with an anonymized Nigerian military senior officer deployed in northeastern Nigeria.

> There is precious little evidence that the U.S. military is competent to train another military in counterinsurgency and counterterror operations, especially when it comes to such "hearts and minds" activities as economic and social engagement in another country […] the money, equipment, training, counseling, intelligence, and operating support the United States provides in Africa will only be reinforcing the militaries as institutions in their countries (Adams, 2014).

Professor Adams is neither right nor wrong in his claims. However, his broad assumption on the scope of training and interaction between an African military such as Nigeria's, and the US military, is problematic. Certainly, it goes without saying that, within Nigerian military efforts to develop its COIN war model, US military assistance will be less useful in some areas ("hearts and minds" activities, as Adams puts it); more useful in others (military contracts, counseling and intelligence).

Moreover, interview data indicates a lot of this assistance — within the Nigerian context at least — is requested (Villo, 2012). The US does not arbitrarily decide whom to train on what, within the Nigerian military. Adam's insinuation therefore, that US military assistance as an aggregate is not useful for African military COIN development, is questionable and a little too broad. Interviews and documentary data within the Nigerian Army CT-COIN directorate indicate a number of areas where such assistance is relevant, though by no means pivotal, in the Army's COIN against Boko Haram. Put simply, Western assisted training is a contribution to Nigerian military COIN development that arguably helps, more than it hurts, the Army's COIN war model.

Moreover claims that such training is reinforcing military standing neglect the state of African militaries' capabilities, and especially their unpreparedness in conducting COIN operations, to begin with. Indeed, an important argument made in chapter one is that the insurgent in SSA has been successful precisely because states lack institutional capacity, and militaries lack the capabilities, necessary for COIN to be "full spectrum" (US Army and Marine Corps, 2007) in nature. Insurgency,

as a result in SSA, often has gone on to approximate civil war (such as in Sierra Leone, Somalia, DR Congo and in the Northern Mali conflict). The counter-insurgent in SSA thus appears caught between a rock and a hard place: criticized for being poor at military counter-insurgency on the one hand, and yet lacking institutional capacity and security expertise to substantively improve COIN warfighting, on the other (Herbst, 2004).

Professor Adam's argument is that the US is going about its foreign security policy in Africa the wrong way; it is an argument beyond this project's scope. However, in hoping to convince his audience, he undermines the benefits of such assistance for African militaries' development of their counter-insurgency war models.

If the counter-insurgent in SSA is both bad at COIN and lacks the expertise to improvise his lot, the notion that attempts by external actors (such as the US) to make him better, are problematic, is suggesting that letting the problem fester may be better than trying to address it with external assistance. Adams is not the only commentator to express skepticism around the impact of external assistance to militaries struggling against insurgents in SSA. Specific to Nigeria, former US ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell dismissed the importance of such collaboration, being of the view that the FGN is "not particularly interested in operational help or training" for its military. Specifically, the former ambassador scoffs,

> "Please drop off some hardware. Please write a cheque," was a likely Nigerian response to US defence and FBI experts […] Campbell told AFP. Aside from marginal training and surveillance assistance, the ex-ambassador said he had seen "almost nothing" emerge from the new co-operation (News.com, 2014).

Ambassador Campbell has good reason to be skeptical of the results of Western training for Nigerian military COIN: there hitherto has been little to show, in terms of operational success, for all the

investment made in the COIN against Boko Haram. Chapter five's analysis of the Nigerian Air Force component of the COIN against Boko Haram will demonstrate that a divide exists between what is being said about modernization of the Air force, and the actual state of the NAF between 2007 and 2015. Still, it may be a tenuous argument that training (and assistance) specific to COIN would not benefit conduct of operations specific to COIN; particularly when the action set associated with counter-insurgency constitutes an area the Nigerian military historically has struggled with. A number of commanders in theatre, as well as CT-COIN training instructors I spoke to, would disagree with Ambassador Campbell's view, for instance.

Operational performance within UN and regional peacekeeping missions indicates Nigerian contingents in PSOs over the past two decades have benefited from tactical and operational training. Whether such intervention was local to the NA, or came from US Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCETs) or British Military Assistance Training teams (BMATTs) is beside the point that training and education of military personnel is important to their function. Though it should again be pointed out that most of the training from which the Nigerian military has benefitted has leaned towards a PSO action set, rather than a COIN one *per se*. Whether COIN training from Western partners will bring about the type of operational adjustments skeptics like Ambassador Campbell would ostensibly rather see, is a question that — as is the case in Iraq and in Afghanistan — may only be answered with time and with purposive and enduring training commitment by Western partners.

In summary of this initial section of the chapter, a few general points, emergent from the section's discussion, are worth reiterating. First, counter-insurgency, like other areas of the military function, requires development of both theory and practice (Guttieri, 2006); the learning process within militaries should begin in the classroom and learning environment but does not end there (Guttieri, 2006). Field-level adaptations and thinking drawn from bottom-up innovation in the field, as much as

practicalization of classroom lessons, should also inform the development process over time (Russell, 2011).

Second, operations should draw from planning, and planners in turn should have a rich pool of localized theory and codified experiential learning to draw from. It is important, moreover, that so far as counter-insurgency is concerned, the military does not switch off its peripheral vision related to what its contribution should be. Coercion may seem temptingly viable as the military's core strenght, but as analysis in the theory chapter indicates, there may well be more to the military contribution this *forme de guerre*. A broadening of skill sets and capabilities may thus be required; and for this, external assistance and collaboration, in and out of the learning environment, may prove useful.

If the Nigerian military therefore has historically struggled at counterbalancing VNSAs as an embedded threat within the populace, and has a certain parochialism around what the military contribution to counter-insurgency should be, the problem is not only in the field. It is also in the failure to develop the learning environment and institutions that should underpin the operational function. An evaluation of the learning environment and institutions, relevant to counter-insurgency in Nigeria over the past few decades, will be conducted in the next section of this chapter.

A third point worth noting is that whereas an army may be effective at PSOs, it may not, necessarily, translate this effectiveness to COIN (Zaalberg, 2012). Moreover, an army that can easily win conventional and heavy-mechanized engagements may struggle against a small and relatively poorly equipped guerrilla insurgency (Fitzgerald, 2014). Precisely this is happening, as the Nigerian military battles Boko Haram (Agwunobi, 2012).

Certainly experiential learning from PSOs *should* present a baseline level of readiness for forces deployed for COIN (Zaalberg, 2012). However, PSO readiness and performance should not be confused for COIN readiness (Zaalberg, 2012). Institutions and processes that facilitate combat

readiness and other capabilities pertinent to effective PSOs, or basic infantry tactics for that matter, may not necessarily facilitate COIN preparedness (USARAF, 2014). It should come as no surprise therefore, that the Nigerian military is better at PSOs, which it has been engaged in for consistently for about two decades, than it is at counter-insurgency, which is still relatively nascent within the NMOE.

Finally, counter-insurgency requires its own institutions, doctrine and training; as well as processes that, drawing lessons from the field, can help link all three to practicable guidance for operations (Russell, 2011). This is why collaborative learning and partnerships with militaries that are better experienced and better positioned to lend assistance and training are a key part of the process (Villo, 2012). It is however a process that takes time — years, and possibly even decades — if substantive institutional self-sufficiency is to be achieved.

The section that follows will evaluate how the Nigerian military has used its time, since the post-civil war period to develop, or fail to develop, the processes underpinning institutionalization of counter-insurgency warfare.

3-3. Development of Nigerian Military COIN in the Post- Civil War Period

BMATT established Special Warfare Wing (SWW) within the Nigerian Army School of Infantry (NASI), in April 1978. This was the same month as the first of a trio of ECOWAS defence protocols were signed between 1978 and 1981. It was a period that signaled a shift in Nigerian strategic culture, as discussed in chapter two, as the Army's internal function and its counter-insurgency capabilities more specifically, in effect came under review (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012). This shift in posture would come about, as surrounding Francophone countries now were perceived as less of a threat; compared to the previous decade (1968-1978).

Looking inward to the risk of more local threats for perhaps the first time since the civil war, the Nigerian military, with BMATT's assistance, created SWW in 1978 to provide, primarily, training for

the Army and, intermittently, irregular warfare training for police, and paramilitary organizations, as directed by Defence Headquarters (DHQ) (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012). This contrasts to some degree the environment today where training in the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN), as Maj. Gen Ihekire observes, "is a matter for the individual services […] the Nigerian Army (NA), the Nigerian Navy (NN) and the Nigerian Air Force (NAF)" (Ihekhire, 2005, p. 165).

Decades after its initial setup, SWW would become the Counter Terrorism and Counter Insurgency (CT-COIN) Centre (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012). Whereas the core function of the wing was to provide specialist counter-insurgency training —then called Special Forces Training (SFT) — for the NA, and for the infantry corps in particular, the wing extended its function to train local security agencies, most notably the police, for this function. SWW also has "external friendly collaborators" (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012) including external Army troop components. Additionally, because CT-COIN development falls under AHQ's remit (rather than the Ministry of Defence), directives have been issued in the past, by AHQ, for the wing to conduct specialist training for local paramilitary organizations (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012).

Today, decades after establishment of SWW, training scope for CT-COIN has been expanded both in audience and in curricula within the NMOE. Packages start from cadet CT training at National Defence Academy (NDA), Kaduna and go all the way up to specialized counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategy courses delivered to SO5 (OF-6) and equivalent, at the National Defence College (NDC; formerly War College), Abuja. So as to avoid discussing classroom-level and tactical-level details of CT-COIN training within the main body of this chapter, Appendix I at the end of the thesis outlines the entire curricula of the training divisions at the CT-COIN Directorate[34]. Packages are both classroom-based and field-based and delivery times, expectedly, vary on a per-course basis. Alongside the categories of personnel highlighted at the start of this paragraph, CT-COIN training

[34] Accurate as at time of fieldwork, in 2012.

within the NMOE is also aimed at a number of other groups of military and security personnel. The core audience includes, (1) NA units and formations, as well as select sister service personnel from the NAF and NN, as part of the Quick Response Group/Force (QRG/QRF). QRF consists of small, mobile, trained CT-COIN military personnel, and is structured to enable "timely deployment and response to incidents of violent insurgency and terrorism" (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012). (2) Police personnel; trained on CT. (3) Young, newly commissioned NA officers; trained on the Basic Counter Terrorism Course for Young Officers and Soldiers (BCTC). (4) Other non-Nigerian personnel have also participated in CT-COIN training in recent years — Special Warfare Training (SWT) for Liberian Army personnel, for instance (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012). Finally the CT-COIN Directorate assists the US JCET team in joint training and simulation exercises. A number of these, and how they tie into broader CT-COIN operational requirements, will be touched upon in the study implications chapter at the end of the thesis.

Before moving on it is worth emphasizing that SWW was put together by BMATT, with little assistance from the NA (which had effectively no experience in this area of warfare). This meant that from the onset in the 1970s, counter-insurgency in Nigeria, in terms of training and development of concepts, was modeled after an internal function for the military, instituted by the British during colonialism[35]. As Rajagopalan (2000)[36] notes within his account on the Indian Army's development of COIN, the British institutional model brings with it[37], for better or for worse, artefacts foreign both to the local socio-cultural environment and to OC. Particularly in the Nigerian experience however, little within that model — certainly not enough — changed for it to be seen as locally informed. The formalized area of development, much like the informal organizational culture discussed in chapter

[35] Discussed in chapter two

[36] For more details refer to the account by Rajesh Rajagopalan (2000, p. 6).

[37] There is nothing detrimental *per se*, much less extraordinary, for one army's approach to influence another's. The Irish copied British doctrine, just as the US also copied British COIN doctrine. US COIN doctrine would itself go on to influence not just British doctrine but also NATO doctrine in Afghanistan.

two, thus was institutionally consistent with the model left in place by the British. Yet, as writings by both Kiszely (2006) and Vego (2007) indicate, the local environment should be an important influencing factor on armed forces' development of counter-insurgency training.

Embedding experiential learning into COIN warfighting is, at the least, to be seen as an enterprise that captures the local experience and the peculiarities of the OE, to be effective. To be sure, success of a third party in some COIN in some faraway land may lend important contribution to the principles underpinning COIN warfighting; that is, the doctrine. However, without the local experience to give context to such external lessons and experiences — *What are our own capabilities? How does the enemy we face differ from that, which ABC counter-insurgent has faced in XYZ theatre? To what extent do classical contemporary counter-insurgency theories apply to our approach and OE? How do we appraise operational failures (and successes) and formalize experiential learning? et cetera* — a copy and paste approach to areas such as training and development of local COIN theory and practice, may itself be problematic to the enterprise at hand. As the writers of US Army and Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 caution, counter-insurgency practice should be developed to embed the OE, that is, developed *ab intra*, for best results (US Army and Marine Corps, 2007).

This is not to say the British contribution to Nigerian Army's nascent COIN development was not based on years of researching, fighting and refining irregular warfare. British Army doctrine effectively constitutes a conversation that draws from experiential learning on and off the field, in and out the classroom, and that makes remarkable effort to connect theory to practice (British Army, 2009). Indeed, operational experience from Mandatory Palestine to Northern Ireland continues to inform the British institutional model (British Army, 2006). Moreover, by 1978 when the British began helping the Nigerian military develop irregular warfare, and not least because of the vast reach of empire in the preceding century, the British had arguably more experience — with significant amounts of it codified within publications — than any other power in the world; including the US who

had admittedly made impressive ingresses into the area of counter-insurgency, since the post-Second World War period (Birtle, 2006).

Yet whether British experience made it adequate for the Nigerian military *within the Nigerian environment*, is perhaps a question worth considering. Even so, an argument that the British institutional model — introduced via SWW post-independence — was poorly matched to the NMOE, should be weighted by a counter-argument.

To begin with, the Nigerian military, for its part, did little to help its cause by deferring almost entirely to British expertise on the matter. The theory base for this argument has been discussed in chapter two. Nonetheless this indifference came despite vigorously contrasting statements by the military Head of State Olusegun Obasanjo in April 1979 that "that Africa had no need for an external policeman since 'there is no vacuum in Africa to be filled militarily by international do-gooders'" (Nwokedi, 1985, p. 195).

Nor was Obasanjo the only Nigerian Head of State to appear critical of Western (British and US) military assistance. Moreover Gen Obasanjo adopted this confrontational posture while doing little to make the necessary adjustment to post-civil war Nigerian armed forces increasingly reflective of strategic culture in the period (Sondhaus, 2006). This culture was outward looking (Sondhaus, 2006), was dependent on conventional warfighting capabilities (Howe, 2001, pp. 153-154) and came at the cost of unconventional warfighting development (Howe, 2001, pp. 153-154; IISS, 2014, p. 451). This led to the Nigerian military being described as unfit — within that cold war period of the 1990s (Howe, 2001, p. 153), and even up to two decades after — to conduct COIN operations.

President Shehu Shagari, like Gen Obasanjo, two years later in July 1981, would himself "call into question the existence of military or defence pacts between some OAU [Organization of African Unity] members states and extra-continental powers" (Nwokedi, 1985, p. 195). Yet Shagari, like

General Obasanjo, did little to develop the armed forces; particularly given the impending vacuum to be left by the proposed absence of the Western military assistance he and his functionaries appeared so critical of (Nwokedi, 1985, p. 195). It was one thing for the FGN to have an increasingly "radical" strategic culture that often resulted "in direct confrontations with Western powers, most notably the United States and the United Kingdom" (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 260). It was another for this posture, supposedly aimed at strengthening Nigerian military standing (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 260), to translate to a deliberate, measured, review of the military's internal function. Quite the opposite, the indication in the post-civil war decades was that COIN warfighting had been sacrificed at the expense of conventional capabilities development (Howe, 2001, pp. 153-154), aligned with strategic culture of the period (Sondhaus, 2006).

Going by such posturing of the FGN in the decade-and-a-half after the civil war, there thus seemed a divide between state rhetoric, and actual decision-making, to revise the substantial, and enduring influence of the British on the Nigerian military institution. Not surprisingly, and with the military's continued identity crisis and involvement in state politics, questions around what kind of military the Nigerian military needed to be, if it faced an unconventional security threat within its borders, were not addressed with intent. Indeed, the 1980s and 1990s arguably were lost decades for the Nigerian military. A perpetuated coup culture, successive juntas and extreme politicization meant that development of counter-insurgency, or any other functional area of the Army for that matter, was swept under the carpet or poorly conducted. The military would buy a lot of equipment — artillery and the like — but much of it was not purposive, would end up being moribund (IISS, 2014) and did little to address the institutional issue of indiscipline (Agwunobi, 2012; Ajayi, 2007). Discipline however remains important for an armed force to translate its contribution toward long-term stable peace, in a war form requiring as much restraint and adaptation, as counter-insurgency (Hall, 2012).

Regionally, the Army also will be kept busy with PSOs, ostensibly a reason for much of the military spending (although UN missions were also heavily subsidized in terms of matériel, hardware and remunerations)[38]. Locally, the military would busy itself with politics and military rule.

There would nonetheless be modest ingresses into the area of counter-insurgency warfare from the 1980s. The final section of this chapter will attempt to evaluate this period and its contribution to counter-insurgency institutionalization within the Nigerian military.

3-4. Institutional Review of Nigerian Military CT-COIN (1980s to present)

If the postcolonial military posture, modeled as it was after a colonialist action set, constitutes a missed opportunity to revise a model not without flaws; criticism should perhaps be tempered. BMATT's formation of SWW was arguably a practical start point for a Nigerian military without the skill, interest, or strategic culture necessary for purposive and strategic revision of its war model. In this regard the COIN school could be argued as constituting an important building block in the institutionalization of counter-insurgency as functional area within the Army.

SWW, within the timeline of COIN development is important too because, at inception in 1978, it was the single military institution available, aimed at developing the spectrum of irregular warfare activity (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012). This is particularly noteworthy because COIN remained an unpopular — practically unheard of — form of war at the time (Villo, 2012). To implement its function, the COIN institution consisted five divisions: Jungle Warfare and Combat Survival Division (JWCSD), Mountain Warfare Division (MWD), Airborne Division (ABD), Amphibious Division (APD) and Desert Warfare Division (DWD). Whereas there were no counter-guerrilla warfare (CGW) or urban warfare divisions present at inception, an increased emphasis on counter-insurgency and special

[38] Conversations with anonymised senior military personnel, some in logistics (G4), who had been deployed in regional PSOs. In fact, as a result of the generous dollar payments, the UN missions arguably became a lucrative endeavor for personnel deployed in those missions

warfare training, within the composite schools of SWW, may have helped address that oversight in the interim (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012).

Further to the initial BMATT setup, the four active component divisions of the SWW began gradually to assume identities of their own. In 1986 for instance, both the Airborne Division and the Amphibious Division, upgraded to "Wing" status, effectively equaling their principal structure, at least on paper (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012). The Amphibious wing itself was upgraded further to school status — becoming the Amphibious Training School (ATS) and granted semi-autonomous status, upon its relocation to Calabar. Shortly after, both the Jungle Ware and Mountain Warfare Divisions were put together to form a new, merged, division, "the Special Warfare Division" (SWD). This merger would occur in 1987, and is important insofar as it indicated further "recognition" that non-conventional warfare was a salient development area for the Army (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012).

Within this gradual recognition in the NMOE, albeit amongst a minority (Golau, 2012), that irregular warfare required development, Nigerian Army HQ ICCS (Infantry Corps Centre and School) established an additional division, the Counter-Terrorism Division (CTD), in April 1994 (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012). Creation of CTD however was only sequel to the hijack of a Nigerian Airbus A300 from Lagos to Niamey (Niger) by the Movement for Advancement of Democracy (MAD) (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012). Field findings from the CT-COIN Directorate at Jaji indicate CTD's creation at that particular point in time, rather than mere coincidence, was loosely an outcome of the outcome of the hijacking (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012).

Even after CT Division's establishment however, it was not until 2009 that SWW was made a center of excellence and re-designated the Nigerian Army Counter terrorism and Counter Insurgency Centre (NA CT-COIN Centre). This was on 10 June 2009. Formally commissioned by then Minister of Defence, Prince A. Ademola alongside the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Lt. General A.B. Danbazau, the school was to better prepare the NA for irregular warfare, due to realization at the

command level, that "over the years, responses by the Nigerian Government to the threats posed by ethnic conflicts and ethnic militias have tended to follow a predictable pattern" (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012). The Centre's core function was "to remould officers and soldiers of the NA, para-military and other nationals into professionally trained special and counter forces capable of protecting the country's citizens and national interest against all acts of terrorism and insurgency" (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012). This objective, "training of specialists" for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism it was said, "would bring about a new innovation to countering the excesses of such ethnic militias" (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012).

The Centre was however granted further recognition and status, within the 2010 ORBAT[39], which placed it officially under NATRAC and granted it full directorate status. At the time of writing in 2013, the directorate retains just two divisional functions conducted by the SWD and the CTD. As of January 2013, the CT-COIN Centre operated officially from its complex at Jaji-Kaduna, which is were fieldwork was undertaken over a two-week period until December (2012). However, relocation to the NATRAC site at Kontagorra, Niger State, was imminent (Golau, 2012) and is now understood as complete.

Within its daily function, the Centre coordinates training and development of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism concepts and practice for the Army, other service branches, police, state paramilitaries and non-military security agencies. A number of objectives underpin this daily function; some of these are within lower-tactical and higher-tactical levels of war. Some however fall into the operational level of war.

One such objective is the support of NA efforts to combat domestic incidents of terrorism, whether isolated or as part of a broader insurgency phenomenon. Such acts would typically be significant enough that the local police and security agencies are unable to deal with them. Whereas the particular

[39] Hierarchical organization and command structure of an armed force.

details of the training are not enshrined constitutionally, deployment of military personnel — who have received such training — may be subject to the constitutional requirements of Military Assistance to the Civil Power (MACP) (Villo, 2012). Unlike Military Assistance to the Civil Authority (MACA) that deploys military assets without use of force, in incidence of civil unrest, humanitarian or environmental crisis, MACP would typically have military force options with its mandate (Akem, 2014). Still, both MACA and MACP inform the deployment of military aid to civil counter insurgency initiatives. Moreover, MACA and MACP also outline situations wherein the military should not, constitutionally, intervene.

At the tactical level, the CT-COIN Centre also aims to help with development of counter terrorism skills, techniques and procedures for the AFN. Two relevant areas here include specialist equipment training and resilience training that would enable soldiers and officers to operate remotely, and in hostile environments for extended periods and without much supply or reinforcement options . Whereas both areas are tactical, they also are relevant to, and possibly even impact, operations.

First, it is cost saving — as a mitigating factor around the need for military and security operatives to go for foreign training courses, overseas. Such indigenous training, moreover, where it involves local rather than foreign instructors, may also militate against the considerable costs involved with using US and British training personnel for delivering training packages. For personnel within operations (G3) as well as those in logistics (G4), these cost savings constitute an incentive for local training to become more viable and promotable.

Second, an objective within design of training courses, as Col Villo notes in-interview, is that the curriculum[40] now accommodates courses for mid to senior-level operatives to better understand the OE well enough not to sacrifice short-term gains for longer-term objectives within the operation. As

[40] Please see Appendix 1 at the end of the thesis for the CT-COIN bifurcated curriculum, as at the end of 2012.

commonsensical as this might sound, it constitutes a measure of progress; just a few years ago after all, the training curriculum did not include such a learning objective (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012).

A third objective is classroom courses delivered to SO2 (OF-3) and equivalent, on Staff Course at the AFCSC, by personnel from the CT-COIN Centre (CT-COIN Directorate, 2012). An objective of these operational educational packages is to stimulate and coordinate a better understanding of the joint dimension, as codified in the Army's capstone doctrine (Nigerian Army, 2009a). Specifically, the center assists with mixed courses of counter-insurgency training involving different security agencies, the service branches, and personnel at different stages of their career (Villo, 2012). CT-COIN trained personnel trained in this way may be particularly useful learning assets in joint simulation exercises such as *Ex Haske Biyu* at the AFCSC.

For the CT-COIN military instructor, three considerations in particular become relevant in preparing training packages for students at the center (Villo, 2012). The first is conduct and execution of special warfare operations (tactical level of involvement). The second is organization and planning of operations (tactical up to operational/task force levels of involvement). The final consideration is formulation of military CT-COIN strategy, which then is pressed down to the task force level (operational up to command levels of involvement). The CT-COIN Center focuses on the tactical up to operational and SO2 (OF-3) and equivalents in particular benefit from this aspect of the training.

As the CT-COIN Head Instructor noted in-interview however, development of this interaction between the three levels constitutes a challenge; particular in design of packages suited for operational level training (Villo, 2012). There is theory to support Col Villo's concerns. As Newell observes,

> The conduct of war from the operational perspective has perhaps the most impact on the ultimate success of using military force. It is this perspective which links the national goals set

> by the strategic perspective with the tactical military forces which actually use force to attain the desired order (1991, p. 79).

However Newell also cautions on the challenge for personnel at this level of war,

> The conduct of war from the operational perspective has the greatest potential for problems and misunderstandings, because the operational perspective of war is where senior military commanders must integrate the military forces of air, land, and sea. […] Because the view from the strategic perspective of war is so broad, officers from different services may find more agreement there then they can from the operational perspective […] Some of that difficulty may be resolved by developing a bit of understanding […] The solution is not to change each other's cultural point of view, but to understand that each will have a different cultural background (1991, pp. 79-83).

Certainly, development of joint warfare is important at all levels of war. However, as Newell cautions, the operational level of warfare is arguably where the strongest case for training and learning should be made. This is because, as studies by both Newell (1991) and Trainor (1993, p. 71) indicate, particular potential exists for an "out of joint" (Trainor, 1993) force, at the operational level of war.

With regards to measures taken by the Army to facilitate such inter-agency coordination via counter-insurgency training, CT-COIN Centre Director, Brig. Gen T. K. Golau, noted in-interview, increased curriculum emphasis in this area; with further adjustments being fairly frequently made to training packages, as the inter-agency and inter-service training requirements may demand (2012). Whereas this emphasis is not only for officers involved with planning and facilitation of operations — it also includes packages on counter-insurgency tactics for the infantryman and security agent — recognition of inter-agency relations as a COIN force multiplier is perhaps a positive step away from the existing action set, where individual services are said to be "straitjacketed" (Bello, 2012) to the point that other

LOOs are neglected at the expense of infantry-centric activity. Whereas it is premature to say how the development of inter-service coordination will pan out, an informed guess would be that breakdown of inter-service communications (as occurred in Operation Sea Dog in 1985, for instance) (Pawa, 2012) might be less likely in the future of COIN operations, if further inroads are made in this area of COIN institution within the military.

A final point of note here is that the CT-COIN Center is not the only learning institution within the NMOE to facilitate development of inter-service coordination. Indeed, whereas the Centre is mostly focused on practice, in operations and tactics (Villo, 2012), other operational-level learning structures, most notably within the Senior Course Curriculum (SCC) at the AFCSC (AFCSC) as well as the War College, Abuja, develop joint operational warfare and coordination at the concept stage. The Jointness Dimension (JD) of the operational environment will be evaluated in some detail in chapter four's analysis of Nigerian military COIN doctrine.

3-5. Chapter Summary

The note on which the chapter ended suggests a measure of awareness, within the Nigerian military environment, on important aspects required for effect COIN learning, planning and operationalization. The chapter that follows for instance will demonstrate how CT-COIN, in the area of doctrine specifically, has indeed gained increased recognition within the learning environment. Certainly then, progress has been made in the institution of COIN warfare within the Nigerian military; vis-à-vis the period circa the 1980s and 1990s in particular, when strategic culture and the military posture of the era did little to accommodate an institutional focus on ways to counter a non-existent internal threat.

Recent progress in the area of COIN warfare development regardless, the Nigerian military — and the Army in particular — now finds itself trying to understand and to prepare for an unfamiliar form of war, *in situ*. The difficulty and unlikelihood of success in this enterprise is difficult to overstate. The

notion that the Nigerian Army can simultaneous reinvent its thinking, its doctrine, and its action set, during its current campaign and then go on to defeat the insurgent with practically no lag between learning and transfer of skills to practice, may be misplaced.

This is not to say adjustments by the Nigerian military — an emphasis within NATRAC on CT-COIN training; Land Power Symposium papers that reflect increased military thinking around COIN; experimentation with drone warfare; acquisition of T72-M1 tanks (Army)[41]; acquisition of more Mi-24 and Mi-35 helicopters (Air force); increased use of APCs and light armour vehicles, rather than MBTs, in offensives; a more disciplined military regimen in the TOO comparative to military conduct elsewhere in the country, and even hiring of Private Military Security Contractors (PMSCs) — will not bring about tactical progress in the military campaign.

Nor is it to say contributions, by the US and Britain — in JCETs and BMATTs for instance, or in the provision of equipment and of excess defence articles — are having no impact; by some indications, they are.

However, tactical gains should not be mistaken for strategic institution of COIN within the military. The process of COIN development within a military takes time. It is a process that will involve adjustments to doctrine, to operations and to the learning environment. Indeed, organizational culture itself may require adjustments. Yet these processes require time and careful management; either or both of which may be unachievable objectives during an on-going campaign. Moreover there may be consequences as to how the insurgent is inadvertently allowed to use that time, within his own military campaign.

[41] These tactical land warfare assets were much welcome additions considering the Army's MBTs before these were Soviet T52s and British Vickers Mk. 3s

Broader implications, of the Nigerian military's relative neglect of its COIN function for years, will be evaluated in the thesis' final section; where study findings and implications are discussed. As a highlight of these implications however, the expectation should be that the military either tries to upskill itself *in-situ*; affording the insurgent the time and space required to make gains. Or the military could turn to external help — in form of PMSCs, regional allies, or both — while it gradually gets trained, adjusts its doctrine, acquires the relevant capabilities, and builds its overall resilience against the enemy. Within the Nigerian experience, both scenarios have come to apply to varying degrees, in the military campaign against Boko Haram.

How war planners address this balance between long-term strategic COIN institutionalization, and short-term tactical gains within a campaign, are areas further built upon within this project's study findings and implications chapter.

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CHAPTER FOUR

INSURGENCY-COIN MILITARY DOCTRINE IN NIGERIA

"Doctrine is not dogma"

– Maj. Gen Milton OBE[42]

"Learning organizations defeat insurgencies; "bureaucratic hierarchies do not"

– US Army and Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*[43]

"Since little in life is more fuzzy and unmanageable than culture, it tends to cause the dream of doctrine to implode into mere dust and spilled ink […] if the makers of doctrine are culture's slaves, and not its masters, doctrine is little more than a weathervane"

– Harald Høiback[44]

4-1. Introduction: Doctrine in Insurgency and Counter-insurgency

Beginning with organizational culture and historical experience, the thesis has over the previous two chapters explored increasingly formalized underpinning influences of military counter-insurgency in Nigeria. Doctrine, as "fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives" (NATO, 2008, pp. 2-D-9), constitutes one of the most formal and explicit ways of promulgating "explicit knowledge" (Ives, 2007, p. 138). In a sense therefore, it is quite different to culture, which is tacit and which, "involves intangible factors such as personal belief, perspective, and the value system" (Ives, 2007, p. 138).

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[42] Cited in Milton (2001, p. 43).

[43] Cited in US Army and Marine Corps (2007, p. x).

[44] Cited in Høiback (2011, pp. 885-886).

Some theorists today, as this chapter will later highlight, contest the overall utility of doctrine. One school of thought argues that not only is doctrine superseded by culture, "doctrine is particularly bad in the type of operations that have concerned us the most recently, namely counter-insurgency (COIN)" (Høiback, 2011, p. 880). Some other scholars are of the view that bottom-up innovation, and learning from experience, are just as, if not more, effective than written doctrine (Farrell, 2009; Russell, 2011). Others meanwhile contend that some of the most effective militaries functioned just fine without codified doctrine for a long time (Hills, 2004). Yet another area of thinking (US Army and Marine Corps, 2007; British Army, 2009), consistent with views of some military personnel (Ifezue & Kotun, 2012; Villo, 2012) in the Nigerian military learning environment, make the case for doctrine as instrumental to the improvement of the military function, particularly in COIN . Indeed, it is not uncommon to read within the literature, and even in the media, about the effect the "Petraeus Doctrine" had on the War in Iraq: Bergen for instance is of the view that the Petraeus doctrine "changed the U.S. military" (2012).

Each of these schools of thought on the relevance of doctrine will be evaluated in some detail later in the chapter; each has its merits. Scepticism of some scholars about the concept regardless, the case for doctrine — especially within the Nigerian military context where the concept is problematic for reasons soon considered — should not be discarded too hastily. Rather, it may be worth investigating what the role of doctrine is, and has been, within Nigerian military counter-insurgency.

This chapter's contribution therefore, is to discuss the doctrine underpinning military COIN in Nigeria. Amongst other areas, how the doctrine has evolved, and existentiality of the gap between Nigerian military COIN theory and practice, will be evaluated. The chapter's analysis situates the evaluation of Nigerian military COIN doctrine within a broader conversation on doctrine and its role in the military function.

Insofar as this chapter's emphasis will be focused entirely on doctrine, doctrine by itself however should not be seen as determinant of the conduct of an armed force; it is, rather, one element and even proponents such as Bergen are unlikely to argue otherwise. Indeed, change to the military organization, as chapter two indicates, is both difficult to implement and difficult to observe. This arguably is regardless of adjustments made to doctrine in the interim, and may be more related to tacit influences such as organizational culture and institutional isomorphism.

4-1-1. Doctrine for the insurgent

Historically, state militaries have tended to adapt slowly within campaigns to dislodge the insurgent. As far back as the US counter-insurgency in the Philippines (Deady, 2005) and as recently as counter-insurgencies in Northern Ireland and Afghanistan by the British (Chin, 2012), in Iraq by the Americans (Russell, 2011), and in northeastern Nigeria by the military JTF as studied in this research project, the counter-insurgent's adaptation to guerrilla warfare has often been slow.

Demonstrable effectiveness of adaptation has likewise proved modest within an analysis of past counter-insurgencies, even after years of campaigning. Doctrine has not always been codified throughout these campaigns, moreover; yet all militaries have some sort of doctrine, by which their campaign conduct is for the most part guided.

On the other hand, if historical and ongoing insurgency campaigns serve as any indication, the insurgent appears better at changing the doctrine that underpins his tactics and operations; if not his strategy *per se*. In the case of Boko Haram for instance, rapid switches from guerrilla attacks on a small scale, to more conventional large-scale attacks, to use of roadside IEDs to slow military mobility and willingness to ingress into contested areas, to use of *Istishhad* — matyrdom operations — all reflect the mutative nature of the group's doctrine.

Doctrine in this context, if codified, is for the most part tactical in nature (Chaliand & Blin, 2007); and is largely uncodified, moreover. Sometimes however, as in the case of jihadist manuals for terrorism tactics, doctrine can be codified into forms that can be readily digested and disseminated.

Such codified tactical doctrine for the insurgent tends to be highly specific — perhaps even technical — in nature. An example is the jihadist training manual, *Mujahidin ki lalkaar* (War Cry of the Holy Warriors), which François Géré notes, "devotes a chapter to attacks by boat: 'A warship can be immobilized if 1.2 kilograms of explosives are attached to the driveshaft; an additional 1.3 kilograms will destroy the engine . . . 4 kilograms near the bottom of the hull will sink it'." (2007, p. 354). This is the type of tactical detail expected within tactical and even operational-level doctrine for the counter-insurgent; though in the latter, tactical-level detail punctuates, rather than dominates, the main narrative of such publications.[45]

Another point worth noting about the insurgent's use of doctrine is that, where a VNSA co-opts the expertise of former government soldiers and military officers, such personnel may bring along their doctrinal understanding of operational and tactical warfare. A marriage of such formalized understanding of doctrine, with the largely informal doctrine that determines what phase of the campaign a VNSA is in, and how operations are conducted in that phase, could bring about hybrid forms of thinking and practice by the insurgent. Here, recognizable military activity at the operational and higher-tactical level, is mixed with tactics and methods foreign to professionalized military forces.

Regardless of how these changes in doctrine come about, what this means for the observer is that the ensuing message conveyed by the actions of the insurgent, sometimes are confusing; leading such groups to be called terrorists today, insurgents tomorrow, rebels the next, proscribed action groups at

[45] Compare for instance, Armée de Terre (2010), which is tactical doctrine, with US Army and Marine Corps, with contributions like Nigerian Army (2011a) and British Army (2009), both of which are operational-level publications.

yet another time, and so on. Correspondingly, talk of insurgency, terrorism, civil war, internal security crisis, internal armed conflict and so on, tend to then be associated with VNSA's activities, dependent on the nature and rampancy of the action set employed. Lionel Beehner (2012) for instance, alludes to the "paradox" involving interchangeability of civil war and insurgency terminology, for policy makers trying to interpret the implications of actions by a VNSA.

Furthermore the message, attendant to these marked changes in doctrine and action set, may well appear to signify ideological polarity between strategic intent and tactical expression of the VNSA. After all, if a group wants to establish a caliphate for Muslims, some may ask, why does it, rather paradoxically, conduct *Istishhad* at mosques, as well as target gatherings populated by Muslims in locations such as market places and town squares?

Yet such polarity need not necessarily exist for a group to assume a range of behaviours over the course of the insurgency. Put another way, just because the insurgent can adapt new doctrine to his warfighting and broader campaign quite suddenly in practice, should not be taken to mean ideological confusion *per se*. Intent may remain the same; only the expression of that intent may have changed. For the insurgent, and relative to state forces, such expression of intent, via operational shifts and considerable adjustments to doctrine *in situ*, tends to change fairly quickly.

As an example, a shift in tactics of a group may indicate viciously terrorist methods hitherto unemployed. Strategic ambition on the other hand may remain unchanged: a push for increased inclusion in the political process, resource control, demands that a government step down, self-determination, territorial control, or millenarian objectives[46]. The insurgent's operations meanwhile, insofar as they link strategy to tactics, could occupy a spectrum of activity that includes conventional military campaigning at one time; political dialogue at another; capture, holding and administration of territory at another and guerrilla warfare at yet another. In this regard and as an example, Boko

[46] Both latter objectives of territorial control and millenarianism arguably apply to Boko Haram.

Haram's insurgency, and the way the group's doctrine has changed over time, proves no different. Tables 4-1C and 4-1D highlight these changes. Indeed, changes to the way Boko Haram has waged its insurgency over the years is consistent with Neumann and Smith's argument that perpetrator groups (VNSAs) tend over time to transition to more advanced forms of insurgency (Neumann & Smith, 2008). Both Table 4-1C and Table 4-1D highlight this transition: for Boko Haram specifically and more broadly as it applies to insurgency as a phenomenon, respectively..

The themes discussed here are hardly new, moreover. Much research exists on typologies of perpetrator groups that contest state power. For some theorists, Martha Crenshaw (2011; 1987) and Max Abrahms (2006) for instance, terror groups are not always insurgent and vice versa. Indeed some scholars, like Ariel Merari (2007), include terrorism as one of a number of indiscrete levels within an insurgency schema (Tables 4-1A and 4-1B). Indeed, by and large, the existing theory indicates insurgency and terrorism may converge or may diverge, dependent on a number of factors. Such factors include: phase of the conflict; presence (or absence) of asymmetry; ability (or failure) of perpetrator groups to gain popular support; nature of target response, et cetera (Merari, 2007). That the insurgent's doctrine changes therefore, consequential to campaign factors, should be seen as logical, as necessary, or sometimes as both. Yet the insurgent's ability to quickly adapt doctrine invariably proves vexing for the counter-insurgent who typically is slow to adapt doctrine, both codified and uncodified.

		Target	
		State	Citizens
Initiator	State	Full-scale war; belligerent activity in peacetime (e.g., cloak-and-dagger operations and punitive strikes)	Legal and illegal law enforcement oppression
	Citizens	Guerrilla war; insurgent terrorism; coup d'état; (Leninist) revolution	Vigilante terrorism; ethnic terrorism

Table 4-1A. A Basic Classification of Political Violence[47]

Form of Insurgency	Insurgency level	Number involved	Duration	Violence	Threat to Regime	Spontaneity?
Coup d'état	High	Few	Short	Varied	Great	No
(Leninist) Revolution	Low	Many	Short	Great	Great	No?
Guerrilla	Low	Medium	Long	Great	Varied	No
Riot	Low	Medium	Short	Little	Small	Yes
Terrorism	Low	Few	Long	Varied	Small	No
Non-violent resistance	Low	Many	Long	No	Varied	No

Table 4-1B. A Comparison of Insurgency Forms[48]

[47] Adapted from Merari (2007, p. 17).

[48] Adapted from Merari (2007, p. 20).

Boko Haram **Before Battle of Maiduguri, 2009)**	**Boko Haram (2010 – 2011)** **PHASE ONE**	**Boko Haram (2012 – 2013)** **PHASE TWO**	**Boko Haram (2014 -)** **PHASE THREE**
▪ Ultra-Salafist Islamist group. Non-violent at this phase. ▪ Were active in spreading ideology more openly; in the group's *masjid* (mosque), though leafleting, tapes and across other states in north beyond Borno. ▪ Minor skirmishes with police but little more than a local nuisance. ▪ However, message resonated with *Talakawa* (commoners) so followership was large and increasing ▪ No notable military capabilities at this phase	▪ Having attempted to tackle Nigerian police and security forces head-on, Boko Haram failed and disappeared. ▪ Guerrilla warfare on re-emergence ▪ No real territorial ambition. ▪ Targeted killings of senior leadership (such as IED experts, tacticians and overall head) more likely to degrade group at this stage ▪ Deterrence by denial as main COIN strategy. Hard targets should be harder; soft targets, hardened. ▪ You do not need troop surge here ▪ Intelligence plays key role ▪ Classic examples of phase 1 attacks: Edet House and UN building suicide bombing in Abuja (2011); the Bauchi prison break (2010)	▪ People know more about them ▪ Technically proficient at this stage: attacks more frequent, more spectacular ▪ Numbers of combatant fighters increase compared to phase one ▪ Active recruitment within this phase. ▪ Expect stalemate(s) here ▪ The insurgent is counting on an over-reactive state target response: do not take bait ("courageous restraint"). ▪ Police role crucial – Strong military presence among civilians may be mistaken as "occupation" ▪ Counter-insurgent should go non-kinetic: shuras, town hall meetings, community initiatives, CMO as part of "carrot". ▪ Attacks on military assets by insurgent more rampant here. This is to bait an over-reactive target response ▪ Classic example of phase 2 attack: Attack on 21 Bde, Maiduguri	▪ Military capabilities have increased sufficiently to realize territorial ambition. By this phase, the group, ▪ Can now successfully challenge state writ and realize territorial ambitions as seen in capture (or attempted capture) of areas such as Mubi, Konduga (despite the presence of 103 Battalion), Delwa, Gworza, Bama. ▪ Has enough military clout to negotiate from position of power. Bad time for state to talk ▪ Can demand inclusion in political process or, if strong enough, may overhaul process Furthermore, ▪ As military offensive against the insurgent increase, expect counter-coercion by punishment here. Attacks on schools, marketplaces and Mosques. ▪ Expect a smoother pathway to political legitimacy, if group is successful here

Table 4-1C: Transitioning of Perpetrator Groups over Time (Boko Haram Case).

	Terrorism	Guerrilla War	Conventional War
Unit size in battle	Small (can be fewer than ten persons)	Medium (platoons, companies, battalions)	Large (armies, corps, divisions)
Weapons	Hand guns, hand grenades, assault rifles, and specialized weapons (e.g., car bombs, remote-control bombs, barometric pressure bombs)	Mostly infantry-type light weapons but sometimes artillery pieces as well	Full range of military hard- ware (air force, armor, artillery, etc.)
Tactics	Specialized: kidnapping, assassinations, car bombing, hijacking, barricade-hostage, etc.	Commando-type	Usually joint operations involving several military branches
Targets	State symbols, political opponents, and the public at large	Mostly military, police, and administration staff, as well as political opponents	Mostly military units, industrial and transportation infrastructure
Intended impact	Psychological coercion	Mainly physical attrition of the enemy	Physical destruction
Control of territory	No	Yes	Yes
Uniform	Do not wear uniform	Often wear uniform	Wear uniform
Recognition of war zones	No recognized war zones; universal operations. Operations may (and often do) extend cross-border, transnational or international	War limited to the country in strife	War limited to recognized geographical area
International legality	No.	Yes, if conducted by rules	Yes, if conducted by rules
Domestic legality	No	No.	Yes

Table 4-1D: Mode of Violent Struggle and Doctrine, By Phase.[49]

[49] Adapted from Merari (2007, p. 26).

4-1-2. Doctrine and Boko Haram's transformation

The tables above indicate the extent, over the course of a campaign, to which the insurgent can blur the lines between conflict forms, as it adapts its doctrine. This section of the chapter argues that Boko Haram's insurgency constitutes a case in point.

Before 2009 Boko Haram was a small radical ultra-Salafist sect (n.a., 2012), led by Ustaz Yusuf Mohammed. Fieldwork with the Nigerian police in Maiduguri indicates that at the time, adherents to the sect, and its leadership, were considered little more than a local nuisance by authorities (Adeoye, 2012), despite fairly frequent run-ins with local authorities (Abubakar, 2012) (Abubakar, 2012). This is consistent with Comolli's study findings on the formative years of Boko Haram (2015).

With regards to doctrinal influence and modeling, Yusuf was likely influenced by 13th (and 14th) Century religious scholar Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya (Forest, 2012, p. 62; Higazi, 2013b, p. 10). The Yusufiyya mosque in Maiduguri, *Ibn Taymiyyah Masjid*, destroyed during the Battle of Maiduguri, was named after this individual.

As Higazi notes, the ideology which Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya first promulgated, inspired over time not just Yusuf but also Wahhabis "and other revivalist movements" (Higazi, 2013b, p. 10). James Forest points to the three tenets of the Ibn Taymiyyah viewpoint that were a likely influence on Boko Haram's thinking around lesser jihad and the role the local populace had to play. First, that the "suffering" experienced by the ummah (community of the faithful) was often due to leaders' failure to adhere to the tenets of pure Islam (Forest, 2012, p. 62). Second, that jihad was the duty, within the lifetime, of a true Muslim. This was a necessity brought about not just to "defend the ummah" but also for purposes of Islamization (the spread and proselytization of Islam) (Forest, 2012, p. 62). Third, and consequently, that the "leader who does not enforce Sharî'a law completely, and wage active jihad against infidels, is unfit to rule" (Forest, 2012, p. 62).

Over the period between 2007 and 2009, more people — first a handful, then hundreds, then, possibly, thousands — were drawn to Ustaz Yusuf's ideology that western education (Boko) was not permissible (Haram) due to the Bid'ah (innovation, also, heresy) it had introduced into northern Nigerian Muslim society (Mohammed, 2010). Other accounts regarding how the Boko Haram began acquiring financial support for its "jihad" note that, in building its mosque, Ibn Taimiyya Masjid, the Yusufiyya (followers of Yusuf) began to spread its ideology through tapes — proceeds from which were said to have increased "tremendously" as its doctrine became more popular (Sani S. , 2011). There was, likely by design, no immediacy for armed insurgency at this phase, even if there was the intent within the group's leadership (Ahmed, 2012; Bello, 2012). The engagement was avoided. Rather, at this formative phase, the group's doctrine was to attract a followership and to stir up disaffection against the state, and in particular against the police who were seen as the embodiment of state corruption and secular rule (Abubakar, 2012; Mohammed, 2010). This underpinning disaffection for the police moreover, was personal: Yusuf and Boko Haram, in the group's formative years, had tenuous relationship with the police; he and his followers had been arrested several times (Abubakar, 2012).

To piece together this picture of Boko Haram's formative years, I interviewed a religious scholar who had known Ustaz Yusuf personally (Abubakar, 2012). Fieldwork with the Office of the National Security Adviser, with the DSS and with the police in Maiduguri, who had privy access to early pre-insurgency reports on Boko Haram, constituted the second point of triangulation. Numerous newspaper clippings, as well as academic and Islamic research on the group's formative years, that by James Forest (2012), Abdulkareem Mohammed (2010), Shehu Sanni (2011), Adam Higazi (2013b) and early work by Virginia Comolli (2013), amongst others, completed the third point of the triangle.

The sum of the findings relevant to this section indicate that, in Boko Haram's formative years, the movement's doctrine was meant to gather local sympathy and to insinuate the inevitability of jihad:

open confrontation with authorities. Militarization for this confrontation was not the aim, nor was it the emphasis that local authorities be immediately confronted (Ahmed, 2012; Bello, 2012). There were skirmishes to be sure, but these were minor, were infrequent and were able to be contained by the local police (Adeoye, 2012).

Consequent to these underpinnings of Boko Haram's formative years, there was deliberate sowing of seeds of discord through Yusuf's sermons, and of a growing sense of urgency that action — and violent action if necessary — would have to be taken (Ahmed, 2012).

As police sources noted in Maiduguri, it was one such sermon in the summer of 2009 that may have pushed the Yusifiyya over the edge, causing them to take up arms and attack the local police (Adeoye, 2012). This, for all intents and purposes, would gradually precipitate events that lead to the deadly Battle of Maiduguri that year (Adeoye, 2012). Scattered and with their leader, Ustaz Yusuf, killed shortly after that major skirmish involving Boko Haram, the police (Forest, 2012; Comolli, 2015) and a specially drafted military task force commanded by NA Colonel Benjamin I. Ahanotu (2010), Boko Haram adherents would go underground. The sect's previously permitted preachings would be banned and its supporters facing a massive crackdown by local security forces (Adeoye, 2012; Comolli, 2015; Forest, 2012; Mohammed, 2010). The group would remain in this extended hiatus till September 2010 when it broke hundreds of its suspected members out of a Bauchi jail (Smith D. , 2010). Gradually since 2010 when the group re-emerged, it will increasingly escalate its contest against the military.

By 2012, Boko Haram was demonstrably capable of engaging the Nigerian military in low-intensity skirmishes: it was no longer a purely guerrilla-style military group, as it was in 2011 (Forest, 2012). Rather, in dominating local police units at practically every level of the engagement, Boko Haram had made it such that JTF ORO, not local police commands, was virtually in charge of daily security across contested sectors of Borno (Adeoye, 2012; Danmadami, 2012).

During this period of what approximated a stalemate, whereas there were punctuated guerrilla attacks rather than the large scale sustained offensives that would become the group's modus operandi by early 2015, there was, in fact, a second war on-going locally.

This war, silent and virtually unobservable except by intelligence personnel, was a war of hearts and minds. Here, Boko Haram's ability to target, virtually uncontested, some unprotected villages and small settlements, seriously damaged government legitimacy and rule on the one hand and, on the other, likely won the jihadists sizeable amounts of coerced and also many willing and won-over male recruits, for its campaign (Ahmed, 2012). Some of these "recruits" moreover may neither have been forced, nor ideological supportive of Boko Haram *per se*. Rather, the lack of basic infrastructure and state provision, and the ability of Boko Haram to provide food, weapons, camaraderie and shelter, may have, for many disaffected males, proved the tipping point (Ahmed, 2012).

Moreover, efforts of G3 (operations) Army personnel to establish outreach projects[50], as a counterbalance to Boko Haram's incentives or alternatives to what was practically a non-existent writ of governance in parts of the northeast, and in Borno specifically, had their own challenges (Danmadami, 2012). In some areas, the insurgents were already establishing a foothold, which the JTF had neither the manpower, nor the expertise, to counter-balance long-term.

The effect of this dynamic was that Boko Haram's ability to swell its ranks was proving more effective, within this stalemate period of 2012 in particular, than the Nigerian military and security agencies' efforts to deny it that ability. This is despite the insurgent still being unable to win, or escalate, the engagement during this period of his campaign.

This was a phase of the insurgency-COIN was one, as the 21 Bde CO and the JTF ORO Land Component Commander, Brig. Gen R. O. Bamigboye put it in-interview, where the "invisible enemy"

[50] Discussed in chapter five's analysis of the spectrum of military COIN operations against Boko Haram.

became preponderant to the engagement (Bamigboye, 2012). Put another way, the land component of the COIN was effectively facing an enemy that blended into, recruited from, struck from, and faded back into, the local populace (Bamigboye, 2012; Ahmed, 2012; JTF, 2012).

To clarify, the assertion here is not that the doctrine underpinning the insurgency was, by any stretch, "people's war" in the way either Mao (2007) or Che Guevara (1968) may have envisaged it. Yet, by using the threat of, or actual, retribution against those who supported the military on the one hand, and the promise of inclusion into the fold, so to speak, on the other, Boko Haram was in a sense using the very same carrot and stick strategies that writers from Mao (2007) to Trinquier (1961) identify within insurgency and counter-insurgency.

Caught between the insurgent and an increasingly frustrated military "occupation", that members of the populace would over time be left feeling disaffected and disenfranchised from the social contract that is "Nigeria", was inevitable. Many of these moreover, would have been impoverished youth from Abu Shekau's own ethnic tribe, the Kanuri (Blair, 2015), as repeatedly came up during fieldwork with no less than four JTF components[51]. Such individually may have been coerced, seduced, or, as events played out, may have ipso facto been left little choice but to throw in their lot. With food, weapons, camaraderie, modest shelter and a shared purpose the incentive for this decision, it may have been a decision that was more rationalizable for people caught in this conflict trap, than an outside-in cursory analysis may uncover.

Put another way, Boko Haram's doctrine of extreme brutality combined with a willingness to take in ever more impoverished individuals as mujahideen for its military campaign, indicates there likely is "a method to their madness" (Ahmed, 2012). As a consequence, interview data from the DSS indicates certain areas – such as parts of Bulabulin Ngarannam and London-Chiki wards, right there in

[51] Due to the sensitivity of some of the comments, it is not possible for more explicit identification of contributing respondents/JTF ORO components to be made.

Maiduguri much less within the broader Borno axis — were sympathetic to, and maybe even actively protected, the insurgents (Ahmed, 2012). At the least, such areas were passive-aggressive to JTF ORO efforts (Ahmed, 2012).

If there was indeed a battle of hearts and minds however, it is unclear whether JTF ORO fully recognized how to win that battle. Use of the Directorate of Islamic Affairs for instance, as a counterbalance to the anti-establishment propaganda by Boko Haram in some areas would not, as an example, come until much later after the JTF had been disbanded and during its successor operation, OP Zaman Lafiya (Sani, 2014).

Indeed, that Boko Haram, after JTF ORO was ended, had a much large group of fighters — to the extent that it could now afford to go conventional and establish a "caliphate" with a headquarters at Gwoza (Blair, 2015; Comolli, 2015) — suggests the insurgents were more successful in this aspect, within this phase of the war. Combined with likely cross-border support from Chad Basin mujahideen (Adeoye, 2012), the numbers gained or coerced within this phase in northeastern Nigeria and in Borno in particular, would play a pivotal role in the insurgent's war calculus, going forward.



Chart 4-0: Boko Haram Shifts in Engagement Patterns.[52]

Chart 4-0 above shows the shifts in the engagement patterns by Boko Haram. A number of observations can be made from here. From the data, the insurgent, prior to 2013, does little military fighting. The doctrine in this phase is unambiguous: war avoidance, and harassment of the population.

Over the course of the insurgency with the insurgent's numbers and capabilities increased, the local populace were not anymore the only legitimate targets; military formations increasingly were targets as well. Indeed, as yet more time passed, the military engagement would increasingly feature in Boko Haram's calculations. This effectively reverses the earlier dynamic prior to 2013, whereby civilians and the police, though not the military, constituted the targets. Put another way, the insurgent's military doctrine will increasingly shift away from one of war avoidance to one where the engagement and military fighting would feature in the operational environment.

[52] Source: The Economist Data Team (The Economist, 2015).

By mid-2013, Boko Haram would be able to increasingly engage the military. A year from then, Boko Haram's ability to match the Nigerian military on the ground, and to hold territory (see Figure 4-0), would be unprecedented since arguably the civil war. Indeed, as the analysis that follows would demonstrate, Boko Haram's doctrine by now, rather than discouraging the engagement, encouraged it.

In this context, it may be said that whereas there was ideological consistency in Boko Haram's jihad, the military doctrine demonstrated by the group — its tactics, its operations, its decision-making around both, and recurrent military patterns that fundamentally drove its campaign — had seen a marked shift, since the early days of constituting a local nuisance and preaching at Ibn Taymiyyah Masjid. Boko Haram however would show that not only was it adept in going from irregular to more conventional military confrontations, it could also switch back as the need arose.

In March 2015, a series of counter-offensives and spectacular routes by the Nigerian military will see virtually all of the Islamist's major held territories recaptured (Blair, 2015b; Mail & Guardian Africa, 2015). Figures 4-0 shows the vast land area controlled or contested by the group, at arguably the height of its military dominance in February 2015. Around a month later by March 2015 however, around 36 of the held or contested towns would be recaptured from the insurgents, with the threat on the capital city of Maiduguri effectively snuffed out (Blair, 2015b; Mail & Guardian Africa, 2015).

Within this short period, about 30 days or so, Boko Haram losses would mount and its major territorial gains would be wiped out. Former Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Lt. Gen Kenneth Minimah (retd) noted in August 2015, "the ability of Boko Haram terrorists to confront our security forces in open combat is virtually non-existent" (Omonobi, 2015).

As a consequence, returning to its war avoidance doctrine with which it originally began its insurgency, Boko Haram would once again ignore military fighting and instead would significantly ramp up attacks on civilian soft targets. *Istishhadiya* (martyrdom) operations using mostly using

female bombers in public locations, a tactic already explored by the group (Pearson, 2014; Chothia, 2014), would become particularly prominence. The final data bar in Chart 4-0 is an indicator of this reversal in military doctrine, by the insurgent. This emphasis on *Istishhadiya* doctrine, and users of female bombers more specifically within this doctrine, would dominate the group's military campaign, particularly since the change in federal government in May 2015 (ABC News, 2015; The BBC, 2015c; 2015d; 2015e; 2015f; 2015g; 2015h).

The question of how Boko Haram went from this a doctrine of war avoidance, then on to one of covert attacks and *Istishhadiya*, then on to one of territory-seeking guerrilla warfare ercomplete with large ground units, armoured elements and protected mobility aris worth considering in more detail. Indeed, that the insurgents had no territorial ambition to speak of at one time, at another controlled key areas or contested them with the state, and then practically overnight went back to *Istishhadiya* and hit-and-run gun attacks, elicits further examination of the similarities and distinctions between terrorism and guerrilla warfare.

Whereas the VNSA may remain the same, both in constitution and in strategic objectives, the doctrine that underpins the achievement of that objective is, this thesis argues, is not only subject to change but necessarily *must* change, over the course of a military campaign. As Ariel Merrari writes,

> As strategies of insurgency, however, terrorism and guerrilla warfare are quite distinct. The most important difference is that unlike terrorism, guerrilla warfare tries to establish physical control of territory. This control is often partial. In some cases, the guerrillas rule the area during the night and government forces have control in the daytime. In others, government forces are able to secure the main routes of transportation but guerrilla territory starts as little as a few hundred yards to the right and left. In many instances, guerrillas have managed to maintain complete control of a sizable portion of land for long periods of time. The need to dominate a territory is a key element in insurgent guerrilla strategy. The territory under the

> guerrillas' control provides the human reservoir for recruitment, a logistical base and—most important—the ground and infrastructure for establishing a regular army. [On the other hand] Terrorist strategy does not vie for a tangible control of territory (2007, p. 24).

In the case of Boko Haram, there was indeed a noticeable shift in the way the group began to conduct itself, at the point where it felt confident enough, and began, to conduct territory-seeking guerrilla warfare. Likewise there was a noticeable shift in decision-making and conduct, once the group again decided to go clandestine, having been thwarted in its attempt to establish (and to hold) large territory. The notion therefore than Boko Haram has a consistent military doctrine throughout its campaign, simply does not reflect the reality of events, charted below.

Throughout 2011 and 2012, a period spanning around two calendar years, Boko Haram's territorial ambitions were virtually none-existent (Ewansiha, 2012). To hold territory, after all, the group had to expel not just the military bridgehead in contested areas, it had to be capable of defeating the larger nearby Nigerian Army formations which, inevitably, would counter-attack and redeploy more light infantry. Beyond merely repelling counterattacks however, Boko Haram would have required such a dominant presence in its administered territory, that deterrence, rather than constant military fighting, would keep it from losing that territory. This, however, was not the sort of engagement Boko Haram's at-the-time clandestine nature could afford be caught up in. Rather, *Istishhadiya*, ambushes, sabotage, and small-scale overt and covert missions, were more consistent with the group's modus operandi at the time (Adeoye, 2012). By 2013 however, this would change.

As Chart 4-0 indicates, by 2013 when military fighting began to feature prominently, Boko Haram had demonstrably sufficient numbers, training, matériel and coordination, to begin larger scale conventional operations. Company-level, and approximating battalion-level[53], attacks on hardened

[53] A company (typically headed by a captain or major) here is taken to mean anywhere between 75 to 150 numbers; a battalion (typically headed by a lt. col) is taken to mean a number of companies, or anywhere

military formations, specifically, were on the rise. Thus, Boko Haram's attack on 202 Tank Battalion, Bama in December 2013 (This Day, 2013), was a clear indication, and perhaps even a test run, of the group's readiness to quite radically revise its doctrine, towards the end of 2013.

By 2014, Boko Haram could engage battalion elements of the Nigerian Army (The BBC, 2015b). Two specific examples are the group's sacking of 174 Battalion, Abadan (Premium Times, 2014) and in the overrunning of the MNJTF base at Baga (The BBC, 2015b), under which both 124 and 174 Battalions fall, and for the loss of which the MNJTF CO, Brig. Gen Enitan Ransome-Kuti and members of his command and staff personnel, were court martialed (Ibeh, 2015).

By 2015, the insurgents were demonstrably capable of challenging Brigade-level formations, as the mass prisoner break at 21 Bde, Giwa Barracks (YouTube, 2014), and the overrunning of 243 Army Bn of 5 Bde Monguno both suggest. The former in particular showed at least a few hundred Boko Haram fighters, moving in attack formation, in an offensive hitherto unthinkable on such a scale against West Africa's most powerful army, Nor are these the only instances of Boko Haram fighters, moving in force and with protected mobility and light armour (with several APCs), against Nigerian military hard locations. Video evidence of the insurgents' blitz-style takeover of Gwoza town (Nigerian FM, 2014), later the capital of their caliphate (Blair, 2015; Comolli, 2015) in August 2014, once again demonstrated Boko Haram's ability to successfully prosecute battalion-scale offensives (Nigerian FM, 2014), and, crucially, to defend gains (Blair, 2015).

By February 2015, Boko Haram's transformation, from phase one secondary nuisance to phase three primary military threat, appeared complete. The Islamists at this time now held, or contested, a large number of strategic towns, particularly within Borno and Yobe states of northeast Nigeria (The BBC, 2015b). Assertions that Boko Haram now held territory "the size of Belgium" (Blair, 2015) may have

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between 300 to 800 men. A brigade (typically headed by a brigadier), constituting 2,000 to 4,000 men, is formed up of a number of battalions. A colonel may also command a brigade, though the position is mostly a staff one.

been an exaggeration; but the Islamists *did* hold considerable territory and would defend some of it for days, weeks or months. Figure 4-0 below highlights Boko Haram's territory at arguably the height of the realization of its territorial ambition. Most of the territory came back under control of the FGN, after a series of offensives against Boko Haram, between February and March 2015 (Blair, 2015b).



Figure 4-0: Boko Haram Control in Northeast Nigeria (Circa February 2015).[54]

[54] Source: Campbell (2015).

As dramatic as Boko Haram's transformation might appear however, it is, by and large, consistent with existing and long-established theories of insurgency; specifically those of Maoism and focoism doctrine. In Maoism for instance, the insurgent starts small, and, through three phases, acquires both the support of the broad populace, and the numbers and military capabilities required, to directly challenge the state (Tse-Tung, 2007). More specifically, the Maoist thinking is that in phase one, guerrilla warfare, and an ability to discredit the state by making harassing military incursions into state-controlled territory, should be preponderant to the insurgent's war calculus. In phase two, the insurgent aims to gain population support and acquire military capabilities that approximate that of an army able to challenge the state. In phase three, territory-seeking guerrilla warfare, as a means to ultimately defeat the state, seize its territory, and establish a new order, is the objective. Put another way, by phases three, war, rather than war avoidance, for this typology of insurgent, should be seen as the necessary doctrine (Tse-Tung, 2007; Mackinlay, 2012).

Focoism on the other hand, whereas similar to, and drawing from, Maoism theory in many respects, recommends that the insurgent may entirely or in part skip the second phase of "people's war"; that is, he need not, *per se*, build up significant military capabilities (Guevara, 1968; Debray, 1967). Rather, the insurgent should aim, within his campaign, to create sufficient chaos and unrest, using guerrilla tactics, as a vehicle to discrediting the state. The broader populace, distracted by the insurgent's message, and left without a sense of state-projected social and military security, becomes more likely to lose faith in the state. The people's overt or tacit support, at this juncture, may then be used as focus (*foco*, in Spanish) for an escalated final phase of the insurgency campaign. At this phase, military intervention, in itself, may be unable to end the insurgency (Guevara, 1968; Debray, 1967).

As highlighted earlier however, the counter-insurgent, unlike the insurgent, is typically slower and largely less adept at significantly changing posture and action set over the course of an insurgency.

Indeed, where codified doctrine is concerned, it may even be more challenging for the counter-insurgent. As an example, the writers of FM 3-24 caution that campaign-level changes that reflect new doctrine cannot be expected anytime soon if the doctrine is introduced during an on-going campaign (US Army and Marine Corps, 2007, p. x). James Russell, likewise, within the specific case of US COIN doctrine in Iraq, takes the view that FM 3-24's effect on operations in the theatre, may have been blown out of proportion (2011).

Assertions like this however, relevant to the counter-insurgent, stand in stark contrast to the doctrine of the insurgent, as typified in the adaptability and change demonstrated by Boko Haram, over the course of its military campaign.

In the case of the Nigerian Army, on the other hand, its counter-insurgency doctrine, published 2011 during its counter-insurgency, seems to have made the Army's operations no better. If anything, the Army's COIN operations had increasingly less effect when the COIN doctrine was first published in 2011[55]. This is not to say the introduction of the doctrine and the worsening COIN are correlates. JTF ORO after all came after the new doctrine and fared better, relatively speaking, than past counter-insurgencies by the military. However, insofar as it may also not be entirely accurate to assume introduction of doctrine that constitutes a better fit for the OE would be a panacea for the Nigerian military's COIN woes; it may likewise be inaccurate to assume the new COIN doctrine had no bearing on operations between 2011 and 2013 in particular. Such is the relatively polarizing nature of military doctrine for the professional military institution already conducting operations to which the doctrine is meant to apply.

However, before an evaluation of Nigerian military COIN doctrine and its turbulent (and mostly tenuous) relationship with the conduct of operations since promulgation in 2011, the section that follows will discuss, more broadly, the implications of doctrine for the professional military institution.

[55] Particularly since 2013 when Boko Haram began to erode JTF gains.

4-2. Doctrine for the Professional Military Institution

Within the literature on operational warfare, doctrine is identified as critical to the military factor of force (Vego, 2007, pp. III-45). So important is doctrine to the military function at the operational level of war, that some have predicted a failure of campaigns and military operations in the absence of "soundly written and skilfully applied doctrine" (Vego, 2007, pp. III-45).

As the writers of G/G3/01, the Nigerian Army's capstone doctrine, observe, "military doctrine defines the most effective way of using military assets on the basis of practical experience" (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. 1). This definition of the concept within NMD, with its reference to practical experience, appears somewhat self-defeating however. This is insofar as NMD for the most part fails to draw from practical experiences within the OE. Rather the doctrine draws, extensively so in some places, from Western military doctrine and from a broad range of military practices — except those from within, *ab intra*, the NMOE. This assertion will be validated later on in the chapter.

Broadly speaking, a feature of doctrine is it provides "common techniques and procedures to solve military problems" (Vego, 2007, pp. III-45). However interpretation of doctrine should not be literal *per se*, without latitude to insert personal judgement and situational context. Rather, Vego cautions, "sound doctrine" should encourage mental agility and innovation by mid to senior level personnel within decision-making roles (2007, pp. III-45). With regards to these roles, whereas the particular audience for promulgation of doctrine may vary dependent on its form, doctrine is typically relevant to mid-level to senior command personnel from the platoon to brigade level or the staff equivalent[56]. Put another way, doctrine applies in particular to officers, within the operational function, tasked with translating strategy to tactics. This viewpoint is supported by AFM-10's assertion, within its foreward, that doctrine "is focused at the brigade level and below" (British Army, 2009, p. foreward) as well as

[56] SO2 (OF-3) to SO5 (OF-6). Major to Brigadier rank in the NA, or the equivalent

by Nigerian Army's own capstone doctrine whose writers observe, "circulation of the doctrine" should "include all officers in the rank of Major and above" (2009a, p. v).

Personnel who adopt doctrine are thus expected to be in positions that afford them latitude to align the military's action set with existing doctrine, whilst applying necessary contextual judgement. This is reflected in NATO's definition of doctrine as being the "fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application" (NATO, 2008, pp. 2-D-9). This specific definition of the concept has remained unchanged since 1973; an apparent rigidity that may be inconsistent with the much-evolved nature of war, since.

Doctrine, dependent on function, may be differentiated by scope of intended audience: *does doctrine apply to the tactical level of war? Is it relevant to a specific service branch? Or, due to a joint (inter-service) function, is joint doctrine more relevant?* Indeed, whether two or more nations combine to facilitate interoperability, could factor into the form of military doctrine required.

Consequently the types of military doctrine, for the professionalized military institution, are tactical doctrine (for basic tactics), service doctrine (particularly relevant within and between services, at the operational level of war), joint doctrine (for joint operations) and combined doctrine (for combined operations between militaries of different countries) (Vego, 2007, pp. XII-7). The Nigerian military uses tactical and service doctrine. The military does not have a joint doctrine, as of time of this project. The tri-services use the Army's capstone doctrine and doctrine for MOOTW.

4-3. Military Doctrine and Counter-Insurgency in Nigeria.

Within the NA capstone doctrine, former COAS Lt. Gen A.B. Dambazau discusses a shift in the contemporary geo-strategic environment of war, made more complex by "the role of non-state actors

as a major source of conflict" (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. iv). In SSA, the COAS notes, "the threat of insurgency has reached a critical mass" (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. iv). More specifically in Nigeria, he observes, "the threats to national security are increasingly manifest in growing youth restiveness/militancy […] ethno religious crises…" (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. iv). One indication here is that the insurgency phenomenon and indeed the OE is mutating. The Army chief concedes as much where he points to an "increasingly complex operational environment". It was also suggested that, within Nigeria, development of the doctrine, in relation to military effort to counter the mutating insurgency phenomenon, has been modest (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. iv).

Dambazau alludes to the relatively stagnant theory within the NMOE where he says that doctrine has taken a "long-held informal approach" (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. iv), assumed within the OE to have "sufficed over the years" (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. iv). This questionable assumption, not helped by an action set that remained coercive within the internal security function for decades[57], has however been put under scrutiny by the military's COIN pedigree. This "critical mass" of insurgency, as Dambazau calls it, constitutes the backdrop against which the Army's "adoption of a formal doctrine" was said to have become "a necessity" (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. iv). Yet formalization of doctrine, the COAS observes, came only in 2009 with the publication of G/G3/001 (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. iv). The timing is of the publication is not coincidence: 2009 was the year Boko Haram began its insurgency.

Introduction of G/G3/001, which itself referenced the Army's reactionary response to the emergence of Boko Haram, nonetheless highlighted gaps in the Nigerian military's existing counter-insurgency action set, with very little operational emphasis on either the civil-military interphase when fighting an embedded enemy, or in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), within the same context (Nigerian Army, 2009a).

[57] Discussed in chapter two.

COIN doctrine specifically, on the other hand only introduced in 2011 with publication of G/G3/10 *Counter Insurgency Operations,* was thus meant to better prepare the Army in its conduct of counter-insurgency operations within "built-up" areas, along with other aspects of guidance relevant to the military contribution to counter-insurgency and re-establishing stable peace in contested areas (Nigerian Army, 2011a).

Within NMD and in particular, publication G/G3/G10, the Army's capstone COIN doctrine, the theory underpinning operations to counter insurgency invariably is concomitant with description and evaluation of insurgency itself. This is not uncommon within the broader doctrine on military operations to counter terrorism and insurgency. FM 3-24 (US Army and Marine Corps, 2007) and AFM 10 (British Army, 2009), for instance, as well as JP 3-26 *Counterterrorism* (US Army, 2009) (US Army, 2009), as examples of Western doctrine, spend much, if not most, of their analysis, discussing the threat, rather than activity to counter it *per se*. This again is consistent with the nature of these doctrinal publications and the audience for which they are meant.

As the JTF ORO ACoS G3 observed in-interview during this project's fieldwork, at the operational level of warfare, planning and facilitation of plans, rather than tactical execution and implementation *per se*, is the emphasis (Danmadami, 2012). Much, though certainly not all, of the actual implementation, falls within the areas of higher and lower-tactical levels of warfare, and to personnel at SO1 (OF-2)[58] or the equivalent, and below. However, for military personnel tasked with operational planning on the other hand, that is, SO2 (OF-3) through SO5 (OF-6) between the formation and brigade levels, understanding and mapping out military activity to counter the enemy is typically the task at hand. This perhaps is why understanding the enemy appears to be the first step to planning against him.

[58] NA Captain, or the equivalent

With G/G3/10 (2011a) (the Nigerian military's COIN doctrine) and G/G3/12 (2011b) (CT doctrine), both of which are publications meant for this audience of military personnel, SO2 (OF-3) through SO5 (OF-6), it should be no real disclosure that an analysis of the enemy, his tactics, features of his campaign and areas of intersection between forms of threat, constitute much of the doctrine. Whether this doctrine, and the codification of what constitutes insurgency, captures the nature of campaign Boko Haram has come to wage, is thus a question worth asking.

For the most part the answer can be neither yes nor no, but lies somewhere in-between. Certainly the rubric of insurgency and the features associated with it were consistent with Boko Haram's modus operandi at the time the Army published its COIN doctrine in 2011. These features included guerrilla style attacks (ambushes, prison raids and sabotage missions as examples); use of terrorism as a tactic (including suicide bombings and attacks on government and civilian structures); use of criminality as an operational lever (kidnappings, robberies and market raids); lack of territorial ambition (the Sambisa forest reserve was seen as the group's base, at the time); use of the local populace as an anchor, and avoidance of major engagement with the Nigerian Army. Indeed, these features dominate Table 4-1C's overview of the insurgency's phases.

Since the publication of the Army's COIN doctrine however, Boko Haram's own doctrine arguable has seen substantive change. Boko Haram's apparent territorial ambition in the wake of a number of captured and contested towns[59]; its engagement (and even overrunning) of major Nigerian military formations[60]; its administering of captured towns and its refusal to negotiate — with jihad now looking as an end in itself, rather than as a means to an end *per se* — suggest some rethinking may be required, within future revision's of the Army's doctrine. Traditional definitions of what insurgency constitutes

[59] Northeastern Nigerian towns and rural areas of Mubi, Konduga and Chibok as examples.

[60] Extended siege on 21 Bde (Maiduguri), overrun of 174 Bn (Abadan), overrun of 234 Bn (Mubi) and multiple other military and police formations constitute examples.

therefore, may not apply to Boko Haram in much the same way that such definitions may fail to apply to Daesh's campaign in Syria and Iraq today (Beauchamp, 2014).

With regards to an actual definition of insurgency, the writers of G/G3/10 for refer to it as the actions of a minority group, aimed at forcing political change via "subversion, propaganda and military pressure" (2011a, p. 4). These three instruments, the doctrine notes, are employed as necessary and constitute direct or indirect coercive measures by which the "broad mass of the people" can be "persuaded or intimidated" (2011a, p. 4). This is consistent with British military definitions of COIN, which, even today and also historically, has influenced Nigerian military institutional thinking, doctrine and practice.

Additionally, the range of fieldwork conducted indicates insurgency within the Nigerian military institution is for the most part not viewed as a monolith, both terminology-wise and as a concept. Rather insurgency was generally observed, amongst interview participants, particularly those directly involved in operations against the insurgents, as being a superset of terrorism. This is consistent with the schema by Ariel Merari (2007, p. 12), outlined in Table 4-1B, showing that terrorism *could be*, although not always is, a form of insurgency.

The general use of the term "CT-COIN" within the NMOE, in reference to military activity to counter either or both forms of threat, is thus lent some explanatory power even if the moniker CT-COIN itself may be little more than "a label of convenience in practice"[61]. Nonetheless Interview respondents' views indicate insurgency and terrorism are linked; with terrorism being a subset of the former (Ewansiha, 2012; Ochoga, 2012; Bello, 2012). This moreover was largely the same position adopted by non-military security personnel, such as the police, and the mobile police (MOPOL), for instance (Adeoye, 2012; Graham, 2012). Again here there is some consistence between interview data and documentary data from military publications and doctrine. As an example, whereas separate manuals

[61] I attribute this phrase to my supervisor, Warren Chin

are published for counter-insurgency (G/G3/10) and counter-terrorism (G/G3/12), there is overlap, and, sometimes, significant overlap, in codification.

This non-monolithic view of both threat forms, one that is supported by the theory — Ariel Merari for instance refers to "terrorism as an insurgency strategy" (2007, p. 19) and "terrorism as a strategy of insurgency" (2007, pp. 12-51) — may prove an applied approach for Nigerian military CT-COIN planners. This is insofar as the VNSA threat today constitutes groups that wear the guise of the insurgent with broad political ambitions, but yet that use subversion and ideologically leaning propaganda to subvert the government and win "hearts and minds". The same enemy however employs, in addition, a doctrine consistent with terrorism, within a broader typology of operations.

This practical interchangeability of terrorism and insurgency notwithstanding, connotational nuances exist to both forms of contestation, which the military scholar should be aware of. As Merari writes,

> The terms "terrorism" and "guerrilla war" are often used interchangeably. Apart from some carelessness in the use of technical terminology by the media, politicians, and even academics, this faulty synonymy reflects confusion concerning the definition of terrorism and, often, a wish to avoid the negative connotation that the term has acquired. "Guerrilla war" does not have defamatory overtones, and its usage therefore seems to many writers to convey objectivity (2007, p. 24).

Put another way, within the context of Boko Haram's campaign, referring to them as guerrillas is perhaps then a higher form of categorization, so to speak, than referring to them as insurgents. Referring to them as terrorists on the other hand, or referring to the military contribution as a counterbalance to the threat of terrorism as a subset of insurgency, lends increased legitimacy to the counter-insurgent's approach to his campaign. In this way the enemy is neither insurgent nor terrorist, but more a mix of both, as the Head CT-COIN Instructor pointed out in-interview (Villo, 2012)..

By not viewing either form of threat as monoliths that require compartmentalized counter-balances and activity; but rather evaluating them as a complex set of factors that together make the insurgent more difficult to defeat than asymmetry suggests, the military planner can draw up an integrated approach to operations that encourages a broader action set[62]. This integrated approach, as codified in NMD, indicates the military, in countering perpetrator groups, "supports wider law enforcement efforts in order to establish the conditions in which other measures deliver long-term solutions" (Nigerian Army, 2011b, pp. 27-28). How this translates in practice however, is questionable. This is insofar as such an approach depends on an effective and credible law enforcement framework and the ability for the military to facilitate its CT-COIN function using that framework. Whether such a framework currently exists in Nigeria, and whether military operations are synergised with this framework is open to debate, as interviews with the CLEEN Foundation[63] indicate (Mbaegu & Abiri, 2012).

At the very least however, this view within the NMD, that the military plays a "supportive" role in CT-COIN operations, constitutes a departure from the institutionalized action set discussed in the previous chapter. Practice, certainly in the case of JTF ORO, also suggests operations have some potential to approximate the underpinning theory in NMD. Chart 4-1 for instance indicates the military component within JTF ORO, and in particular the role played by the NA, although significant, is not an ownership one *per se*. Specifically, besides the NA and NAF components, no less than four other components function in the operation. Two additional components also feature; though their roles, as indicated below, are marginal. JTF ORO components will be analysed within the operation's instrumental study of Nigerian military COIN operations, in chapter five. It is worth pointing out here however that Joint Effort (JE) on the scale within JTF ORO, particularly when cognisance is taken of the richness of interaction between JTF ORO components[64], is an outlier in the NMOE. JTF ORO's approach to Joint

[62] Discussed later in the chapter.

[63] Formerly known as Centre of Law Enforcement and Justice Reform.

[64] Discussed in chapter five

Operational Warfare (JOW) quite possibly approximates the underpinning theory of an integrated approach to CT-COIN, discussed in NMD.



Chart 4-1: JTF ORO Personnel Contribution by Component. NAF's main contribution is not personnel, it is air combat and support assets.

Additionally, JTF ORO Police Component Commander (PCC), CSP Adeoye notes in-interview that whether called CT, COIN or CT-COIN, military activity to counter insurgency, should not be conducted via the same isolated doctrine that police task forces or anti-robbery squads adopt (Adeoye, 2012). Due to the interwoven nature of insurgency and terrorism, and to the complexity of this threat form, such an integrated approach moreover, may now have become a virtual necessity.

Figure 4-1, from NMD , illustrates how the Nigerian military's internal function sits within an integrated approach to counter insurgency and terrorism. It is an approach that aims to integrate all three instruments of power: military, diplomatic and economic (Nigerian Army, 2011b, p. 28).



Figure 4-1: Framework for integrated approach to CT in Nigeria[65]

However the framework for this integrated approach appears to be problematic in a number of ways. To begin with, functions of each stakeholder are not clarified within the framework itself, nor given context within the doctrine. It is not, for instance, clear as to why Interpol is in the framework or what "external affairs" mean. Indeed no additional explanation is provided for what this integrated approach is, what it aims to achieve and why it is codified in doctrine for personnel at SO2 (OF-3). Personnel reading the doctrine are only told, of the integrated approach, that it "is co-ordinated at the highest levels of government to ensure that the 3 instruments of power are used in a co-ordinated and coherent manner" (Nigerian Army, 2011b, p. 28). Such abstractions, without any form of grounded context, are not uncommon within NMD. Yet perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the framework however, is why the military function is so de-emphasized within it. This appears detached from the reality of Nigerian

[65] Adapted from Nigerian Army (2011b, p. 28).

CT-COIN wherein the military function constitutes the nucleus of state response. Indeed, even in JTF ORO, where joint task forcing indicates a more interagency driven approach, emphasis on the engagement, and the Army's footprint, is nonetheless unmistakable, as Chart 4-1 indicates.

Therein lies the problem in Figure 4-1's framework. Like much else in NMD, the theory framework — the doctrine in particular, in this case — is detached from the OE. This framework, which NMD refers to as its "integrated approach to CT", is in fact lifted from British doctrine[66]. Nor is it the only instance within the CT-COIN doctrine. As other examples, the two frameworks in G/G3/10 *Counter Insurgency Operations* are likewise lifted from British doctrine, specifically from Army Field Manual volume 1 *Combined Arms Operations, Part 10 Counter Insurgency Operations* (Strategic and Operational Guidelines) (MOD, 2001a). This again is problematic not least because the manual being referenced was published in 2001 and had, by time of publication, been superseded by AFM 10. Released 2009, AFM 10 was, at its time of publication, over eight years more current than *Combined Arms Operations*, but not so current that the writers of G/G3/10 (published 2011) could not have referred to it instead, if they had to. Yet there is not much to suggest, in the exposition surrounding the framework, of which there admittedly is little, that British doctrine had to be used at all. Indeed the overall purpose of Figure 4-1's British-adopted framework, within this particular Nigerian military COIN context, remains unclear.

That the only integrated framework for CT-COIN in the NMOE does not actually reflect the NMOE, but rather follows an enduring Nigerian military tradition of copying Western doctrine, shows in practice. Over a dozen Nigerian military officers between SO2 (OF-3) and SO3 (OF-4) and equivalent

[66] The exact doctrinal manual is unclear. The writers of the Nigerian Army COIN manual say the framework is from "UK Joint Doctrine Publication 'Countering terrorism, The UK Approach to the Military Contribution p. 6.)" (2011b, p. 28).

rank have so far been shown the framework, reproduced in exact form, in Figure 4-1. Personnel largely came across as indifferent to the overall relevance of the framework to their function.[67]

Inclusion of ECOWAS and the AU as ways to insinuate reflection of the NMOE within this replica seem a contrived attempt to differentiate it from British Army source. The British doctrine could not have included the AU for instance; the doctrine was published July 2001, the AU was launched a year later in July 2002. At best then, these additions signal a missed opportunity to communicate with Nigerian military personnel between SO2 (OF-3) to SO5 (OF-6) and equivalent rank, by including them in a conversation regarding their function in COIN operations. At worst such attempts to awkwardly pass British COIN doctrine as suitable for the NMOE indicate an example of how the British approach, in being copied, *talis qualis*, by Nigerian military planners, fails to transfer correctly.

Attempting to address this de-emphasis of the military function, Figure 4-2 starts with a blue-sky approach that has, at its core, requirements of the NMOE and the Nigerian military function in CT-COIN. The framework was developed from the outcomes of this study, from field findings and from dozens of interactions with Nigerian military personnel on the specific areas of counter-insurgency operations and how they reflect — or fail to reflect — doctrine. Without any Western military frameworks as a baseline and created with the SO2 (OF-3) to SO5 (OF-6) officer in mind, the framework intentionally does not make mention of COIN *per se*. Rather it looks to connections between doctrine, praxis, military operations and the operational competencies of the components that contribute to the military function in counter-insurgency.

[67] Over a dozen Nigerian military personnel between SO2 (OF-3) and SO3 (OF-4) and equivalent rank were asked this question in informal settings during fieldwork between September 2012 (when I came up with the idea) till project submission. Responses have been largely the same. As interactions were informal, respondents are anonymised. The exercise nonetheless provided an opportunity to assess, from the intended audience's perspective, relevance of the framework. Finally, it is worth pointing out that respondents did not appear surprised (a number said words to that effect) when told the framework from lifted from British doctrine

More broadly, the framework constitutes a start point for the JTFC and his staff to come up with a more context-specific integrated approach to JCP[68]. As a framework for personnel at and above battalion level, the emphasis is to allow personnel to first understand their function, then the functions of the components they work with, and finally, what they have to do in order to facilitate synergy between component functions. The key items in the framework, moreover, can be swapped with more context specific actors or structures, as is fit for the JFC's intent and for JCP requirements.

[68] JCP will be discussed within the particular context of JTF ORO, in chapter five



Figure 4-2: Joint Operational Competencies (JOC) Framework for AFN v.0.1

To summarize this section it should be pointed out that as a basic framework that keys into broader national strategic objectives, Figure 4-2 is not, by any means, radical. Quite the opposite, it simply uses what already exists in the NMOE but does so "recombinantly" (Tidd & Bessant, 2009; Kleiner, 2004; Hargadon, 2003). Put another way therefore, Figure 4-2 uses already-existing structures, processes and thinking and recombines them towards an entirely new framework for joint operational competencies, and in a manner entirely different to what already exists in NMD.

In this regard, the framework in Figure 4.2 is aligned with existing objectives of CT-COIN, while also keying into the paradigm of integrated JE. Yet, in refocusing its approach to stay as directly relevant to the NMOE, as possible, the updated framework becomes a more useful tool for the Nigerian military planner, staff officer or field commander involved in JOW and CT-COIN.

In summary of this section, it should be pointed out that whereas current military doctrine is important to understanding principles underpinning counter-insurgency in Nigeria, the present doctrine emerged from decades of pre-existing doctrine consistent with the isomorphic nature of the Army's development. An evaluation of doctrine therefore, may require more than a contemporary analysis; some historical context also may be pertinent.

Broadly speaking the Nigerian military has had two broad phases of doctrine, discrete in theory but less so in practice. The first phase was underpinned by offensive doctrine. The second saw the transition to manoeuvre warfare (MAW). Phase one constitutes the period from the postcolonial years to the late 1990s, during which time the Nigerian military adopted offensive doctrine. Phase two constitutes the period from the 1990s till now wherein the military's approach is manoeuvrist. This phase includes the period of introduction of the Army's formal CT-COIN manuals, circa 2011. Both phases will be discussed next.

4-4. Doctrine and the Nigerian Military Since the Post Colonial Period

British colonialist influence on Nigerian military warfare was discussed in the previous chapter. This influence would endure long after British rule however. The writers of NMD acknowledge this influence where they note that, in the decades following independence, NA troops' "practices and procedures were basically guided by the British approach to operations" (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. 5). Indeed, the Civil War of Nigeria, the first major test of the Nigerian Army as a professional force, was underpinned by British Army doctrine, training and practice. As observed in capstone doctrine, G/G3/001 *Nigerian Army Doctrine*, "although the NA executed the Nigerian Civil War independent of direct command of British officers, there was still the influence of British ethos in battle procedure" (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. 5).

4-4.1. Offensive Doctrine in Nigerian Military Counter-insurgency

With the Nigerian military at war in the late 1960s, and with the 1970s and 1980s being an era of military dictatorship that overall deprioritized the military's development, chances for development of codified doctrine in this period were modest. Not until 1986, when the first "official codification of doctrine" was attempted, did the NA introduce ROD (Responsive Offensive Doctrine) (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. 5). Offensive doctrine however is not today classed as a doctrinal manual *per se*. Rather, as put by the writers of NA capstone doctrine, "the phrase ROD is viewed as a concept upon which the NA doctrine was based instead of a doctrine" (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. 5). Offensive doctrine's principles, within the context of the Nigerian Army's internal function, held that:

(1) The initial posture of the NA should be defensive; based on deterrence by denial. The Army's use of deterrence in this context is consistent with classic deterrence theory (Jervis, 1979). Classic deterrence theory and its newer interpretations argue that deterrence — unlike compellence — is aimed at convincing the enemy to preserve the status quo (Wilner, 2011; Byman & Waxman, 2002). The codification with the Nigerian military's offensive doctrine, of import here, was that

threat of force, rather than use of force *per se*, underpinned the Army's default posture in ROD (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. 5).

(2) Upon failure of deterrence, it was expedient that swift and spontaneous use of military force be employed. In this context, force is seen as a response to a hostile entity undeterred by threat of force.

(3) The NA, in adopting use of force alluded to in (2) has historically favoured force that is "mobile, hard-hitting, well trained and well-motivated… [to] respond with speed, agility and enormous fire power…" (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. 5).

As Snyder (1984) argues however, offensive doctrine has its origins in the Great War and emphasizes a kinetic action set consistent with a persistent and concentrated force posture. In conventional battlefield engagements, the doctrine brought about bloody and attritional battles, at great operational cost, even where strategic victories where achieved (1984; Guderian, 1999). That such outcomes were acceptable as alternatives to infamous military stalemates of the period therefore, does not make the doctrine any less problematic, as much for some military writers and theorists of the time (Guderian, 1999), as for Snyder (1984).

Moreover, if the attritional nature of offensive doctrine facilitated such outcomes in conventional engagements in the past, the doctrine is even less suited to the shifts in warfare that have occurred since the end of the Second World War. However, with doctrine said to be fundamental to the operational function of armed forces (Vego, 2007), it should not be unexpected that kinetic emphasis is written into the posture of militaries where offensive doctrine underpins the action set. In offensive doctrine moreover, kinetics do not just influence the action set, they constitute its emphasis, as the writers of G/G3/001 observe (Nigerian Army, 2009a). Why, however, is this conversation on offensive doctrine directly relevant to counter-insurgency in Nigeria and how is it problematic?

First because the military threats faced by Nigeria have been internal. In other words, and victory in the Civil War of Nigeria regardless, the Nigerian Army has only ever been faced with threats largely inconsistent with its doctrine. Indeed, the civil war victory, as Brig. Gen Alabi-Isama notes, brought with it with a "tragedy" for the professional development of the military institution (Alabi-Isama, 2013). Offensive doctrine's success lent the military a misplaced sense of just how much improvement, internally; it required to be fit for purpose. Counter-insurgency development, within this context, and as evaluated in chapter two, proved one such casualty of the Nigerian military's civil war victory. This is insofar as the COIN institution was, subsequently, largely neglected. Nor was this a fleeting period of neglect, or limited specifically to the Army's COIN function *per se*. Former Chief of Army, Lt. Gen Kenneth Minimah, reflecting on his major challenge in OP *Zaman Lafiya*, the post-JTF ORO counter-insurgency campaign against Boko Haram, pointed to being "confronted with the decay in the service due to long periods of neglect the army had suffered" (Omonobi, 2015).

A second reason why ROD is problematic to the experience of Nigerian military counter-insurgency is because the only other major deployments, of which the NA has been part, have been PSOs. As Zaalberg's study indicates however, peacekeeping requires a rather different approach to its doctrine, its planning and its operations, vis-à-vis those required in COIN (Zaalberg, 2012). Here again moreover, offensive doctrine arguably is problematic. The military peacekeeper, after all, is not the same as the warfighter; nor is the warfighter's function the same as that of the counter-insurgent.

This distinction between warfighting, peacekeeping and counter-insurgency arguably constitutes an area of confusion for some. As an example, some Nigerians today, in criticism of the Army's current challenges within the Boko Haram insurgency, look back to the military's Biafra adventure in the late 1960s, and then to its peacekeeping pedigree — Chad in the 1980s, Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1990s, and Sudan (Darfur) (Boshoff, 2005) beyond the turn of the century — with bewilderment. The confusion arises when they see how relatively poorly military operations to counter Boko Haram have

fared in northeastern Nigeria. According to this line of reasoning, the Nigerian Army has experience, and operational pedigree, in fighting the insurgent: within Nigeria during the civil war; in Sierra Leone; in Liberia, and elsewhere. Why then, the thinking follows, does the Army struggle against smaller and less-coordinated forces that make up Boko Haram?

However it is worth noting to those critics that the Nigerian military, within the Civil War, used ROD in its warfighting role when facing enemy formations that were conventional and that had a regular ORBAT. The Nigerian military's missions to foreign TOOs in Liberia, Sierra Leone and elsewhere, did not mandate it as a counter-insurgent, moreover. Rather the Nigerian military, within those missions, featured within a quite specific peacekeeping framework, that mandated a broader contingent of UN and, or, African coalition troops, in the TOO. The military's UN or ECOWAS mandate in those conflicts, therefore, is markedly different to its FGN mandate in its counter-insurgency against Boko Haram. Indeed, everything from doctrine, mind-set, equipment, training and campaign length, is quite different in peacekeeping, comparative to counter-insurgency.

Nonetheless, just because doctrinal differences exist does not mean experiential learning transference does not occur between operations underpinned by different forms of doctrine. Indeed the marriage, of what doctrine fits which action set, often entails nuanced use of a range of military tools, in combination. Counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and PSO doctrines all intersect at some point; so it may be more about understanding the nuances of this intersection and using force in degrees, as the situation requires. This however is a process that requires discipline, calculation and planning, in practice. As Byman and Waxman observe,

> Most crises involving coercion fall along the continuum between pure brute force and coercion. The goal of the coercer is usually not total destruction but the use of enough force to make the threat of future force credible to the adversary. Counterinsurgency campaigns, for example, are typically designed to dislodge and eradicate pockets of resistance… (2002, p. 5)

Put another way, militaries can develop an action set that approximates a brute force approach but doing so may detract from what their COIN objectives should be. Offensive doctrine however, being really about the use of force to overwhelm the enemy, is, virtually universally, a poor fit for counter-insurgency as a vehicle for long-term stable peace. Historically use of offensive doctrine, within the Nigeria experience, arguably did little to prepare the military for the disciplined use of force required in COIN. Thus, all else being equal, there had to be a shift away from offensive doctrine, if the Nigerian military was to begin making inroads in the area of counter-insurgency.

4-4.2. Manoeuvre Warfare in Nigerian Military Counter-insurgency

Moving away from ROD, and to phase two, the current approach adopted by the Nigerian military is that of the Manoeuvrist Approach to Warfare (MAW) (Ifezue & Kotun, 2012). This is the so-called "one doctrine" referred to by the writers of G/G3/12 *Counter Terrorism Operations* (Nigerian Army, 2011b, p. 30). Although not jointly formalized, MAW is nonetheless informally adopted by the tri-services — not just the NA (Ifezue & Kotun, 2012; Nengite, 2012). Additionally, MAW within the NMOE today extends beyond just OOTW and in fact provides the "foundation for the Armed Forces approach to all operations" (Nigerian Army, 2011b, p. 31).

NA defines MAW as involving operations aimed at sapping the enemy's cohesion and will to fight. "It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed" (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. 50). The writers of the Army's capstone doctrine likewise observe that MAW "is the employment of forces on the battlefield using movement in combination with communication and firepower potential to achieve a position of advantage, relative to the enemy, in order to accomplish a mission" (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. 50). Here again, consistence with Western military doctrine is observable. De-emphasis on destruction of enemy matériel and attainment of position "for its own sake" also are manoeuvrist themes written about in JWP 0-01 *British Defence Doctrine*, for example (MOD, 2001b). Evidently

the source material for the Nigerian Army's interpretation of MAW, JWP 0-01 defines the manoeuvrist approach as one that "…calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed" (MOD, 2001b, pp. 4-5).[69]

NMD justifies the adoption of MAW in MOOTW[70] where the writers of G/G3/001 state that principles of MAW are "…equally applicable to MOOTW" (Nigerian Army, 2009a). Whereas NMD is explicit in its adoption of MAW for OOTW, it does not clarify why MAW is suited for this area of warfare and, in particular, for COIN. A point of note here constitutes the fundamental difference between offensive doctrine and MAW. This difference is underpinned by the principle that in offensive doctrine (ROD), the counter-insurgent, if unable to deter the enemy, adopts, specifically, an offensive posture. This posture, as codified in NMD, involves "concentration of forces", and "enormous firepower" (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. 5).

MAW, by contrast, encourages the counter-insurgent to adopt different postures — to manoeuvre as necessary — with the aim to avoid engaging the enemy head on but rather to defeat him by dislodging his CoG through indirect means. NMD refers to this as the adoption of "elements of movement" and "positional defence" (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. 51). Indeed the manual discourages the military planner from matching his strength with the strength of the insurgent (attrition). Rather, strength, the writers of G/G3/01 note, should be applied to the enemy's weakness (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. 51). However perhaps the clearest distinction between MAW and offensive doctrine is that MAW encourages the counter-insurgent who adopts the manoeuvrist approach, unlike his counterpart who adopts the offensive approach, to take defensive positions if it means ultimately outmanoeuvring the enemy.

[69] Compare with Nigerian Army (2009a, p. 50).

[70] Which, within Nigerian military lexicon, includes COIN. See Nigerian Army (2011a) and Nigerian Army (2012)

NMD alludes to this flexibility of posture for the manoeuvrist, where it exhorts him to "not be afraid to take up a defence posture provided he does not see it as an end in itself, but [as] a preliminary to resuming the offensive or regain[ing] balance" (Nigerian Army, 2009a, p. 51). In this regard, the argument can be made that MAW (manoeuvre doctrine), more so than ROD (offensive doctrine) is suited for counter-insurgency warfare insofar as it approximates an approach that will accommodate the "inglorious, unproductive stalemate", alluded to by Snyder (1984, p. 17), which often constitutes a part of COIN warfare[71]. Yet such a stalemate, for the manoeuvrist, is not an acceptance of defeat *per se*, even if hard ground is conceded or hard-won tactical gains are receded as a result. Rather it should be seen, as the writers of NMD note, as a shift in posture meant to ultimately outmanoeuvre the enemy and in so doing achieve operational objectives without excessive use of force. In theory at least then, manoeuvre warfare constitutes a break from the more conventional posture associated with offensive doctrine.

NMD also highlights, as two features of MAW, its use of the tri-services as well as other components within the armed forces; and economy of effort: minimum use of force for maximum effect. These characteristics, the writers of the Army's capstone doctrine note, make the manoeuvrist approach "fundamentally joint" (Nigerian Army, 2009a). How does this use of joint effort (JE) as part of the manoeuvrist approach, reflect within operations?

During fieldwork at the ONSA specifically, conversations around the need for "jointness" and a joint, rather than just a combined arms approach, kept recurring. As an example, Maj Gen (retd) S-Y Bello, former CO of JTF Operation Restore Hope (ORH), a phase of the counter-insurgency against

[71] See, as examples, the stalemate in Maiduguri between JTF ORO and Boko Haram by late 2012; the Stalemate in Now Zad (Nawzad), Afghanistan, by May 2009, between the Taliban and a US Marines company (Lima Co. of 3rd Battalion, 8th Regiment). It is of note that, since 2006, British, Gurkha and Estonian units experienced similar stalemates against the Taliban in Nawzad (Helmand province), prior to Lima Company's arrival. A final example could be within LTTE's insurgency in Sri Lanka, during the four-year ceasefire period prior to the Eelam War IV.

militants in the Niger Delta, notes that without unification of the various JTF command structures (in Rivers, Delta and Bayelsa states) under his command, the military's counter-insurgency in the Niger Delta axis was unlikely to have dislodged the insurgents to the extent it eventually did (Bello, 2012). Challenges to inter-service coordination also were an area Maj. Gen Bello's successor[72] in JTF ORH, Maj. Gen Johnson Ochoga, flagged as concerning, during our interview (Ochoga, 2012). Likewise the CO JTF ORO, Gen J.A.H. Ewansiha also noted, in-interview, that one of his priorities as JFC was to ensure his component commanders get the support they need from other components (that they work well together) (2012).

Going back to JTF ORH, as an earlier example of this interaction between manoeuvrist doctrine and practice in the NMOE, aspects of Gen S-Y Bello's command of that campaign, circa 2007, suggested there already was a modest shift in the Army's thinking, sequel to its move to manoeuvrist doctrine in the 1990s. Subsequent JTF commanders, in Maj. Gen Omoregie, Maj. Gen Ochoga and Maj. Gen Debiro would increasingly rely on JE, police and community cooperation for intelligence building. This is insofar as the insurgents depended heavily on the network of creeks, and were more interested in kidnapping and pipeline sabotage, than in the engagement (Ebegbulem, 2010; Vanguard, 2014; Omeni, 2013). Military force therefore was impractical against an enemy that refused the engagement, or that did not see battlefield defeat of the Nigerian military as a preponderant calculation.

This was not an organized network of insurgents, moreover; especially after the FGN's blanket amnesty in 2010 (Omeni, 2013; Oluwaniyi, 2011). As JTF Commander Maj. Gen Charles Omoregie noted during a press briefing, December 2010, "they [the militias] want to lay credence to their activities to say they are big and well-organized organisation. But, I do not think so, they are just pocket of criminals operating" (Ebegbulem, 2010).

[72] Maj. Gen Ochoga was not Maj. Gen Bello's direct successor in the Niger Delta counter-insurgency operation. There was, in-between, Maj. Gen Charles Omoregie.

As a result of the "criminal element" within the insurgency (Omeni, 2013), the Nigerian Air Force, Nigerian Navy and Nigerian Police components would feature quite prominently in JTF operations, in the Niger Delta (Ifezue & Kotun, 2012; Graham, 2012; Omeni, 2013). Fieldwork with 2iC Mobile Commander, 31 (Command) Asaba, Delta State, indicated the reach and extent of coordination between the military and the security agencies - the police in particular (Graham, 2012). Gone it seems are the days where such operations were Army-run, through and through.

To be sure, the Army's interpretation of manoeuvre warfare at the time (circa 2007 to 2010 when Bello and Omoregie commanded the Niger Delta counter-insurgency respectively) might have been crude and perhaps not as well planned or executed as the same concept in JTF ORO years later. Moreover, there may even have been something a little careerist around these calls for jointness. Maj. Gen Bello, after all, fresh off his command posting at 2 Bde Port Harcourt, was now in command of a unified counter-insurgency across the Niger Delta; operationalized in a way that had not quite been done before. Control of military assets, and coordination with police and security agencies across three states of the republic (Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers) was a significant command responsibility for a newly minted major general.

Still there was some indication that, beneath all of this, manoeuvrist doctrine was indeed, even if slowly and awkwardly, was starting to take root in the military's identity. The principles of jointness and inter-agency thinking creeping into the operational environment; the acknowledgement that stalemates would be a possibility in the campaign[73]; Bello's engagement with the people in town hall meetings from early on in his command (Bello, 2012); Omoregie's use of police assets, intelligence operations and community assistance in Akparemogbene and Oyangbene communities in handling hostage situations, as much as in his hunt for ex-militant leader John Togo (Ebegbulem, 2010;

[73] Despite the military having the tactical initiative by 2010, Bello's command in JTF ORH would end in a virtual stalemate and a more stable region insofar as the militants finally agreed terms with the government, relinquished their arms en masse, and accepted a blanket amnesty with generous DDRR terms included.

Vanguard, 2014), were all positive signs of maturing manoeuvrist doctrine, being put to practice. Niger Delta Liberation Force leader "General" John Togo for instance was killed in May 2011, by a Nigerian Air Force strike as part of an intelligence-driven JTF operation against the militant group (Amaize, 2011).

Just a decade or so earlier, such operations within the same Niger Delta axis, may have been the exception, rather than the norm they have increasingly come to be. A cursory look at the military operations in the Niger Delta in the late 1990s for instance, indicates the preponderance of offensive doctrine, and poor use, if any, of JE in heavy-handed military campaigning (Okonta & Douglas, 2003; Ukeje, 2011). Jointness, and an inter-agency and inter-service approach that at least recognised the impact of operations on the local populace, appeared largely non-existent in that period of the military's COIN adventure. At the very least as an assertion, the benefits of JE were not being demonstrated within the military's Niger Delta adventure of the 1990s.

By the time of the JTF-run Operation Restore Order against Boko Haram (2011-2013), and as chapter five's analysis will categorically demonstrate, significant progress would have been made, relevant to the praxis of manoeuvre warfare theory and practice. As an example, the Director of the DSS in Borno State noted in-interview that the Directorate's Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection was helped by operational intelligence gathering and sharing between components, with the whole thing coordinated by the Army (Ahmed, 2012). Component commanders in Maiduguri were also forthcoming in their views on how important their component contributions were, to aggregate military decision-making in the TOO. Both the Police Component Commander (PCC) (Adeoye, 2012), and the Air Component Commander (ACC) (Pawa, 2012), for instance, observed that locations within the theatre would have been less safe without the CO's insistence that they function as primary, not secondary, components of the JTF. This approach, as the interview data suggests, devolved total tactical oversight to component commanders while also enabling them to tap into, and

benefit from, into the Army's JIPOE methodology[74]. Details of how the jointness dimension works in practice within operations will be discussed in chapter five's analysis of operations. The underpinning theory however, of the jointness dimension of COIN, also features prominently within NMD, and shall be discussed shortly in this chapter.

With the manoeuvrist approach said to be "fundamentally joint" therefore, and as the above analysis might suggest, the indication here is that the doctrine may better be suited, than ROD, for the COIN military planner. This assertion is supported by the writers of JWP 0-01 who contend that "cohesion" of joint components, at a higher strategic level, may be the centre of gravity within "modern interpretations of manoeuvre warfare" (MOD, 2001b, pp. 3-6). Other publications by NATO also appear to support this viewpoint that the manoeuvrist approach is suited for "…Operations Other Than War (OOTW)" (NATO, p. 9).

Justification for manoeuvre warfare in COIN is also given within the broader COIN literature. Crowe alludes to counter-guerrilla tactics as being referred to, more formally, as "manoeuvre warfare" (2011). Gray suggests the suitability of MAW in operations requiring joint effort (JE) where he contends, "…the manoeuvrist approach is built on joint warfighting" (p. 13). Bulloch (1996) also contributes to the debate in arguing that the manoeuvrist, rather than the attritionist, is better positioned to wage a successful COIN. Plysical destruction, Bulloch observes,

[74] JIPOE: Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. This is a planning methodology, typically within Battalion HQ, involving staff contribution from G2 (Intelligence) and G3 (Operations). The JIPOE includes collection, study, analysis and implementation of intelligence as part of a battle plan (a Joint Campaign Plan, or JCP, within the context of JTF ORO). The JIPOE effectively allows the JTFC and his staff to penetrate and disrupt the enemy's decision-making cycle. Within this context, threats and weaknesses, as well as available course of actions (CoAs), for both the enemy force and the JTFC's force, are used to facilitate a more robust planning and contingency process within the OE. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (recce), by the various military and non-military components, are critical to the JIPOE. The different committees and components that contribute to the JIPOE, within the context of the JTF ORO case, will be discussed in chapter five.

> […] is a means and not an end in a COIN campaign; the doctrine seeks to contribute in creating the conditions for political success with less force, more quickly and with reduced costs. The theory of manoeuvre warfare shares a common ancestry with some of the most successful insurgent strategies; the military planner who is fully educated into this doctrine is more likely to cope with the real and inherent complexities of a counterinsurgency campaign (1996, p. 177).

Effectively therefore, Bulloch shares this position with the writers of the Nigerian military's capstone COIN doctrine[75],, who argue for "applicability of the manoeuvrist approach to counterinsurgency operations" and observe,

> Because the theory of manoeuvrist approach shares a common ancestry with some of the most successful insurgent strategies, the military planner educated in this doctrine is more likely to cope with the inherent complexities of COIN (Nigerian Army, 2011a, p. 141).

Hoffman in his contribution to the debate provides three supporting arguments for why MAW constitutes fit within the COIN OE. The first is that the philosophy of manoeuvre warfare "is well suited for winning against insurgents because it accepts the inevitability of chaos, complexity, friction and the pre-eminence of the human element in conflict". The second, that MAW "places a premium on intelligence, flexibility and adaptability —essential attributes of a successful counterinsurgency force". The third, that the "approach is completely consistent with the distilled wisdom of classical counterinsurgency theory" (Hoffman, Marine Corps, 2010, p. 90).

Within the literature therefore, there is considerable theory underpinning use of MAW, by the counter-insurgent. Whether this translates well in practice, particularly to the Nigeria case, is less

[75] The conceptualizations by Bulloch, vis-à-vis those by the writers of NMD, are practically the same. This is hardly coincidence. Such similarities reinforce a pattern within this analysis, of Western COIN doctrine, and military theory more broadly, copied virtually word for word, within NMD codification.

clear however. As an example, Wing Commander Kotun[76], 2iC at 235 NAF BSG, Swale-Yenagoa, who had spent time in the (Niger Delta), and who in fact was interviewed in that axis, shared his thoughts on whether the military's counter-insurgency approach in the Niger Delta had indeed been maneouvrist and if not, why not. Wg Cdr Kotun's view was that the theory of manoeuvre warfare is almost impossible to "perfectly translate" into practice in the NMOE, for two reasons. First because COIN is not an area that has been well developed — instituted — to begin with, within the military. Second because the operational environment may not accommodate a lot of the Westernized equivalents of counter-insurgency doctrine, imported into the Nigerian military manuals (Ifezue & Kotun, 2012).

Put simply then, both OC and the OE may influence whether manoeuvre warfare will be applied in the first place; as well as whether it will work even if applied, respectively. Critics of the Nigerian Army's emphasis on offensive doctrine in practice, may well be right in their assertion that force operations, in and of themselves, are problematic. As an example, perpetuity of a coercive action set appears to be one of several concerns of Jonathan Hill regarding the Nigerian military, which he notes adopts the coercive approach "with such frequency" that it has "become part of the security forces' modus operandi" (2012, p. 36). However an issue worth considering, as a counterbalance to such views, is whether a different approach, applied *in situ*, will necessarily yield markedly different results to what methods already exist. Indeed, evidence to support this latter notion is either inconclusive or altogether inexistent.

Theoretical recommendations are unlikely to translate as prescribed within the OE, and certainly take considerable time to be integrated into military thinking and action, if the Nigerian experience is anything to go by. This for instance is what Wg Cdr Kotun (2012) suggests, in making his observation above. Difficulty of such transference, whether from doctrine to practice or from one

[76] Wg Cdr Kotun was a Directing Staff (DS) at the AFCSC, around the time.

institution to another as discussed in chapter two, is often largely ignored within what is now an increasingly dominant popular narrative on just how bad the Nigerian military is, in its internal function. If the Nigerian military is indeed bad at COIN operations, despite having, since 2011 at least, dedicated publications (Nigerian Army, 2011a; 2011b), promulgated in November that year, on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, then question then becomes *why*?

It is one thing to simply rehash a narrative that a military is bad at its function. It is quite another to fully comprehend why. This is a question, which aggregate analyses and findings from this research project, hopefully help address.

The final section of this chapter will look at the praxis of doctrine: the features and challenges of the transferences processes between doctrine (as theory) and operations (as practice). Praxis, within this context, "seeks to dissolve the distinction between theory and practice" (Barker, 2004, p. 166).

4-6. The Military as a Learning Organization: Linking Training, Operational Appraisal, Doctrine and Campaign Experience

Much, within this chapter has been made of the importance of doctrine, as underpinning principles, of the military function. Yet one also must be careful not to exaggerate the role of doctrine in the military COIN function. Some theorists, Alice Hills as an example, have gone as far as to question overall relevance of doctrine to military adaptation. Referring to the British Army's experience, Hills for instance writes,

> Doctrinal development […] was undoubtedly more often the result of hasty improvisation than conscious debate, the Army preferring to rely on operational effectiveness, and the skill and experience of its personnel, supported by a close relationship with policy makers. The lack of specific guidance was never seen as a disadvantage; if anything it was a matter of pride. Indeed it is arguable that the UK's pragmatic ad hoc approach was a strength, being developed

> in the course of operations, rather than the artificial atmosphere of a ministry or staff college (2004, p. 47).

Others have adopted a somewhat different view from Hills, to be sure. The writers of AFM 10 make painstaking arguments for the relevance of doctrine, in improving the operational function (British Army, 2009); the writers of FM 3-24 adopt a similar view (US Army and Marine Corps, 2007). Harald Høiback makes the argument that whereas "doctrine cannot be, or rather should not be, all things to all men […] the future of doctrine is far brighter than its critics want us to believe" (2011, p. 879).

Insofar as doctrine by itself is of import to the military function, effectiveness of transference of doctrine, from codified form to the operational function, may well supersede the written doctrine itself. Furthermore, ground level innovation can (and should) be taking place even without the promulgation of doctrine specific to the challenges in a TOO. In this regard, the argument by Hills (2004)— like that by Farrell (2009) and by Russell (2011) — is something along the lines that a bottom-up, operationally driven learning process may, in itself, be quite effective in developing the COIN function.

Indeed, because "Innovation in the crucible of war" may already be taking place long before COIN doctrine is codified and promulgated, such battlespace adaptations become important to informing doctrine; not just the other way round (Farrell, 2009; Russell, 2011). Nor is this a new way of thinking. As Christopher Ives argues, as far back as the Vietnam War, and despite "institutional failure" to develop effective COIN, operational innovation still took place in degrees, on the ground (2007). "In the absence of counterinsurgency doctrine", Ives writes, "[US] Special Forces soldiers applied their unconventional warfare background and training to missions assigned and implied" (2007, p. 124). Such activity, for Ives, "constituted an operational innovation in counterinsurgency" (2007, p. 124).

Yet, if indeed innovation may already be occurring within units, and independent of existing COIN doctrine, the question for the war planner then becomes how such processes can be spread laterally across the military as a learning organization. Attempts to evaluate this question may be served by an understanding that relevance of doctrine, rather than doctrine *per se*, may well prove of more import to the often-difficult process of institutionalizing new ways (tactics, operations) of doing old things (fighting and defeating an enemy). Where conscious effort is not made to make existing doctrine relevant to the operational function, such doctrine may appear, as Hills (2004) suggests, "artificial". There are two broad steps therefore, to establishing this practical relevance of doctrine.

First, as Vego (2007) observes, the greater the relevance of doctrine, the more likely it is the operational function will reflect the doctrine employed. Second, and as a consequence of such relevance, Maj. Gen Milton (2001)also notes that personnel are then more likely to perceive doctrine as having an impact on conduct of operations. Put another way, first the doctrine should be made fit for purpose, factoring in peculiarities of the OE. Operations then have an improved likelihood of reflecting doctrine, though not necessarily adhering to it to the letter. Finally, personnel in turn become more likely to adopt the view that doctrine is practicable, not just theoretical: *this publication says this, that operation followed similar steps and was successful; so the writers may have been on to something*. The doctrine effectively then becomes increasingly embedded within organizational culture, consequential to its effectiveness and worth being proven in the field. There is a counterargument here, however. Høiback (2011) contends that culture is a deep influence on how, and on if, an armed force develops doctrine. This is consistent with chapter two's underpinning argument around OC and institutional isomorphism. "The crucial question for doctrine-makers", Høiback posits, "is how deep rooted such cultural traits actually are" (2011, p. 886). Høiback's view is consistent with Paul Johnston's,

> It is not enough to write new doctrine, if the purpose is to change the way an army will fight. Ultimately, an army's behaviour in battle will almost certainly be more a reflection of its character or culture than of the contents of its doctrine manuals. And if that culture – or mindset, if you will – is formed more by experience than by books, then those who would attempt to modify an army's behaviour need to think beyond doctrine manuals (2000, pp. 36-39).

For Johnston therefore, OC plays more of a role than written doctrine. The aim of this section is not to debate whether formalized instruments such as doctrine supersede functionality of non-formalized factors such as culture. Rather this section's analysis constitutes a sort of counterbalance to much of the argument so far in the chapter, on the relevance of doctrine. As chapter two's analysis demonstrates — and certainly within the Nigerian context — culture too, not just doctrine, plays a powerful role in the mindset and action set of the military.

The analysis so far in this section highlights the complexity, and the range of factors, relevant to the military planner's objective of linking doctrine to the operational function, and methodically controlling and adapting this interaction over time. In real life terms however, within the haphazardness that sometimes is COIN, achievement of such an objective may be beyond most war planners: *better to simply copy doctrine, adapt in the field where the need arises, or simply perpetuate an existing model*, might be the convenient way to approach the question of doctrine and operations. Such thinking, as the project's analysis so far demonstrates, appears largely consistent with the Nigerian military experience.

As a consequence, the interaction involving doctrine, its internalization and its operationalization, sometimes is non-existent or otherwise tenuous to identify. This is more so the case with NMD, by and large, approximating a foreigners' hodgepodge of best practices, rather than encompassing a field-informed set of publications that originated *ab intra*, from within, the NMOE. This interaction

certainly is not as tidy as Nigerian military COIN doctrinal manuals, and other COIN manuals from armed forces elsewhere for that matter, make it out to be. How can steps be taken therefore, to evaluate, and to gradually address, this identified problem?

Figure 4-3 shows a recommended flowchart process aimed at partially addressing this ambiguity around the function of doctrine, as part of a larger set of military activity aimed at developing the military COIN function. The flowchart is aimed at providing some structure to the cyclical interactions between doctrine, the learning environment, experiential learning, and operationalization of COIN activity. The recommended process is an original contribution within this analysis and is based on (1) interrogation of Nigerian military doctrine and related publications, (2) analysis of field findings and consultation with mid to senior-level NA and NAF personnel, and (3) this thesis' theory base. Furthermore, the process intentionally accommodates latitude for adaptation by the military planner. Indeed, specific action and role playing around internalization of the highlighted steps, as much as the interaction between the learning and operational environments, may need to be worked out by the JTFC, NA TRADOC, NATRAC, NASI, BMATT and other internal and external stakeholders. Such stakeholders by and large should be looking to leverage, and to actively employ, a number of factors to the challenge of Nigerian military COIN adaptation. These include existing practice, experiential learning from past operations, new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), revised doctrine, and research findings. Within this process, some key actors in particular are worth mentioning.

First, my interaction with 2 R Anglian indicates the unit's approach toward training the NA may prove instrumental to this development process. Likewise the CT-COIN Directorate, now part of NATRAC, is a primary stakeholder in the flowchart process. TRADOC also has a role to play and in this regard may shed its current perception as one of the NA's most irrelevant institutions: a "career

graveyard" as one NA senior officer put it[77]. More specifically the roles of TRADOC, the Office of Nigerian Army Transformation (ONAT), the Department of Army Standards of Evaluation, and the office of the Chief of Policy and Plans, in the codification of doctrine, may require reassessment within the flowchart process. This is insofar as all these structures contribute to the codification of doctrine. Yet such codification, if it is to be effective, cannot remain as detached from both operationalization and organizational culture. As Ives writes,

> People purposely form data and information into knowledge. This knowledge is the basis for some sort of action: a decision, a product, or an attack. There are two kinds of knowledge, tacit and explicit. Tacit knowledge is ''personal knowledge embedded in individual experience and involves intangible factors such as personal belief, perspective, and the value system.'' This type of knowledge – as much a part of the people who develop and possess it as of an organization or structure – is fragile and intuitive. Tacit knowledge is also critical to accomplishing organizational objectives and adapting. Codification allows the capture of elements of such knowledge, making them explicit. Codification requires sensitivity to cultural inflection and nuance to be effective (2007, p. 138).

Codification of COIN doctrine within the NMOE therefore may best be served as cross-pollination of distilled knowledge from the classroom, from the OE, from experiential learning, and from external assistance and input. Yet such codification should also factor in the organizational culture of the military it is meant to formally guide. It is in this final area that a robust system of appraisal, by those for which the codified doctrine is meant, may further benefit the overarching relevance of the doctrine. Ives in his analysis of the transference between the theory and practice of counter-insurgency makes an important contribution where he writes that,

[77] Anonymous senior NA officer.

> Practice is the actual implementation of doctrine to satisfy requirements. Practice is execution. Tension may arise if process capabilities do not match practice requirements. Experimentation must take place. Adaptation takes place as creativity occurs in experimentation to bridge gaps between tactical and operational requirements and doctrine, organization, and/or structure, or to stretch constrained resources. Successful adaptations reconcile the tension between process and practice (2007, p. 139).

Barry Watts also highlights the importance of measurement and appraisal of the military function, within this transference process from experiential learning to codification of doctrine. To Watts, tactical performance, more so than operational level activity, can be measured. Whereas such tactical level appraisal may seem limiting to overarching strategic objectives, Watts is of the view that the extent to which exploitation of measurement within the tactical level exists, may have effects that extend up to "political-strategic objectives" (2007, p. 61).



Figure 4-3: Doctrine and Operations Interaction Process Flowchart

A number of other points are worth noting within possible employment of the flowchart process. First, operational reports may be needed to assess actual field performance, as well as practical versus requested adjustments within units. As an example, what a company officer commanding (OC), or even a battalion CO, may request, may be detached from what a detailed, first-party account operational report indicates is actually required by the unit. This too may be detached from what existing doctrine indicates is required. Bridging the gap between these areas of the COIN function, for the military planner, may require the type of "topsight" that Figure 4-3 brings.

Second, with training logistics a significant challenge within the NMOE, clarification and facilitation of the role of the Army's G4 branch — in assisting with required logistics — is important. So too is the role of train-the-trainer led sessions to embed the relevant set of TTPs, long after departure of original training teams. These may seem non-essential operational points: higher tactical level at the most. Yet, my interaction with BMATT, Nigerian Army CT-COIN instructors and counter-insurgency units in the TOO indicate these areas could have surprising impact on the operational function.

Third, a dedicated Nigerian military team that leverages appraisal outcomes may also be relevant to facilitating the praxis between doctrine and operationalization. As an example, an equivalent of OPTAG (the Operational Training Advisory Group) (G4s) for the British Army may be a useful addition to this area of the military function. The CT-COIN Directorate arguably approximated this function circa 2012. However, within the context of Figure 4-3's recommendations, a more deliberate re-assessment of the pre-deployment training function may be required.

Finally, with the process in question constituting a 360 degree approach — the leveraging of experiential learning, doctrine, external training, and changes in the OE — it may be worth

considering professional security services consultation. One example is the services provided by G4S for the British Army (G4s). Put another way, stakeholders need not be limited to the usual pool. A more inclusive approach, with professional and civilian expertise, may be required.

In leading to the chapter summary, a cautionary note here is that much of what has been discussed in this section, regarding processes by which the gap between Nigerian military COIN doctrine and operations may be bridged, will likely take a long time. Put another way, current development of Nigerian military COIN doctrine will have modest short-term impact, if any, on COIN operations against Boko Haram. Much of the findings and recommendations within this thesis are not tactical in nature, moreover. Implementation and visibility of outcomes may both take time and may not be achievable within the current cycle of military activity against Boko Haram. Indeed, any possible impact of much of the evaluation within this chapter may take the span of several years to be demonstrable, even with careful planning and guidance.

The writers of FM 3-24 allude to this difficulty of bridging the gap between doctrine and operations *in situ* where they caution that adoption of doctrine and practices developed during counter-insurgency constitute a practical challenge to effectively adopt, "for a military engaged in a conflict" (US Army and Marine Corps, 2007). Yet the alternative should not be an option for the military as a learning organization; "learning organizations defeat insurgencies", the writers of FM 3-24 declare; "bureaucratic hierarchies do not" (US Army and Marine Corps, 2007, p. x).

4-7. Summary

Doctrine constitutes perhaps the most understudied area of Nigerian military counter-insurgency. Yet, as this chapter's analysis indicates, doctrine — whether codified or uncodified — is useful to understanding the military function. Particularly in COIN, where inter-service and interagency JE feature within campaign planning and prosecution, doctrine functions as the fundamental principles

by which military activity at and below formation level is guided. The military counter-insurgent therefore may benefit from choosing to develop doctrine; to institute it; to adapt it based on experiential learning, and then to apply it at the operational and higher-tactical levels as necessary. Failure to understand the processes that underpin the interaction between doctrine and practice could be as damaging as failure to take experiential campaign learning and institute that learning for future adaptation. Figure 4-3 is a flowchart process by which such experiential learning, alongside doctrine, can be reflected within the operational function, and vice versa. It is not Nigerian military specific.

Having evaluated a number of other areas within military counter-insurgency in Nigeria, the thesis, in the next chapter, will focus on the operational function. Instrumentality of this evaluation, within the contemporary Nigerian military experience, will be the military COIN against Boko Haram, between June 2011 and August 2013, by JTF ORO. This analysis will form part of a broader evaluation of military thinking and theory, around planning and features of the multiple LOOs relevant to a COIN campaign.

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE OPERATIONAL FUNCTION OF MILITARY COIN IN NIGERIA: JTF ORO CASE STUDY

5-1. INTRODUCTION

Whereas the Boko Haram insurgency saw formation of JTF ORO as the FGN's primary military response to the threat in Borno State circa 2011, the task force and its COIN so far have been poorly researched. Put another way, gaps exist within the academic understanding both of JTF ORO and of where it is situated within studies on military COIN in Nigeria. Yet because the majority of commentators on the operation had no insight into the interagency and operational interactions within the TOO, much has been said to fill in the gaps without requisite military field research. I understand, from the Office of the Chief of Training and Operations, DHQ, that I was the only researcher allowed access to JTF ORO, throughout the operation. With the taskforce since disbanded moreover, there exists no further research opportunity to study joint task forcing, within a COIN text, the way it was conducted by JTF ORO. This is insofar as the current counter-insurgency operation against Boko Haram is conducted by 7 Division and is under the remit of Army HQ. JTF ORO, being an inter-service and interagency driven operation, was under the remit of Defence HQ. This distinction is important to understanding the main operational plank of 7 Div's COIN vis-à-vis JTF ORO's.

My project's field findings, and findings analysis, therefore constitute an original contribution to an understanding of two understudied areas of Nigerian military counter-insurgency. First, of JTF ORO in being the closest that military COIN in Nigeria has come to truly joint, rather than the less atypical combined arms, operations. (2) Second, of the technical underpinnings of military COIN; including its relation to national strategic objectives, its planning and the component features within JE. JTF ORO's

COIN, situated in this broader context, constitutes instrumentality within the Nigerian military experience.

To achieve its objectives, the chapter is split in five. The first three parts in particularly are heavily reliant on field findings from military and security agency units, as part of JTF ORO, in northeastern Nigeria. Field findings from other command and non-command structures outside of the task force are also employed within the chapter's analysis.

The first part of the chapter provides background to JTF ORO and charts the military units ready for mobilization in the TOO, in the period prior to the creation of JTF ORO. The second part discusses the features and challenges of the TOO, not those of JTF ORO *per se*. This part of the thesis highlights two key features in particular. First, the section evaluates — using a theory base — why geographic size, population density and troop availability may matter to the calculus of war, over the long term, in COIN. The case of JTF ORO's COIN case supports this assertion. Second, the section looks at civil-military relations (CMR) and military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) and evaluates challenges for JTF ORO in these areas of its COIN.

Part three of the chapter conducts a technical analysis of each of the components' functions within JTF ORO's COIN operations. This section of the thesis, using interview analysis and other field data from each component, highlights challenges faced by each component, as part of a broader analysis of the components' JE function. The fourth part of the chapter is a theory-based analysis of Joint Campaign Planning (JCP) and how it applies to Nigerian military COIN, more broadly. The final part summarizes the main discussion within the chapter.

5-2. Background to JTF ORO

Between September 2010 when Boko Haram resurfaced after the Bauchi prison break, and June 2011 when JTF ORO commenced, the police and DSS conducted independent security activity against the

group (Adeoye, 2012). This was in the 12-month period prior to JTF ORO's formation and there was no military operation. Instead, the police operation, Operation Flush II, effectively an anti-robbery operation and in place since 2009, was "the first line of defence", at this phase of Boko Haram's re-emergence (Adeoye, 2012). In this first phase of the conflict, such a response seemed a practical approach to a militant Islamist threat that although escalating, was, as CSP Adeoye puts it, still weak (2012). Boko Haram's insurgency in these early months, consistent with chapter four's brief analysis of insurgency's phases, was not coordinated insofar as a series of operations were not being strung together to constitute a campaign; as would later be the case. Furthermore, whereas the group's weakness and poor coordination increased the likelihood of success of a purely military operation, its use of guerrilla tactics nonetheless made it difficult to engage. Boko Haram's non-engagement strategy, and irregular tactics, made it appear less of a problem than it was in reality. Put another way, Boko Haram, prior to mid-2011, appeared to be a growing concern, though not a major concern, for the military and security establishment in Nigeria.

When JTF ORO commenced on 15 June 2011 to counterbalance Boko Haram's escalated activity in the northeastern axis, the military response was both reactionary and kinetic: reactionary because there had not been a prior ready response force, JTF ORO was purpose-built; kinetic because, like most insurgencies, the military response came first prior to a realization that "hearts and minds" also required winning. The population-centric nature of Boko Haram's threat was yet to be fully understood after all, just as the scale of inter-service and interagency effort was also not fully appreciated by the government at the time. JTF ORO's core constitution at inception therefore, was Army.

Some of the active combat units were drawn from elements that had fought Boko Haram previously during the July 2009 Battle of Maiduguri. Specific military and security units involved in the counter-offensive in 2009, some of which were again functional circa 2010 to 2011, are listed below. Elements from these formations, rather than the entire formations *per se*, were involved: NA 21 Armoured

Brigade[78]; Task Force; The Nigerian Police Force (NPF); 234 Battalion, 23 Armoured Brigade (Yola); 213 Battalion, 23 Bde; 211 Demo Battalion; 301 Artillery Regiment, Gombe; Armoured School, Bauchi; NASI; Special Forces; NAF 79 Composite Group. 21 Bde drew from elements of three main units: 212 Tank Battalion; 202 Tank Battalion; 243 Recce Battalion (Monguno Barracks).

As part of JTF ORO, 21 Bde constituted the nucleus of the land component and the brigade commander, who doubled as the JTF ORO land component commander (LCC), was an important primary source for this study. 21 Bde also played a key role in the 2009 Battle of Maiduguri, effectively making it amongst the more experienced NA units to have faced the insurgent. Specifically, within the 2009 engagement with Boko Haram, 21 Bde was tasked by the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 3 Division (3 Div), to mobilize for MACA (Ahanotu, 2010). This, as the Army commander for that operation, Col Ahanotu, pointed out, came within the stipulation of paragraph 8 of the National Defence Policy document (2010).

By early 2010 therefore, there was a security response, albeit an uncoordinated one, in Maiduguri. Specifically, the Army had a persistently strong presence in Maiduguri, due to the location of Giwa Barracks as part of 21 Bde. Monguno Barracks in Monguno (about 200km) north of Maiduguri has 243 Bn stationed there — a recce battalion — as part of NA 5 Brigade[79]. Furthermore, the NAF formation in the TOO (79 Composite, Maiduguri), since upgraded to group status though initially a base, had adequate air combat and support capabilities, consistent with its status (Pawa, 2012). 79 also constituted one of this project's primary field sources late in 2012. 79 however was largely non-operational as a counterbalance to Boko Haram around this period in question (2010). 21 Support Group, Yola, is also a NAF unit with additional support options for the JTF. Other Army elements

[78] May be referred to as 21 Bde from now, for brevity.

[79] 5 Bde has engaged Boko Haram multiple times since 2013 when Boko Haram's territorial ambitions precipitated offensives against key strategic towns, such as Monguno, where 5 Bde's elements are quartered.

from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MN-JTF)[80], stationed in Baga also added to the resilience of the military presence in the axis, prior to JTF ORO commencement. Both 134 Battalion and 174 Battalion, stationed in Baga as part of the MN-JTF, also were part of the military's border presence in the axis. As Boko Haram began to penetrate more built-up areas however — making ingresses deeper within Borno rather than just in border towns such as Baga, Gamboru-Ngala, Banki and Gwoza — the MN-JTF no longer proved a sufficient operational counterbalance.

As the list of formations above indicates, by 2010, and besides an enduring presence of the MN-JTF around the border areas, there were no less than two additional brigade-strength forces in the TOO (21 Bde, Madiguri and 5 Bde, Monguno) as well as other NA and NAF formations. However these units were not part of a joint force, with a single mandate. Rather, the military's operational parameters remained within the same MACA stipulation as in the crisis and aftermath of Boko Haram's uprising of 2009 (Ahanotu, 2010). Put another way, military activity at the time, although at heightened vigilance vis-à-vis the norm, was not coordinated as a mandated counterbalance against Boko Haram's insurgency.

The NPF meanwhile was acting under Operation Flush (OP Flush); an existing police operation in Maiduguri, effectively made up of anti-robbery squad units. As put by CSP Aderemi Adeoye in-interview, OP Flush "…was set up by the state government to fight crimes generally and then it was the first line of defence against this insurgency" prior to the formation of JTF ORO, which the FGN

[80] The MN-JTF is constituted of military ground forces and support elements from the some of the countries that make up the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). The MN-JTF has been in existence since 1998; but has had a more prominent border role to play, since the emergence of Boko Haram circa 2010. Other nominal functions of the MN-JTF include acting as a counterbalance to the threat of arms trafficking and related cross-border threats that affect Nigeria's LCBC neighbors. Whereas the eight countries of the commission technically constitute Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Algeria, the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya and Sudan; only four countries contribute troop elements to the MN-JTF in practice: Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The MN-JTF is brigade sized. Nigeria provides the highest percentage of the forces and the MN-JTF barracks is located in Baga; a border town of Borno state, Nigeria.

formed when it “appeared as if the insurgency was growing in leaps and bounds” (Adeoye, 2012) (2012).

Certainly then, and in summary of this section of the chapter, the different components of JTF ORO existed on paper in and around Borno, and more collectively across in northeastern Nigeria (Yobe and Adamawa). However it was not until the counter-insurgency commenced that the different military and security components, unified under one command, and led by a single CO (JFC) were tasked with the same COIN mandate.

5-3. JTF ORO COIN: Features and Challenges of the TOO

One of the first features to understand regarding the counter-insurgency by JTF ORO is the geographical size of its AoR, relative to the population in question, and relative to the troop requirement within COIN doctrine, for a population of that size.

Borno state, the JTF’s AoR, was mostly not made up of built-up areas; rather most of the state is sparsely populated and unpatrolled areas. The JTF therefore had to patrol and secure vast, sparsely populated, arid-type terrain. It is in this particular operational objective, provision of contiguous military security within such areas, that one of the major challenges of JTF ORO came to the fore.

Figure 5-1 shows a map of Borno state, comparative to Helmand province, Afghanistan. The comparison highlights the population-to-troop ratio requirement within COIN doctrine and indicates how ill matched this requirement was, within JTF ORO’s COIN. Comparative to force requirement to feasibly secure the AoR, JTF ORO numbers, at around brigade strength[81], were insufficient by some margin. This assertion requires some broader context, alongside some theory-based premising. Here, the practical experience of the British campaign in Helmand is used to highlight campaign

[81] Around 4,000 personnel, by Nigerian Army official standards.

considerations around troop number requirements, terrain and geographic size, relative to the operational environment and phase of insurgency.



Figure 5-1: Borno compared with Helmand. Borno alone is over three-quarters entire eastern Nigeria.[82]

Borno state alone within JTF ORO's AoR, at 70,898 square km, is larger than Helmand province (58,584 square km) by some margin. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (NATO-ISAF) considered Helmand, as part of the AoR of Regional Command Southwest (RC SW), one of most contested areas within Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (King, 2010). As an example, the first three British brigades in the theatre from 2006 — 16 Air Assault, 3 Commando Royal Marines and 12 Mechanised — had especially difficult initial tours(Farrell, 2009). At Nawzad, the stalemate (2008-2009) between NATO-ISAF units and the Taliban, was further indication of a substantial troop

[82] Grey circles denote size of Boko Haram attacks.

requirement in the province . Several thousand more troops were subsequently deployed, mostly US. By Nov. 2010, Helmand would see a presence of over 30,000 total troops including coalition troops and Afghan national Army (ANA) personnel; mostly from the newly activated 215th Corps (NATO-ISAF, 2010) .

Granted, a troop surge into a contested area may seem a predictably military solution to what some may argue is an altogether more nuanced and unconventional threat form, in insurgency. Yet there is theory underpinning the thinking that more troops, whether for combat or for non-combat function, could make a difference in COIN (King, 2010). With Nigerian military counter-insurgency doctrine for the most part a rehashing of Western military counter-insurgency literature[83], it is perhaps worth investigating what this literature says regarding the population-to-troop ratio in counter-insurgency.

Sir Robert Thompson for instance notes, "If the selected area is sufficiently limited so that the government forces can saturate it, it is unlikely that the insurgents will seek a major battle" (1966, p. 106). US Army Col Greg Julian observes referring to US doctrine, perhaps referring to interim manual 3-7.22 specifically (US Army, 2004), that, "in counterinsurgency doctrine, it should really be a 10-to-one ratio of population [to troops]", though this view has been contested (Thiel, 2011). British Army doctrine is a more conservative in its estimate, arguing instead that "counterinsurgency operations call for a ratio of 20 security force personnel for every 1,000 people" (King, 2010, p. 319); that is, a ratio of 1 personnel for every 50 locals (50:1).

In practice it is difficult, though not impossible, to reach these targets. In Helmand, as an example, the population is around 1.4m. This gives a population-to-troop ratio of 1,400/35 or about 40:1, around height of troop surge in November 2010. Borno, by comparison, is significantly higher in terms of number of locals per task force personnel to secure them. Specifically, JTF ORO was just over brigade strength at its height in July 2013; two months after second State of Emergency was declared by the

[83] Chapter four's analysis of Nigerian military COIN doctrine demonstrates this.

FGN (The BBC, 2013b). Even assuming each of these personnel were combat ready — unlikely in reality, from fieldwork with 21 Bde (Bamigboye, 2012) — Borno state, with a population of over 3.1m, still yields a population-to-troop ratio of over 3,000: 4, or 750:1. Even with current combat-ready troop levels of 15,000 within 7 Div's ongoing COIN, this ratio is still 200:1. The indication here is that, *ab initio*, the OE, and in particular the scale of the AoR, already presented a challenge for the JTFC and his staff. This is insofar as the COIN had too few men to secure a well-dispersed population within a considerable geographic area.

A caveat here is that troop numbers alone may not necessarily make the operational difference in counter-insurgency. 7 Infantry Division, as an example, replaced JTF ORO in August 2013. Yet, as highlighted in Chart 1-2 in chapter one, the number and frequency of Boko Haram attacks actually increased after JTF ORO ended. This is despite 7 Div being, on paper at least, over twice, and perhaps up to thrice, the size of JTF ORO. The writers of interim manual 3-07.22 capture this antithetical view to population-troop ratios within COIN operations where they note, "in reality, research has demonstrated time and again there are no valid ratios that, when met, guarantee victory. As in conventional war, correlation of forces in an insurgency depends upon the situation" (US Army, 2004, pp. 1-3). However the writers of the manual also acknowledge the added benefit of added numbers where they observe, "though objective and valid force-correlation ratios do not exist, counterinsurgency has been historically manpower intensive. Time, which often works on the side of the insurgent, just as often places serious constraints upon counterinsurgent courses of action" (US Army, 2004, pp. 1-3).

Geographical size of sparsely populated areas was not the only defining feature of JTF ORO's counter-insurgency campaign, however. Indeed, it was in civilian-populated areas — "built-up" areas — that the counter-insurgency's steepest challenges may have manifested.

5-3.1. Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)

Commencing its operations on 15 June 2011, JTF ORO's mandate was to "restore law and order to the northeastern part of Nigeria and Borno state in particular", according to spokesman, Col Sagir Musa (2012). This mandate however, is directly related to that of denying the insurgent's ability to operate within the same axis, as the JTF ORO ACoS G3 pointed out. Figure 5-2 highlights the JTF ORO AoR relative to state local, regional and global threat forms.



Figure 5-2: JTF ORO to tackle the "Boko Haram Terrorists" (BHTs) at State Local level

With Boko Haram particularly active in the Borno state capital of Maiduguri throughout 2011, the first phase of the COIN, which lasted between the first nine to 15 months, was centric to conduct of operations within "built-up" areas. Such urban areas however brought with them increased potential

for civilian casualties, particularly since the intelligence components of the task force had not built up the necessary local networks for more precise offensives in the TOO. JTF Spokesman, Col Sagir Musa spoke about how the JTF began adapting to military activity in populated civilian areas, even as one of the first operational objectives was to expel the enemy from these built-up areas; Maiduguri in particular. This operational objective however proved challenging for JTF ORO; not least because implementing a LOO specific to civil-military relations (CMR) in "built-up" areas, indicated changing the existing action set.

Fieldwork with the JTF ORO ACoS G3 as well as the the JTF Intelligence Officer and Head of the Joint Interrogation Centre indicated the Army component of the task force had three objectives, when it became clear that operations in "built up" areas, without a drastic attendant change in action set, would lead to massive casualties. Boko Haram was dug into these areas, Maiduguri and Bama in particular. Discreetly plain clothed like civilians until the moment of attack, the insurgent was practically impossible to identify. This was more so the case since Boko Haram functioned in cell units that were unaware of each other's commands, or even presence (Danmadami, 2012).

To counterbalance this practically invisible enemy, the Army's three objectives were, first to create a rear area secure from further external offensives. Certainly, that the insurgent would remain embedded within these "built-up" areas for a while hence, was almost inevitable. Yet, weapons caches; seemingly innocuous materials which nonetheless could be used for IEDs (ammonium nitrate for instance) (Adeoye, 2012); and lorry loads of fighters coming in for major offensives, could not be an option of ingress into these areas, if aggregate progress was to be made. Second, the Army then had to detach itself from its omnipresent image of an offensive force with guns, armoured units and camouflaged fatigues, to one where police, undercover DSS and trained military personnel in mufti could beginning building local trust. This change of action set, from offensive, where the Army took the lead, to defensive, were roadblocks were manned and soft targets were hardened, would then allow for the

third objective: a safer environment for the intelligence-gathering taskforce components to facilitate precision and tactical military offensives. The local police and SSS, as well as the DIA (military intelligence) would play an instrumental role here as plain clothed operatives intermingled with the local populace.

Important to this action set required within COIN in "built-up" areas, or what some refer to as Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT), is an emphasis on understanding and facilitating the civil-military interphase. Yet, within COIN operations by JTF ORO in the first 12 months of fighting the insurgent in such areas, there were missed opportunities to exploit CMR. Whereas the Nigerian Army School of Military Engineering (NASME) retains one of the highest attendance rates within its class of military learning institution for instance, both the Nigerian Army Corps of Engineers (NAE) and Nigerian Army Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (NAEME) corps play, at best, a perfunctory function within the counter-insurgency in northeastern Nigeria. Crucially, where the NAE (the Engineers Construction Regiment, ECR, in particular) has played a role, it has been for the most part in engineering projects within the Army's more conventional function in G4 (maintenance, repairs, logistics) rather than at the community end, within G9 (civil-military activity) *per se*.

As an evidential case to support the above assertion, the JTF ORO ACoS G3 (Operations Officer) noted in-interview that civilian projects had to be contracted out — with a specific portable water project given as an example — because the NA's engineering capabilities were not present to use as a lever in-theatre (Danmadami, 2012). These projects were in turn delayed however; civilian contractors were too scared to proceed with them, for fear of being targeted by insurgents. In hindsight, deploying Army engineering units in combination with CMR personnel for this function, may have simultaneously completed the civil projects and brought about improved interaction with locals. Put another way, synergistic use of the G2 (Intelligence/Security), G3 (Operations), G4 (Logistics) and G9

(Civil-Military) branches, within this context, may act as a force multiplier, compared to if each staff branch functioned on its own.

Certainly within the period being discussed here, the first nine months of the counter-insurgency against Boko Haram when the Army component practically ran the effort from start to finish, the extent of coordination discussed above was effectively non-existent within JTF ORO. Indeed, some staff branches, such as G4 and G9 played practically no role until both G2 and G3 realized the need for NAEME, NAE and well as the civil-military function, in 2012. Until that point CMR remained an ad-hoc aspect of the COIN; and the action set leaned towards combat and combat support functions.

Notwithstanding, post-JTF ORO, operational progress was made in the area of CMR, particularly in locales contested with Boko Haram. Some examples here include establishment of computer based FM radio stations in Maiduguri and Damaturu towns. The purpose being provision of "…a means of supporting the NA to entertain, inform and correct misconceptions about its efforts in countering contemporary security challenges in both areas" (Sutch & Lark, 2014, p. 18). Other CMO projects include the construction of boreholes in "Kano, Maiduguri, Benisheik, Dikwa, Damboa and Biu amongst others" (Sutch & Lark, 2014, p. 18). Feedback from communities on this project set was said to be positive (Sutch & Lark, 2014, p. 18). Some of these restive areas were also given distributed food items by the military, in addition to a "free medical outreach", by the NA. Some locales affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, where there hitherto had been collapse of infrastructure, were selected (Sutch & Lark, 2014, p. 19). Mubi as well as some parts of Maiduguri are two examples (Sutch & Lark, 2014, p. 19).

Whereas JTF ORO was active for just over two years, it could be argued that some lessons taken away from that particular COIN operation are, to some degree, resonant within the Army's thinking around MOUT, since then. Participants at the 2014 joint counter-insurgency workshop between US Special Operations Command (USSOC) and the newly formed Nigerian Army Special Operations Command

(NASOC) recognized CMR, within COIN, as a neglected area compared to the conventional action set of the NA (Nigerian Army, 2014, p. 38). Identified by participants as a "force multiplier" going forward, CMR was presented as important "to restructure the environment [and] to displace the enemy" (Nigerian Army, 2014, p. 38). Exploitation of the civil-military dimension in the counter-insurgency against Boko Haram also has more direct implications.

Maj. Gen I. Sani, the Army's chief of information and operations, pointed to "innovations employed by the NA" within OP ZAMAN LAFIYA[84], the name given to the Army's counter-insurgency, after JTF ORO (Sani, 2014, p. 40). Noting that "perception management" is important to information operations (IO) within CMR, Gen Sani observed the Nigerian Army Information Processing Centre (NAIPC), within OP ZAMAN LAFIYA, constitutes an "indigenous system expected to enhance the free flow of intelligence from the general public to the NA" and that the Center has "immensely assisted the NA in immediate response to distress calls and important reports on likely security breaches" (Sani, 2014, p. 40). Gen Sani also emphasised the function of Islamic clerics in the Army's counter-insurgency,

> This measure involved the NA employing the Directorate of Islamic Affairs[85] to conduct sermons in the worst hit areas of BHT activities using publications and CD recordings in a bid to sway public opinions to denounce terrorism. These measures have yielded remarkable results as the use of clerics provides one of the most profound consequences on OP ZAMAN LAFIYA (Sani, 2014, p. 40).

Whereas General Sani's words may seem post-mortem to this section's analysis of JTF ORO, they are important to the project's overarching evaluation of COIN by the Nigerian military. This is insofar as experience from that operation now appears to be informing current Nigerian military thinking about

[84] Zaman Lafiya translates roughly to "restore order" in the local Hausa dialect

[85] Director of Islamic Affairs, Brig Gen Abdulsalam Mohammed, is also Chief Imam of the Army.

ways by which the civil-military interface can be exploited in COIN; from informal conversations between mid to senior-level personnel with command and staff involvement in the TOO, to more formal planning within the Army institution. One such initiative is the joint workshop between Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC) and US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which highlighted Effects Based Training (EBT) as a future venture that,

> …Could incorporate CMR to facilitate better relations with the civil society and enhance their support to the NA. The training could also include a framework for the incorporation of civilian support during IS operations. This could be similar to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) during PSOs, which outlines the various administrative and logistic supports available to troops (Sani, 2014, p. 25).

This transfer of experiential learning appears all the more purposive with the former OC (JFC) of JTF ORO, Maj. Gen J.A.H. Ewansiha, who has been an important primary source for this project, now the Army's Chief of Training and Operations (CTOP)[86].

Still, as relatively promising as the hindsight experience may now appear, the MOUT by JTF ORO, in the first 15 months of the COIN, and within the first nine in particular, constituted a crucible of war for the Army component of JTF ORO. During this time, it had to bring about artificial peace, long enough for long-term government measures to make that peace permanent. Yet the Army would go about this task using troops untrained for such operations; contending with population-to-troop ratios that made its task unfeasible; lacking the necessary CMO planning, capacity and networks; and facing an enemy too deeply embedded within the population for the combat function to yield effective results. Operations during this initial period, as the JTF ORO ACoS G3 observed in-interview, had to factor in implications of civilian casualties and this fell into planning by G3 staff.

[86] General JAH, as he is popularly called in the Army, was still CTOP (AHQ) as of writing.

The insurgent, on the other hand, had no such moral obligation to plan around the possibility of civilian casualties. If anything, civilian casualties constituted an active operational objective for Boko Haram insofar as achieving this objective discredited the military response and terrorized locals. Better still for Boko Haram if it could impersonate the JTF and conduct attacks in that guise; a tactic verified by both the PCC in Maiduguri (Adeoye, 2012), and the National Coordinator for CT at the ONSA in Abuja (Bello, 2012). Casualties with "built-up" areas, regardless of what side was responsible, constituted a win for Boko Haram and a loss for the Army.

In sum, the operational challenges of MOUT proved amongst the most significant feature of the theatre, within the first year of the counter-insurgency. As an example, nine months into the COIN, Col Musa made the following notes based off a patrol experience with the troops,

> Fighting in built-up areas is tasking, cumbersome and hazardous. There is limited view of space and fire, visibility and manoeuvrability is limited and ambush attrition losses are high. I was on patrol with JTF troops in Maiduguri aimed to fish out suspected members of Boko Haram and to recover arms, ammunition and explosives. It was then I had a clear perception of how difficult and dangerous it is for troops to fight in built-up areas. Some of the terrorists hid in mosques, planted Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) by the sides of the mosques or inside churches, hid on rooftops, planted IEDs on our routes and shot through loopholes. They seemed conscious of our vehicle columns, [and have] good flamethrowers, […] Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), General Purpose Machine Guns and Alexander Kalashnikov (AK 47) rifles in their inventory.
>
> Buildings provide good sniping posts, while alleys, refuse dumps and sand filled streets are ideal for booby-traps. The nature of Maiduguri houses built close to each other with strong gates, tall walls serves as a parapet for the terrorists and a fort onto itself. There are also religious and cultural taboos where most of the houses are locked with "BA SHIGA (No

> Entry) inscription – a terrorist can easily mask himself with "abaya", the long flowing gown that covers the entire body.
>
> [So] as we tactically moved round the city, we could not see the men hiding inside the houses, behind the walls or rooftops. Efforts to insert the hard skin fighting vehicles could not hit the terrorists; moreover, collateral damage could not be eliminated when used, and so we jettisoned the idea.
>
> A few days later, we approached the targeted areas from two flanks and this time we assaulted differently and two notorious commanders of the terrorists were ambushed in the process. The JTF understood that it now needed to "mouse hole "through each or most of the houses suspected of harbouring Boko Haram terrorists and root them out in close combat. The successes recorded were unimaginable as many obvious (because they were caught with weapons) and suspected terrorists were arrested and thousands of assorted ammunition and some arms and quantities of IEDs were recovered (Musa, 2012).

Col Musa is not alone in his frustration within MOUT. The difficulties faced by the counter-insurgent in urban warfare are well documented by Alice Hills in her book, *Future Wars in Cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma*. Professor Hills is of the view that that regardless of how well stacked the odds are in favour of the counter-insurgent, urban warfare, or MOUT (military operations on urbanised terrain) as the Americans call it within their practices (Hills, 2004, p. 43), has proven, time and again, to be a dilemma. Indeed, she summarizes her position that with regards to urban operations in COIN, "a military consensus [within doctrine across a number of armed forces] is clear: urban operations are best avoided…" (Hills, 2004, p. 40).

Whereas urban warfare provided its own challenges for JTF ORO, a lot of its function was situated outside built-up areas. It was such areas, as Maiduguri was increasingly "hardened" by JTF ORO,

which the insurgent would gradually withdraw toward (Ewansiha, 2012). In this regard, documentary material issued from JTF ORO HQ indicates the interagency function and operations classed as "other" (see Table 5-2) were important to denying the BHTs access to "buffer zones" and "safe havens" within the vast border expanses of northeastern Nigeria (JTF ORO HQ, 2012). However, indications point to the Boko Haram going further still and crossing the border areas into the neighbouring countries of Cameroun, Niger and Chad. Two questions emerge here. The first is why the "BHTs" (Boko Haram Terrorists) favoured cross-border activity. The second is how JTF ORO — due to its mandate being within state writ — addresses this cross-border threat of the BHTs.

Section 5-4's analysis of JTF ORO police component field data will aim to answer to the first question, Boko Haram's decision to go cross-border. To answer the question of how this cross-border activity is being addressed within JTF ORO's COIN, field findings point to the task force's use of joint effort (JE) as a superset of the two areas of joint internal effort (JIE) and joint external effort (JEE). With regards to JIE, synergy of inter-agency effort, surveillance and reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and information sharing within activities categorized as "other"[87] compliment existing activity within the three functional areas categorized as "offensive", "defensive" and "social". JIE, put simply, constitutes synergistic cooperation within all the JTF ORO components, particularly those with intelligence-gathering functions.

With regards to JEE, security agencies external to typical activity of JTF ORO, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) specifically[88], were identified within documentary material issued (JTF ORO HQ, 2012). This broader collaborative effort came with a realisation that "strategies to end BHT activities" had to go beyond routine intelligence gathering and had to include agencies with the mandate and capabilities to gather cross-border intelligence. This in part was because, constitutionally

[87] See Table 5-1.

[88] As opposed to the DIA (military intelligence) and the DSS (Domestic Intelligence), the NIA's remit lies within the collection of foreign, cross-border and trans-national intelligence.

within its function in MACA, JTF ORO did not have a cross-border function. Thus JEE within JTF ORO was facilitated by "…Information sharing through DIA/NIA with security agencies of countries that the [Boko Haram] Terrorists use for acquisition of arms/ammunition, IED materials and training of its members as well as safe havens" (JTF ORO HQ, 2012).

5-4. JTF ORO Components

With regards to force composition, JTF ORO was made up of the NA, NAF, NPF, DSS, NIS, NCS and the DIA. Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS) and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) also play a role in JTF ORO, albeit a perfunctory one. Specifically, as Boko Haram detainees are held at Giwa Barracks, Maiduguri, the NPS is called in to conduct inspections of facilities and to provide welfare advice and assistance for detainees. The NCSDC is similarly called in for specific duties — for instance its female members may be called upon to pat down female worshippers, during coordinative defensive operations at mosques in urbanised areas. As JTF ORO is largely composed of male operatives, NCSDC female members proved particularly useful in such scenarios, such as during the 2012 Ramadan fasting period.

Finally the Navy (NN) played a minor role in the COIN. Specifically NN ran the Special Boat Unit (SBU, also known as the Special Boat Squad), which effectively constitutes the Naval Special Forces. The operations conducted by the SBS, altogether recognized by the JTF, are nonetheless flagged as "independent" of the JTF function (Danmadami, 2012). The Navy, in contributing to the military security operations in Maiduguri, also had "the normal ground crew who are actually deployed at the sectors", as the ACoS G3 observed (Danmadami, 2012).

Each component within the task force was assigned a particular function that complemented the strengths of their usual duties. As an example, rather than conducting offensives, the military intelligence component (DIA) was primarily tasked with gathering intelligence regarding the location

and operations of the Boko Haram, according to the JTF Intelligence Office and Head of the Joint Interrogation Centre (JIC) (JTF, 2012). For this task G2 staff had to work in synergy with the JIC at Giwa Barracks, where suspected Boko Haram detainees were held.

The police component meanwhile coordinated police operations at the ground level, due to a police presence typically being retained in even the most remote areas where NA or DSS may not be present (Adeoye, 2012) (Adeoye, 2012). The NA component, 21 Bde, was tasked primarily with patrols, roadblocks — particularly during nigh time curfews — tactical offensives on suspected sect hideouts (21 Bde always took point, unless SOF elements were present), and operations such as "cordon and search". Each of these operations will be evaluated in the relevant sections that follow.

A noteworthy point within this operational overview is how, at the task force level and below, activity was conducted. Component commanders, for instance, were in charge of forces that ordinarily reported to their own respective services, but that, in JTF ORO, reported to these commanders (called sector commanders or simply component commanders). As an example, the PCC, one of the taskforce's nine sector commanders, had under his command not just police personnel but some military personnel. Police and Army units were sometimes assigned to guard the same location, as a result and the police welfare officer was in charge of welfare for personnel within the JTF as well, not just those limited to his local command.

Similarly the DSS (local intelligence) and the DIA (military intelligence) had a close, official, working relationship. This relationship, as I came to observe, was important to facilitating intelligence sharing and quality of information gathering that, arguably, set JTF ORO apart from any other task force that came before it. The interagency, inter-service links are captured in Figure 5-3[89]. The interactions between the DIA, DSS and NPF, as shown in that figure, constitute the elements of the Central Intelligence Committee (CIC), the NA and NPF together contribute to SOF, and also are the main

[89] Author's sketch, based on aggregate fieldwork with JTF ORO.

components, along with the NAF, that hold durbars (town hall meetings) with locals. As yet another example of these interactions, the NAF, DIA, NPF and DSS are the four elements that contribute to a function called the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE), which also uses Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) and Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) contributions. Other interactions exist, such as those between the NCS and NIS that in turn contribute to the JIPOE. Detailed evaluation of each main JTF ORO component is conducted in the sub-sections that follow.

5-4.1. NA Component in JTF ORO

The NA component constitutes the nucleus of JTF ORO. The Army's command and staff structure is consistent with the battalion-level building blocks for an operation, codified in doctrine (G/G3/12). The Cdr 21 Bde, at rank SO5 (OF-6) Brigadier, coordinates the entire ground operation and 21 Bde elements provide the main combat capabilities. Other NA officers were also posted to work in non-combat positions; those from G2 and G3 branches, for instance, who formed the JFC's staff.

A possible question for the military COIN planner is why, and when, the Army function assumes the lead operational role; especially where the local police retain a presence. Fieldwork with JTF ORO indicates there are four possible scenarios of note[90]:

I. Where the police lack requisite capabilities to restore stable peace, long and short term.
II. For MACA and MACP: When military assistance is requested — and is required — in assistance of civil power and civil authority.
III. A scenario where civil disturbances have escalated and now threaten to spread; potentially disrupting national unity.

[90] NASI HQ Document for OP Safe Haven. The author received clearance from DHQ to visit Maj. Gen Ayoola's command at Operation Safe Heaven, Jos.

IV. Where local dissident insurgent and terrorist networks may be leveraging external assistance, or if the likelihood of such assistance increases was conflict to protract.

The role and contribution of the NA, to JTF ORO, is split into four operational categories: defensive, offensive, social and other operations. All four categories are outlined in Table 5-2. Dark-shaded boxes denote shared operational and tactical duties with the NPF. The NPF, in JTF ORO played a larger role than often is recognised. Additional clarification will be provided regarding this, shortly.

DEFENSIVE	OFFENSIVE	SOCIAL	OTHER
Soldiers and police, with soldiers playing a bigger role in rear area defence (Ratio of around 70:30).	Soldiers, mostly. Police assist. Army ratio increases to around 85:15.	Soldiers and NCOs; or officers – dependent on actual activity; civilian contractors for QIPs	Officers, mostly
1. Guard and VIP escort duty	6. Patrol duty	12. Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)	18. Planning and oversight of overall direction for JE and security objectives
2. Police protection (in particular, situations where a police unit is at risk of being overrun)	7. Ambush	13. Town hall meetings	19. Intelligence Gathering
3. Community protection	8. Tactical offensives	14. Engagement with *Bulamas* (local heads)	20. Counter-propaganda
4. Roadblock manning. This includes "stop and search" of persons and vehicles	9. Cordon & Search	15. Assistance with infrastructure repair, food supplies, medicine	21. Military advise to State government
5. Crowd control and dispersal. In this context they may be deployed to assist State mobile police, riot police and regular police	10. Enforcement of curfew (typically between certain hours of the night and early morning)	16. Engagement with Media	22. Engineering assistance particularly with regards to aircrafts (helicopters) and land vehicle logistics and repairs
	11. Route clearance	17. Information Operation (IO) and Propaganda campaign(s)	23. Liaison and coordination with other security agencies

TABLE 5-1: Operational and Tactical Level Contributions of the NA Component of JTF ORO

Within the quartet of operations, defensive operations (1 to 5) and patrol duty tactics within offensive operations (6) together constitute the most visible activity of JTF ORO. This is not least because, as Table 5-1 indicates, largely soldiers, supervised by an NCO or (commissioned) officer, carry out these operations. NCOs, if in command positions, typically would be between corporal and sergeant rank. The typical NA command structure, as codified in both the Army's capstone doctrine and its COIN doctrine, applies here. That is, a section is commanded by an NCO[91] squad leader; a platoon by a lieutenant[92]; a company by a Captain (SO1) OF-2 or Major (SO2) OF-3 and a battalion by a Lt. Col (SO3) OF-4, or, sometimes, by a Col (SO4) OF-5, although the colonel rank is largely a staff one. Soldiers conduct the bulk of these operations, being the most visible and outnumbering NCOs and officers by orders of magnitude.

Overall visibility of 1 to 23, vis-à-vis each other however, may be dependent on the population density of, and insurgent presence within, an area. As an example using Figure 5-2 for the color-coding referenced in this analysis, and Table 5-1 for the number references, locations such as GRA Maiduguri, within the green zone, may see fewer instances of 4 and 6 due to its relative safety; more heavily contested, and built-up, areas such as Londonchiki (toward the edge of the green zone) may have more of both (4 and 6). Likewise, the vicinity around Giwa Barracks (21 Bde) would typically see large amounts of 4 and 6, with the barracks lending that location added strategic relevance. Areas further out still (orange and grey zones) meanwhile would typically have more roadblocks (4) than they have active patrols (6). The blue zone (border area) may have neither for several miles, due to the capacity issues highlighted earlier in the chapter.

Within JTF ORO, as with counter-insurgencies elsewhere, social projects (12 to 17) are typically marginal compared to more visible military activity such 3 to 10. When executed however, social projects — QIPs as JTF ORO staff referred to them — still carry weight within the overall COIN

[91] Typically between corporal to Sargent.

[92] Typically1st Lieutenant.

function. Indeed, interview respondents in G3 viewed them as an effective way to win local hearts and minds (Danmadami, 2012). Warrior-scholars such as US Army Col Christopher Kolenda have discussed the relationship between successful QIPs and COIN in other TOOs, like Afghanistan. However within the literature on African military COIN this is an area that is under-researched and for the most part absent within the discourses. Some emphasis, within this operational evaluation of the Army component in JTF ORO, will be on QIPs and similar projects within the operational category of "social".

Consistent with the views of the Operations Officer, on QIPs (Danmadami, 2012), the JTF Intelligence Officer and Head of the JIC observed in-interview for instance that QIPs are social measures carried out by the military after the insurgency has "escalated", when attempts are now being made to win over the people's "hearts" (JTF, 2012). The JIC Head also indicates the relevance of sensitizing local community heads (*bulamas*) and the populace more broadly, as to what the JTF was trying to accomplish. This, he noted, became a key part of facilitating his job (primarily intelligence gathering for tactical action against the insurgent).

By befriending a *bulama*, if the *bulama* kept a mobile (phone), numbers could be exchanged, and he could be checked on frequently, in order to cultivate the friendship.. This approach constitutes a reminder of what Theo Farrell refers to as "the importance of local knowledge and tactical patience in counterinsurgency" (Farrell, 2013). In practice, some of the JTF ORO personnel I interacted with were so embedded within the local environment, to the untrained eye they were virtually impossible to distinguish from the locals.

In the next step of cultivating the local friendships, visits would follow as social interaction between JTF ORO and the locals progressed. The JTF Intelligence officer, unlike his colleagues, typically would not wear uniform as I came to observe. In fact I do not recall ever seeing him dress as a Nigerian Army Colonel, except perhaps when we met outside Maiduguri, at the Office of the National

Security Advisor (ONSA) in Abuja. Without exception in the TOO, whether at Battalion HQ, Taskforce HQ or in formal briefings with the other component commanders, mufti was the only attire the Intelligence Officer (as well as some other Army personnel in G2) wore.

Permanent use of mufti by certain personnel acting in official capacity was done first to blend into the local community environment and then was meant to reassure, befriend, empower and get support from the *bulamas* and local communities' respectively (JTF, 2012). Local knowledge and acceptance, as much as intelligence, was the object here. After all, to lose these key civilian actors in the COIN would be to effectively impede access to a viable corridor of HUMINT, within Kanuri-dominated areas especially, contested by Boko Haram.

Some in these areas, as the DSS Director for Borno noted in-interview, already were of the same ethnicity as Boko Haram and were sympathetic to them. It was whether or not these areas would tacitly or actively support the insurgents, which was now in contention (Ahmed, 2012).

Influence operations therefore — non-combat activity that include QIPs, attempts to build relationships within communities, town hall meetings (durbars), medical outreaches, and even Army-run FM radio stations[93] mentioned in the previous chapter (Sutch & Lark, 2014, p. 18) — were important to Army CMR effort, particularly in restive areas that were covertly, rather than overtly, contested by Boko Haram. Such attempts to gain local knowledge, acceptance, and ultimately intelligence and assistance are not to be seen as a footnote within the military contribution to counter-insurgency. As Montgomery McFate observes,

> The likelihood of success in a counterinsurgency is inversely proportional to the number of casualties, military and civilian. Casualties, especially those resulting from the use of

[93] Admittedly, whereas this idea was floated during JTF ORO, it was implemented and operational in Damaturu and Maiduguri after JTF ORO's campaign had ended and during OP ZAMAN LAFIYA

> imprecise and disproportionate lethal force, may strengthen the insurgency by creating martyrs, increasing recruiting, strip the government of any remaining political legitimacy, and provide evidence to civilians of the brutality of state forces, resulting in the escalation of the conflict (2010, p. 194)

As the previous chapters indicate, however, doctrine, culture and historical experience may influence whether a military obliges the insurgent with an over-reactive target response. This is consistent with McFate's view that, "for a military organized, trained, equipped and culturally predisposed to seek a kinetic solution, the natural response to an escalating insurgency is to simply identify and neutralize more targets […] This 'downward spiral' [and] […] a structure of reciprocal attacks may result in a cyclical escalation of violence" (McFate, 2010, p. 194).

For McFate (2010), the counter-insurgent could improve this situation by reducing the extent of kinetic operations that impact the population. This objective could itself be achieved, through better local interactions. "Social knowledge", she argues, "can reduce the need for kinetic force during a counterinsurgency" (2010, p. 193).

Social operations and their impact however are, by nature, less measurable and visible, than combat operations and body counts. As the JTF ORO Operations Officer would seem to lament in-interview, only members of an affected community may celebrate an Army, or Army-sponsored, sinking of a borehole; or the establishment of a medical outreach (Danmadami, 2012). Contrast this to the effect of an Army operation that results in civilian casualties, however. Media blowback aside, such news, and the local effect, may set back weeks or even moths of influence operations (Kolenda, 2012). Indeed, as one Chief Superintendent of Police observed in-interview in Maiduguri, not even a Boko Haram attack with massive casualties may have the same setback effect as a military offensive with a relatively smaller amount of unintended civilian casualties (Adeoye, 2012).

In the view that intelligence and social knowledge gained from population-centric COIN reduces the likelihood of civilian casualties in operations, there therefore appears some consensus within the discourses (McFate, 2010; Nagl, 2005; US Army and Marine Corps, 2007; Kolenda, 2012; Kilcullen, 2010; Farrell, 2009).

Practically regardless of how population-friendly military operations are however, where operations are long-term, sustainability becomes an issue. The writers of Western military COIN doctrine appear to recognize this and make a recommendation. Beyond a certain point in the campaign, the counter-insurgent should plan for stability operations that have the local police and security agencies as the nucleus, with the military playing an incrementally supporting role of delegating duty and empowering local agencies (MOD, 2009; Department of Defense, 2013).

5-4.2. Police Theory in Counter-insurgency.

As Maj. Gen Richard Clutterbuck once observed, "there is no doubt that the soundest (and, in the end, the cheapest) investment against […] insurgency in any country is a strong, handpicked, and well-paid police intelligence organization, backed up by funds to offer good rewards" (Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Marine Corps, 2008, p. 7).

Why is so much importance attached to the role of the police function in counter-insurgency? This section of the chapter, in briefly evaluating police theory within counter-insurgency, aims to contribute to a response. This is relevant to the chapter's broader discussion of operations insofar as the police component, within the Nigerian military contribution as much as in that elsewhere (Hills, 2012), constitutes an under-studied part of the "boots on the ground" paradigm within COIN.

In counter-insurgency, police refers to the local officers within a force, public or statutory, "whose significance results from the political objectives it symbolizes, the power relationships it reflects, and its close engagement with local populations" (Hills, 2012, p. 98). Police and policing theory within

COIN, despite the importance of this area, has received significantly lower research interest, however (Hills, 2012). Indeed, studies related to the difference in policing during counter-insurgency operations vis-à-vis before; as well as how the police COIN function itself changes dependent on phase of insurgency; are poorly researched and discussed within the theory. This research gap is all the more obvious, comparative to the wealth of available theory on the military function within the same context (Hills, 2012). As put by Alice Hills, the

> …Literature focuses on the military role, and policing and police are addressed only in so far as they affect military concerns. That few Western practitioners, officials and scholars attempt to understand the role and culture of indigenous police exacerbates divisions between rhetoric and reality (2012, p. 99).

In the case of the Nigerian police in counter-insurgency, these "divisions between rhetoric and reality" alluded to by Hills (2012, p. 99) appear profound indeed, with some of what is being said of the police function approximating conjecture rather than reality, even in circles of quite some renown (RUSI, 2013)[94]. This is hardly a peculiarity to the Nigerian police and Nigerian COIN. More broadly, studies on police doctrine, vis-à-vis those on military doctrine, practically are non-existent (2012, p. 99) and the chances of me getting research data on the Nigerian police in COIN where practically non-existent had I not been physically present to conduct research with police personnel in both the Delta COIN (JTF OPS) and in north-east Nigeria (JTF ORO).

Yet, if police operations in COIN are underdeveloped within the discourses on counter-insurgency, police doctrine is similarly a challenge. This is perhaps because such doctrine may not in fact be recognized as existent, or entirely necessary, to begin with. Hills for instance notes that the British police for instance "do not have doctrine" (2004, p. 47); though she adds, in a viewpoint that some may dispute, that doctrine itself "is not thought operationally essential" (2004, p. 47). Aside from

[94] I was present at that RUSI meeting

doctrine, however it is the broader contribution to policing in COIN, or its lack thereof, that is, by and large, problematic for research into the area. Moreover non-Western COIN policing is particularly susceptible here. Hills suggests the challenge for the non-Western police COIN scholar when she observes, "understanding of the police is, however limited. Specifically there is a fundamental lack of knowledge concerning the role and culture of the non-Western police…" (2012, p. 99).

Within counter-insurgency, or Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) as the Nigerian Police manual calls it, the police is empowered by Section 4 of the Police Act Cap 359 to perform "…such military duties within and outside Nigeria as may be required of them by or under the authority of this or any other Act" (Nigeria Police, 1979). The Police Act, enacted in 1943 and amended in 1979, is the operational legal framework for the police in Nigeria and additionally empowers the police in a number of ways to facilitate its role in LIC. An important example of such powers is that to "search and detain". It is for reasons such as this that the police play such an important role in the conduct of JTF ORO. Specifically, besides the NA, no other components are mandated to mount roadblocks[95] and to stop and search civilians.

Policing in COIN is a different function than in peacetime (2012, p. 102); words echoed by the PCC, where he notes that his role in JTF ORO is quite different from his police function under "normal circumstances" (Adeoye, 2012). DSP Mande Graham, the 2iC Mobile Commander, 31 (Command), Delta State, and also a police commander in the Niger Delta counter-insurgency (JTF OPS), shared similar sentiments in-interview (Graham, 2012). To begin with, both commanders note the quality, training and equipment of personnel selected to constitute part of COIN task forces are often different from that of policemen and women who carry out regular peacetime duties. Those peacetime policing duties however become difficult to prosecute during an insurgency for two reasons. First, for the normal policeman who is not in any form of special outfit or taskforce, his normal capabilities, action

[95] That is, no other components are mandated to mount roadblocks outside of their installations – the NAF for instance mounts one outside 79, but regular NAF roadblocks are uncommon.

set, and the colleagues he either fights besides or polices with, make him poorly prepared to contribute meaningfully to COIN. Indeed, as Hills notes of the regular non-Western policeman, “poorly paid and inadequately trained men in battered trucks cannot contain an insurgency” (2012, p. 107).

The second reason why regular policing becomes problematic as insurgency escalates is because the insurgent is particularly prone to attack the policeman, practically on principle. In the case of the Boko Haram’s insurgency, this has been widely observable from the onset of the insurgency. Why is the policeman such a viable target to the insurgent? Whereas both policeman and soldier represent state power and the rule of law being contested, the policeman is, typically being more visible, and thus is typically more visibly corrupt. Furthermore, police formations also, in practically any society, constitute a softer target, comparative to military formations. Targeting of the police, who in peacetime protect the general public, is also a way to undermine state legitimacy. This is one reason why police asset security within sectors, as the Boko Haram insurgency escalated, became a major concern for the Police Component Commander (Adeoye, 2012).

Finally, attacks on the police are also of direct tactical value. Police installations, whether as roadblocks or as police stations, have, especially at the latter, weapons and other tactical assets, such a gear, armoured vehicles and ordnance, that can be carted away. The combination of the features discussed here, increases police vulnerability in insurgency..

To summarize this overview of the police in insurgency-COIN, three typologies of the police function therefore are broadly observable here. The first, in peacetime, where that function tends to supersede that of all other security agencies locally, including and especially the military function, which for the most part is (or should be) invisible. The second, in insurgency, which is largely a skeleton function and that in fact may paint a target on the police who now take a secondary role, at best, behind the Army. The third is in counter-insurgency — that is, for the police function integrated into the COIN. Purposive use of the police for COIN, in a role that Hills argues should be “assertive and multifaceted”

(2012, p. 107), holds potential for long-term COIN success, particularly in the rear area. The police function highlighted in Table 5-1 indicates as much. Police roles here, specific to Nigerian military COIN include maintaining a local footprint in even the most remote communities; collecting local intelligence (and working closely with the DSS in this regard since they collect domestic intelligence); manning checkpoints; maintaining visibility alongside military personnel; defending soft locations with military units; conducting routine patrols within designated sectors[96]; helping with tactical bomb squad duties; and conducting joint tactical offensives with military units.

Primarily, analysis of policing and the police function within COIN, the third typology, is this chapter's concern. This function, within the context of the JTF ORO COIN, is evaluated below.

5-4.3. NPF Component in JTF ORO

Within the specific context of JTF ORO, the police function is not, like the regular police function, actively out to solve and combat crime. Its mandate rather, as part of the task force is to compliment the function of the other components in a thrust aimed at denying the insurgent, Boko Haram, the ability to function in northeastern Nigeria (Adeoye, 2012).

Police personnel within JTF ORO are typically kitted in combat vests and helmets and often work closely with military units; unlike their counterparts outside the COIN who do not have protective gear, are not mandated to fight the insurgency (in the same way that JTF ORO police are) and are rather tasked with the usual peacetime duties of policing, crime solving and prevention and so on. Activities 1 to 10, in Table 5-1, indicate the main scope of police or police assistive activity within the JTF ORO COIN military function.

Despite high visibility of the NPF in offensive operations (such as patrols) and defensive operations (such as the mounting of roadblocks), the police — alongside the DSS — is also at the fore of

[96] In Maiduguri for instance, Sector 8 was a police-heavy sector

intelligence gathering within the operational environment. Figure 5-3 highlights the function of the JIPOE within the JTF ORO COIN interagency interaction. Presence of a police command at even the most basic grassroots level is a feature no other component within JTF ORO can boast of. It is a feature the PCC notes is a particularly useful for police planning (integration of the police function) within the JIPOE (Adeoye, 2012).

The PCC also stressed practicality of police intelligence contribution is the JIPOE (Adeoye, 2012). As an example he discussed, police reports in Maiduguri, related to specific sermons and radical activity by former Boko Haram leader, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf. The police had tracked Ustaz Yusuf and several Boko Haram members for a while before the Battle of Maiduguri in 2009. CSP Adeoye (2012) noted that, being not just PCC but also a CSP for Borno State, he inherited these reports and that they had proved useful to his component function in JTF ORO.

Additionally, the NPF's mission "to partner with other relevant Security Agencies and the public in gathering, collating and sharing of information and intelligence with the intention of ensuring the safety and security of the country" (Nigeria Police) is consistent with its function as a JTF ORO core component. As outlined in Table 5-1, other roles of the police in counter-insurgency include crowd dispersal, patrols, road blocks, "stop and search" and offensive raids[97].

As a primary component of JTF ORO, the NPF, behind the NA, is the second most important contributor in terms of manpower. The NPF contributes one of eight sector commanders, and is headed by the state police command 2iC who doubles as both the PCC and the State Police Command CSP. The following is an excerpt from the JTF Police Component Commander on his role. Sensitive parts of his account have been taken out at his request or discretion,

[97] Within JTF ORO, the NA typically coordinates these raids.

> In the joint task force, I am one amongst the nine sector commanders in Maiduguri. Incidentally I am the only police officer who is a sector commander, at the moment. What I do in the joint task force is directly to fight insurgency. And I have under my command, troops comprising the three arms of the military and mobile police officers. I cover roughly one-eighth of Maiduguri metropolis.
>
> Apart from my duty in protecting people, critical infrastructure, social facilities — like schools, churches — in this area, I also coordinate the *X* mobile policemen across all the sectors in the JTF. So all issues affecting troops, and for this purpose that includes mobile policemen in my sector — operationally, administratively — it is my responsibility (Adeoye, 2012).

The excerpt provides insight into the operational and administrative roles of the PCC. Table 5-1 also highlights tactical police activity that falls under the PCC's command. In theory, going with the detail in Table 5-1, duplicity of function between the police and the Army components may seem an issue of concern. In practice however, this potential duplicity is largely avoided, as the PCC later noted, due to clear assignment of unit duty. As an example, police and soldier roadblocks and patrols, where not conducted separately, are planned and synergistic rather than competitive. Outside the COIN in northeastern Nigeria, this is not always the case as police and military roadblocks sometimes seem both duplicative in duty and perhaps even competitive.

Within the PCC's sector, police presence is overall stronger; with soldiers also assigned to him, within the sector. Increased police rear presence frees up the Army to conduct operations elsewhere and also limits contact between soldiers and civilians in the rear area — a situation the soldiers may not be as well trained, as the police, to handle. However it should be noted that regular police units, already struggling with capacity issues even in peacetime duties, may be unable to fill this gap in the rear, during insurgency. With COIN training and better equipment however, the police could be an

important asset in this same area; the Army as substitute police force is, at best, a stopgap measure, as CSP Adeoye (2012) cautions. This view is echoed by Hills (2012).

Defence operations in the rear area aside, police and policing in CT-COIN also facilitate the campaign in a number of other ways. In the JTF ORO case the police component gathered intelligence through community policing and local police commands, even as the NA gathered intelligence largely through the DIA component and its G2 staff. So again here, duplication of function is avoided.

Additionally, the police component (which also includes mobile police, criminal investigation, community relations, tactical bomb units and other sub-components) was the only JTF ORO component with bomb and IED disposal capabilities. CSP Adeoye was keen to emphasize this point when pushed to justify the police component contribution within JTF ORO. The following is an abridged excerpt from that portion of the interview with CSP Adeoye. As put by him,

> The police is a very critical component of the JTF. In fact I can tell you that without the police in the JTF, it will be a lost war. You would think that is being dramatic? I will give you instances, For example, anything IED, or bombs — it is the police that deals with it. No other service has that capability. That is one area where the police prove to be indispensable to JTF operations. So everything IED — whether it has happened, or suspected, or recovered, or detonated, or wired, or primed; whatever — as a matter of fact, if the JTF, doing "cordon and search", gets to any location, and an IED is discovered; it is full stop; until [the] bomb disposal [police unit] arrives (2012).

The PCC goes on to elaborate, in detail, instances of the police component contribution that leverage its increased footprint, its unique IED capabilities and its better interactions with local communities, for the most part. In one case we discussed, a Boko Haram chase by military operatives was stopped

dead in its tracks after the insurgents dropped a suspected IED. The police tactical bomb squad was then called in to remotely detonate the device (Adeoye, 2012).

A final set of points regarding the instrumentality of the police in JTF ORO relates to (1) its function as the only other component, besides the military, to man roadblocks; (2) its contribution — in terms of manpower and equipment — to the operation as a whole and (3) its synergistic role with the SSS and DIA, in intelligence and information sharing (in the JIPOE). With regards to point (1), the JTF ORO police component commander notes that the police is typically jointly deployed with soldiers in guard locations (such as roadblocks). With regards to point (2), on troops' contribution, the PCC observes,

> …Apart from the Nigerian army, the police is the second largest troop contributor to JTF. We have *X*[98] men. Apart from the army, no other service has that strength (Adeoye, 2012).

With regards to point (3), on the synergy of intelligence and info sharing, he notes,

> …In terms of intelligence, we collaborate. We have a tracking centre in Abuja. When we get intelligence from there, we share — we distribute. So there's a synergy between SSS [DSS], us [NPF], the military intelligence [G2 and DIA], and others. That is why I say that the police are a critical component of the JTF (Adeoye, 2012).

Such synergistic coordination does not come seamlessly however, as the PCC himself admits. There are challenges involved with these forms of closely coordinated JE between two organizations with different cultures and typical functions that invariably have a small area of intersection. To exacerbate the gaps between military-police coordination within counter-insurgency, this area of intersection expands as the military takes the lead even as the police deemphasizes some old functions and is tasked with new ones. This functional intersection applies as much to social operations, as it does to

[98] Undisclosed within this project at author's discretion.

offensive, defensive and jointly planned operations that fall into the category of "other". Within the NMOE, measures have been on-going that may as an aggregate, help address scenarios where differences in organizational culture may insinuate poor coordination at the higher tactical and operational levels of war, as Clayton Newell notes (1991).

As an example of such measures, there is the annual Staff Course training for middle level officers, as well as simulated training on Internal Security Operations (ISOs) at the AFCSC, Jaji. Nor are these the only joint training initiatives being run today in the learning environment. Wg Cdr Kotun, himself a Directing Staff (DS) at the AFCSC noted in-interview the relevance of Exercise Haske Biyu, a CT-COIN exercise at the AFCSC that involves "all other security agencies from the civil defence up to the police […] immigration… the SSS, the NIA, the Prisons [service]". However Kotun notes that exercises that Haske Biyu,

> Can be done better and on a larger scale. For instance Ex Haske Biyu is done once a year in the staff College; for the benefit of everybody [the other security agencies] and also those students that are on staff course that year. But it can be done maybe on a quarterly basis; for creating scenarios, and [for] wargaming (Ifezue & Kotun, 2012).

Moreover, experiential learning from joint operations like JTF ORO hold potential for regular military instruction and classroom-based learning (such as the AFCSC Land Power Symposium), but also for development of more practical and inclusive training initiatives (such as Ex Haske Biyu) that expose the tri-services to the operational procedures of the police, and vice versa.

With regards to Ex Haske Biyu for instance, experiential learning from police-military relations in JTF ORO appears a possible fit within the narrative of its scenario planning against fictional perpetrator groups. With its wargaming in a (fictional) joint military, security and interagency OE, Ex Haske Biyu 2011 already was a robust (Nigerian Army, 2011c) and thoughtfully planned (Nigerian Army, 2011d)

operational training exercise. In particular, for personnel at SO2 (OF-3) and equivalent rank on Senior Staff Course, as well as other security agency participants, Ex Haske Biyu provided a hands-on opportunity for JCP; discussed later in this chapter. However, as Wg Cmdr Kotun notes, exercises like Haske Biyu could play an even bigger role in facilitating joint task forcing.

Whereas training and joint exercises present an avenue for development of the police COIN function, a more pressing need for the police component of JTF ORO, at the lower and upper tactical levels, was that of the number of combat ready police units available for deployment. This chapter earlier discusses population-to-troop ratio in COIN and considered both sides of the argument of whether a troops "surge", for the counter-insurgent, could break a COIN stalemate. For the JTF ORO PCC, the answer to the question would be an emphatic yes, as he made a number of observations on how challenged his component had been prior to the visit of the Inspector General of Police, IG Abubakar, who visited JTF ORO HQ with the CDS and promised an injection of police troops by the fall of 2012. By late 2012, 11 units of 63 personnel each were deployed to Borno and assigned to the PCC; for a total of almost 700 troops (Adeoye, 2012). CSP Adeoye was of the view that this additional troop surge improved his ability to coordinate rear area COIN activity,

> Before the deployment, we were having [BHT] attacks on police stations at the rate of two per week; two per week. And when I say attack, I'm talking of serious attacks: use of rocket launchers, throwing of IEDs; camouflaging with cattle rearers and then opening fire with machine guns; burning of [police] station; looting pf police armouries; killing of some policemen — that is the nature of attacks.
>
> We were having it at two per week!
>
> After that deployment two weeks ago, no attack has succeeded — in fact we've only recorded one attack and it was foiled (Adeoye, 2012).

The JTF ORO PCC also discussed impact this manpower challenge had not just on JTF ORO but, by extension, on the "civilian populace" his component was tasked with protecting and policing (Adeoye, 2012). Within a broader context of why the manpower challenge was his foremost concern, The PCC observed the challenge meant the police more broadly — and the JTF police function specifically — were unable to perform primary objectives of policing and community protection (Adeoye, 2012). Additionally, that the BHTs were able to attack police guard locations and installations so frequently, additionally terrorized the larger community. CSP Adeoye summarized this last point,

> If the civilian populace is attacked, those victims suffer trauma. When a police station is attacked, the whole communities around suffers trauma. Because it [the communities' viewpoint] is like, "if those who are to protect us are being attacked — if they can't even defend themselves — then we are doomed" (Adeoye, 2012).

CSP Adeoye pointed to manpower shortages, poor (non-specific COIN) training and inadequate equipment for some of his available units, as his primary challenge as PCC. He gave another example to further stress how much of a challenge this was, and to highlight how much of a difference even a few additional men per location could make. An excerpt of this part of the interview is below,

> PCC: I am still talking on how injection of additional troops could help. So, when these additional policemen[99] were deployed all over the state, attacks on [Police] stations dropped almost to zero. Now, in Maiduguri, I have had attacks on a particular location, in two weeks. It is a cluster of masts — you must have heard of how they [Boko Haram] tried to destroy all the masts, to prevent security agencies from communicating freely. This particular mast [cluster] is not far from this area in Jeskwan. The first time the [insurgents] attacked that place, I had only two soldiers there; due to this shortage of manpower I'm talking about. And these people [Boko Haram] came — they were six. All of them firing AK-47 rifles. It would have been

[99] As discussed above: The 11 units of 63 police personnel each, deployed to Borno.

easy for them to overrun that location, killed the soldiers, or severely injure them, carry their arms away, and burn the masts. Imagine what dent that will make on the image of the joint task force. But because of training, because of them being battle-tested, these two men [soldiers] — they stood their ground, took proper cover, and engaged them [the insurgents].

At the end of the day, they [the JTF soldiers] fatally hit one of them [the insurgents] — and that is what broke up the attack. They [the insurgents] were now more concerned about rescuing the one that was one that wounded, and they fled. A bullet hit one of our soldiers in the buttocks. The other mobile policeman, who took cover behind a wall fence, was not injured and his own shot [return fire] was actually what prevented them [the insurgents] from taking the [wounded] soldier's weapon. Now, they [JTF ORO operatives] were two.

After evacuating the soldier to the hospital — I took him to the hospital myself — we now reinforced that location which how many men? One person. You get what I'm trying to say? [Regarding the shortage of manpower in JTF ORO and the strain this puts on commanders]. So now they are three [soldiers stationed there].

Today, before I came here, the place came under attack again; but now, because there are three [JTF ORO operatives], they were able to repel the attack without suffering casualties. But a bullet [from the insurgents] hit the butt of the rifle of one of the soldiers, and shattered it — it is a wooden butt — shattered it; but the soldier was not injured.

Now, I want you to imagine a scenario if they were six [soldiers] that location. That in itself is deterrence!

Researcher: in this scenario, the insurgents may not even bother [to attack that installation]

> PCC: Thank you! So you see, if I have enough forces, we will make sure each card location is adequately manned — and that will deter attacks. And they cannot attack anywhere in the town [due to how heavily reinforced it is with the bulk of the JTF force]. The insurgency is dying […] If we can have one, two, three months here — no attack, even the federal government will begin to relax. They will begin to review whether there is still [a] need for the JTF to remain on ground (Adeoye, 2012).

Finally the PCC noted that whereas existing equipment enables the police conduct its duties, "we can always do with better situations […] better facilities; better funding; we can always do with that — it will help" (Adeoye, 2012).

An indication of this analysis of the police function's challenges, in JTF ORO, point to capacity. This is a fairly common challenge faced by police personnel in COIN however (Hills, 2012), not peculiar to the NMOE *per se*. What is perhaps further noteworthy is the effect a police troop surge had on coordination of JTF ORO's rear area defence, as the PCC demonstrates. It perhaps could be argued that deploying more troops, merely for facilitating an existing offensive action set, may not have the same effect as deploying more troops to support taskforce components in multiple combat and non-combat LOOs. Put another way, a troop surge in itself— particularly if insurgency is viewed primarily as light infantry warfighting — may not yield the same results as a troop surge used across the range of operations, via component forces.

5-4.4. Intelligence in COIN operations: JTF ORO Case

Within JTF ORO, the DIA function constituted the military intelligence component. The JTF ORO, an Army Colonel, doubled as Head of JIC at Giwa Barracks. The DIA component, via the intelligence officer and G2 staff, coordinated military intelligence gathering and information sharing. This sharing was particularly relevant to the NIS, NCS, NPF and DSS who, together with the DIA, contributed to

the JIPOE methodology. The NPF, DIA and DSS further constituted a Central Intelligence Committee (CIC)[100]. Representatives from every component constituted the Joint Intelligence Team (JIT).

Like the DIA, both the NCS and NIS, within the COIN component force structure, played a largely intelligence role rather than a combat function[101]. The NIS (immigration) function was closer aligned to information provision regarding ingress and egress of suspected BHTs cross-border. Conduction of armed patrols; manning of guarded border outposts; knowledge of border paths[102]; arrest or denial of suspected illegal immigrants; and attempts to cover as much of the 800km border stretches as possible, are enduring duties of the immigration service. Contribution specific to JTF ORO however constitutes mainly information provision based on the activity action set highlighted above.

The NCS (customs) function was more aligned with information collection and sharing related to the ingress of IED material, SALWs and ordnance. Similar to the NIS, the Customs Service contribution to the counter-insurgency operation was a sub-set of its overall state duties. The function of the NIS within the counter-insurgency will be discussed a little later in the chapter.

This section of the chapter, as well as the next, will evaluate field data related to both NIS and NCS, within a broader intelligence-based analysis that includes contribution from the other components. Put another way, this section's analysis will focus on intelligence within the OE; with particular emphasis on the (1) cross-border acquisition of ordnance by Boko Haram; (2) how this contributed to NCS, SSS, DIA and NPF components' threat assessment in the JIPOE; and (3) what intelligence operatives in JTF ORO made of this aspect of the counter-insurgency.

[100] Referred to as the Joint Intelligence Committee. However the acronym "CIC" is used here to differentiate JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee) from JIC (Joint Interrogation Center) both within JTF ORO.

[101] See the JTF ORO component contributions in Figure 5-3.

[102] Over 250 such paths exist, by conservative estimates according to Lt. Col Sagir Musa.

Whereas the idea of a connection between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda (AQ) has been floated within the literature, in the media and in security circles for years now, little research substance has come of this supposed affiliation. There may well be a transnational aspect to Boko Haram's jihad: fieldwork with the ONSA, and in particular an interview, on the record, with the National Coordinator for CT, revealed that at the time of Osama bin Laden's killing, US DEVGRU (SEAL) Team 6 recovered caches of documents at the Abbottabad compound where Osama bin Laden (OBL) was killed. Amongst these documents, when they later were analysed, was direct correspondence between Boko Haram and OBL. The US security agencies would pass on this intelligence to Nigerian security (Bello, 2012).

On the surface, this revelation may appear significant. From a research perspective, it certainly is original as this is the first time the information is being shared with the public domain. However, external linkages with AQ may be of less import, from an operational perspective — though not an ideological one *per se* — than some may assume, to Boko Haram's emergence as a threat form. Rather, field findings, as will be discussed below, indicate Boko Haram's transnational linkages to AQ — assuming these linkages are strong at all — have been marginal to the group's calculus of war, comparative to geographically closer cross-border ties within the Chad Basin and to regional networks in the Sahel and Maghreb.

The assertion here is not that Boko Haram commands a strong following in these areas; nor is it that Boko Haram wields anything other than extremely limited influence beyond northeastern Nigeria, even considering cross-border ethnic Kanuri ties with some of the Chad Basin countries. If anything, some of the networking in question is likely based on trade affiliations with weapons dealers. Ideological or political alignment is unlikely to be preponderant in these cross-border and sub-regional relations between Boko Haram and its "affiliates".

However, as operational contributors to the JIPOE observed during this study, such connections have been critical enough to lend Boko Haram a tactical edge. The tactical advantage lent by these cross-border and sub-regional interactions in turn have influenced a change in the insurgent's operational calculations; first between 2010 when Boko Haram re-emerged and January 2013 when this project's field study was complete; and then between the end of JTF ORO combat operations in August 2013 and February 2015 when Boko Haram held the most territory it had in northeastern Nigeria, since it began its insurgency.

Put simply therefore, Boko Haram did not emerge as the threat it is today because it is an AQ affiliate. Based on analysis which would follow shortly or that has been conducted in the preceding chapters, this thesis contends that Boko Haram's operational scope was extended in part for four largely unexplored reasons within the literature. First, because Boko Haram recognized, and was able to exploit, a regional security vacuum in the Libya conflict. The ordnance obtained here, and its impact on the insurgency, will be discussed shortly. Second, because the group leveraged cross-border and sub-regional networks in its militarization. Transportation of SALWs and ordnance; refuge across the border during tactical retreats; limited cross-border ethnic links which lent a level of sympathy; recruitment and more likely conscription of young men, and often boys, as "mujahideen" from cross-border communities, are all means by which this exploitation occurred. Third, the group was able to change its doctrine: from one of war avoidance to one of engagement on a scale the Nigerian Army had not faced in any theatre after the country's own civil war. This third point is a direct outcome of the first two. The fourth point is largely related to the Nigerian military's willingness and capabilities or a lack thereof, to contain the insurgency before it escalated. This final point, as the "COIN-side analysis", has been discussed throughout much of the thesis but new light will be further shed in this area, over some of what remains of this chapter,

Coupled with the fact that the Nigerian military has left a lot of its equipment to become moribund — barely functional Kalashnikovs and FN-FALs constitute Army standard issue; poorly-maintained ZSU-23-4 *Shilka* tanks as main form of light armour[103]; T-55s and the Vickers Mk 3 as MBTs; Alpha Jets as the NAF backbone; Swedish Haubits FH77 (*bofors*) that are two or three generations obsolete as the main 155mm artillery gun for the NA — it should come as little surprise therefore that the tide of war, over the years, has taken its current direction. Indeed, as much of this thesis has discussed, regarding Nigerian military readiness, or lack thereof, for unconventional warfare, it was not just likely the Nigerian military eventually would meet an adversary with which it will struggle, it was a virtual inevitability.

Yet if the decay of Nigerian military equipment has been well documented by the IISS Military Balance over the years (IISS, 2012; IISS, 2013; IISS, 2014; IISS, 2015), the method by which Boko Haram has exploited its external networks and specifically, how the group acquired its military hardware and ordnance externally, has seen much less research study. The section that follows evaluates this latter phenomenon, based on an analysis of intelligence within the JIPOE and contributions from the relevant components of JTF ORO.

As JTF ORO's counter-insurgency wore on, the taskforce over the months came to identify weapons used by Boko Haram, which were not local to the NMOE. Specifically, the arms in question — General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMGs); Rocket-Propelled Grenade Launchers (RPGLs); assault rifles other than the ubiquitous AK-47; and more sophisticated Austrian Steyr Aug "Bullpup" rifles — are not standard issue to the police munitions stores, commands and roadblocks which Boko Haram attacks. This assertion is consistent with video evidence from the ONSA, which shows BHTs with a number of weapons not local to, and certainly not easily obtainable in, Nigeria. These include German

[103] Present at both 21 Bde and 5 Bde for instance

PSG1 Sniper Rifles and Austrian Steyr Aug 5.56mm Bullpup rifles[104]. The National Coordinator for CT also noted in-interview that the weapons in the video did not originate locally. Nor were they standard issue, even for local Special Forces. This is also consistent with police accounts to me, from Maiduguri (Adeoye, 2012).

Later on in the insurgency moreover, Boko Haram would in addition display protected mobility capabilities, with its use of both grip and vehicle-mounted anti-air (AA) guns. The insurgent's ability to acquire these capabilities effectively helped reduce the asymmetry of conflict and brought Boko Haram close to, equal with, or even beyond, the Nigerian military's deployed tactical assets within the engagement. Even airpower, where the Nigerian forces should have dominated, proved less effective as a result. This assertion will be validated in the COIN's airpower analysis that follows shortly.

As a consequence of Boko Haram's ability to deny the Nigerian military strategic victory, an important question some have asked is how the military have struggled against Boko Haram; and in particular, how the insurgents can move in columns across the arid terrain, capture towns, and defend strategic territory for months. Boko Haram, by the end of JTF ORO's COIN had amassed, or had begun to mass, capabilities that approximated those of entire Nigerian Army formations. By 2014, the group could successfully challenge, and defeat, battalion-sized units. By 2015, with its capture of Monguno barracks and elements of 5 Brigade, the indication was now that Boko Haram — as incredible as it may sound — may well have possessed the ability to engage Nigerian Army forces at brigade level. These capabilities however originated from somewhere and the Islamists' militarization, on this scale, arguably began during the stalemate with JTF ORO circa 2012. The taskforce's intelligence components, including the DSS, police and the DIA, as well as data from the ONSA, were primary field sources for the related evaluation conducted in the sections that follow.

[104] Series of videos shown to me at the ONSA by Maj. Gen. Bello.

Regarding the question around how the BHTs came by this ordnance, field findings indicate the insurgents acquired the tactical assets in the aftermath of the Civil War in Libya. Specifically, the JTF ORO PCC noted that police and intelligence agency investigations revealed that inscriptions on captured ordnance indicated the weapons' origin (Adeoye, 2012). This was an area I also discussed with a member of the UN Weapons Expert Panel in Libya, who confirmed the connection between the inscription on weapons (French or Arabic, with regards to trafficking in the Sahel region) and weapon origin. However the weapons panel expert also pointed out that serial numbers, which the JTF ORO intelligence operatives did not emphasise[105], arguably are a better approximation than language inscriptions, to determine origin of arms and ordnance (UN Expert Panel member, 2013). The PCC was also of the view that the BHTs weapons and ordnance came from Libya specifically, rather than from Mali, because bringing SALWs from Mali constitutes a lengthier journey (Adeoye, 2012).

Such a journey, the PCC observed, would necessarily be routed through the interior of northern Nigeria. This would have increased the chances of discovery by security forces. A trip through the interior would have been more logistically complex than a border route, moreover. Coming in to northeastern Nigeria from Libya by comparison, although further away in theory, constitutes a more direct route. The UN Weapons Expert Panel member also was in agreement on this last point; that whereas the route from Libya appeared lengthy, in practice a lot of these cross-border routes were poorly manned and porous to weapons and illegal persons movement (UN Expert Panel member, 2013). Hundreds of kilometres could, in practice, be traversed without security checks. The UN expert however was not convinced the weapons originated from Libya, not least because the expert could not

[105] It is a possibility that serial numbers, rather than purely inscriptions were used by intelligence operations in JTF ORO. However serial numbers were not mentioned during conversations. Moreover, the process of tracing the origin of a serial number of a specific weapon or batch of weapons is, as the UN expert advised, difficult.

access them to verify (UN Expert Panel member, 2013). By the expert's account, the Nigerian military had been reticent about official UN access to the TOO, moreover (UN Expert Panel member, 2013).[106]

The JTF ORO PCC however was categorical that significant amounts of weaponry acquired by Boko Haram originated externally; and that the ordnance in particular originated in Libya. The follow excerpts are taking from the interview with the PCC,

> PCC: Boko Haram does not do anything just to make a statement. Anything they do is well thought out, well planned, [and] designed to achieve a particular objective. I will explain what I mean by that. Those [police] divisions that they [Boko Haram] are attacking, what Boko Haram is trying to do is weaken government authority to create in Northern "Mali" in this part of the country. They are targeting that swath of land that borders Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Arms and ammunition they need from other countries, they buy; rocket launchers for instance.
>
> Boko Haram cannot get rocket launchers from the police armoury; they cannot get sophisticated machine guns from the police armoury. So they buy these things from Cameroon, from renegade troops in Chad, [from] elements of the Libyan forces. The presence of police stations, dotting all these areas, is an obstacle, which they [BHTs] use these weapons to address.
>
> Researcher: You just mentioned Libya; would you say that the revolution in Libya actually has an impact here?
>
> PCC: Seriously. Because, I will tell you, some rocket launchers we recovered in the past, have Arabic inscriptions. *Arabic inscriptions* [respondent's emphasis].

[106] This final point constituted the basis of our meeting and interaction

Researcher: But they [the weapons in question] could also belong to the Tuareg rebels; or could belong to the Chadians, or the Malians. How do we know, in particular, that they [captured SALWs] originated in Libya?

PCC: Okay. First, you see our neighbouring countries — Cameroon, Niger, Chad — ordinarily you would have the inscriptions [on weapons] in French. And Mali, the Touareg is that you are mentioning, are to the west of Chad. If they [Boko Haram] are coming from that axis, they will not enter through Maiduguri or northeastern Nigeria; they will enter through the North West: Sokoto, Katsina, Jigawa borders. And I tell you it is not easy for them to move with these things [SALWs] within Nigeria than across international borders. Or, if they are coming from Mali, they could cross Niger, cross Chad before they enter here [Borno].

Researcher: So, what you are saying is [that] there are too many borders in between [for Weapons to originate from Mali?

PCC: [Nods] So the way we see it is that, you will recall the other time also, when the Libyan dissidents who were fleeing from Tripoli and Benghazi, fleeing south — at a point we were even monitoring their movement. There was a time some of them were even arrested in Niger; that will show you the southward trend [migration of the ex-fighters in Libya]. And they were not moving empty-handed, *they were moving armed* [emphasis]. And along the line, in other to survive, they started selling these arms, to gunrunners. And there are always international arms merchants ready to profit from chaos — linking seller to buyers.

That is why we believe it is [influenced by the crisis in Libya]. And of course they are intelligence reports to this effect also; not just our own assumptions — they are intelligence reports of arms, being stolen from Libyan armouries, finding their way into our neighbouring countries, and we are being alerted to watch out for them!

> And that is what led to some of these interceptions [of foreign arms smuggled into Nigeria, ending up with Boko Haram]. Actually, what was foretold is what we got (Adeoye, 2012).

The above exchange between the PCC and I highlights the contribution of intelligence to the JIPOE. Cross-border weapons smuggling by BHTs was reaffirmed by both the ONSA (Abuja) and the DSS (Maiduguri). The JTF ORO PCC's assertion that Boko Haram acquired ordnance from Libya, rather than from Mali, also is supported by a report by US Representatives Patrick Meehan and Peter King, to the US Committee on Homeland Security, where they note,

> Besides *building*[107] sophisticated weaponry, it is now possible that Boko Haram has acquired, or will acquire, SA-7 and SA-24 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. Of 20,000 such weapons in Libya, only 5,000 of them had been secured through a $40 million U.S. program to buy up loose missiles during the fall of the Gadhafi regime. The *Washington Post*[108] reported in early 2012 that two former CIA officers have been raising this issue repeatedly with current law enforcement and intelligence community contacts. In an email, these officers explain, "The missiles and munitions that have been streaming out of Libya since the fall of 2011 have made their way to Agadez in Niger and points west...Boko Haram has taken possession of some of the refurbished missiles. They have brought Egyptian Army ordinance technicians to refurbish and test the SA-7B missiles pictured below...The source claims that some 800 missiles are available in the area" (Meehan & King, 2013).

Another report, this time from the New York Times, also reads,

> "A potent stash of Russian-made surface-to-air missiles is missing from a huge Tripoli weapons warehouse amid reports of weapons looting across war-torn Libya. They are Grinch

[107] Emphasis preserved from original.

[108] Ibid.

> SA-24 shoulder-launched missiles, also known as Igla-S missiles, the equivalent of U.S.-made Stinger missiles."
>
> "A CNN team and Human Rights Watch found dozens of empty crates marked with packing lists and inventory numbers that identified the items as Igla-S surface-to-air missiles." […] (Other empty crates that CNN mentioned had contained other types of munitions, including SA-7s, the earlier generation of shoulder-fired heat-seeking missile that verifiably was in Qaddafi's possession, and has vanished in untold numbers) (Chivers, 2012).

A final report, this time from David Fulgum and Robert Wall for Aviation Week, observes,

> Fears that some of the world's most sophisticated antiaircraft weapons that disappeared from government warehouses in Libya would end up in the hands of stateless insurgent are being realized (Fulghum & Wall, 2012).

Whereas the New York Times and Aviation Week reports do not make the linkage between the missing ordnance in Libya and Boko Haram, the section's earlier analysis indicates there is some evidence to indicate this linkage exists and that it existed since after the period circa the fall of the Libyan dictator; long before the Committee on Homeland Security report in 2013. The findings discussed here are consistent with the Homeland Security report on the Boko Haram insurgency, with one critical difference: the findings evaluated here constitute field-based primary research data from between December 2012 and January 2013. Whereas the Homeland security report speculates and can only present evidential data from a third party source. As a final point to highlight the cross-border threat posed by this weapons influx, Boko Haram shot down a NAF Alpha Jet that went missing 11 September 2014. The pilot, Wing Commander Hedima, who was captured and beheaded on video by the Islamist radicals, said in that video, "we were shot down and our aircraft crashed" (Associated Press, 2014).

It is likely, from the analysis here, that Boko Haram's military capabilities are sufficient to shoot down an Alpha Jet, if indeed the Islamists have possession of SA-24 "Grinch" surface-to-air missile systems[109]. The NAF uses the older version Alpha Jet E. This Alpha Jet variant is not optimized for air-to-air engagements; rather it is optimized for ground attacks. The ideal flight ceiling for this purpose would be between 2,000 to 8,000 feet. It is widely known that increased flight above that altitude — indeed, even medium altitude flight — becomes proportional to drastic reduction in bombing accuracy; this was the case for instance during NATO's bombing campaign against Milosevic in 1999, for instance (Posen B. , 2000).

The SA-24 surface-to-air missile system, as a counter to these aircraft, has a flight ceiling of 11,000 feet and travels at Mach 2.3 (2.3x speed of sound). The Alpha Jet E's maximum speed, on the other hand, is about Mach 0.8, or less. This means, theoretically at least, the SA-24 payload could travel three times the speed of the Alpha Jet E; but has homing properties and is within the same effective (low altitude) range.

Put simply therefore, if the BHTs do indeed have these surface-to-air missile systems, in SA-7s and SA-24s in particular, this would support Wing Commander Hedima's final statements that his Alpha Jet was shot down by the insurgents. The theory makes it possible. The evidence indicates as much and the circumstances appear to have presented such an opportunity. The analysis here therefore indicates this is entire scenario is credible and that the missile systems in possession of Boko Haram are advanced enough to be the same systems that went missing in Libya; some of which, going by JTF ORO intelligence, was smuggled southward through the Sahel and into Nigerian borders.[110]

[109] It is important to stress that Boko Haram has not displayed MANPAD (man-portable air-defence system) missile systems capabilities. SA-24 surface-to-air systems being discussed here refer to the vehicle-mounted versions, or grip-stock variants.

[110]

A final point on the role of intelligence operations in COIN relates to information sharing on movement of illegal material, rather than weapons *per se*, smuggled in by the insurgents. Regarding confiscated suspected BHTs IED material for instance, one operative pointed out,

> Regularly, trailers of fertiliser, we intercept them, and impound them at the checkpoint entering Maiduguri; until we are able to determine the destination and we are able to convince ourselves that it is for lawful purposes. Until then, they are not allowed in. And that is even fertiliser, not to talk of ammonium nitrate, and gunpowder, and stuff; which are confiscated on sight (Adeoye, 2012).

Such denial of access, highlighted above, is for the most part only possible due to good intelligence; not unless fortuitous interceptions become the main plank of a denial strategy. This, for obvious reasons, should come ill advised and, especially in the case of the Boko Haram insurgency where contested areas are vast and poorly manned, fortuitous encounters may not always favour the counter-insurgent. This challenge of border security and its impact on intelligence and indeed on the spectrum of operations in the Nigerian military's COIN against Boko Haram, is important enough to warrant further evaluation.

The scale of border areas in northeastern Nigeria — over 800km of land border — and the available commensurate patrol capabilities, indicate a problem for the government, which JTF ORO could not address. Field findings indicate this border challenge simultaneously handicaps the NCS and NIS even as it makes it easier for BHTs to ingress and egress Nigerian territory. One report from JTF ORO HQ highlights this challenge for both customs and immigrations security agencies,

> The porous nature of the Nigerian border in the northeastern part of the country allows for influx of illegal arms and immigrants. Though deployments of personnel of NIS and NCS

> have helped to reduce the influx of immigrants in particular, porous routes still exist and could be used to move arms/equipment into the country (JTF ORO HQ, 2012).

JTF Spokesman, Col Sagir Musa further captures the severity of this challenge,

> From conservative estimate by locals, there are well over 250 footpaths from Damaturu/Maiduguri axis that link or lead direct to Cameroon, Chad or Niger. These paths are mostly unknown by security agencies, are unmanned, unprotected and thus serve as leaky routes for arms and ammunitions trafficking in to Nigeria (Musa, 2012).

Fieldwork with the ONSA likewise pointed to the cross-border challenge, as being a "puzzle" unsolvable at the task force level; that the government — not just the military and security agencies, of which JTF ORO is but a sub-set — would need to be involved. The puzzle is one that requires solving if the insurgent was to be enduringly denied cross-border mobility. The BHTs cross-border movement, I was advised, is related to the insurgent's "strong presence, membership, sympathizers and sanctuaries across our [Nigerian] border in Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroon" (ONSA, 2012).

Field-based findings in this general area lead to two deductions. The first is that the challenge of porous border expanses is perhaps the single largest strategic challenge faced by JTF ORO as a whole, and by the NCS and NIS security agency components in particular. The second, which would be discussed in more detail later in the chapter, is that the border challenge is not limited to ground components alone. The NAF component likewise struggles in its task to gather actionable intelligence for the COIN. Air Cdre Pawa, the ACC and the CO 79 Group, for instance observed that his air assets were not enough, and were in no condition, to conduct the type and scale of border reconnaissance operations required (Pawa, 2012). Moreover, whereas air reconnaissance duties specific to the border areas were more within the remit of National Air Defence Corps (NADC) than of 79 Group *per se*,

there was no NADC component in JTF ORO. Furthermore I was made to understand that such recce patrols by the NADC, unrelated to requisitioning by JTF ORO, in practice were almost non-existent.

To summarize this section, it could be said that the picture painted, of how border-related challenges stifle the intelligence function, appears grim. Still, there have been some tactical victories for the NCS and NIS in their intelligence function. Maj. Gen S-Y Bello for instance notes that a number of suspected BHTs and their affiliates had been arrested moving cross-border. Money, correspondence letters and, crucially, caches of SALWs, also have been intercepted over time; based on intelligence tip-offs. Furthermore, the MN-JTF, discussed earlier, has within its AoR border areas like Baga (Borno) and Geidam (Yobe). Such areas ordinarily were outside JTF ORO's own AoR. The presence of MN-JTF in that axis therefore likely helped reduce the geographical stretches the insurgent could exploit in the TOO. The cross-border threat however remains, and has been far from solved in on-going counter-insurgency efforts.

5-4.5. DSS Component in JTF ORO.

Within JTF ORO, the DSS (SSS) was tasked with obtaining local (domestic) intelligence specific to Boko Haram, which other security and intelligent components, the Army's G2 branch for instance, may not be expected to obtain (Ahmed, 2012). Put another way, the DSS's function in the COIN was the gathering and sharing of domestic information that would simultaneously degrade the insurgent's operations, whilst strengthening JTF ORO intelligence-driven activity (Ahmed, 2012). The DSS therefore does not play an isolated role; with its core function being domestic intelligence collection, the agency functions most effectively in its contribution to JIPOE methodology.

More specifically, field findings reveal the DSS's contribution to the JIPOE is as follows. (1) Surveillance and monitoring of suspected Boko Haram persons and activity. (2) Procurement and sharing of actionable intelligence on BHTs. (3) JE with the DIA and other security and intelligence

agencies within JTF ORO's operational category of "other" (see Table 5-1). (4) Threat estimates within the JIPOE. (5) Routine intelligence. 6) Participation within JIC briefings. (7) Participation in Psychological Operations (Psy Ops) to manage public perceptions and expectations of JTF ORO — media sensitization is also a related objective here; this is one of the areas where the DSS chooses to be visible in public. (8) Field-informed contributions to de-radicalization counter balances. These countermeasures fall under the faith based Threat Department, within the Directorate of Operations in National HQ (DSS, 2011).

The DSS also monitors displaced Boko Haram members who may have fled following the killing or capture of remaining cell members. Like the NA and NPF components, the SSS may also assist with protective security duties (rather than escort duties *per se*) for VIPs. The SSS component of JTF ORO also arguably has the longest experience of tracking the evolution and activities of the Boko Haram. This was evident in the knowledge of its operatives I interviewed in Maiduguri. Operatives involved in JIPOE contribution appeared to have a longer memory, and deeper understanding of the workings of Boko Haram. The DSS Director, Borno was one of one most important primary sources for the fieldwork of this project (Ahmed, 2012). The director is the DSS component head within JTF ORO and is the most senior DSS operative in Borno state. The director, as I observed, also had a close working relationship with the JTF ORO Intelligence Officer.

To summarize, this section on the DSS section is kept brief because input from this area of the COIN has underpinned virtually the entire analysis conducted over the course of this chapter.

5-4.6. NAF Function in COIN Operations: The Capabilities Debate Around the Air Force

Established 1964, the NAF is the service branch of the AFN responsible for "safeguarding the nation's airspace and other responsibilities as prescribed in the NAF Act" (Global Security). As the JTF ORO ACC observed in-interview, the NAF does not have its own promulgated COIN doctrine, and within

JTF ORO used the Army's own doctrine as adopted by the JTFC (Pawa, 2012). Outside its COIN function the NAF uses the so-called "one doctrine", the MAW doctrine adopted by the tri-services and evaluated in the previous chapter (Nigerian Army, 2009a). However NAF does have its own CONOPS, consistent with its function in war and in OOTW,

> The first constituent part of the NAF concept of operation is the Active Defence component. It is anchored on the maintenance of a credible defensive posture. This is derived from the national foreign policy objective that Nigeria has no territorial expansionist ambition, but would ensure that her territorial integrity is protected and not violated. It follows therefore that the NAF must be strategically defensive. This stance should act as deterrence to a potential enemy. However, should deterrence fail, the enemy should be subdued by the employment of air power. To accomplish this, the NAF must carry the war to the enemy, hence the forward engagement component.
>
> Forward Engagement is the other component, which implies the maintenance of an offensive stance. The significance is that the NAF must have the capability to seize the initiative from the enemy. This implies taking the war to the enemy's territory and would entail force projection. Basically, this would involve mobility, which does not only connote the movement of men and materials but also the ability to apply offensive force externally (Global Security).

The NAF's CONOPS, outlined above is aligned with its posture; both within Nigerian military COIN operations and within manoeuvre warfare doctrine. Air Force operations are never by themselves independent but are generally part of a combined (or joint, in the case of JTF ORO) arms approach. Within this action set, air assets are requisitioned either for a specific category of operations, as will shortly be discussed; or for support missions for the sister services. The main examples of these support missions, relevant to this section's evaluation of the NAF's contribution to COIN operationalization in Nigeria, are (1) close air support and (2) air interdiction.

Close air support operations constitute the secondary offensive, albeit seldom used, support function of the NAF component of JTF ORO in its COIN. Close air support missions are defined within the NAF's CONOPS as operations,

> Conducted on request by the army or naval commanders within their theatre of operation. Close air support operations are aerial attacks against targets, which are so close to friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of own surface forces is necessary […] The Alpha Jet and the Mi-24 and Mi-35 assault helicopter gunships can fulfil this role (Nigerian Air Force, p. 18).

Within Operation Zaman Lafiya[111] however, 7 Div's COIN circa 2013, this air power component would increasingly see a lot more lot more use vis-à-vis the period of activity of JTF ORO. This is insofar as, was discussed earlier, the insurgency by this later period had shifted phase. Asymmetry within the engagement was now much reduced. Furthermore the engagement distance between friendly ground forces and BHT formations was physically minimal on several occasions; in addition to enemy forces being substantial.

The NAF's CONOPs, and its practical contribution within the military's COIN offensive action set — in close air support situations — is consistent with its designation as a tactical air force. The NAF defines itself, within this context, as,

> …[An] Air force primarily designed to conduct operations within a theatre of war in support of surface forces. It is therefore, limited in reach and capability". It is for this reason that the NAF adopts the concept of operation of "ACTIVE DEFENCE, FORWARD

[111] Local Hausa dialect for "restore order".

> ENGAGEMENT[112]", which in broad terms means, "strategically defensive, but tactically offensive" (Nigerian Air Force, p. 17).

Close air support operations are not the only air power component within the NAFs tactical offense function, however. A primary offensive function for the NAF component of JTF ORO, though again one that seldom saw use vis-à-vis the combined arms use of the NAF in Operation Zaman Lafiya, is the air interdiction component. The Nigerian Air Force defines the air interdiction component of its air power as,

> Those operations aimed at destroying or neutralizing the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces. Such operations are carried out at such a distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of specific actions with own forces is not required. In this context, the enemy's military potential includes those forces not engaged in close combat; his supplies and means by which the supplies are moved forward such as assembly areas, roads, railways, bridges, convoys and storage areas. The Alpha Jet is used for this purpose in a secondary role (Nigerian Air Force, p. 19).

With regards the specific contribution of the NAF to JTF ORO's counter-insurgency, the NAF component was part of a joint arms approach; rather than a combined one. This meant the Air Component Commander, although an NAF commodore, reported directly to the JTFC at JTF ORO HQ in Maiduguri; rather than to Air Force HQ, Abuja.

Under command of the ACC, Air Commodore I. M. Pawa, was 79 Composite Group. The unit was formerly a FOB before its re-designation to group status (Pawa, 2012). Rather than having operations that fall into the categories in Table 5-1 like the other components, the NAF function has its own set of unique operations. Specifically, as the ACC noted in-interview, the NAF service was co-opted into

[112] Emphasis from original

JTF ORO to facilitate six specific operational categories. The first two of these functions, central to the NAF's function in the COIN, are recce and air surveillance — both of which "go together" as part of a basic form of ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) (Pawa, 2012).

As ISR activity constitutes the main plank of 79's contribution JTF ORO, it has been categorized as a separate operational class. Within these ISR operations, intelligence from recce flights is relayed back to the JIT, which then decides whether additional ground or air recce is required, or whether existing intelligence is sufficient for a tactical offensive (Pawa, 2012). In its ideal form however, the ISR function is meant to scout terrain that is (1) too difficult (geographically) for a ground offensive or reconnaissance operation, or (2) in an area too far away from existing Army installations, for a ground offensive to be an efficient tactical option. Air recce is one of the main planks of the NAF's broader tactical support role. The Air force defines its role within this context as the conduct of "tactical reconnaissance, which would provide information about military and other targets within defined areas of operation. The platforms used include the Alpha Jet and the ATR 42 Maritime Patrol Aircraft" (Nigerian Air Force, p. 22).

79's aerial reconnaissance (AR) is also a key support capability for the NA's COIN activity. This is insofar as AR goes beyond just mapping terrain and possible structures. It could also be used to determine whether enemy forces are mobile or settled, or what the enemy numbers estimates are and whether they are in close proximity to the border, for instance. BHT cross-border activity however falls within the remit of the National Air Defence Corps (NADC); thus, in such cases, ground operations may be unable to leverage air power; since the COIN operation has no NADC component. Nonetheless, air combat and non-combat options are required in the interior. Moreover, in some of such operations, planning for ground-based combat offensives would typically benefit from prior recce and intelligence briefing, by 79. On this final point, the ACC was categorical (Pawa, 2012).

The other four operations, for which 79 air assets were deployed within the counter-insurgency campaign, were as follows. (1) “Search and Rescue”. (2) Close Air Support operations; these operations, as put by the ACC, occur “where kinetic action becomes necessary”. (3) Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC); which is the efficient and emergency removal of personnel from the battlefield. Ad-hoc treatment, administered by trained medical personnel, is typically issued onsite (where possible) and en route from the battlefield, while airborne, in all cases. (4) Light Liaison Duties — an example was given of such duties when “the CDS [Chief of Defence Staff] came, with the IG [Inspector General of police] the following day; we [NAF component] flew him to Damaturu [the Yobe state capital] and back” (Pawa, 2012). (5) Air Troop Movement (ATM); this refers to the insertion and extraction of troops within the theatre of operations — particularly “in places that are not not motorable” (Pawa, 2012). ATM differs from medical evac (evacuation), which the OC 79 notes is “primarily [used] to evacuate injured personnel” (Pawa, 2012).

Impeding the functions highlighted above however was a gamut of capacity-related challenges. First, 79 was running at a fraction of its operational capacity. Even where air sorties were successful, the situations under which they were conducted often were far from ideal. Perhaps the main capabilities challenge, revealed by field findings, was in the area of logistics; this refers largely to the state of the equipment itself, but also in its holding and maintenance. For instance, field findings from 2012 revealed that, as an NAF group, 79 was meant to have six Agusta aircraft but only had one; within its COIN function (Pawa, 2012). Yet, as inadequate as NAF’s assets were in 2012, not much had been done to improve the unit’s assets. This is despite the CO putting in relevant requests and whereas 79 Group constituting a critical component to the counter-insurgency campaign in Borno (Pawa, 2012). Indeed, findings from 2012 remain to a large extent consistent with late 2014 operational estimates of NAF’s COIN capabilities,

> The NAF currently fields a very limited offensive counterinsurgency (COIN) capability in the guise of 11 Chinese-built CAC F-7 fighters; as well as 21 Aero L-39ZA Albatros, 12 Alenia MB-339, and 12 Dassault/Dornier Alpha Jet trainer and light strike platforms. It also fields seven Mil Mi-24 'Hind' assault helicopters. With the exception of the F-7s, which were acquired in 2010, the NAF's fixed-wing combat fleet dates back to the early 1980s and needs replacing (Jennings, 2014).

A senior Nigerian military officer I spoke to, summed the NAF situation in a statement, "the Nigerian Air Force needs to decide what kind of air force it wants to be".[113]

There is a caveat to the capabilities challenge, as it existed in 2012 however. This is insofar as the NAF has supposedly acquired several new craft since. Specifically, the NAF is said to now operate, "both dedicated strike and surveillance types – the Chengdu F-7Ni and ATR 42, respectively – but believes that a low-cost aircraft with a dual capability would enable quicker and more precise counter-insurgency operations" (Stevenson, 2014).

The NAF's recent announcements of "new" equipment procurement only followed a shift to suppliers such as the Czech Republic (Czech News Agency, 2015) and Russia (This Day, 2015), from traditional suppliers such as the US who some sources note have been reticent regarding recent requests to supply military hardware (This Day, 2015; Stevenson, 2014). There is a sense therefore — if statements from senior NAF officials and officers are to be believed — that the NAF's COIN function may have improved, vis-à-vis the same function in 2012. One senior NAF official for instance pointed out,

[113] Conversation with senior Nigerian military officer who preferred to remain anonymous.

> We [now] have the MI35 attack helicopters from Russia and associated weapons and accessories, Agusta 109 support helicopters, Super PUMA helicopters from France, F17 Bombers with precision guided munitions, and the ever present Alpha Jet bombers […]
>
> We also have specialised night helicopter operations that seriously degraded Boko Haram leadership, round the clock aerial surveillance by strategic surveillance platforms, which provides round the clock intelligence to ground troops before, during and after operations.
>
> This is also followed up with specialized ground to air communications between surveillance platforms, aerial attack platforms and ground troops (This Day, 2015).

How much of such assertions is actually true, may be difficult to verify. However there is perhaps some indication the Air force is indeed rethinking the role of air power, and thus its function, in Nigerian military COIN. Air Vice Marshall (AVM) R.A. Ojuawo, NAF Director of Operations, for instance observed at the International Fighter conference in London on 18 November 2014,

> In my country, we want and need this [Textron AirLand Scorpion strike and surveillance aircraft] […] We want this equipment, but are they [US] going to give it to us?[114] […] It is going to take the international community to fight insurgency, and the only way to do that is to give [countries] the technology that they need.
>
> The nature of warfare has changed…but air power remains important against irregular warfare, and the importance of air power in the contemporary environment is increasing," he adds. "We as a nation and as an air force are having a rethink (Stevenson, 2014).

[114] As Flight Global's Beth Stevenson notes, the NAF's Director of Operations concerns were as a result of a previously rejected request, to Israel, for Bell Helicopters AH-1 Cobra rotorcraft. The US-made AH-1s became excess defence articles of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) in 2013, and were to be sold to Nigeria. The US blocked that sale.

The Chief of Air Staff (CAS), Air Marshal (Air Mshl) Adesola Amosun, also noted during 50-year jubilee (1964 to 2014) activities for the NAF, "the federal government approved the acquisition of new fighter aircraft and helicopters for the Nigerian airforce […] to enable the Nigerian Air Force perform its role" (AIT News, 2014). Considering the CAS was speaking in April 2014, his statement is consistent with another report from August 2014, which noted that the NAF budget office had a 2014 capital budget allocation for six Mi-35M helicopters (Defence Web, 2014).

Notwithstanding the NAF's official position above, criticism has been directed at it for diverting allocated funds, from its combat function. First, it was reported the NAF's acquisition of two Agusta Westland AW101 helicopters (NAF 280 and 281) (African Aerospace, 2014) were for VIP transport duties, as part of its 101 Presidential Air Fleet in Abuja (African Aerospace, 2014). The AW101 acquired were the VVIP (Very Very Important Person) variant of the AW101 (Mk 641) (African Aerospace, 2014); one of Agusta's most luxurious offerings (YouTube, 2013), which goes for around $50m (£40m) (Nelson, Squires, & Moore, 2013). Putting this NAF expenditure into context, the Nigerian Army's capital budget for 2013 was about $24m, according to Maj. Gen A. Muraina, the Army's Chief of Budget and Accounts (The Sun, 2014). As put by Army finance chief,

> …The army budget for this year is just N4.8billion [about $24m]. Now, to provide only one item for the troops engaged in the operation in the North-East. Assuming we committed 20,000 troops, the jacket and the helmet is in the average of about $1,000, if you change that to naira, it is about N150,000, if you now have about 20,000 troops, this means, they are going to spend about $20million and that is about N3billion naira. N3billion as a percentage of N4.8billion which is the capital budget for this year is more than 50 percent and that is just one item, we are not talking about uniforms, we are not talking about boots, we are not talking about structure where they will stay, we are not talking about training, because training is key to enhancing the capability of the force (The Sun, 2014).

If the budget and accounts chief's calculations are accurate, need for an evaluation of capabilities, as a function of budget allocation for the tri-services, becomes all the more important to the conversation on COIN operations in Nigeria. The assertion here is not that military spending is the preponderant reason militaries fail or succeed in operationalizing COIN. Militaries however require spending to prosecute effective campaigns. Within this context, effectiveness of an airpower campaign in COIN can be greatly affected by type and maintenance of available craft for its specific operational categories. My interactions with 79 Group, Maiduguri, indicated as much. A second point moreover, specific to this particular scenario being analysed, is the issue of misprioritization of military budget allocation in Nigeria.

With not just the Air force, but also the Army struggling for budget allocation, the choice of combined (V)VIP Air force assets costing up to $100m, for the presidency, is a baffling investment choice. This is more so the case for an air force supposed to be modernizing, and in the middle of a COIN; when COIN-specific assets including drones, more advanced combat platforms, and even personnel welfare, training and equipment, should perhaps be the focus. Even more baffling is that that these acquisitions came at a time when the Air force's craft are in poor shape, as field findings indicate.

In August 2014, just a month after the acquisitions, the Air Force lost a pilot and an Air Force Colonel, Wg. Cdr Hedima, and an Alpha Jet, to Boko Haram; with the craft shot down the by insurgents (Associated Press, 2014). As was analysed earlier in the chapter, the Alpha Jet E constitutes a fairly easy target within an art of war as advanced as the surface-to-air. Moribund assets such as the NAF's Alpha Jet fleet invariably undermine viability of airpower for military counter-insurgency operations in Nigeria (IISS, 2014; IISS, 2014, p. 451).

Similarly, late July 2014, the NAF also "took delivery of three Beechcraft King Air 350i light transport aircraft, which are operated by the 209 Executive Airlift Group (EAG) at Abuja-Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport" (Defence Web, 2014).

Considering the comparative state of the Air force's core tactical assets, the question then seems to be not if the NAF is getting funds, but how it chooses to invest its budget allocation. It is a question important to an evaluation of the NAF's COIN contribution, and one that may require further study. An open letter supposedly written by an NAF corporal serving in Yola, Adamawa state, in northeastern Nigeria, was openly critical, directly accusing the Air force of corruption,

> In my unit, soldiers live without accommodation. In the little space available, they are being paired up two (2) and three (3) in a room. Still, millions are being spent on the gigantic edifice of the Airlodge located near Ribadu Square, Jimeta Yola, which is meant for senior officers. Millions are allocated to the ongoing project of the Air Chief Marshal A. S. Badeh's golf club (along Jambutu Numan Road, Yola).
>
> I know that soldiers serving in 37 BSG [Base Services Group] and 75 STG [Special Strike Group], Yola (war zones), are not being paid their operational allowances. It is crystal clear to us that the funds are coming from the DHQ Abuja. But the money is diverted to the private pocket of few "chosen" ones. Our colleagues in the Nigerian Army have to endure a similar fate.
>
> Now, let's talk about operational efficiency. Nigerian military is too ill-equipped to combat the ravaging insurgency in the North. Forget about what the Defense spokesman is saying from Abuja. Here, it's visible to the blind and audible to the deaf. In my unit here in Yola, despite the global technological progress, we are still using the Fabrique Nationale rifles that were used in the Biafran War! Meanwhile, the insurgents are carrying advanced weapons. They have light machine guns, new AK-47 rifles, general-purpose machine guns, to mention a few.

> It's sad to know that, because of the same corruption in the Nigerian military, we don't have rocket-propelled grenade launchers. All the armoured personnel carriers we use to defend our bases are outdated. Of the two outdated Mi-35M helicopters, one has crashed, and the other one was fired at by the insurgents and grounded in Maiduguri.
>
> The operation of archaic fighter aircrafts such as Alpha jet and F-7 fighter jet is a waste of taxpayers' money […] (Information Nigeria, 2014)

Authenticity of the above letter, which is open and is publicly available, cannot be verified as the writer assumed anonymity. The default research position here therefore is that the letter is inauthentic, for lack of a creditable source. However, and this is important, the accusations made within that letter should not be so easily dismissed, hence the reason for its inclusion within this narrative.

It is worth pointing for instance, that much of what was said in the letter above — specifically statements regarding the downed helicopters, and assertions on the poor state of current tactical assets of the Nigerian military — are both easily verifiable and difficult to refute. Based on this project's research experience moreover, the letter reads like off-the-record grumblings of Nigerian and foreign military personnel, interacted with during fieldwork, with knowledge of the military's COIN. Indeed, there is little said above, in terms of operational (in)efficiency within the NAF, which sounds far-fetched. Put simply therefore, despite fighting a low-intensity war against Boko Haram, in which the Army has come to require air combat operations more than at any time since the Civil War of Nigeria, it appears the NAF has sometimes been more willing to invest in its presidential and executive fleets, and perhaps elsewhere in addition, than in its COIN capabilities; including in equipment and personnel.

With regards to operational efficiency and capability balance, statements by the CAS and Director of Operations, quoted earlier in this section, appear to suggest significant acquisition of equipment has

shifted that balance to favour a more effective COIN action set within the Air force. Again however the NAF's 2015 military balance does (as yet) not reflect much of the supposed acquisitions from the last 24 months. The section that follows, evaluates the premises, and presents evidential data, to validate this position.

[Nigerian] Air force [2014] 10,000	**[Nigerian] Air force [2015]** 10,000
FORCES BY ROLE Very limited op capability	**FORCES BY ROLE** Very limited op capability
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn[115] with F-7 (F-7NI); FT-7 (FT-7NI)	**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK** 1 sqn with F-7 (F-7NI); FT-7 (FT-7NI)
MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with ATR-42MP; Do-128D-6 *Turbo SkyServant*; Do-228-100/200	**MARITIME PATROL** 1 sqn with ATR-42MP; Do-128D-6 *Turbo SkyServant*; Do-228-100/200
TRANSPORT 2 sqn with C-130H *Hercules*; C-130H-30 *Hercules*; G-222 1 (Presidential) flt with B-727; B-737BBJ; BAe-125-800; Do-228-200; *Falcon* 7X; *Falcon* 900; Gulfstream IV/V	**TRANSPORT** 2 sqn with C-130H *Hercules*; C-130H-30 *Hercules*; G-222 1 (Presidential) gp with B-727; B-737BBJ; BAe-125-800; Beech 350 *King* Air; Do-228-200; *Falcon* 7X; *Falcon* 900; Gulfstream IV/V
TRAINING 1 unit with *Air Beetle*†; 1 unit *Alpha Jet** 1 unit with L-39 *Albatros*†*; MB-339A* 1 hel unit with Mi-34 *Hermit* (trg);	**TRAINING** 1 unit with *Air Beetle*†; 1 unit *Alpha Jet** 1 unit with L-39 *Albatros*†*; MB-339A* 1 hel unit with Mi-34 *Hermit* (trg);
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AW109LUH; Mi-24/Mi-35 *Hind*†	**ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER** 2 sqn with AW109LUH; Mi-24/Mi-35 *Hind*†
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† **AIRCRAFT** 54 combat capable **FTR** 15: 12 F-7 (F-7NI); 3 FT-7 (FT-7NI) **MP** 2 ATR-42 MP	**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†** **AIRCRAFT** 53 combat capable **FTR** 15: 12 F-7 (F-7NI); 3 FT-7 (FT-7NI) **ELINT** 2 ATR-42 MP

[115] List of Abbreviations from Table 5-2 data: **AAM** air-to-air missile. **ATK** attack/ground attack. **ELINT** electronic intelligence **FTR** fighter. **HEL** helicopter. **ISR** intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. **IR** infrared. **MP** maritime patrol. **MRH** multi-role helicopter. **MSL** missile. **PAX** passenger/passenger transport. **SQN** squadron. **TRG** training. **TPT** transport. **UAV** unmanned aerial vehicle.

TPT 30: **Medium** 5: 1 C-130H Hercules (4 more in store†); 1 C-130H-30 Hercules (2 more in store); 3 G-222 (2 more in store†); **Light** 16: 1 *Cessna* 550 *Citation*; 8 Do-128D-6 *Turbo SkyServant*; 1 Do-228-100; 6 Do-228-200 (inc 2 VIP); **PAX** 9: 1 B-737BBJ; 1 BAe 125-800; 2 *Falcon* 7X; 2 *Falcon* 900; 1 Gulfstream IV; 1 Gulfstream V **TRG** 107: 58 *Air Beetle*† (up to 20 awaiting repair); 14 *Alpha Jet**; 23 L-39 Albatros†; 12 MB-339AN* (all being upgraded)	**TPT** 33: **Medium** 5: 1 C-130H Hercules (4 more in store†); 1 C-130H-30 Hercules (2 more in store); 3 G-222 (2 more in store†); **Light** 16: 1 *Cessna* 550 *Citation*; 8 Do-128D-6 *Turbo SkyServant*; 1 Do-228-100; 6 Do-228-200 (inc 2 VIP); **PAX** 9: 1 B-737BBJ; 1 BAe 125-800; 2 *Falcon* 7X; 2 *Falcon* 900; 1 Gulfstream IV; 1 Gulfstream V **TRG** 106: 58 *Air Beetle*† (up to 20 awaiting repair); 13 *Alpha Jet**; 23 L-39 Albatros†; 12 MB-339AN* (all being upgraded)
HELICOPTERS	**HELICOPTERS**
ATK 9: 2 Mi-24P *Hind*; 2 Mi-24V *Hind*; 5 Mi-35 *Hind* **MRH** 6 AW109LUH **TPT** 3: **Medium** 2 AS332 *Super Puma* (4 more in store); **Light** 1 AW109 **TRG** 5 Mi-34 *Hermit*† **MSL * AAM * IR** R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡ PL-9C	**ATK** 8: 2 Mi-24P *Hind*; 2 Mi-24V *Hind*; 4 Mi-35 *Hind* **MRH** 6 AW109LUH **TPT** 3: **Medium** 2 AS332 *Super Puma* (4 more in store); **Light** 1 AW109 **UAV * ISR * Medium** (9 Aerostar non-operational) **MSL * AAM * IR** R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡ PL-9C
Nigerian Air Force 2014	Nigerian Air Force 2015

Table 5-2: Comparative capabilities balance of NAF: 2014 and 2015.[116]

[Nigerian] Air force [2012] 10,000
FORCES BY ROLE Very limited op capability
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-7 (F-7NI); FT-7 (FT-7NI)
MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with ATR-42MP; Do-128D-6 *Turbo SkyServant*; Do-228-100/200
TRANSPORT 2 sqn with C-130H *Hercules*; C-130H-30 *Hercules*; G-222 1 (Presidential) flt with B-727; B-737BBJ; BAe-125-800; Do-228-200; *Falcon* 7X; *Falcon* 900; Gulfstream IV/V
TRAINING

[116] Comparative data used from IISS (2014, pp. 452-453) and IISS (2015, p. 463).

1 unit with *Air Beetle*†; 1 unit *Alpha Jet** 1 unit with L-39 *Albatros*†*; MB-339A* 1 hel unit with Mi-34 *Hermit* (trg);
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AW109LUH; Mi-24/Mi-35 *Hind*†
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† **AIRCRAFT** 55 combat capable **FTR** 15: 12 F-7 (F-7NI); 3 FT-7 (FT-7NI) **MP** 2 ATR-42 MP **TPT** 29: **Medium** 5: 1 C-130H Hercules (4 more in store†); 1 C-130H-30 Hercules (2 more in store); 3 G-222 (2 more in store†); **Light** 16: 1 *Cessna* 550 *Citation*; 8 Do-128D-6 *Turbo SkyServant*; 1 Do-228-100; 6 Do-228-200 (inc 2 VIP); **PAX** 8: 1 B-737BBJ; 1 BAe 125-800; 2 *Falcon* 7X; 2 *Falcon* 900; 1 Gulfstream IV; 1 Gulfstream V **TRG** 108: 58 *Air Beetle*† (up to 20 awaiting repair); 14 *Alpha Jet**; 24 L-39 Albatros†; 12 MB-339AN* (all being upgraded) **HELICOPTERS** **ATK** 9: 2 Mi-24P *Hind*; 2 Mi-24V *Hind*; 5 Mi-35 *Hind* **MRH** 2 AW109LUH **TPT** 5: **Medium** (6 AS332 *Super Puma* in store); **Light** 5 AW109 **TRG** 5 Mi-34 *Hermit*† **MSL * AAM * IR** R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡ PL-9C
Nigerian Air Force 2012[117]

Table 5-3: NAF Operational and Tactical Capabilities Balance (2012).

Table 5-2 is a comparative analysis of the NAF military balance between 2014 and 2015. The table shows that combat capable aircraft have — on paper at least — actually *decreased*, between 2014 (when there were 54) and 2015 (when there were 53). The alpha jet shot down by Boko Harm, discussed earlier in the chapter, is reflected in the 2015 capabilities balance. Changes between both years are emphasized. Going further back, to 2012 when I did my fieldwork with JTF ORO, the NAF's capabilities balance is, by and large, the same as in 2015. Table 5-3 presents the comparative military capabilities of the NAF in 2012. Going by the data in that table, there is little to suggest a

[117] Data sourced from IISS (2012, p. 448).

marked improvement in NAF COIN capabilities between 2012 and 2015. If anything the Air force in 2012 had two additional combat capable aircraft (55) comparative to the number of craft it has in 2015 (53 combat capable). This means, on paper at least, and despite all that has been said by the NAF officially, the Air force is, technically speaking, no stronger in 2015 than it was in 2012. Perhaps it is even a little weaker, as the comparative capabilities balance between Tables 5-2 and 5-3 indicates.

Between 2012 and 2014, amongst noteworthy changes to the capabilities balance are that the NAF appears to be reactivating and upgrading some of its craft that hitherto were in storage, or inoperative. Yet, whether this can be said to constitute an improvement to capabilities is questionable, relative to defence spending in the same period. Moreover some of the upgrades in question — to the 12 MB-339AN trainer jets for instance — have taken over three years now, since 2012. Aircraft in upgrade status are inoperable and thus are an academic contribution to the operational function. Moreover the Aermacchi MB-339 is an odd choice of trainer jet for an air force that claims to be modernizing. The Aermacchi MB-339 was first researched in 1972, flown in 1976 and introduced in 1979 (Air International, 1978). The extent therefore, to which refurbishment of MB-339s constitutes "modernization", surely should be questioned.

Amongst noteworthy changes in NAF capabilities, between 2014 and 2015, are that the president fleet acquisition is reflected. Assets within the combat function however, although announced as acquired much earlier, are not likewise reflected. Additional operational considerations in the period are that two of the NAF's maritime patrol (MP) aircraft were retrofitted for Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) recce; and that the Air force has one less available Mi-35 rotorcraft capability in 2015. As highlighted earlier however, an order for six more has been placed. Finally, the nine Aerostar Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle Systems (TUAVs) (Aeronautics Systems), in possession by the NAF have now been listed. These have been in the NAF's possession for some time now and are either inoperative (as the 2015 balance indicates) or are otherwise in poor shape. Moreover the Israeli systems TUAV model in

commission by the NAF is obsolete and is a poor overall unmanned surveillance platform; comparative to new entries such as the cheaper, arguably more serviceable, more durable and significantly more loiter-capable Chengdu Pterodactyl I (Wing Loong) (The Aviationist, 2012). The Wing Loong, moreover, can be retrofitted with an offensive payload, if required (The Aviationist, 2012).

At the minimum, it can be assumed the NAF realizes airpower, to be effective in COIN, requires platforms beyond the Agusta rotary capabilities on which the Air force had relied for some time now (Stevenson, 2015). Yet at the same time questions remain as to what this realization means for the current state of air power. Certainly, improvement on the scale suggested by officials, from the analysis here, is difficult to see. That said, it may well be that much of the platforms acquired in the past 18 months, may only now begin to trickle in over the next 12. Entry into service, of platforms, may be preceded by months of upgrades, maintenance and flight training for personnel.

Chart 5-1, as a final contribution to this section's analysis, takes the data from Tables 5-2, 5-3 and 5-4 to highlight the NAF's number of combat capable craft from 2007, before the insurgency began; from 2009, when Boko Haram's first major military confrontation took place; from 2012 when this project's fieldwork was conducted; and finally between 2014 and 2015. The expectation would be that, in this period, identifiable improvement in military capabilities would occur; considering claims by Air force officials. Yet the data analysis below reveals surprising trends.

[Nigerian] Air force [2007] 10,000	**[Nigerian] Air force [2009]** 10,000
FORCES BY ROLE Very limited op capability	**FORCES BY ROLE** Very limited op capability
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with 12 Jaguar S(N) (Jaguar S□International)† non-operational; 3 Jaguar B(N) (SEPECAT Jaguar International B)†; 1 sqn with 6 Alpha Jet (FGA/trg); 9 (FGA/trg)†; 1 sqn with 12 MIG-21bis *Fishbed* L & N/MIG-21FR *Fishbed*†; 5 MIG-21MF *Fishbed* J†; 1	**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK** 1 sqn with *Jaguar* S(N)† non-operational; *Jaguar* B(N)†; 1 sqn with *Alpha Jet*; 1 sqn with MiG-21bis/MiG-21FR†; MiG-21MF†; MiG-21U†*

MIG-21U *Mongol* A†*	
TRANSPORT 2 sqn with 5 C-130H *Hercules*; 3 C-130H-30 *Hercules*; 17 DO-128D-6 *Turbo SkyServant*; 16 DO-228-200 (incl 2 VIP);□5 G-222; 7 AS-332 Super Puma; 2 SA-330 *Puma*; 5 Mi-34 *Hermit*†; some (Presidential) fleet with 2 *Gulfstream* II/*Gulfstream* IV; 1 B-727;□1 BAe-125-1000; 2 *Falcon* 900	**TRANSPORT** 2 sqn with C-130H Hercules; C-130H-30 *Hercules*; Do-128D-6 Turbo *SkyServant*;□Do-228-200 (incl 2 VIP); G-222; Presidential fleet with *Gulfstream* II/*Gulfstream* IV; B-727; BAe-125-1000; *Falcon* 900
TRAINING some sqn with 24 L-39MS *Albatros*†*; 58 Air Beetle† (up to 20 awaiting repair); 12 MB-339AN (MB-339A)†* (all awaiting repair); 13 Hughes 300	**TRAINING** sqns with MB-339A* (all being upgraded; L-39MS *Albatros*†*; *Air Beetle*†; Hughes 300
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER some (Armed) sqn with 5 Mi-35 *Hind*†; 5 BO- 105D†	**ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER** sqns with Mi-24/Mi-35 *Hind*†; Bo-105D†; AS-332 *Super Puma*; SA-330 *Puma*; Mi-34 *Hermit* (trg);
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† **AIRCRAFT** 84 combat capable **FTR** 17: 5 MIG-21MF *Fishbed* J†; 12 MIG-21bis *Fishbed* L & N MiG-21 FTR/MIG-21FR *Fishbed* RECCE† **FGA** 36: 24 L-39MS *Albatros*†; 12 Jaguar S(N) (Jaguar S International)† non-operational **TPT** 52: 2 *Gulfstream* II/*Gulfstream* IV; 1 B-727; 1 BAe-125-1000; 5 C-130H *Hercules*; 3 C-130H-30 *Hercules*; 17 DO-128D-6 *Turbo SkyServant*; 16 DO-228-200 (incl 2 VIP); 2 *Falcon* 900; 5 G-222† **TRG** 89: 58 Air Beetle† (up to 20 awaiting repair); 6 Alpha Jet (FGA/trg)*; 9 FGA/trg†*; 3 Jaguar B(N) (SEPECAT Jaguar International B)†*; 12 MB-339AN (MB-339A)†* (all awaiting repair); 1 MIG-21U *Mongol* A†* **HELICOPTERS** **ATK** 5 Mi-35 *Hind*□ **SPT** 9: 7 AS-332 *Super Puma*; 2 SA-330 *Puma* **UTL**[118] 10: 5 BO–105D†; 5 Mi-34 *Hermit*†□ **TRG** 13 Hughes 300 **MSL • AAM** AA-2 *Atoll*	**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†** **AIRCRAFT** 75 combat capable **FTR** 17: 5 MIG-21MF *Fishbed* J†; 12 MIG-21bis *Fishbed* L & N MiG-21 FTR/MIG-21FR *Fishbed* RECCE† **FGA** 36: 24 L-39MS *Albatros*†; 12 Jaguar S(N) (Jaguar S International)† non-operational **TPT** 52: 2 *Gulfstream* II/*Gulfstream* IV; 1 B-727; 1 BAe-125-1000; 5 C-130H *Hercules*; 3 C-130H-30 *Hercules*; 17 DO-128D-6 *Turbo SkyServant*; 16 DO-228-200 (incl 2 VIP); 2 *Falcon* 900; 5 G-222† **TRG** 80: 58 Air Beetle† (up to 20 awaiting repair); 6 Alpha Jet (FGA/trg)*; 3 Jaguar B(N) †*; 12 MB-339AN* (all being upgraded); 1 MIG-21U *Mongol* A†* **HELICOPTERS** **ATK** 9: 5 Mi-35 *Hind*□; Mi-24 *Hind* (2-24P, 2-24V) **SPT** 9: 7 AS-332 *Super Puma*; 2 SA-330 *Puma* **UTL** 10: 5 BO–105D† **TRG** 13 Hughes 300; 5 Mi-34 *Hermit*†□ **MSL • AAM** AA-2 *Atoll*
Nigerian Air Force 2007	Nigerian Air Force 2009

Table 5-4: Comparative capabilities balance of NAF: 2007 and 2009[119].

[118] List of Abbreviations from Table 5-2: **SPT** support. **UTL** utility. Abbreviations from IISS (2015, pp. 501-2).



Chart 5-1: Defence budget relative to combat capable aircraft for NAF (2007, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2015).[120]

Put simply, whereas the defence budget has markedly increased as an aggregate between 2007 and 2015, the NAF's platforms do not show an identifiable increase[121]. Rather there appears to be decline in the aggregate airpower contribution to COIN, and certainly an indication that the NAF's overall military balance remains precarious considering the role required of it. This moreover is consistent with field findings discussed earlier in this section.

[119] Comparative data used from IISS (2007, pp. 287-288) and IISS (2009, p. 314-315).

[120] Comparative data used from IISS (2007; 2009; 2012; 2014; 2015).

[121] An important point of note is the changes to the NAF's capabilities between 2007 and 2009. Whereas "combat capable" aircraft, as Table 5-2 indicates, decreased from 84 to 75 respectively, the NAF's capabilities arguably improved. First because some obsolete and moribund assets were decommissioned; but more importantly because many existing aircraft were being repaired and upgraded even as additional platforms were being acquired — the *Hind* helicopters, for instance. That said, aggregate improvement to the NAF in the period should not be exaggerated. Moreover, relative to a mostly steady rise in Nigerian defence spending, the NAF's improvement appears incommensurate.

Whereas availability of platforms and overall air power capabilities remains a strategic-level concern for the NAF, one that has affected its entire structure as a tactical air force, a number of operational-level challenges also affect the NAF's component function in JE to counter insurgency.

As an example, a second area related to capabilities where the NAF's COIN function struggled during JTF ORO[122] was that of combat readiness, as one of the three planks of military capabilities. Part of the challenge here was that much of the Air force's rotorcraft capabilities "are largely based in the south of the country, but militants advancing from Chad to the east and north of Nigeria pose a problem due to the logistical burden of transporting the helicopters to these areas" (Stevenson, 2015).

The NAF, specifically as an adaptation to its increased commitments in the northeast, is trying to improve its COIN function's combat readiness through establishment of FOBs. These FOBs would typically be at wing[123] status and would align with the NAF's four operational command functions of tactical (implementation and control of NAF operational plans), mobility (tactical and strategic airlifting for the Army's operations), training (for operational readiness) and logistics (support function) (Nigerian Air Force, pp. 10-13). It is unclear, and perhaps unlikely, that any of the FOBs would be autonomous in function; that is, reporting directly to HQ NAF, as is more usual (Nigerian Air Force, p. 13) rather than to their local operational command or to the JTFC (if part of a joint force).

Having more forward bases give the NAF more manoeuvrability and adapts it — to some degree at least — from the tactical air force it has been over the decades, to one that can demonstrate manoeuvre operations by using air power assets coordinated from a range of FOBs, simultaneously, at short notice. Right now, with NAF structures spread thin in the north-east TOO, and with its rotorcraft

[122] Operation Zaman Lafiya as the counter-insurgency became more commonly referred to, after 7 Div took over command in the northeastern axis.

[123] Following the Army's nomenclature, a wing is a battalion equivalent.

capabilities unable to be deployed effectively within its COIN function, large scale coordinated quick response has not been entirely practicable. Creating of several FOBs therefore means, as Air Vice Marshall A. A. Zannah, the Chief of Policy and Plans (COPP) for the NAF notes, the Air force "can respond slightly faster", within the requirements of maneouvrist doctrine (Stevenson, 2015).

Third as a challenge for 79 Composite Group specifically, as the NAF component of JTF ORO, was the issue of equipment serviceability. Simply put, personnel who could effectively service NAF craft (not just that of 79) are hard to come by, and inferior servicing may diminish the lifespan of platforms, may endanger pilot(s) and passengers, or both. It is in part for this reason that the NAF now uses South African and Eastern European air personnel to maintain, to assist in training, and quite possibly to even fly, some of its craft, as at 2015[124]. With regards to servicing, craft in need of this may otherwise need to be flown all the way to Europe for that task; with many of the NAF's platforms left inoperative for years; due to lack of readily available local maintenance. Lack of readily available maintenance expertise was an enduring issue for the JTF ORO ACC and prevented him from having at every point in time a full complement of combat-ready platforms. It is again noteworthy that this challenge affects the entire NAF, not just 79.

A fourth challenge of 79 Group was that of communication. As put by Air Commodore I.M. Pawa, when asked how this particular challenge affects joint task forcing,

> Up till now, between the services, we have not established an integrated communications system between the army, Navy, and Air Force which makes it such that any aircraft flying in the sky can, at the same time, talk to the soldier on the ground; talk to the ship at sea.
>
> Communications is not just between the aircraft and the troops. Even between the aircraft and the tower. If the aircraft is far out — and you know helicopters are low-flying aircraft — once

[124] Anonymous NA senior officer serving in northern Nigeria.

> we are about 30 nautical miles out, which is about 58 km or thereabout, we can hear the tower but the tower cannot hear us. So it is a big problem. You cannot remove the helmet to talk, to use phone; even as it is prohibited by aviation regulations. So we now may have to position someone in the tower. I have a radio here and ideally, sitting in my office here, I should be talking to the aircraft wherever it is within this domain. But because there are no base stations — there are no repeater stations — that is also not possible (2012).

Air Cdre Pawa (2012) refers to this particular area as his "main challenge" in integrating into the JE and notes that lack of communication essentially makes it difficult, or very difficult, for true JE in operations where air power plays such a crucial function. When asked if this, as well as the other challenges, had been taken up with the JFC (JTFC), Air Cdre Pawa responds in the affirmative, noting that the JTFC had been made aware both through write-ups and quarterly reports. However, competing demands related to defence budgeting ultimately mean that such reports — some of which I was demonstrably advised on their urgency — end up being de-prioritized or overlooked entirely. For instance when asked whether communications repeater towers had been destroyed by the BHTs, the response what no, because such facilities "have never been provided" in the first place. The gamut of communications issues discussed by the ACC were said to affect recce operations in particular, from take-off to landing (Pawa, 2012).

The final identified challenge for the NAF component was that of the Air force's poor mastery of local topography in some areas. This is turn was related to three issues: (1) poor cartography capabilities at the higher-tactical level; (2) inaccurate maps or no maps at all[125]; (3) inaccurate coordinates or no coordinates at all. The JTF ORO ACC gave an example scenario of 79 being requisitioned to conduct either reconnaissance or a tactical strike on a BHT IED-making location. The question asked here was

[125] This is an issue with which the NA also struggles. Two different senior NA officers advised me that on occasion in-theatre; available maps may be inaccurate or out of date. It was not uncommon for maps to be ordered from elsewhere in the country; delaying tactical or even operational progress as a result.

what happens if a 79 pilot opens his map and (1) the location in question is not on the map and (2) the coordinates are incorrect?

Air Cdre Pawa suggests that both scenarios do in fact occur and that as a result, such flights are made "…manually […] mechanically — if not blindly in some cases" (2012). The ACC also observes, regarding how 79 surmount such challenges, that they have found innovative ways to fly craft in less than ideal conditions, "which shouldn't be" (Pawa, 2012). As put by Air Cdre Pawa,

> If they let me know that some insurgents are building bomb[s] in a particular location I would expect again, at this stage where even ordinary phones can give you GPS locations, one would expect that if you really want effective support — then you give me [the Nigerian Air Force pilot] co-ordinates. Because even in the air, I don't have to wait for any other thing. As it is, we only get lucky; we stumble on the place[s]—which should not be the case. We should be able to say: '*XYZ* place, these are the coordinates'. Because somebody is on ground there; he picks the coordinates, forwards them, you key in the coordinates, and probably catch the insurgents (2012).

The issue of cartography as a challenge at the higher-tactical level is not isolated to the NAF, moreover. Nigerian Army units in addition struggle with either out-dated maps or no maps at all (in which case maps may need to be requested or purchased *in situ*), for operations.[126]

Using largely primary field data, and secondary material in addition, this section of the thesis has analysed, with emphasis on the higher-tactical and operational levels of war, the Nigerian Air Force's COIN function. The section's analysis draws from the NAF's CONOPS, its actual operational activity in the TOO, its integration within a joint arms approach and its posture and function, comparative to that of the Army, in counter-insurgency. Analysis in the section included an

[126] Anonymous NA senior officer serving in northern Nigeria.

evaluation of the broader capabilities question surrounding the NAF and how this affects its contribution to COIN JE, at and below formation level.

The section's analysis may prove useful to senior NAF personnel, at formation level and above, involved either with the Air force's COIN function, with its modernization, or with both. This is insofar as the section's analysis indicates performance of the former (NAF COIN performance and contribution to JE) may well be dependent on the enterprise of the latter (modernization).



FIGURE 5-3: Generic Schema for JTF ORO Components Interaction

5-5. SUMMARY.

Chapter five of this thesis considered counter-insurgency operations and joint task forcing within the NMOE, with specific focus on JTF ORO against Boko Haram in the northeastern axis of Nigeria. From its initial formation from the police-run "Operation Flush" as a first line of defence against the Boko Haram insurgency, JTF ORO would become a fully formed joint force composed of military and non-military components. Its scope of operations ran the gamut of offensive to social. Furthermore intelligence — not a component easily seen, or understood, from the outside — was more of a feature of the COIN than some external commentators appear to realize. To a number of non-embedded observers rather, JTF ORO was an offensive operation that was army-run through and through. Furthermore, as chapter one's analysis demonstrates, there is abundant literature, media and policy reporting related to the subject. These contributions, keen to comment on kinetic aspects of "Nigerian military counter-insurgency operations", neglect to ask important questions on, or indeed to interrogate using research methodology, actual military COIN at the operational level of war.

Using JTF ORO as a case study, this chapter, and indeed the project as a whole, in asking and in attempting to answer such questions, has catechized military counter-insurgency warfare in Nigeria. The chapter's emphasis was on the operational level of war and on the function of the various military and multi-agency components of Nigerian military COIN. These components include the Air force, the police, the SSS, the Army and other non-military security agencies. The chapter's objective was not to answer a specific question *per se*, rather it was to evaluate the operationalization of military COIN in Nigerian, within a joint arms and multi-agency environment.

Some would argue that, multi-agency contributions and joint task forcing regardless, JTF ORO was still too offensive leaning. This chapter makes no claim to affirming or refuting such assertions. Rather the objective, now accomplished, was to analyse the spectrum of joint tasking forcing within a

contemporary instance of military COIN operations in Nigeria. How the chapter findings are interpreted and used sequel to this analysis would depend on audience intent and perspective.

At this point of the project, the four main areas highlighted at the start of the thesis, as important to a research driven study of military COIN in Nigeria, have now been evaluated. As a reminder, these four areas are: (1) organizational culture, historical experience and sociology of the Nigerian military; (2) formalized institutionalization of COIN within the military; (3) counter-insurgency doctrine; and (4) counter-insurgency operations.

The final section of the thesis will reflect on the study findings implications for a number of audiences: from researchers on military COIN in Africa, to historians on the Nigerian military, to senior Nigerian personnel who are learning, teaching, theorizing and operationalizing COIN.

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6-1. Chapter Two (OC and Historical Experience)

A key implication of the chapter's findings is that non-formalized aspects of the Nigerian military — its organizational culture — may be as important, if not more so, than formalized doctrine and institutional development of the Army's counter-insurgency model. A second implication is related to how challenging it is, from an institutional perspective, for a military to break with convention. Indeed the indication here is that existing practices cannot be easily replaced with a model that, in attempting to overcome institutional inertia, breaks from a decades-long approach.

Specifically, as the chapter's analysis indicates, the shift from warfighting to COIN is not an easy one to make and even when made, the chances of success may not increase nearly as much as the budget, planning, and restructuring, related to the shift itself. The broad scope of operations required in COIN marks a traditional departure from warfighting. Yet this also brings with it institutional inertia, as the Nigerian military case indicates. This reluctance to adjust action set is also suggested within the broader discourses on COIN, not localized to SSA. Anderson for instance is critical of what this shift entails for the warfighter. Arguing that COIN within this context is broad enough to constitute a departure from the traditional military function, Anderson writes that "populace-centric counterinsurgency" ostensibly includes everything from construction and reconstruction projects and maintenance; school building and well digging; community mentoring; security supervision and training and even "trash picking" (Anderson G. , 2010).

With the scope of COIN activity so broad and the cost of adjusting action set so high; why therefore should the NA restructure itself; from a force better suited to warfighting to one better suited to COIN? The answer to this question is implied in the Army's reluctance — or outright failure even —

to make the considerable adjustment to its institution, if it is to be better equipped for future COINs. The alternative, sticking to convention and settling for a tactical finish-line scramble in the campaign against Boko Haram, arguably comes with lower costs and less institutional disruption. Nonetheless the question above retains implications for Army planners, as well as for military scholars evaluating approaches by which the NA can make the practical, and necessarily difficult, adjustment toward more effective COIN.

6-2. Chapter Three (CT-COIN Institutionalization)

This chapter puts forward the argument that Nigerian COIN development has been in existence since 1978 but was that, vis-à-vis the military's emphasis in other areas, counter-insurgency's development within the institution was neglected. Specifically, in the 1980s and 1990s, capabilities building and development of operations other than war (OOTW), part of the Army's lexicon for military activity that also includes counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, were de-emphasized within the institution. Part of this neglect was consequential to a shift in strategic culture within the period. Strategic culture within the 1970s would be influenced by the perception of an interstate threat. By the mid-1980s, with ECOWAS treaty signings, the military posture consequential to the outward looking threat perception would gradually lean toward a PSO action set. Throughout the 1990s and beyond the turn of the century, peacekeeping missions would become the Army's main preoccupation, as the Nigerian Army Peacekeeping Center (NAPKC) within NASI, would become possible the most well-oiled institution for infantry and other combat arms. The Army's strategic focus, PSO-focused at the time, inevitably would neglect counter-insurgency development within the institution.

Consequential to institutional de-emphasis on COIN warfare development was that whereas the Nigerian military maintained a robust PSO pedigree and forged a reputation as one of the main

contributors to, and performers within, peacekeeping missions on the sub-continent; it — like most of the militaries in SSA — struggled with insurgency when faced with the phenomenon.

COIN-related areas like the police function in COIN; the need for locally developed and codified doctrine; training and equipment as part of broader COIN capabilities building; JCP[127] and even warfighting itself (which was predominantly based on offensive rather than on manoeuvrist warfare doctrine until the late 1990s), betrayed a neglect of counter-insurgency development within the NMOE. Past neglect of counter-insurgency institutionally, should not be taken to mean this area of the military function has not been recognized and that adjustments have not been made.

Since 2010 specifically, and then increasingly with the escalated threat of Boko Haram, there has been increased emphasis on the development of CT-COIN within the Nigerian military institution. Internally, military simulation exercises at the operational and higher tactical levels, such as *Exercise Haske Biyu*; "performance-oriented" joint training exercises for mid-level military personnel at the AFCSC and Land Power Symposium series since 2010 at the AFCSC, reflect this recognition that development of CT-COIN, and its institutional relevance, will contribute to an improved counter-insurgency function within the military.

The range of training packages within the CT-COIN Directorate also cater for a broad cross-section of military and non-military security operatives, deployed to assist with the COIN effort in the TOO. Appendix I at the end of this thesis shows the NA's bifurcated approach to CT-COIN training packages within the directorate[128]. Table 6-1 below meanwhile presents these training packages as a counter-balance to what was perceived as the upper end of Boko Haram's capabilities, as at 2012 when this project's fieldwork was conducted.

[127] This refers to JCP within COIN. The Nigerian military doctrine and operations reflected a more than acceptable understanding of JCP, within a PSO context.

[128] Accurate at time of fieldwork, January 2013.

Boko Haram capabilities and assets (2010 – Date)	Counter Terrorism Division (CTD) - Training Packages
Use and expertise of IEDs. These include VBIEDs, SVBIEDs and packaged IEDs	Special physical training and martial arts Rescue operations Raid, patrol and attacking terrorist camps Counter revolutionary warfare Dog handling techniques Field engineering and demolition Communication skills Advance close quarter battle and reactive shooting House break-in and entry techniques Helicopter drills Intelligence operation and concept package Mission planning Abseiling and rappelling Tactics and Field Craft in Urban Terrain First aid in Urban Terrain Bomb identification, handling, detonation and disposal Escort duties and VIP protection Disaster management Lectures on Terrorism (Organization, type, weapons, tactics, planning cycle, profile et cetera) Leadership & Man Management Package
Suicide bombings	
Police and military (NA) outfitting	
AK 47 Assault Rifles. General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMGs). Rocket Propelled Grenades. Pistols. Light Machine Guns. Telescopic Sight Sniper Rifles. *Katyusha* Rockets. Biological and Chemical capability (different types of poisons, including cyanide). IED capability.	
Recruitment drive has been said to target "unemployed millions of 'almajiris' (students of local madrassas) roaming in Northern Nigeria beyond and across the border in Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroon"	
Elements of the Sect are well-trained by AQIM and al Shabaab in weapon handling, IED making, operational planning and execution, and media management	
Media propaganda, both domestic and international. This is in addition to their local dissemination network of GSM texting, radios, audio and video CDs	

Table 6.1: TABLE IV: BHTs Assets and Capabilities, vis-à-vis the CTD Course as a "Counter-Balance". Source(s): ONSA, Abuja; DSS, Maiduguri; CT-COIN Directorate, Jaji.

Externally, Britain and the US have also played for some time now, a functional role assisting Nigeria with COIN tactical and higher-tactical level development; training paratrooper and ranger battalions respectively. As recently as March 2015 for example, 2 Royal Anglian continues to assist with CT-COIN tactical training with some Nigerian Army units (72 Special Operations Forces

Battalion's training at Makurdi, for instance). British Military Assistance Training Teams (BMATTs) are also involved in developing the Nigerian military's counter-insurgency action set at all levels from the National Defence Academy (NDA) for cadets up to the National Defence College (NDC). Part of the problem with a lot of the ongoing training emphasis however, is that it is infantry-centric in nature.

As an example, the Nigerian Army School of Infantry (NASI) at Jaji, rather than the Nigerian Army Training Center (NATRAC), which is the institution for COIN training situated in Kontagorra, constitutes the main structure that provides troops for the counter-insurgency in the northeast. A lot of BMATT training and assistance therefore is coordinated through NASI, the Department of Training and Operations (DATOP), and the Chief of Training and Operation (CTOP) at AHQ.

Yet, that NATRAC and DATOP (DHQ) are not, considering the scale of inter-agency effort that should be weighted into military COIN planning, at the fore of training and coordination regimens with foreign assistance partners, may be problematic to the outcomes of such assistance. This is insofar as a lot of the training still appears to be Army-driven, and, more specifically, aimed at infantry battalions. Indeed, as one senior officer observed during a battalion-level exercise, NATRAC — the institution for COIN training, and which in practice rightly accommodates a broader audience for its COIN training packages (Villo, 2012) — appears to have taken a backseat as the center of excellence for COIN learning at battalion level and below[129]. Local and foreign training initiatives around the Army's COIN action set, therefore are largely centered around NASI (Jaji, Kaduna state), and to a lesser extent around the armour school (NAAS, Bauchi) and the school of artillery (NASA, Kachia in Kaduna state) not around NATRAC (Kontagorra, Niger state), which has a more inter-service and multi-agency audience and comprises a former standalone center (at directorate status) for CT-COIN training.

[129] Based on my interactions with 2 R Anglian, during a battalion-level training day at Kendrew Barracks, Rutland, Cottesmore, Oakham, Rutland, April 2015..

NASI, furthermore, has not historically trained personnel for a COIN-specific action set. The question therefore is not whether personnel are being trained at NASI — they are — it is which military personnel are being trained, what they are being trained for, whether that training is anything but the core infantry tactics training that falls within NASI's remit, and even where trained personnel end up. There has been some chatter for instance that some of the best trained personnel do not get sent to join the effort in the northeast; rather they sometimes are deployed to the Presidential Guards Brigade at the capital Abuja, and elsewhere.[130]

As also was discussed in this chapter, the US likewise constitutes an important strategic partner within this development process. With regards to ongoing training projects with the US, the Joint Combined Exercises Training (JCETs) are perhaps the most notable instance. JCETs institutional contribution to military counter-insurgency in Nigeria was an area of particular interest during fieldwork with the CT-COIN Directorate, at the Jaji Cantonment[131]. JCETs may include, but are not restricted to "NCO development, light infantry training, […] medical operations, human rights training, humanitarian relief operations, airborne operations or leadership training in varying amounts" (Global Security).

A specific example of a JCET is that of Exercise Flintlock, run by the US with host nations to "to develop military interoperability as a cornerstone for regional security and stability" (AFRICOM, 2010). This JCET constitutes part of "an interactive exchange with the US military and State Department's Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership" (Burton, 2011). Again here however is some room for improvement. Exercise Flintlock is run just once annually, only accommodates a small number of military personnel and is not specific to Nigeria. It therefore is unlikely to address the nuances of the type of challenge the NA faces against Boko Haram today. Indeed its overall impact on Nigerian military CT-COIN, so far at least, can be downplayed. One commentator for

[130] Anonymous Nigerian military senior officers with whom I raised this issue.

[131] The CT-COIN Centre Director advised me the centre was soon to relocate to NATRAC, , circa January 2013.

instance was of the view the mission parameters for Flintlock, do not always "…square perfectly with the outlines of other regional counterterrorism partnerships" (Thurston, 2010).

Operation Flintlock, as one example of a JCET, is a US led exercise with regional forces. The emphasis is on counterterrorism preparedness from tactical (field tactics training, FTT, below formation level) all the way up to the strategic level (as part its trans-Sahara Security Symposium series) (AFRICOM, 2010).

Locally, there has also been modest progress driven by the Nigerian Army to both institutionalize counter-insurgency development and to create an environment for joint and inter-agency coordination going forward. At the lower-tactical level there have been increasing numbers of military and security personnel trained for counter-insurgency tactics, particularly since 2013 when the CT-COIN Centre's relocation to NATRAC afforded added training and intake capacity. Part of the training regimen by the Army since 2012, is outlined below.

Early August 2013, while 7 Division was still forming up to take over from JTF ORO, the Nigerian Army graduated 187 Officers on CT and COIN tactics (combat skills, specifically) from NATRAC. As official correspondence from Mua'zu Babangida Aliyu, the state governor noted, "the young officers, include three females and three foreign nationals from the Central African Republic (CAR), were trained for eight weeks in anti-ambush drill, house breaking and clearing as well as other anti-terrorism operation guidelines" (Aliyu, 2013).

In November 2013, in the first joint training effort specifically between the school of infantry and Navy personnel, graduating students successfully underwent between 15 and 16 weeks "academic and field exercises", according to NASI Chief Instructor Colonel Adebola Adefarati (Channels Television, 2013). Graduates were to be part of "Special Forces on Counter-Terrorism and counter

insurgency operations for onward deployment to the troubled parts of North-East Nigeria" (Channels Television, 2013).

In January 2014, the Nigerian Army School of Infantry trained participants from 1, 2, 3 and 82 Divisions of the Nigerian Army specifically, on a six-week counter-insurgency course. 114 participants soldiers graduated from that course (PUNCH Newspaper, 2014).

At the higher-tactical level, there also have been initiatives. As of mid-2012, the Army graduated 216 officer cadets specializing in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency tactics, from NDA. This is in addition to the 299 soldiers and 200 NSCDC personnel inaugurated around the same time, at the CT-COIN Center, according to Director Golau (Defence Web, 2012).

As a more recent example, and a little higher up in terms of rank and expertise, in August 2014, 25 young officers with the Nigerian Army Armour School (NAAS) completed 31 weeks of training on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations course. The Chief Instructor of the Young Officer Course observed that concepts around MAW and MOOTW were central to the course objectives. As put by Colonel Suleiman Idris, the Chief Instructor, "the NAAS can conveniently state that these [sic] set of officers is well grounded in rudiments of counter terrorism and counter insurgency operation (CTCOIN)" (Garba, 2014).

Finally, at the formation level there has, in addition, been increasingly larger-scale joint and inter-agency training within the military learning environment.

As an example, as of May 2014, no less than 103 officers, drawn from eleven local security agencies as well as from the Nigerian Army and its sister services, completed inaugural joint training exercises on this scale, at the AFCSC. The exercise, involving personnel, specifically, from "the Nigerian Customs Service, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Nigerian Immigration Service, Federal

Fire Service, Department of State Security Service, Defence Intelligence Agency, Nigeria Intelligence Agency and Federal Road Safety Commission" (Channels Television, 2014).

Co-opting five core modules, the programme included learning around, amongst other areas, joint interactions on the "internal security environment and role of each security agency, as well as discussions on operational experiences of the Nigerian Armed Forces in the internal security operations" (Channels Television, 2014). Information sharing, intelligence in multi-agency operations, and low-intensity conflict management routines, were also shared learning themes (Channels Television, 2014).

The Director of Joint Studies, Brig. Gen Ahanotu also observed that training initiatives at this level were to encourage decision-making by participants, and shared consultation with colleagues from other military and security branches and agencies (Channels Television, 2014). Moreover, such locally driven counter-insurgency training at the formation level complements the tactical and higher-tactical level complements training provided by BMATT and within JCETs.

This list of training initiatives is far from exhaustive. There have been several other local inter-agency and military counter-insurgency courses, from lower-tactical to formation level, for military, paramilitary, security and media agencies, which increasingly key into the military contribution, other the years (The Guardian, 2014; AIT, 2014; Africa Defense, 2015; Defence Web, 2012). The police, in addition, has taken the initiative, pairing with counter-insurgency agencies in Pakistan (AIT, 2014) for long-term development of its own contribution, as well as projecting a major recruitment exercise to address the capabilities issue of available trained counter-insurgency personnel (Defence Web, 2012), identified by CSP Adeoye (2012) in chapter five's analysis. .

The analysis so far indicates there have indeed been increasingly purposive efforts, both internally and with external partners, to develop CT-COIN within the Nigerian military learning environment,

as well as regionally. Component security agencies — the NPF receiving training from Pakistani security agencies (AIT, 2014) and the NSCDC receiving training from NA 313 Artillery Regiment, Minna (Africa Defense, 2015) for instance — also increasingly appear to be taking the initiative and keying into this theme of counter-insurgency institutionalization, moreover. Yet, this is not to say such efforts always translate to tactical or operational successes, particularly short-term. As an example, if major police recruitment, flagged as far back as 2012 (Defence Web, 2012), is yet, in 2015, to translate to operational police impact in the military's contribution to counter-insurgency in the northeast, then the possibility of aggregate short-term impact of a lot of the rhetoric and action may yet require modest revision.

Nor is it to say current thinking and activity around the institutionalization of COIN in Nigeria is adequate or without room for improvement. Within the counter-insurgency exercise at the AFCSC highlighted above for example, it is quite likely that many, if not most, of the participants, may depart the Staff College and return to their current units or to new postings unattached to the counter-insurgency operation in the northeast. Thus the question then becomes how such expertise, especially short-term when it is arguably in need, becomes translatable to demonstrable operational progress?

Furthermore, there has been at least one case of a US-trained Nigerian Army battalion that, post-training, performed especially poorly against Boko Haram; when deployed to the TOO. One NA officer, at colonel rank, also was of the view that British-trained Nigerian units "tend to perform better, when deployed" compared to US-trained counterparts[132]. The reasons for this remain unclear. It furthermore may be difficult to ascertain the extent to which US and British-trained units differ in performance once deployed; assuming there is much of a difference in practice.

As another feedback note on JCETs more broadly, and to NA personnel on JCET 2 to 4 in particular, one NA report from the AFCSC Land Power Symposium, suggesting areas of improvement within

[132] Senior Nigerian Army source who prefers to remain anonymous.

institutional development of CT-COIN, points out that “the training assistance rendered by the Israelis and US had no syllabus or programme and efforts to get them to produce one were futile” (AFCSC, 2010). This is virtually the same concern expressed by the Head Instructor at the CT-COIN Directorate, when asked about the transfer processes between foreign assistive training teams and instructors local to the Nigerian military (Villo, 2012).

To give credit where credit is due, having a locally-driven trickle-down effect within the training regimen, and building internal expertise via train-the-trainer (TTT) exercises, seems to be an area flagged for adjustment within the US Ranger training to 143 Bn (California National Guard, 2014). As put by Lt. Col. Vinnie Garbarino, U.S. Army Africa's (USARAF) international military engagements officer,

> This is a huge benefit — that we're able [to contribute] to the Nigerian capacity to help with training themselves," said. "I think this is going to be the first of a couple of battalion training efforts that the Nigerians are going to undertake, so training their own trainers is huge because it offsets the student-to-instructor ratio. Our 12 guys don't go very far; when you add 40 Nigerian cadre members to the equation, they are doing some heavy lifting (California National Guard, 2014).

Perhaps therefore it is not just about increasingly more training *per se*, but also about effort toward the building of transfer processes that both serve to make the Nigerian military its own trainer, even in hitherto unexplored aspects of war; and that serve to translate training-driven expertise, to operations. This second point is of particular import as, short term, at least some demonstrable benefits of investment in counter-insurgency institution and development, should be observable.

With decades already lost in the development of counter-insurgency by the Nigerian military, and considering the amount of time required — decades rather than years —to institutionalize and

develop a counter-insurgency culture, it is imperative the urgency of present COIN requirements is not lost within the "big picture" of institutionalization, so to speak. Put another way, long-term thinking around the institutionalization of COIN may not be of much short-term benefit to the military's ongoing campaign. Questions therefore, need to be asked, and swiftly responded to, around how the Army can build in short-term resilience with regards to its counter-insurgency action set.

One possible approach is that short-term training regimens, those conducted with US and British assistive training teams for instance, may need to be scaled upwards for a broader audience and set of participants, and may need to be done so in an expedited (albeit deliberate) fashion, as an effective short-term "Band-Aid" measure. Such a regimen, where it involves an enduring foreign assistive footprint, may likely prove prohibitively expensive however, given the Nigerian Army's budget. A more viable "long-term" solution within this short-term regimen therefore, may be the use of foreign-trained local trainers, to further cascade the TTT routine.

6-3. Chapter Four (Doctrine).

The early discussion within the chapter focuses on doctrine and its implications for the insurgent. The chapter took the opportunity to use, for case study instrumentality, Boko Haram's adaptations since its formative years and until 2015 when the project was handed in.

A cursory analysis of the section's findings indicates a startling degree of evolution and adaptation within the doctrine and practice demonstrated by Boko Haram. Indeed, by early 2015, the group's exploits in many ways made it virtually unrecognizable from the small sect with only a modest following and no violence to speak of, in its formative years in Maiduguri. Transitioning of this sort within insurgency is supported to some measure by existing and long-established theories on Maoism and focoism; both of which the chapter's examination of doctrine touched upon.

Boko Haram's adaptations, within this context, hardly make it an outlier. What they have made it however, is a considerable threat to the larger, more bureaucratized and more doctrinally stagnant institution within the Nigerian military.

In terms of academic contributions to the Nigerian military's internal function, whereas attempts within the literature have been made to discuss other areas of the military's function — its sociology in the postcolonial era (Luckham, 1971a; Miners, 1971); its ingresses into civilian politics in the 1990s (Peters, 1997), its constitutional role in internal conflict (Adedeji & Zabadi, 2005) and its deployment to the Niger Delta crisis (Obasi, 2005; Okonta & Douglas, 2003) — there exists no research-based analysis of Nigerian military doctrine. Indeed, research on doctrine within the area the Nigerian military refers to as OOTW, is non-existent. This chapter attempted to fill that gap; first from the perspective of Boko Haram's military emergence and then from the perspective of the Nigerian military in its contribution to counter-insurgency.

The chapter discussed Nigerian military doctrine broadly and Nigerian military CT-COIN doctrine more specifically. Consistent with the project's overarching theme, the chapter's evaluation focused on why this doctrine, codified and uncodified, was problematic, in practical terms, for the Army's counter-insurgency warfare in a number of ways.

The chapter's focus is on the operational level of war; the level of war to which doctrine largely applies, as the chapter argues. The analysis connects three areas; Nigerian military COIN theory (doctrine), practice (specifically, COIN operations) and the praxis (interface) by which codified theory translates to practice in the TOO.

Evaluating the Army's CT and COIN manuals, the chapter demonstrates that the Army's doctrine, much like its organizational culture, has been institutionally isomorphic: *appearing to change without substantially changing*. Findings within the chapter indicate that a crucial difference exists

however, between the nature of institutional isomorphism in the military's organizational culture over the decades and its doctrine over the same period. As sociological studies on the Nigerian military by scholars such as N.J. Miners (1971), Robin Luckham (1971a) and Jimi Peters (1997) indicate, organizational culture inevitably was influenced by local character within the broader environment in which the Nigerian military is situated. Doctrine, on the other hand, and existing codified doctrine specifically, was not. Indeed, this failure to revise doctrine is identified within the chapter as a fundamental deficiency of the Nigerian military since its postcolonial years: a lack of local character within its codification. Instead Nigerian military doctrine, historically and today, is lifted off — practically word for word, over lengthy sections across entire CT and COIN texts — from British, US and NATO doctrine. The resultant effect this hodgepodge of doctrine has had, on the ability of the Nigerian military to develop its own approach to COIN warfare, is, expectedly, modest.

The chapter's analysis highlighted the gap between doctrine, as codified in the Army's manuals, and doctrine as reflected in operations. Specifically, doctrine is codified to engender a particular posture. Whereas actual COIN practice — from command to below formation levels — appear to reflect another. There are two caveats here however.

First is that there are degrees to the prominence of this apparent gap between theory and practice. The Niger Delta Crisis in the late 1990s for instance saw operations that were entire Army run and co-ordinated. The structure; objectives; features and outcome of those operations, betrayed a lack of COIN doctrine, formal or informal, as a formulaic contribution to effective military planning in the TOO. JTF ORO against Boko Haram, by contrast, had structure; military and interagency components; coordination of those components, and multiple LOOs in its counter-insurgency strategy.

Second, the gap between COIN theory and practice in the NMOE appears more pronounced lower down the command chain. Sub-unit level activity in the field vis-à-vis battalion-level interagency planning (JCP) constitutes an example. In this case the former tends to reflect less, codified doctrine, than the latter. A question emergent from the findings is how the gap can be bridged over time.

Figure 4-2, a Joint Operational Competencies (JOC) framework, presents a flowchart by which doctrine could better align better with operations — itself being improved in the process. The JOC framework makes a number of adjustments to the pre-existing framework for integrated approach to CT (Figure 4-1). One of these adjustments entails some rethinking of the current process, within Nigerian military doctrine, by which theory and practice interact. In this regard, Figure 4-3, Doctrine and Operations Interaction Process Flowchart, also makes a contribution. Here, an adjusted feedback process between doctrine and operations is introduced.

To understand the "why" and the "how" of doctrine within the NMOE however, research-based studies on COIN doctrine are, in and of themselves, insufficient. This is insofar as praxis involves the interaction between both theory and practice. Primary data on Nigerian military operations therefore constitutes a requirement for robust evaluation, as a complement to the chapter's analysis of doctrine. The final chapter of the project therefore, focuses on COIN operationalization by the Nigerian military.

6-4. Chapter Five (Operations: JTF ORO).

JTF ORO, despite how much academic contribution ostensibly exists on it, constitutes perhaps the most understudied counterbalance to Boko Haram since the group emerged. Compared to police and military operations that preceded and that succeeded it, the JTF's denial of Boko Haram activity, in its AoR, was considerable. Between 2011 and 2013, as Chart 6-2 below indicates, Boko Haram attacks were relatively low and even lower within Maiduguri, where JTF ORO was quartered. Yet by early

February 2015, the same town, and perhaps Borno at large, seemed at risk of being overrun by insurgents.



Chart 6-1: Reported civilian deaths by Boko Haram, September '10 – January '15 (The BBC, 2015b).

The spike in civilian fatalities since late 2013 in Chart 6-1 therefore is indicative of a more intense insurgency compared to any other period in the past four years. This was despite a division-size force quartered in the TOO, despite increased military spending, and with no less than eighteen months for previous gains by JTF ORO to be consolidated by 7 Infantry Division, its successor.

To be sure, the spike in Boko Haram fatalities is also consistent with a phase shift in its insurgency; Table 4-1C highlights this well. It is not merely enough therefore, to say that relative to its size and the population and area it was asked to secure, JTF ORO appears to have fared considerably well between

2011 and 2013. It should also be pointed out that Boko Haram's shift in tactics as a division-sized force was deployed in the TOO, may also have contributed to escalated fatalities, sequel to the disbandment of JTF ORO.

Nor is the interpretation presented so far to suggest that JTF ORO was without tactical concerns; that the campaign did not struggle; or that criticisms levelled against its components were unwarranted. On the contrary, as chapter five's analysis indicates, there were significant sub-unit, component-level and taskforce level challenges. These challenges are discussed in detail within the chapter.

Capacity was a recurrent issue raised amongst component force generals and senior personnel. Air power in particular appears to have struggled in the area of capabilities. Analysis of the NAF's combat readiness (using number of combat-ready platforms) as well as its sustainable capabilities (as a measure of availability of FOBs in the northeast) indicates modernization, or the lack thereof, remains an issue within air power's function in Nigerian military COIN. As examples, 79 Composite Group in Maiduguri, JTF ORO's air component, had a critical capabilities handicap in the number of operational platforms vis-à-vis the number of platforms meant to be operational for the Group. The Air Component Commander also pointed to a range of other issues, discussed in the chapter, which limited his Group's component function in the COIN (Pawa, 2012).

Likewise, 235 Base Services Group, Yenagoa, where I also did some fieldwork studying COIN operations by JTF Pulo Shield in the Niger Delta seemed in little state — in terms of base location, size, availability of platforms, and staffing — to be effective in its role as an NAF mobility command. Secondary sources, discussed within the chapter, also indicate 75 Strike Group Yola, a tactical air command like 79, has struggled as well. Unofficial sources pointed out that assets from 99 Air Combat Training Group, Kainji often were requisitioned at short notice, when 75 is required for major operational duty, because the latter did not have the required number of ground attack jets.

Yola was far outside Maiduguri, where this project's fieldwork was conducted with JTF ORO. As a result, primary findings from 75 STG,Air Force HQ Yola are unavailable. Going by primary fieldwork with 79 CG however, it is improbable that 75 STG was operational at full group status, whereas 79 CG was not.

Much of the analysis on the Air Force contribution to military COIN operations in Nigeria points to a rather glum outlook. Newly elected Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari observed as recently as late July 2015 that, in the military campaign against Boko Haram, "The Airforce is virtually non – existent. The fixed wings aircraft are not very serviceable. The helicopters are not serviceable and they are too few" (Ujah, 2015). There is a different perspective to the NAF contribution however, a more positive one.

Air force generals in both JTF ORO, and JTF Pulo shield pointed to the amount of sorties they had conducted in the northeast and Niger Delta respectively. Against Boko Haram in particular the NAF has conducted more sorties than at any other period in its history, at over 1,600 "in aid of group troops since the war against the terrorists began", as at March 2015 (Information Nigeria, 2015). Both 79 CG and 75 STG have been important contributors to the sortie numbers, "either for intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, air transport, close air support for ground troops, and interdiction" (Information Nigeria, 2015). Indeed, as Air Cdre Dayo Amao, Commander 75 STG observed in March 2015,

> The efforts of the Nigerian Air Force have been pivotal in the recent successes achieved in the fight against the insurgents. We soften the ground for the ground force to move and occupy the territory. We try to avoid collateral damage. That is why we make maximum use of our Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions - to be sure that only Boko Haram locations are attacked (Information Nigeria, 2015).

Overall however, and large number of air sorties regardless, primary field findings are consistent with secondary data on the NAF's capabilities balance. There is little doubt the NAF has indeed been active in the COIN, but primary and secondary data analysed indicate the NAF function can be much improved, if actual — rather than merely proposed — modernization takes place. Tables 5-2 to 5-4 and Chart 5-1 further suggest a difference between what NAF officials have said about the acquisition of new platforms and the actual state of platforms between 2007 and 2015. Lack of modernization and manoeuvrability in the northeast, with ad-hoc FOBs in the axis only now being floated as an idea, is all the more puzzling considering the NAF has been reorganized no less than five times, since establishment in 1964.

Another area the chapter discussed relevant to the multiple LOOs was the intelligence function and the contributing agencies within the COIN operation. Intelligence component contribution to the JIPOE however was challenged by the difficulty of obtaining HUMINT within certain parts of Borno; Kanuri-dominated areas in particular, as fieldwork with the DSS in Maiduguri revealed (Ahmed, 2012).

Another operational feature, evaluated in detail within the chapter, was policing of the vast border stretches, and the large number of possible footpaths, over 250 at least, along 800km of border expanses. These routes potentially constitute cross-border ingress or egress for insurgents. Furthermore the border security agencies, in the NIS and NCS, like practically all the other components of the COIN operation, were less effective as a result of manpower and equipment challenges: number of patrol vehicles, lack of tactical satellite surveillance to track cross-border movement, poor staffing, and so on. Coupled with the sheer size of the region of the north-east — or even just Borno state — that JTF ORO was tasked with securing, it became all the more important to adopt an "all hands on deck" approach at gathering intelligence. Here, the NAF conducted air recce and ISR; the DIA, the G2 staff and DSS worked closely together, along with the police; and even the NIA, though not a JTF ORO component, helped by passing on relevant foreign and cross-border

intelligence (Adeoye, 2012; Ewansiha, 2012; JTF ORO HQ, 2012). Customs and immigrations security agencies also played a key role within the JIPOE. Yet, JE notwithstanding, the population-to-troop ratio in the TOO meant only pockets of the AoR could be permanently secure. Response times to other areas remained dependent on proximity and on other operational factors, not on troop availability and mobility *per se*.

Intelligence nonetheless remained useful — critical in some instances — in offsetting the challenge of manpower and capabilities. As an example, the Boko Haram IED specialist in Maiduguri was killed as a result of months of intelligence operations (Adeoye, 2012). This reduced the number of bombing incidents, dramatically, for a while. Throughout the entire Christmas of 2012 for instance, the TOO was relatively calm, with no incidents on both Christmas and Boxing Day there, when primary research for this project was still on going. This is unusual by Maiduguri standards, since Boko Haram re-emerged in 2010.

A lot of the summary till now has been on operations. Strategically, however, JTF ORO could only ever be a stopgap measure. The FGN still had to address non-military concerns within the taskforce's AoR and more broadly in the northeast where the insurgents conscripted or recruited members. Chief amongst the non-military requirements, and related to the broader concern of high youth population and low income per capita in Borno state, was the issue of practically non-existent infrastructure in towns outside Maiduguri and Bama. As a result, some towns, Buni-Yadi, Gwoza, Dikwa, and other smaller towns and hamlets were early targets for Boko Haram recruitment; wherein the insurgent held particular appeal for many impoverished Kanuri who the group were more likely to see as a recruitment audience, comparative to other Hausa/Fulani, due to shared ethnic ties (Ahmed, 2012).

The JTF could provide infrastructure in only very limited capacity to such communities, as it did not have a standing support unit from the Nigerian Army Engineers (NAE). 21 Bde, for all intents and purposes, was the task force's core Army constitution: it's backbone. Yet 21 Bde was an armour unit

and was poorly suited for civil construction and reconstruction projects, as the Brigade Commander noted in-interview. The alternative therefore, according to JTF ORO G3 personnel, was to hire local civilian contractors to assist even in tasks as modest as the prosecution of portable water projects. These civilian contractors however became Boko Haram targets and thus became scared and reticent, regarding project lead times and completion (Danmadami, 2012).

Besides infrastructure, primary data from JTF ORO indicated other concerns the task force had identified as real or possible conflict drivers, within the AoR.

Poor regulation of potentially radical preaching in *masjids* (mosques), and even tactical-level concerns such as holding facilities at Giwa Barracks that were getting overcrowded according to inspections by the Nigeria Prisons Service (NPS), were both research findings. There also was the issue of how the hundreds of suspected Boko Haram detainees would be tried, furthermore. This, the CO noted in-interview, was not the military's job, but rather was a matter for the justice courts. Who would provide evidence, moreover? And would it be admissible in court? Evidence collection was not the Army's job, I was told; nor was it the potential of collectable evidence high on the minds of personnel going on offensives against the insurgent, or defending against waves of them. Issues such as these posed major implications for the strategic fit of JTF ORO's operational objectives. Put simply, the counter-insurgency could not become an end in itself. Military security was a part of stable peace within the AoR; but it was not the only part, just as warfighting activity is not the only LOO within counter-insurgency.

Despite these concerns from theatre-level down to sub-unit level, JTF ORO's military campaign presents primary-sourced findings that indicate the COIN campaign was (1) in some ways unique relative to what came before and what has come since; (2) was the first example of counter-insurgency in Nigeria where joint, rather than merely combined arms, were used at and below battalion level, and

(3) was possibly more successful within its AoR, than its is given credit for, during its period of activity.

Implications for military planners are that questions need to be asked regarding how the JTFC and his staff prosecuted a COIN that created more stability by a brigade-sized force, between June 2011 and August 2013, vis-à-vis the efforts of an entire division, in 7 infantry, between August 2013 and February 2015. For future research in this area of African military studies, the study findings shed light on technical details of JCP, and on inter-service and multi-agency coordination within military COIN in SSA. The spectrum of activity that COIN planning and operationalization entailed for JTF ORO is also analysed, within the chapter, in a manner accessible to a wider non-military audience. Where specific academic interest lies in a single component — air power, the role of the police, or the intelligence function as examples — scholars would also find within this chapter, primary-sourced analysis, on a per component basis.

Some of these findings, moreover, may be of import to military counter-insurgency studies and development elsewhere within militaries in SSA. Assumption of a linkage between lessons from past counter-insurgencies or those in different operational environments, and future campaigns, should be treated with attentiveness however. Thomas Rid for instance, asking the question of whether "yesterday's counterinsurgency methods help to counter tomorrow's insurgencies?" cautiously suggests these methods indeed have their place in current and future warfare, albeit "under vastly different political, social, ideological, and technological conditions" (2010, p. 756).

Potential broader implications notwithstanding therefore, it is in its localized lessons for the Nigerian military war planner, between SO2 (OF-3) and SO6 (OF-7) or equivalent, where this chapter's findings may prove most relevant. Strategic foreign partners invested in Nigerian military COIN development, specifically units with vested interests in Nigerian military COIN such as 2 R Anglian at

the battalion level and 7 Bde at the brigade level of the British Army, may likewise find the technical analysis and field based findings, within the chapter, useful.

Still, this chapter, like the rest of the thesis, does not proffer solutions on how to prosecute COIN. There arguably is no panacea for COIN warfare, applicable to every military, in every TOO. Indeed, even so-called "best practices" (Sepp, 2005) may either be unfeasible, unnecessary, or altogether problematic, dependent on context. The best militaries today, as they have for centuries and perhaps even millennia, struggle in this *forme de guerre*. Rather then, the final chapter of the thesis constitutes an original, field-based, contribution to thinking around the operationalization of Nigerian military COIN, against Boko Haram, between 2011 and 2013. The chapter structures its findings into a narrative that, together with the analyses across the thesis, paints a more detailed picture of counter-insurgency from the perspective of the Nigerian military.

6-6. Project Final Summary

As a final summary therefore, it is worth returning to the central question: why has the Nigerian military struggled within its contribution to counter insurgency, and what are the underpinnings of that contribution? Insofar as historical experience and organizational culture; institutions; doctrine; and operations, have been presented as central arguments in response to these questions, the thesis has interrogated all four areas, in considerable and research-driven depth.

In the area of organizational culture and historical experience, the thesis argued that these two areas of the army's identity were influenced by the British and that institutional transfer processes, expectedly imperfect due to haste and the mismatch of military cultures and environments, birthed a Nigerian military that was institutionally modelled closely after its British colonialist principal. Institutional isomorphism however meant the Nigerian military failed to make adjustments in areas that had been adequate for a colonial context of military contribution internally, though not for a post-colonial one.

In this way, the military would remain a "coercive institution of the state", undermining its legitimacy, compromising its political neutrality and neglecting the institutional adjustments required.

Strategic culture in the post-civil war decades moreover would see the military interpret its role, as a counterbalance to threat forms, as purely outward looking. Even when shifts in that strategic culture occurred after regional peace pacts were signed within ECOWAS, by the 1980s and 1990s it was PSOs and an interventionist regime, rather than counter-insurgency institutionalization, that were preponderant to the Nigerian military's war calculus.

Internally, furthermore, the military's interests were divested from developing the institution and diversifying its functions, to politics and an increased stake in the polity. Indiscipline and impunity will follow; with corruption, heavy-handedness towards the citizen, the resultant delegitimization, and a degrading of capabilities, all raising serious questions around what sort of institution the Nigerian military of the late 20th and early 21st century was becoming. From the perspective of the development of counter-insurgency institutions, this of course was problematic. Counter-insurgency, after all, requires first a particular interpretation (or re-interpretation as the case might be) of the military's role internally; otherwise neither doctrine, nor operations, can be consistent with requirements of the civil-military interphase. If the Nigerian military institution, sociologically and capabilities-wise failed to have an interpretation of its role, consistent with the civil-military interphase requirements of COIN, even a shift in codified doctrine would, for all intents and purposes, be academic.

Moreover, the effect of this attitude by the military was so entrenched and so enduring that, even in recent times, some commentators maintain that the Nigerian military, politicized and largely a political and non-neutral instrument of the state, was not interested in whatever substantive COIN assistance was being offered by foreign military partners. Nonetheless a reasonable amount of assistance, over the years, has been offered by British and by US military partners. Granted, this assistance was PSO and conventional infantry tactics leaning rather than oriented, *per se*, towards counter-insurgency.

However, with the military having increasingly struggled to contain the threat of Boko Haram's insurgency, such assistance has seen a shift towards a more counter-insurgency oriented action set.

Beyond culture, institutionalization, and the learning environment around counter-insurgency by the Nigerian military, a third area discussed within the thesis was doctrine. Doctrine, as the underpinning principles of a military's function, is important, both in codified and in practical form, to understanding how the military carries out that function. Doctrine however, within the Nigerian military, constitutes a largely understudied area of the discourses. Nor for that matter, has a critical evaluation of Boko Haram's military and ideological doctrine, as underpinnings of how its military campaign *specifically* has evolved, been conducted within the existing body of works. Chapter four's analysis thus began with an examination of doctrine and its implications for the insurgent, with a dedicated section on the military and ideological doctrines of Boko Haram, since its formative years.

Shifting to a study of doctrine within the Nigerian military institution, the thesis then identified a number of problematic areas, as an impediment to the ability of the Nigerian military to carry out its counter-insurgency function in a manner reflective of the local OE. Nigerian military doctrine, the thesis argued, has, put simply, been too heavily-influenced by a copy-and-paste model of adopting Western doctrine, for the military's own experiential learning to dominate its codified doctrine.

Moreover, it appears the shift to manoeuvrist doctrine, from offensive doctrine, whereas underpinning some doctrinal and (to a lesser extent) operational ingress in the area of counter-insurgency, has been slow to gain traction within the military. This, however, is not entirely unexpected as the process of marriage between doctrine and operations takes considerable time to even approximate a synergy.

Operations were the final area evaluated and fieldwork with JTF ORO in the northeast, as well as more limited fieldwork with JTF OPS in the Niger Delta, presented opportunity to understand, from a inside-out embedded perspective, COIN by the Nigerian military at the operational level of war. The

thesis contended that the three aforementioned premises, combined with capabilities issues, connived to give the lie to the notion that the Nigerian military's COIN operations ought to have been better prepared, despite its PSOs experience, to fight asymmetric warfare and an irregular enemy.

Evaluation of the counter-insurgency operation as an aggregate indicated one telling finding. From a component-level perspective within the task- force level, Boko Haram appeared to be the proverbial elephant being assessed by several blind men. This should not be misconstrued as negative; rather it shows how important a multi-agency and joint service approach to counter-insurgency, contributes to the overall solution. This is insofar as the chapter's analysis indicated that, for different military and security agencies in the theatre, the jihadists appeared to have different centres of gravity.

For the Army, that CoG may have been the enemy's training, equipment and ability to coordinate its elements into overt and covert tactical fronts. For the latter, use of IEDs and employment of *Istishhad* is particularly problematic. The CoG, from field findings, also may have been Abu Shekau and the enemy's leadership; and the military's failure to decapitate this leadership, *early on* in the campaign.

For the Air force, the CoG may well have been the enemy's protected mobility, which, coupled with the NAF's own critical capabilities gap (evaluated within the final chapter of the thesis), made the insurgents better than most realize, at mobile warfare.

For the police, it may have been the Islamists' ability to attract support and their superior firepower vis-à-vis underequipped police personnel. In this context, Boko Haram's CoG from the police perspective may have been those aspects where the police itself was particularly challenged, in local legitimacy and support, as well as in capabilities and manpower.

For the DSS and other intelligence personnel, Boko Haram's CoG may have been the group's ability to embed within the local populace: plain clothed, in plain sight, yet still a deadly threat. For the customs and immigrations paramilitaries, the enemy's CoG may have been the insurgent's cross-

border ingress and egress, and to bring with them weapons, IED materials, and more mujahideen within such movements.

It therefore falls within the military contribution to first understand these different component perspectives of this way of war, and then to coordinate them in a manner that goes beyond just a combined arms approach to one that is fundamentally joint, and inter-agency oriented in addition. Counter-insurgency is virtually impossible to be fought efficiently — with minimum resources in minimum time. It is, however, possible for the counter-insurgent to become increasingly *effective* over time; with joint and inter-agency effort and a balance between the carrot and the stick; between kinetics geared towards the insurgent on the one hand, and influence operations and population-centricity on the other.

This cannot, however, be seen as purely a military enterprise. Insofar as the military contribution is a critical part of state attempts to stop a violent insurgency, the state itself would need to have clear policies around how best to shape the environment such that the military contribution can translate to long-term stable peace. A medical outreach will struggle without electricity and supplies. Without portable water, communities may get sick or may suffer exploitable hardships. Without a well-supported police force, even basic security will be problematic; and, without basic infrastructure and opportunities, young people may remain vulnerable, being socio-economically challenged, and feeling disenfranchised.

Addressing such areas cannot be seen as part of the military contribution. Yet areas such as these are important to making sure that contribution has an enduring effect; that it helps transform artificial military security to long-term stable peace. Consequently, even a military decision against Boko Haram is not, *per se*, a government victory against the threat it poses and against the environment where that threat has been allowed first to fester, and then to thrive, over the years and decades.

Considerations such as these highlight the complexity of insurgency, its intractability, and the need for a coordinated response. They also highlight the difficulty of the Nigerian military in its contribution to a government-mandated counter-balance. Such considerations, moreover, may give the lie to the notion that the military contribution to counter-insurgency in Nigeria can be easily understood without nuanced research and a multi-angle analysis; or that this area of warfare, for the Nigerian military, is one that can be easily or quickly improved for future campaign effectiveness.

If the future appears bleak however, perhaps then the original findings, of this Ph.D. research project, present a contribution towards a glimmer of hope.

As a final note, counter-insurgencies are so difficult because insurgencies require a level of learning, adaptability and innovation, at speed, with which militaries — the bureaucratic, cultural and historically predictive institutions that they are — struggle. Where the insurgent pursues a territory-seeking guerrilla strategy, and he gives up mobile warfare for positional warfare, the counter-insurgent may well obtain the sort of decision that militaries are wont to seek. For the most part however, and insofar as insurgencies function across a spectrum, such victory is unlikely to, figuratively speaking, sever all the heads of the hydra.

In the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria, and as chapter four's analysis of the group's change(s) in doctrine, indicates, victory is unlikely to come as easily as in one full-blooded thrust by the counter-insurgent. Rather, one point becomes clear from the project's analysis of Boko Haram's changes in doctrine: just because insurgents live in the hillside or hold unique territory one day does not mean they cannot trade territorial ambition, even if temporarily, for the opportunity to blend into the local populace and, in becoming invisible, confound the counter-insurgent. Indeed, where positional warfare and the holding of territory becomes a failed enterprise for the insurgent, he simply switches back to mobile warfare and a non-territory seeking terrorism doctrine.

Boko Haram's shift to a non-territory seeking terrorism doctrine, so shortly after controlling vast amounts of territory, is an indicator of the constant threat that the insurgent's doctrinal flexibility, and that indeed the very nature of irregular warfare, which he conducts, affords him to be. In this way the insurgent, as Mackinlay (2012) argues, occupies an "archipelago": he is not one island, but, figuratively speaking, is many islands. The insurgent employs many methods, wears many faces, adopts many doctrines, and knows of many ways by which he can pursue his contestation of state power. Military defeat on one "island" therefore, may not, *per se*, be ultimate defeat; it merely means it may now be time for the insurgent to shift to another.

The counter-insurgent, if he is have any hope of knowing this enemy's archipelago, must first, as Sun Tzu recommends, know himself. This research project does not, broadly speaking, attempt to achieve to former object, knowledge of the enemy. Rather, the project's object is the latter: to assist the Nigerian military in "knowing itself" and to assist the readership in understanding the Nigerian military's contribution to counter-insurgency, through a narrative that is underpinned both by theory and by practice.

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APPENDIX I: Curricula of Training Divisions at the CT-COIN Directorate, Nigeria.

	Special Warfare Division (SWD) – "Tracker"	Counter Terrorism Division (CTD) - Training Courses
1	Special physical training and martial arts	Special physical training and martial arts
2	Jungle warfare and combat survival training	Rescue operations
3	Mountainous warfare training	Raid, patrol and attacking terrorist camps
4	Amphibious warfare training	Counter revolutionary warfare
6	Dog handling techniques	Dog handling techniques
7	First aid and Field Hygiene training	Field engineering and demolition
8	Communication skills	Communication skills
9	Abseiling and rappelling	Advance close quarter battle and reactive shooting
10	Special skill-at-arms and advanced marksmanship	House break-in and entry techniques
11	Helicopter rappelling and drills	Helicopter drills
12	Intelligence operation and concept package	Intelligence operation and concept package
13		Mission planning
14		Abseiling and rappelling
15		Tactics and Field Craft in Urban Terrain
16		First aid in Urban Terrain
17	Bomb identification, handling, detonation and disposal`	Bomb identification, handling, detonation and disposal
18		Escort duties and VIP protection
19		Disaster management
20		Lectures on Terrorism (Organization, type, weapons, tactics, planning cycle, profile et cetera)
21		Leadership & Man Management Package

APPENDIX II: SOME FIELD SOURCES[133]

#	RANK	OFFICE/STRUCTURE	POSITION	LOCATION
1	Brig. Gen	1 Base, 82 Division	CO	Yaba, Lagos (LAG)
2	Col	British High Commission	DA	Maitama, Abuja
3	Col (Rtd)	Office of NSA (ONSA)	Fmr. NSA, SSS Chief, Dir. Military Intel (DMI)	Asokoro, Abuja
4	Maj. Gen	National Defence College (NDC)	Dpty. Comdnt.	Garki, Abuja
5	Col	NA EME HQ, Bonny Camp	-	Victoria Islnd LAG
6	Col	NA EME HQ, Bonny Camp	Chief-of-Staff	Victoria Islnd LAG
7	Wg. Cdr	235 NAF BSG, Yenagoa axis	2iC	Yenagoa, Bayelsa
8	Air Cdre	235 NAF BSG, Yenagoa axis	CO	Yenagoa, Bayelsa
9	DSP	MOPOL Cdr. 31; JTF Pulo Shield	CO	JTF, Delta Axis
10	Maj. Gen	The Presidency; ONSA	National Coordinator (Counter-Terrorism	Garki. Abuja
11	Maj. Gen	JTF OP "Pulo Shield" HQ	CO	Yenagoa Axis, ND
12	Maj. Gen	JTF OP "Restore Order" (OP RO)	CO	Maiduguri axis
13	Air Cdre	JTF OP RO; 79 NAF Base	Air Component Cdr.; Base OC	Maiduguri axis
14	N/A	JTF OP RO; SSS	Director (Dir.) SSS	Maiduguri axis
15	CSP	JTF OP RO; NPF	CSP; Police Component Cdr (JTF)	Maiduguri axis
16	Col	JTF OP RO	OO (ACoS G3)	Maiduguri axis

[133] Several field sources chose to remain anonymized, and/or were part of data sets obtained prior to clearance from DHQ. For this reason, such sources are not included here.

17	Brig. Gen	JTF OP RO; 21 Armored Bde	Land Component Cdr; Bde Cmdr.	Maiduguri axis
18	Lt. Col	JTF OP RO	Head Joint Interrogation Center; JTF Intel Officer	Maiduguri axis
19	Maj. Gen	Spec. Task Force (STF) OP Safe Haven	CO	Jos axis, Plateau
20	Brig. Gen	CT-COIN Center, Jaji Cantonment	Director (Head of Center)	Jaji axis, Kaduna
21	Col	CT-COIN Center, Jaji Cantonment	Chief of Training (CoT)	Jaji axis, Kaduna
22	Maj. Gen	Training & Doctrine Cdr (TRADOC)	CO	Minna axis, Niger

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